De Cive

Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. Or, A
Dissertation Concerning Man in his severall habitudes and respects, as
the Member of a Society, first Secular, and than Sacred.

Containing The Elements of Civill Politie in the Agreement which it hath
both with Naturall and Divine Lawes.

In which is demonstrated, Both what the Origine of Justice is, and
wherein the Essence of Christian Religion doth consist. Together with
The Nature, Limits and Qualifications both of Regiment and Subjection.

By Tho: Hobbes.

London,
Printed by J.C. for R. Royston, at the Angel in Ivie-Lane.
1651.



To the Right Honourable, William, Earle of Devonshire,
My most honoured Lord

May it please your Lordship,

It was the speech of the Roman people (to whom the name of King had been
render'd odious, as well by the tyrannie of the Tarquins, as by the
Genius and Decretals of that City) 'Twas the speech I say of the
publick, however pronounced from a private mouth, (if yet Cato the
Censor were no more than such) That all Kings are to be reckon'd amongst
ravenous Beasts. But what a Beast of prey was the Roman people, whilst
with its conquering Eagles it erected its proud Trophees so far and wide
over the world, bringing the Africans, the Asiaticks, the Macedonians,
and the Achaeans, with many other despoyled Nations, into a specious
bondage, with the pretence of preferring them to be Denizens of Rome? So
that if Cato's saying were a wise one, 'twas every whit as wise that of
Pontius Telesinus; who flying about with open mouth through all the
Companies of his Army, (in that famous encounter which he had with
Sylla) cryed out, That Rome her selfe, as well as Sylla, was to be
raz'd; for that there would alwayes be Wolves and Depraedatours of their
Liberty, unlesse the Forrest that lodg'd them were grubb'd up by the
roots. To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; That Man to Man
is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe. The first is
true, if we compare Citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we
compare Cities. In the one, there's some analogie of similitude with the
Deity, to wit, Justice and Charity, the twin-sisters of peace: But in
the other, Good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a
Sanctuary the two daughters of War, Deceipt and Violence: that is in
plaine termes a meer brutall Rapacity: which although men object to one
another as a reproach, by an inbred custome which they have of beholding
their own actions in the persons of other men, wherein, as in a Mirroir,
all things on the left side appeare to be on the right, & all things on
the right side to be as plainly on the left; yet the naturall right of
preservation which we all receive from the uncontroulable Dictates of
Necessity, will not admit it to be a Vice, though it confesse it to be
an Unhappinesse. Now that with Cato himselfe, (a person of so great a
renowne for wisdome) Animosity should so prevaile instead of Judgement,
and partiality instead of Reason, that the very same thing which he
thought equall in his popular State, he should censure as unjust in a
Monarchical, other men perhaps may have leisure to admire. But I have
been long since of this opinion, That there was never yet any more than
vulgar prudence that had the luck of being acceptable to the Giddy
people; but either it hath not been understood, or else having been so,
hath been levell'd and cryed downe. The more eminent Actions and
Apothegms both of the Greeks and Romans have been indebted for their
Eulogies not so much to the Reason, as to the Greatnesse of them, and
very many times to that prosperous usurpation (with which our Histories
doe so mutually upbraid each other) which as a conquering Torrent
carryes all before it, as well publick Agents as publick Actions, in the
streame of Time. Wisdome properly so call'd is nothing else but this,
The perfect knowledge of the Truth in all matters whatsoever. Which
being derived from the Registers and Records of Things, and that as
'twere through the Conduit of certain definite Appellations, cannot
possibly be the work of a suddaine Acutenesse, but of a well-ballanc'd
Reason, which by the Compendium of a word, we call philosophy. For by
this it is, that a way is open'd to us, in which we travell from the
contemplation of particular things to the Inference or result of
universall Actions. Now look how many sorts of things there are which
properly fall within the cognizance of humane reason, into so many
branches does the tree of philosophy divide it selfe. And from the
diversity of the matter about which they are conversant, there hath been
given to those branches a diversity of Names too: For treating of
Figures, tis call'd Geometry; of motion, physick; of naturall right,
Moralls; put all together, and they make up philosophy. Just as the
British, the Atlantick, and the Indian Seas, being diversly christen'd
from the diversity of their shoares, doe notwithstanding all together
make up The Ocean. And truly the Geometricians have very admirably
perform'd their part. For whatsoever assistance doth accrew to the life
of man, whether from the observation of the Heavens, or from the
description of the Earth, from the notation of Times, or from the
remotest Experiments of Navigation; Finally, whatsoever things they are
in which this present Age doth differ from the rude simplenesse of
Antiquity, we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe meerly to
Geometry. If the Morall philosophers had as happily discharg'd their
duty, I know not what could have been added by humane Industry to the
completion of that happinesse, which is consistent with humane life. For
were the nature of humane Actions as distinctly knowne, as the nature of
Quantity in Geometricall Figures, the strength of Avarice and Ambition,
which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the Vulgar, as touching
the nature of Right and Wrong, would presently faint and languish; And
Mankinde should enjoy such an Immortall peace, that (unlesse it were for
habitation, on supposition that the Earth should grow too narrow for her
Inhabitants) there would hardly be left any pretence for war. But now on
the contrary, that neither the Sword nor the pen should be allowed any
Cessation; That the knowledge of the Law of Nature should lose its
growth, not advancing a whit beyond its antient stature; that there
should still be such siding with the severall factions of philosophers,
that the very same Action should bee decryed by some, and as much
elevated by others; that the very same man should at severall times
embrace his severall opinions, and esteem his own Actions farre
otherwise in himselfe than he does in others; These I say are so many
signes, so many manifest Arguments, that what hath hitherto been written
by Morall philosophers, hath not made any progress in the knowledge of
the Truth; but yet have took with the world, not so much by giving any
light to the understanding, as entertainment to the Affections, whilest
by the successefull Rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed
them in their rashly received opinions. So that this part of philosophy
hath suffered the same destiny with the publick Wayes, which lye open to
all passengers to traverse up and down or the same lot with high wayes
and open streets; Some for divertisement, and some for businesse; so
that what with the Impertinencies of some, and the Altercations of
others, those wayes have never a seeds time, and therefore yield never a
harvest. The onely reason of which unluckines should seem to be this;
That amongst all the writers of that part of philosophy, there is not
one that hath used an idoneous principle of Tractation: For we may not,
as in a Circle, begin the handling of a Science from what point we
please. There is a certain Clue of Reason, whose beginning is in the
dark, but by the benefit of whose Conduct, wee are led as 'twere by the
hand into the clearest light, so that the principle of Tractation is to
be taken from that Darknesse, and then the light to be carried thither
for the irradiating its doubts. As often therefore as any writer, doth
either weakly forsake that Clue, or wilfully cut it asunder, he
describes the Footsteps, not of his progresse in Science, but of his
wandrings from it. And upon this it was, that when I applyed my Thoughts
to the Investigation of Naturall Justice, I was presently advertised
from the very word Justice, (wich signifies a steady Will of giving
every one his Owne) that my first enquiry was to be, from whence it
proceeded, that any man should call any thing rather his Owne, than
another man's. And when I found that this proceeded not from Nature, but
Consent, (for what Nature at first laid forth in common, men did
afterwards distribute into severall Impropriations, I was conducted from
thence to another Inquiry, namely to what end, and upon what Impulsives,
when all was equally every mans in common, men did rather think it
fitting, that every man should have his Inclosure; And I found the
reason was, that from a Community of Goods, there must needs arise
Contention whose enjoyment should be greatest, and from that Contention
all kind of Calamities must unavoydably ensue, which by the instinct of
Nature, every man is taught to shun. Having therefore thus arrived at
two maximes of humane Nature, the one arising from the concupiscible
part, which desires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things
in which all others have a joynt interest, the other proceeding from the
rationall, which teaches every man to fly a contre-naturall Dissolution,
as the greatest mischiefe that can arrive to Nature; Which principles
being laid down, I seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident
connexion, in this little work of mine, first the absolute necessity of
Leagues and Contracts, and thence the rudiments both of morall and of
civill prudence. That Appendage which is added concerning the Regiment
of God, hath been done with this intent, that the Dictates of God
Almighty in the Law of nature, might not seem repugnant to the written
Law, revealed to us in his word. I have also been very wary in the whole
tenour of my discourse, not to meddle with the civill Lawes of any
particular nation whatsoever, That is to say, I have avoyded coming a
shore, which those Times have so infested both with shelves, and
Tempests. At what expence of time and industry I have beene in this
scrutiny after Truth, I am not ignorant; but to what purpose, I know
not. For being partiall Judges of our selves, we lay a partiall estimate
upon our own productions. I therefore offer up this Book to your
Lordships, not favour, but censure first, as having found by many
experiments, that it is not the credit of the Author, nor the newnesse
of the work, nor yet the ornament of the style, but only the weight of
Reason, which recommends any Opinion to your Lordships Favour and
Approbation. If it fortune to please, that is to say, if it be sound, if
it be usefull, if it be not vulgar; I humbly offer it to your Lordship
as both my Glory, and my protection; But if in any thing I have erred,
your Lordship will yet accept it as a Testimony of my Gratitude, for
that the means of study which I enjoyed by your Lordships Goodnesse, I
have employed to the procurement of your Lordships Favour. The God of
Heaven crown your Lordship with length of Dayes in this earthly Station,
and in the heavenly Jerusalem, with a crown of Glory.

                                                                                             Your Honours most humble,
                                                                                              and most devoted Servant,
                                                                                                         Tho. Hobbs.

The Author's Preface to the Reader

Reader, I promise thee here such things, which ordinarily promised, doe
seeme to challenge the greatest attention, and I lay them here before
thine eyes, whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter
treated of, or the right method of handling it, or the honest motive,
and good advice to undertake it, or lastly the moderation of the
Authour. In this Book thou shalt finde briefly described the duties of
men, First as Men, then as Subjects, Lastly, as Christians; under which
duties are contained not only the elements of the Lawes of Nature, and
of Nations, together with the true originall, and power of Justice, but
also the very essence of Christian Religion it selfe, so farre forth as
the measure of this my purpose could well bear it.

Which kinde of doctrine (excepting what relates to Christian Religion)
the most antient Sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity,
either curiously adorned with Verse, or clouded with Allegories, as a
most beautifull and hallowed mystery of Royall authority; lest by the
disputations of private men, it might be defiled; Other philosophers in
the mean time, to the advantage of mankinde, did contemplate the faces,
and motions of things; others, without disadvantage, their natures, and
causes. But in after times, Socrates is said to have been the first, who
truly loved this civill Science, although hitherto not throughly
understood, yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of
the Common weale, and that he set so great a value on this, that utterly
abandoning, and despising all other parts of philosophy, he wholly
embraced this, as judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde. After
him comes Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers, as well
Greeke, as Latine. And now at length all men of all Nations, not only
philosophers, but even the vulgar, have, and doe still deale with this
as a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every Mother-wit, and to
be attained without any great care or study. And which makes mainly for
its dignity, those who suppose themselves to have it, or are in such
employment, as they ought to have it, doe so wonderfully please
themselves in its Idaea, as they easily brooke the followers of other
arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous, learned, skilfull, what you
will; except prudent: for this Name, in regard of civill knowledge, they
presume to be due to themselves onely. Whether therefore the worth of
arts is to be weighed by the worthinesse of the persons who entertain
them, or by the number of those who have written of them, or by the
judgement of the wisest; certainly this must carry it, which so neerly
relates to princes, and others engaged in the government of mankinde, in
whose adulterate Species also the most part of men doe delight
themselves, and in which the most excellent wits of philosophers have
been conversant. The benefit of it when rightly delivered (that is) when
derived from true principles by evident connexion, we shall then best
discerne, when we shall but well have considered the mischiefes that
have befallen mankinde in its counterfeit and babling form; for in such
matters as are speculated for the exercise of our wits, if any errour
escape us, it is without hurt; neither is there any losse, but of time
onely: but in those things which every man ought to meditate for the
steerage of his life, it necessarily happens, that not onely from
errours, but even from ignorance it selfe, there arise offences,
contentions, nay even slaughter it selfe. Look now, how great a
prejudice these are, such, and so great is the benefit arising from this
doctrine of morality, truly declared. How many Kings (and those good men
too) hath this one errour, That a Tyrant King might lawfully be put to
death, been the slaughter of? How many throats hath this false position
cut, That a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed?
And what blood-shed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused, That Kings
are not superiours to, but administrators for the multitude? Lastly, how
many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of which teacheth that
the knowledge whether the commands of Kings be just or unjust, belongs
to private men, and that before they yeeld obedience, they not only may,
but ought to dispute them? Besides, in the morall philosophy now
commonly received, there are many things no lesse dangerous than those,
which it matters not now to recite. I suppose those antients foresaw
this, who rather chose to have the Science of justice wrapt up in
fables, than openly exposed to disputations: for before such questions
began to be moved, princes did not sue for, but already exercised the
supreme power. They kept their Empire entire, not by arguments, but by
punishing the wicked, and protecting the good; likewise Subjects did not
measure what was just by the sayings and judgements of private men, but
by the Lawes of the Realme; nor were they kept in peace by disputations,
but by power and authority: yea they reverenced the supreme power,
whether residing in one man or in a councell, as a certain visible
divinity; therefore they little used as in our dayes, to joyn themselves
with ambitious, and hellish spirits, to the utter ruine of their State;
for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the
preservation of that by which they were preserved; in truth, the
simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of
folly. Wherefore it was peace, and a golden age, which ended not before
that Saturn being expelled, it was taught lawfull to take up arms
against Kings. This I say, the Antients not only themselves saw, but in
one of their fables, they seem very aptly to have signified it to us;
for they say, that when Ixion was invited by Jupiter to a banquet, he
fell in love, and began to court Juno her selfe; offering to embrace
her, he clasp't a clowd, from whence the Centaures proceeded, by nature
halfe men, halfe horses, a fierce, a fighting, and unquiet generation;
which changing the names only, is as much as if they should have said,
that private men being called to Counsels of State desired to prostitute
justice, the onely sister and wife of the supreme, to their own
judgements, and apprehensions, but embracing a false and empty shadow
instead of it, they have begotten those hermaphrodite opinions of morall
philosophers, partly right and comely, partly brutall and wilde, the
causes of all contentions, and blood-sheds. Since therefore such
opinions are daily seen to arise, if any man now shall dispell those
clowds, and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no
authenticall doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evill,
besides the constituted Lawes in each Realme, and government; and that
the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust, good
or ill, is to be demanded of none, but those to whom the supreme hath
committed the interpretation of his Lawes; surely he will not only shew
us the high way to peace, but will also teach us how to avoyd the close,
darke, and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition, than which I know
not what can be thought more profitable.

Concerning my Method, I thought it not sufficient to use a plain and
evident style in what I had to deliver, except I took my begining from
the very matter of civill government, and thence proceeded to its
generation, and form, and the first beginning of justice; for every
thing is best understood by its constitutive causes; for as in a watch,
or some such small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the
wheeles, cannot well be known, except it be taken in sunder, and viewed
in parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of States,
and duties of Subjects, it is necessary, (I say not to take them in
sunder, but yet that) they be so considered, as if they were dissolved,
(i.e.) that wee rightly understand what the quality of humane nature is,
in what matters it is, in what not fit to make up a civill government,
and how men must be agreed among themselves, that intend to grow up into
a well-grounded State. Having therefore followed this kind of Method; In
the first place I set down for a principle by experience known to all
men, and denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are
naturally such, that except they be restrained through feare of some
coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each other, and as by
naturall right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of
the strength hee hath, toward the preservation of himself You will
object perhaps, that there are some who deny this; truly so it happens,
that very many do deny it. But shall I therefore seem to fight against
my self because I affirm that the same men confesse, and deny the same
thing? In truth I do not, but they do, whose actions disavow what their
discourses approve of. We see all countries though they be at peace with
their neighbours, yet guarding their Frontiers with armed men, their
Townes with Walls and ports, and keeping constant watches. To what
purpose is all this, if there be no feare of the neighbouring power? Wee
see even in well-governed States, where there are lawes and punishments
appointed for offendors, yet particular men travell not without their
Sword by their sides, for their defences, neither sleep they without
shutting not only their doores against their fellow Subjects, but also
their Trunks and Coffers for feare of domestiques. Can men give a
clearer testimony of the distrust they have each of other, and all, of
all? How since they doe thus, and even Countreyes as well as men, they
publiquely professe their mutuall feare and diffidence; But in disputing
they deny it, thats as much as to say, that out of a desire they have to
contradict others, they gainsay themselves. Some object that this
principle being admitted, it would needs follow, not onely that all men
were wicked (which perhaps though it seeme hard, yet we must yeeld to,
since it is so clearly declar'd by holy writ) but also wicked by nature
(which cannot be granted without impiety). But this, that men are evill
by nature, followes not from this principle; for though the wicked were
fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there
is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating,
selfe-defending, ever incident to the most honest, and fairest
condition'd; much lesse do's it follow that those who are wicked are so
by nature, for though from nature, that is from their first birth, as
they are meerly sensible Creatures, they have this disposition, that
immediately as much as in them lies, they desire and doe whatsoever is
best pleasing to them, that either through feare they fly from, or
through hardnesse repell those dangers which approach them, yet are they
not for this reason to be accounted wicked; for the affections of the
minde which arise onely from the lower parts of the soule are not wicked
themselves, but the actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes, as
when they are either offensive, or against duty. Unlesse you give
Children all they aske for, they are peevish, and cry, I and strike
their parents sometimes, and all this they have from nature, yet are
they free from guilt, neither may we properly call them wicked; first,
because they cannot hurt; next, because wanting the free use of reason
they are exempted from all duty; these when they come to riper yeares
having acquired power whereby they may doe hurt, if they shall continue
to doe the same things, then truly they both begin to be, and are
properly accounted wicked; In so much as a wicked man is almost the same
thing with a childe growne strong and sturdy, or a man of a childish
disposition; and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age,
when nature ought to be better governed through good education and
experience. Unlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evill,
because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature,
we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire, feare, anger, and
other passions from nature, and yet not impute the evill effects of
those unto nature. The foundation therefore which I have laid standing
firme, I demonstrate in the first place, that the state of men without
civill society (which state we may properly call the state of nature) is
nothing else but a meere warre of all against all; and in that warre all
men have equall right unto all things; Next, that all men as soone as
they arrive to understanding of this hatefull condition, doe desire
(even nature it selfe compelling them) to be freed from this misery. But
that this cannot be done except by compact, they all quitt that right
which they have unto all things. Furthermore I declare, and confirme
what the nature of compacts is; how and by what meanes the right of one
might be transfer'd unto another to make their compacts valid; also what
rights, and to whom they must necessarily be granted for the
establishing of peace, I meane what those dictates of reason are, which
may properly be term'd the Lawes of nature; and all these are contain'd
in that part of this booke which I entitle Liberty.

These grounds thus layd, I shew farther what civill government, and the
supreme power in it, and the divers kinds of it are; by what meanes it
becomes so, & what rights particular men, who intend to constitute this
civill government, must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the
supreme power, whether it be one man, or an assembly of men, that except
they doe so it will evidently appeare to be no civill government, but
the rights which all men have to all things, that is the rights of warre
will still remaine. Next, I distinguish the divers kindes of it, to wit,
Monarchie, Aristocratie, Democratie, and paternall Dominion, and that of
Masters over their Servants; I declare how they are constituted, and I
compare their severall conveniences and inconveniences each with other.
Furthermore, I unfold what those things are which destroy it, and what
his or their duty is who rule in chiefe. Last of all, I explicate the
natures of the Law, and of sinne, and I distinguish Law from Counsell,
from compact, from that which I call Right; all which I comprehend under
the title of Dominion.

In the last part of it which is entituled Religion, lest that right
which by strong reason I had confirm'd the Soveraigne powers in the
preceding discourse have over their Subjects, might seem to be repugnant
to the sacred Scriptures, I shew in the first place how it repugns not
the Divine right, for as much as God overrules all rulers by nature,
(i.e.) by the Dictates of naturall reason. In the second, for as much as
God himselfe had a peculiar dominion over the Jewes by vertue of that
antient Covenant of Circumcision. In the third, because God doth now
rule over us Christians by vertue of our Covenant of Baptisme; and
therefore the authority of Rulers in chiefe, or of civill government, is
not at all, we see, contrary to Religion.

In the last place I declare what duties are necessarily requir'd from
us, to enter into the Kingdome of Heaven; and of those I plainly
demonstrate, and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ,
according to the interpretation made by all, that the obedience which I
have affirm'd to be due from particular Christian Subjects unto their
Christian princes cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto
Christian Religion.

You have seene my Method, receive now the reason which mov'd me to write
this; I was studying philosophie for my minde sake, and I had gathered
together its first Elements in all kinds, and having digested them into
three Sections by degrees, I thought to have written them so as in the
first I would have treated of a body, and its generall properties; in
the second of man and his speciall faculties, and affections; in the
third, of civill government and the duties of Subjects: therefore the
first Section would have contained the first philosophie, and certaine
elements of physick; in it we would have considered the reasons of Time,
Place, Cause, Power, Relation, Proportion, Quantity, Figure, and motion.
In the second we would have beene conversant about imagination, Memory,
intellect, ratiocination, appetite, will, good and Evill, honest and
dishonest, and the like. What this last Section handles, I have now
already shewed you. Whilest I contrive, order, pensively and slowly
compose these matters, for I onely doe reason, I dispute not, it so
happen'd in the interim, that my Country some few yeares before the
civill warres did rage, was boyling hot with questions concerning the
rights of Dominion, and the obedience due from Subjects, the true
forerunners of an approaching war. And was the cause which (all those
other matters deferr'd) ripen'd, and pluckt from me this third part.
Therefore it happens that what was last in order, is yet come forth
first in time, and the rather, because I saw that grounded on its owne
principles sufficiently knowne by experience it would not stand in need
of the former Sections. I have not yet made it out of a desire of praise
(although if I had, I might have defended my selfe with this faire
excuse, that very few doe things laudably, who are not affected with
commendation) but for your sakes Readers, who I perswaded my selfe, when
you should rightly apprehend and throughly understand this Doctrine I
here present you with, would rather chuse to brooke with patience some
inconveniences under government (because humane affairs cannot possibly
be without some) than selfe opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the
publique; That, weighing the justice of those things you are about, not
by the perswasion and advise of private men, but by the Lawes of the
Realme, you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streames of
your blood to wade to their owne power; That you will esteeme it better
to enjoy your selves in the present state though perhaps not the best,
than by waging warre, indeavour to procure a reformation for other men
in another age, your selves in the meane while either kill'd, or
consumed with age; Farthermore, for those who will not acknowledge
themselves subject to the civill Magistrate, and will be exempt from all
publique burthens, and yet will live under his Jurisdiction, and look
for protection from the violence and injuries of others, that you would
not looke on them as fellow Subjects, but esteeme them for enemies, and
spies, and that yee rashly admit not for Gods Word all which either
openly or privately they shall pretend to bee so. I say more plainly, if
any preacher, Confessor, or Casuist, shal but say that this doctrin is
agreeable with Gods word, namely, That the chief ruler, nay any private
man may lawfully be put to death without the chiefes command, or that
Subjects may resist, conspire, or covenant against the supreme power,
that ye by no means beleeve them, but instantly declare their names. He
who approves of these reasons, will also like my intention in writing
this book.

Last of al, I have propounded to my self this rule through this whole
discourse; First, not to define ought which concerns the justice of
single actions, but leave them to be determined by the laws. Next not to
dispute the laws of any government in special, that is, not to point
which are the laws of any country, but to declare what the laws of all
countries are. Thirdly not to seem of opinion, that there is a lesse
proportion of for obedience due to an Aristocraty or Democraty, than a
Monarchy; though I have endeavoured by arguments in my tenth Chapter to
gain a belief in men, that Monarchy is the most commodious government
(which one thing alone I confesse in this whole book not to be
demonstrated, but only probably stated) yet every where I expresly say,
that in all kind of Government whatsoever, there ought to be a supreme
and equall power. Fourthly, not in any wise to dispute the positions of
Divines, except those which strip Subjects of their obedience, and shake
the foundations of civill government. Lastly, lest I might imprudently
set forth somewhat of which there would be no need, what I had thus
written, I would not presently expose to publique interest, wherefore I
got some few copies privately disperst among some of my friends, that
discrying the opinions of others, if any things appeared erroneous,
hard, or obscure, I might correct, soften, and explain them.

These things I found most bitterly excepted against: that I had made the
civill powers too large, but this by Ecclesiasticall persons; that I had
utterly taken away liberty of conscience, but this by Sectaries; that I
had set princes above the civil Laws, but this by Lawyers; wherefore I
was not much moved by these mens reprehensions, (as who in doing this
did but do their own business) except it were tye those knots so much
faster.

But for their sakes who have a litle been staggered at the principles
themselves, to wit the nature of men, the authority or right of nature,
the nature of compacts and contracts, and the originall of civill
government, because in finding fault they have not so much followed
their passions, as their common sense, I have therefore in some places
added some annotations whereby I presumed I might give some satisfaction
to their differing thoughts; Lastly I have endevoured to offend none
beside those whose principles these contradict, and whose tender mindes
are lightly offended by every difference of opinions.

Wherefore if ye shall meet with some things which have more of
sharpnesse, and lesse of certainty than they ought to have, since they
are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties, as the
establishment of peace, and by one whose just grief for the present
calamities of his country, may very charitably be allowed some liberty,
it is his only request to ye Readers, ye will deign to receive them with
an equall mind.

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De Cive

by Thomas Hobbes



Philosophicall Elements of a true Citizen.

Liberty

Chapter I.

Of the state of men without Civill Society

I. The faculties of Humane nature may be reduc'd unto four kinds; Bodily
strength, Experience, Reason, Passion. Taking the beginning of this
following Doctrine from these, we will declare in the first place what
manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bare
towards each other, and whether, and by what faculty, they are born apt
for Society, and so preserve themselves against mutuall violence; then
proceeding, we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this
businesse, and what are the conditions of Society, or of Humane Peace;
that is to say, (changing the words onely) what are the fundamentall
Lawes of Nature.

II. The greatest part of those men who have written ought concerning
Commonwealths, either suppose, or require us, or beg of us to believe,
That Man is a Creature born fit [1] for Society: The Greeks call him
Zoon politikon, and on this foundation they so build up the Doctrine of
Civill Society, as if for the preservation of Peace, and the Government
of Man-kind there were nothing else necessary, than that Men should
agree to make certaine Covenants and Conditions together, which
themselves should then call Lawes. Which Axiom, though received by most,
is yet certainly False, and an Errour proceeding from our too slight
contemplation of Humane Nature; for they who shall more narrowly look
into the Causes for which Men come together, and delight in each others
company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it
could happen no otherwise, but by Accident: For if by nature one Man
should Love another (that is) as Man, there could no reason be return'd
why every Man should not equally Love every Man, as being equally Man,
or why he should rather frequent those whose Society affords him Honour
or Profit. We doe not therefore by nature seek Society for its own sake,
but that we may receive some Honour or Profit from it; these we desire
Primarily, that Secondarily: How by what advice Men doe meet, will be
best known by observing those things which they doe when they are met:
For if they meet for Traffique, it's plaine every man regards not his
Fellow, but his Businesse; if to discharge some Office, a certain
Market-friendship is begotten, which hath more of Jealousie in it than
True love, and whence Factions sometimes may arise, but Good will never;
if for Pleasure, and Recreation of mind, every man is wont to please
himself most with those things which stirre up laughter, whence he may
(according to the nature of that which is Ridiculous) by comparison of
another mans Defects and Infirmities, passe the more currant in his owne
opinion; and although this be sometimes innocent, and without offence;
yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the Society, as
their own Vain glory. But for the most part, in these kind of meetings,
we wound the absent; their whole life, sayings, actions are examin'd,
judg'd, condemn'd; nay, it is very rare, but some present receive a
fling before they part, so as his reason was not ill, who was wont
alwayes at parting to goe out last. And these are indeed the true
delights of Society, unto which we are carryed by nature, (i.e.) by
those passions which are incident to all Creatures, untill either by sad
experience, or good precepts, it so fall out (which in many never
happens) that the Appetite, of present matters, be dul'd with the memory
of things past, without which, the discourse of most quick and nimble
men, on this subject, is but cold and hungry.

But if it so happen, that being met, they passe their time in relating
some Stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concernes
himselfe; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak
of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell you
miracles, if they have them, if not, they'l fein them: Lastly, that I
may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser than others; if they
meet to talk of Philosophy, look how many men, so many would be esteem'd
Masters, or else they not only love not their fellowes, but even
persecute them with hatred: So clear is it by experience to all men who
a little more narrowly consider Humane affaires, that all free congress
ariseth either from mutual poverty, or from vain glory, whence the
parties met, endeavour to carry with them either some benefit, or to
leave behind them that same eudokimein, some esteem and honour with
those, with whom they have been conversant: The same is also collected
by reason out of the definitions themselves, of Will, Good, Honour,
Profitable. For when we voluntarily contract Society, in all manner of
Society we look after the object of the Will, i.e. that, which every one
of those, who gather together, propounds to himselfe for good; now
whatsoever seemes good, is pleasant, and relates either to the senses,
or the mind, but all the mindes pleasure is either Glory, (or to have a
good opinion of ones selfe) or referres to Glory in the end; the rest
are Sensuall, or conducing to sensuality, which may be all comprehended
under the word Conveniencies. All Society therefore is either for Gain,
or for Glory; (i.e.) not so much for love of our Fellowes, as for love
of our Selves: but no society can be great, or lasting, which begins
from Vain Glory; because that Glory is like Honour, if all men have it,
no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellence; neither
doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in
my selfe; for every man must account himself, such as he can make
himselfe, without the help of others. But though the benefits of this
life may be much farthered by mutuall help, since yet those may be
better attain'd to by Dominion, than by the society of others: I hope no
body will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carryed by
Nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain Dominion, than to gaine
Society. We must therefore resolve, that the Originall of all great, and
lasting Societies, consisted not in the mutuall good will men had
towards each other, but in the mutuall fear [2] they had of each other.

III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality
of men, partly in their mutuall will of hurting: whence it comes to
passe that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to our selves
the least security: For if we look on men fullgrown, and consider how
brittle the frame of our humane body is, (which perishing, all its
strength, vigour, and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it) and how easie
a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is
no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive
himself made by nature above others: they are equalls who can doe equall
things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things,
(namely kill) can doe equall things. All men therefore among themselves
are by nature equall; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring
from the Civill Law.

IV. All men in the State of nature have a desire, and will to hurt, but
not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemn'd; for
one man according to that naturall equality which is among us, permits
as much to others, as he assumes to himself (which is an argument of a
temperate man, and one that rightly values his power); another,
supposing himselfe above others, will have a License to doe what he
lists, and challenges Respect, and Honour, as due to him before others,
(which is an Argument of a fiery spirit:) This mans will to hurt ariseth
from Vain glory, and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength; the
other's, from the necessity of defending himselfe, his liberty, and his
goods against this mans violence.

V. Furthermore, since the combate of Wits is the fiercest, the greatest
discords which are, must necessarily arise from this Contention; for in
this case it is not only odious to contend against, but also not to
consent; for not to approve of what a man saith is no lesse than
tacitely to accuse him of an Errour in that thing which he speaketh; as
in very many things to dissent, is as much as if you accounted him a
fool whom you dissent from; which may appear hence, that there are no
Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the same Religion, and
Factions of the same Commonweale, where the Contestation is Either
concerning Doctrines, or Politique Prudence. And since all the pleasure,
and jollity of the mind consists in this; even to get some, with whom
comparing, it may find somewhat wherein to Tryumph, and Vaunt it self;
its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and
contempt either by Laughter, or by Words, or by Gesture, or some signe
or other; than which there is no greater vexation of mind; and than from
which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt.

VI. But the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other,
ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the
same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor
yet divide it; whence it followes that the strongest must have it, and
who is strongest must be decided by the Sword.

VII. Among so many dangers therefore, as the naturall lusts of men do
daily threaten each other withall, to have a care of ones selfe is not a
matter so scornfully to be lookt upon, as if so be there had not been a
power and will left in one to have done otherwise; for every man is
desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evill, but chiefly
the chiefest of naturall evills, which is Death; and this he doth, by a
certain impulsion of nature, no lesse than that whereby a Stone moves
downward: It is therefore neither absurd, nor reprehensible; neither
against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his endeavours
to preserve and defend his Body, and the Members thereof from death and
sorrowes; but that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men
account to be done justly, and with right; Neither by the word Right is
any thing else signified, than that liberty which every man hath to make
use of his naturall faculties according to right reason: Therefore the
first foundation of naturall Right is this, That every man as much as in
him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.

VIII. But because it is in vaine for a man to have a Right to the end,
if the Right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him; it followes, that
since every man hath a Right to preserve himself, he must also be
allowed a Right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without
which He cannot Preserve himself.

IX. Now whether the means which he is about to use, and the action he is
performing, be necessary to the preservation of his Life, and Members,
or not, he Himself, by the right of nature, must be judg; for say
another man, judg that it is contrary to right reason that I should judg
of mine own perill: why now, because he judgeth of what concerns me, by
the same reason, because we are equall by nature, will I judge also of
things which doe belong to him; therefore it agrees with right reason
(that is) it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion, (i.e.)
whether it conduce to my preservation, or not.

X. Nature hath given to every one a right to all. That is it was lawfull
for every man in the bare state of nature, [3] or before such time as
men had engag'd themselves by any Covenants, or Bonds, to doe what hee
would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possesse, use, and enjoy
all what he would, or could get. Now because whatsoever a man would, it
therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really
doth, or at least seems to him to contribute toward his preservation,
(but we have already allowed him to be judge in the foregoing Article
whether it doth or not, in so much as we are to hold all for necessary
whatsoever he shall esteeme so) and by the 7. Article it appeares that
by the right of Nature those things may be done, and must be had, which
necessarily conduce to the protection of life, and members, it followes,
that in the state of nature, To have all, and do all is lawfull for all.
And this is that which is meant by that common saying, Nature hath given
all to all, from whence we understand likewise, that in the state of
nature, Profit is the measure of Right.

XI. But it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common Right to
all things; for the effects of this Right are the same, almost, as if
there had been no Right at all; for although any man might say of every
thing, This is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his
Neighbour, who having equall Right, and equall power, would pretend the
same thing to be his.

XII. If now to this naturall proclivity of men, to hurt each other,
which they derive from their Passions, but chiefly from a vain esteeme
of themselves: You adde, the right of all to all, wherewith one by right
invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetuall
jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to
provide against an enemy invading us, with an intention to oppresse, and
ruine, though he come with a small Number, and no great Provision; it
cannot be deny'd but that the naturall state of men, before they entr'd
into Society, was a meer War, and that not simply, but a War of all men,
against all men; for what is WAR, but that same time in which the will
of contesting by force, is fully declar'd either by Words, or Deeds? The
time remaining, is termed PEACE.

XIII. But it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to the
preservation either of Man-kind, or of each single Man, a perpetuall War
is: But it is perpetuall in its own nature, because in regard of the
equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by Victory; for in
this state the Conquerour is subject to so much danger, as it were to be
accounted a Miracle, if any, even the most strong should close up his
life with many years, and old age. They of America are Examples hereof,
even in this present Age: Other Nations have been in former Ages, which
now indeed are become Civill, and Flourishing, but were then few,
fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroy'd of all that Pleasure,
and Beauty of life, which Peace and Society are wont to bring with them.
Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in
that state in which all things were lawfull for all men, he contradicts
himself; for every man, by naturall necessity desires that which is good
for him: nor is there any that esteemes a war of all against all, which
necessarily adheres to such a State, to be good for him. And so it
happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our
selves of this condition, and to get some fellowes; that if there needs
must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps.

XIV. Fellowes are gotten either by constraint, or by consent; By
Constraint, when after fight the Conqueror makes the conquered serve him
either through feare of death, or by laying fetters on him: By consent,
when men enter into society to helpe each other, both parties consenting
without any constraint. But the Conqueror may by right compell the
Conquered, or the strongest the weaker, (as a man in health may one that
is sick, or he that is of riper yeares a childe) unlesse he will choose
to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of
protecting our selves according to our owne wills proceeded from our
danger, and our danger from our equality, its more consonant to reason,
and more certaine for our conservation, using the present advantage to
secure our selves by taking caution; then, when they shall be full
growne and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover
that power againe by doubtfull fight. And on the other side, nothing can
be thought more absurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak
in your power, to make him at once both an enemy, and a strong one. From
whence we may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state
of men, That a sure and irresistible Power confers the right of
Dominion, and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the
right of all things, that can be done, adheres essentially, and
immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising.

XV. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in
the state of nature (i.e.) of War, by reason of that equality of power,
and other humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek
Peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is
none, to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War, is the dictate of right
Reason; that is, the Law of Nature, as shall be shewed in the next
Chapter.

____________

1. Born fit. Since we now see actually a constituted Society among men,
and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of congresse,
and mutuall correspondence, it may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidity,
to lay in the very threshold of this Doctrine, such a stumbling block
before the Readers, as to deny Man to be born fit for Society: Therefore
I must more plainly say, That it is true indeed, that to Man, by nature,
or as Man, that is, as soone as he is born, Solitude is an enemy; for
Infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper
years to help them to live well, wherefore I deny not that men (even
nature compelling) desire to come together. But civill Societies are not
meer Meetings, but Bonds, to the making whereof, Faith and Compacts are
necessary: The Vertue whereof to Children, and Fooles, and the profit
whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany
its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that those,
because they know not what Society is, cannot enter into it; these,
because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest
therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in Infancy, are
born unapt for Society. Many also (perhaps most men) either through
defect of minde, or want of education remain unfit during the whole
course of their lives; yet have Infants, as well as those of riper
years, an humane nature; wherefore Man is made fit for Society not by
Nature, but by Education: furthermore, although Man were born in such a
condition as to desire it, it followes not, that he therefore were Born
fit to enter into it; for it is one thing to desire, another to be in
capacity fit for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride,
will not stoop to equall conditions, without which there can be no
Society, do yet desire it.

2. The mutuall fear. It is objected: It is so improbable that men should
grow into civill Societies out of fear, that if they had been afraid,
they would not have endur'd each others looks: They Presume, I believe,
that to fear is nothing else than to be affrighted: I comprehend in this
word Fear, a certain foresight of future evill; neither doe I conceive
flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed,
provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearfull.
They who go to Sleep, shut their Dores; they who Travell carry their
Swords with them, because they fear Theives. Kingdomes guard their
Coasts and Frontiers with Forts, and Castles; Cities are compact with
Walls, and all for fear of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes; even the
strongest Armies, and most accomplisht for Fight, yet sometimes Parly
for Peace, as fearing each others Power, and lest they might be
overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves, by flight
indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise, but
for the most part by Armes, and Defensive Weapons; whence it happens,
that daring to come forth, they know each others Spirits; but then, if
they fight, Civill Society ariseth from the Victory, if they agree, from
their Agreement.

3. In the bare state of Nature. This is thus to be understood: What any
man does in the bare state of Nature is injurious to no man; not that in
such a State he cannot offend God, or break the Lawes of Nature; for
Injustice against men presupposeth Humane Lawes, such, as in the State
of Nature there are none: Now the truth of this proposition thus
conceived is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindfull Reader in the
Articles immediately foregoing; but because in certaine cases the
difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises, I will
contract this Argument, and make it most evident to a single view; every
man hath right to protect himself, as appears by the seventh Article.
The same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which
necessarily conduce to this end by the eight Article: But those are the
necessary means which he shall judge to be such by the ninth Article. He
therefore hath a right to make use, of and to doe all whatsoever he
shall judge requisite for his preservation: wherefore by the judgement
of him that doth it, the thing done is either right, or wrong; and
therefore right. True it is therefore in the bare State of Nature, &c.
But if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation,
which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend
against the Lawes of Nature, as in the third Chapter of this Book is
more at large declar'd. It hath been objected by some: If a Sonne kill
his Father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, That a Sonne cannot
be understood to be at any time in the State of Nature, as being under
the Power and command of them to whom he ownes his protection as soon as
ever he is born, namely either his Fathers, or his Mothers, or his that
nourisht him, as is demonstrated in the ninth Chapter.


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Chapter II.

Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts

I. All Authors agree not concerning the definition of the Naturall Law,
who notwithstanding doe very often make use of this terme in their
Writings. The Method therefore, wherein we begin from definitions, and
exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper to them who leave no place
for contrary Disputes; for the rest, if any man say, that somwhat is
done against the Law of Nature, one proves it hence, because it was done
against the generall Agreement of all the most wise, and learned
Nations: But this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and
learning of all Nations: Another hence, That it was done against the
Generall consent of all Man-kind; which definition is by no means to be
admitted; for then it were impossible for any but Children, and Fools,
to offend against such a Law; for sure, under the notion of Man-kind,
they comprehend all men actually endued with Reason. These therefore
either doe Naught against it, or if they doe Ought, it is without their
joint accord, and therefore ought to be excus'd; but to receive the
Lawes of Nature from the Consents of them, who oftner Break, than
Observe them, is in truth unreasonable: besides, Men condemne the same
things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side,
they publickly commend what they privately condemne; and they deliver
their Opinions more by Hear-say, than any Speculation of their own; and
they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope,
love, or some other perturbation of mind, than true Reason. And
therefore it comes to passe, that whole Bodyes of people often doe those
things by Generall accord, or Contention, which those Writers most
willingly acknowledge to be against the Law of Nature. But since all doe
grant that is done by RIGHT, which is not done against Reason, we ought
to judg those Actions onely wrong, which are repugnant to right Reason,
(i.e.) which contradict some certaine Truth collected by right reasoning
from true Principles; but that Wrong which is done, we say it is done
against some Law: therefore True Reason is a certaine Law, which (since
it is no lesse a part of Humane nature, than any other faculty, or
affection of the mind) is also termed naturall. Therefore the Law of
Nature, that I may define it, is the Dictate of right Reason, [1]
conversant about those things which are either to be done, or omitted
for the constant preservation of Life, and Members, as much as in us
lyes.

II. But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature is, That Peace is to be
sought after where it may be found; and where not, there to provide our
selves for helps of War: For we shewed in the last Article of the
foregoing Chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but
that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes, that hath been
newly prov'd above; But this is the first, because the rest are deriv'd
from this, and they direct the wayes either to Peace, or self-defence.

III. But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is
this, That the right of all men, to all things, ought not to be
retain'd, but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd, or
relinquisht: for if every one should retain his right to all things, it
must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade; and others, by
the same right, might defend themselves against them, (for every man, by
naturall necessity, endeavours to defend his Body, and the things which
he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body) therefore War
would follow. He therefore acts against the reason of Peace, (i.e.)
against the Law of Nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with his
Right to all things.

IV. But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely
renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it,
who by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares that he is
willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again, which
before, by Right, he might have done; but he conveys it to another, who
by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares to that other, that
he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him, in going
about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before, with
Right, have resisted him; but that the conveyance of Right consists
meerly in not resisting, is understood by this, that before it was
convey'd, he, to whom he convey'd it, had even then also a right to all,
whence he could not give any new Right: But the resisting Right he had,
before he gave it, by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy
his Rights, is utterly abolisht: Whosoever therefore acquires some Right
in the naturall state of men, he onely procures himself security, and
freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his Primitive Right:
As for example, if any man shall sell, or give away a Farme, he utterly
deprives himself only from all Right to this Farme, but he does not so
from others also.

V. But in the conveyance of Right the will is requisite not onely of him
that conveys, but of him also that accepts it. If either be wanting, the
Right remaines: for if I would have given what was mine, to one who
refus'd to accept of it, I have not therefore either simply renounc'd my
Right, or convey'd it to any man; for the cause which mov'd me to part
with it to this Man was in him onely, not in others too.

VI. But if there be no other Token extant of our will either to quit, or
convey our Right, but onely Words; those words must either relate to the
present, or time past; for if they be of the future onely, they convey
nothing: for example, he that speaks thus of the time to come, I will
give to morrow, declares openly that yet he hath not given it; so that
all this day his right remains, and abides to morrow too, unlesse in the
interim he actually bestowes it: for what is mine, remains mine till I
have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the time present, suppose
thus; I doe give, or have given you this to be received to morrow, by
these words is signified that I have already given it, and that his
Right to receive it to morrow, is conveyed to him by me to day.

VII. Neverthelesse, although words alone are not sufficient tokens to
declare the Will; if yet to words relating to the future, there shall
some other signes be added, they may become as valid, as if they had
been spoken of the present: If therefore, as by reason of those other
signes, it appear, that he that speaks of the future, intends those
words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his Right,
they ought to be valid; for the conveyance of right depends not on
words, but (as hath been instanc'd in the 4. Article) on the declaration
of the Will.

VIII. If any man conveigh some part of his right to another, and doth
not this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a
conveighance in this kind is called a Gift, or free Donation. But in
free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the present, or
the time past; for if they respect the future, they oblige not as words,
for the reason given in the foregoing Article: It must needs therefore
be, that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will: But,
because whatsoever is voluntarily done, is done for some good to him
that wils it; there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give
it, except some benefit either already receiv'd, or to be acquir'd; but
is suppos'd, that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact in being;
for if so, it would cease to be a free gift: It remains therefore, that
a mutuall good turne without agreement be expected; but no signe can be
given, that he, who us'd future words toward him who was in no sort
engag'd to return a benefit, should desire to have his words so
understood, as to oblige himselfe thereby. Nor is it suitable to Reason,
that those who are easily enclined to doe well to others, should be
oblig'd by every promise, testifying their present good affection: And
for this cause, a promiser in this kind, must be understood to have time
to deliberate, and power to change that affection as well as he to whom
he made that promise, may alter his desert. But he that deliberates, is
so farre forth free, nor can be said to have already given: But if he
promise often, and yet give seldome, he ought to be condemn'd of levity,
and be called not a Donour, but Doson.

IX. But the act of two, or more, mutually conveighing their Rights, is
call'd a Contract. But in every Contract, either both parties instantly
performe what they contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had from
either to other; or the one performes, the other is trusted, or neither
performe. Where both parties performe presently, there the Contract is
ended, as soon as 'tis performed; but where there is credit given either
to one, or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance;
and this kind of promise is called a COVENANT.

X. But the Covenant made by the party trusted with him, who hath already
performed, although the promise be made by words pointing at the future,
doth no lesse transfer the right of future time, than if it had been
made by words signifying the present, or time past: for the others
performance is a most manifest signe that he so understood the speech of
him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly make performance also at
the appointed time; and by this signe the party trusted knew himselfe to
be thus understood, which, because he hindred not, 'twas an evident
token of his Will to performe. The promises therefore which are made for
some benefit received (which are also Covenants) are Tokens of the Will;
that is, (as in the foregoing Section hath been declared) of the last
act of deliberating, whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolisht,
and by consequence are obligatory; for where Liberty ceaseth, there
beginneth Obligation.

XI. But the Covenants, which are made in contract of mutuall trust,
neither party performing out of hand, if there arise [2] a just
suspicion in either of them, are in the state of nature invalid: for he
that first performes by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest
part of men studying their owne advantage, either by right, or wrong,
exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath
Contracted; for it suites not with reason, that any man should performe
first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise
after; which, whether it be probable, or not, he that doubts it, must be
judge of, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 9.
Article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature, but in a
Civill State, when there is a power which can compell both parties, he
that hath contracted to perform first, must first performe; because,
that since the other may be compell'd, the cause which made him fear the
others non-performance, ceaseth.

XII. But from this reason, that in all Free-gifts, and Compacts, there
is an acceptance of the conveighance of Right required: it followes,
that no man can Compact with him who doth not declare his acceptance;
and therefore we cannot compact with Beasts, neither can we give, or
take from them any manner of Right, by reason of their want of speech,
and understanding, Neither can any man Covenant with God, or be oblig'd
to him by Vow, except so far forth as it appeares to him by Holy
Scriptures, that he hath substituted certaine men who have authority to
accept of such like Vowes and Covenants, as being in Gods stead.

XIII. Those therefore doe vow in vain, who are in the state of nature,
where they are not tyed by any Civill Law, (except by most certain
Revelation the Will of God to accept their Vow, or Pact, be made known
to them) for if what they Vow, be contrary to the Law of Nature, they
are not tyed by their Vow, for no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull
act; but if what is vowed, be commanded by some Law of nature, it is not
their Vow, but the Law it self which ties them; but if he were free
before his vow, either to doe it, or not doe it, his liberty remaines,
because that the openly declar'd Will of the obliger is requisite to
make an obligation by Vow, which in the case propounded is suppos'd not
to be: Now I call him the Obliger to whom any one is tyed, and the
Obliged him who is tyed.

XIV. Covenants are made of such things onely as fall under our
deliberation, for it can be no Covenant without the Will of the
Contractor, but the Will is the last act of him who deliberates;
therefore they onely concerne things possible, and to come; no man
therefore, by his Compact, obligeth himself to an impossibility. But
yet, though we often Covenant to doe such things as then seem' d
possible when we promis'd them, which yet afterward appear to be
impossible, are we therefore freed from all obligation? The reason
whereof is, that he who promiseth a future incertainty receives a
present benefit; on condition, that he return another for it: for his
Will, who performes the present benefit hath simply before it, for its
object, a certain good [equally] valuable with the thing promised; but
the thing it selfe not simply, but with condition if it could be done;
but if it should so happen, that even this should prove impossible, why
then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants therefore oblige us
not to perform just the thing it selfe covenanted for, but our utmost
endeavour; for this onely is, the things themselves are not in our
power.

XV. We are freed from Covenants two wayes, either by performing, or by
being forgiven: By performing, for beyond that we oblig'd not our
selves. By being forgiven, because he whom we oblig'd our selves to by
forgiving, is conceiv'd to return us that Right which we past over to
him; for, forgiving, implies giving: that is, by the fourth Article of
this Chapter, a conveyance of Right to him to whom the gift is made.

XVI. Its an usuall question, Whether Compacts extorted from us, through
fear, do oblige, or not: For example, If to redeeme my life, from the
power of a Robber, I promise to pay him 100 l. next day; and that I will
doe no act whereby to apprehend, and bring him to Justice, whether I am
tyed to keep promise, or not? But though such a Promise must sometimes
be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so, because
it proceeded from fear, for then it would follow that those promises
which reduc'd men to a civill life, and by which Lawes were made, might
likewise be of none effect, (for it proceeds from fear of mutuall
slaughter, that one man submits himselfe to the Dominion of another:)
And he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive
covenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds universally true,
that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received; and that
to promisee and the thing promised, be lawfull: But it is lawfull, for
the redemption of my life, both to promise, and to give what I will of
mine owne to any man, even to a Thief. We are oblig'd therefore, by
promises proceeding from fear, except the Civill Law forbid them, by
vertue whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawfull.

XVII. Whosoever shall contract with one to doe, or omit somewhat, and
shall after Covenant the contrary with another; he maketh not the
former, but the latter Contract unlawfull: for, he hath no longer Right
to doe, or to omit ought, who by former Contracts hath conveyed it to
another; wherefore he can conveigh no Right by latter Contracts, and
what is promised, is promis'd without Right: He is therefore tyed onely
to his first Contract; to break which is unlawfull.

XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any Contracts whatsoever not to resist him
who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his Body; for
there is in every man a certain high degree of feare through which he
apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest, and
therefore by naturall necessity he shuns it all he can, and 'tis
suppos'd he can doe no otherwise: When a man is arrived to this degree
of fear, we cannot expect but he will provide for himself either by
flight, or fight. Since therefore no man is tyed to impossibilities,
they who are threatned either with deathe (which is the greatest evill
to nature) or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout
enough to bear them, are not obliged to endure them. Farthermore, he
that is tyed by Contract is trusted, (for Faith only is the Bond of
Contracts) but they who are brought to punishment, either Capitall, or
more gentle, are fettered, or strongly guarded, which is a most certain
signe that they seem'd not sufficiently bound from non resistance by
their Contracts. Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the
day appointed, kill me. Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, though
you should offer to kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be,
contract the first way; but there is need sometimes. This second way,
none, neither is it ever needfull; for in the meer state of nature, if
you have a mind to kill, that state it selfe affords you a Right;
insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you
will afterward kill him. But in a Civill State, where the Right of life,
and death, and of all corporall punishment is with the Supreme; that
same Right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither
need the Supreme himselfe contract with any man patiently to yeeld to
his punishment, but onely this, that no man offer to defend others from
him. If in the state of nature, as between two Cities, there should a
Contract be made, on condition of killing, if it were not perform'd, we
must presuppose another Contract of not killing before the appointed
day. Wherefore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of
Warre returnes; that is, an hostile state, in which all things are
lawfull, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract of not
resisting, we are oblig'd of two Evills to make choice of that which
seemes the greater; for certaine Death is a greater evill than Fighting;
but of two Evills it is impossible not to chuse the least: By such a
Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities, which is
contrary to the very nature of compacts.

XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any Compacts whatsoever to accuse
himself, or any other, by whose dammage he is like to procure himselfe a
bitter life; wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear witnesse
against his Sonne, nor a Husband against his Wife, nor a Sonne against
his Father; nor any man against any one, by whose meanes he hath his
subsistance; for in vain is that testimony which is presum'd to be
corrupted from nature; but although no man be tyed to accuse himself by
any compact, yet in a publique tryall he may, by torture, be forc'd to
make answer; but such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps
for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tortur'd
his answer be true, or false, or whether he answer not at all,
whatsoever he doth, he doth it by Right.

XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a promise, whereby the promiser
declares his renouncing of Gods mercy, unlesse he perform his word;
which definition is contained in the words themselves, which have in
them the very essence of an Oath, to wit, so God help me, or other
equivalent, as with the Romans, Doe thou Jupiter so destroy the
deceiver, as I slay this same Beast: neither is this any let, but that
an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory, as promissory; for he that
confirmes his affirmation with an Oath, promiseth that he speaks truth.
But though in some places it was the fashion for Subjects to Swear by
their Kings; that custome took its Originall hence, That those Kings
took upon them Divine Honour; for Oathes were therefore introduc'd that
by Religion, and consideration of the Divine Power men might have a
greater dread of breaking their Faiths, than that wherewith they fear
men, from whose eyes their actions may lie hid.

XXI. Whence it followes, that an Oath must be conceived in that forme
which he useth, who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to Swear by
a God whom he beleeves not, and therefore neither feares him. For though
by the light of nature it may be known that there is a God, yet no man
thinks he is to Swear by him in any other fashion, or by any other name
than what is contain'd in the precepts of his own proper, that is, (as
he who Swears imagines) the true Religion.

XXII. By the definition of an Oath we may understand, that a bare
Contract obligeth no lesse, than that to which we are Sworn; for it is
the contract which binds us, the Oath relates to the Divine punishment,
which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in its
selfe unlawfull; but it could not be unlawfull if the Contract were not
obligatory. Furthermore, he that renounceth the mercy of God obligeth
himselfe not to any punishment, because it is ever lawfull to deprecate
the punishment howsoever provok'd, and to enjoy Gods Pardon if it be
granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath is this, To cause men who
are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faith, through fear of
punishment, to make the more Conscience of their words and actions.

XXIII. To exact an Oath, where the breach of contract, if any be made,
cannot but be known, and where the party compacted, withall wants not
power to punish, is to do somewhat more than is necessary unto
self-defence, and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it
selfe, as to prejudice another. For an Oath, out of the very form of
swearing, is taken in order to the provocation of Gods anger, that is to
say, of him that is Omnipotent against those who therefore violate their
Faith, because they think that by their own strength they can escape the
punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscient against those, who
therefore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall
see them.

____________

1. Right Reason. By Right Reason in the naturall state of men, I
understand not, as many doe, an infallible faculty, but the act of
reasoning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man
concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the dammage,
or benefit of his neighbours. I call it Peculiar, because although in a
Civill Government the reason of the Supreme (i.e. the Civill Law) is to
be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this
Civill Government, (in which state no man can know right reason from
false, but by comparing it with His owne) every mans owne reason is to
be accounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are done at
His owne perill, but also for the measure of another mans reason, in
such things as doe concerne him. I call it True; that is, concluding
from true principles rightly fram'd, because that the whole breach of
the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of
those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe
toward others in order to their owne conservation; but the Principles of
Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in
the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. articles of the first Chapter.

2. Arise. For, except there appear some new cause of fear, either from
somewhat done, or some other token of the will not to performe from the
other part, it cannot be judg'd to be a just fear; for the cause which
was not sufficient to keep him from making Compact, must not suffice to
authorize the breach of it, being made.


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Chapter III.

Of the other Lawes of Nature.

I. Another of the Lawes of Nature is, to performe Contracts, or to keep
trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law of
Nature commands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain Peace; to
conveigh certain rights from each to other, and that this (as often as
it shall happen to be done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre
forth onely conducible to peace, as we shall performe Our selves, what
we contract with others, shall be done, or omitted; and in vaine would
Contracts be made, unlesse we stood to them. Because therefore, to stand
to our Covenants, Or to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the
obtaining of peace, it will prove by the second Article of the second
Chapter to be a precept of the naturall Law.

II. Neither is there in this matter, any exception of the persons, with
whom we Contract, as if they keep no faith with others; Or hold, that
none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he
that Contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in
vaine, and it is against reason for a knowing man to doe a thing in
vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so, he
affirms the Contract to be made in vain: He therefore, who Contracts
with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at
once think a Contract to be a thing done in vaine, and not in vaine,
which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or
else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared
Warre, Or a sure and faithfull Peace.

III. The breaking of a Bargain, as also the taking back of a gift,
(which ever consists in some action, Or omission) is called an INJURY:
But that action, or omission, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury,
and an unjust action, or omission, signifie the same thing, and both are
the same with breach of Contract and trust: And it seemes the word
Injury came to be given to any action, or omission, because they were
without Right. He that acted, or omitted, having before conveyed his
Right to some other. And there is some likenesse between that, which in
the common course of life we call Injury; and that, which in the Schools
is usually called absurd. For even as he, who by Arguments is driven to
deny the Assertion which he first maintain'd, is said to be brought to
an absurdity; in like manner, he who through weaknesse of mind does, or
omits that which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doe, or omit,
commits an Injury, and falls into no lesse contradiction, than he, who
in the Schools is reduc'd to an Absurdity. For by contracting for some
future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done,
which is to will a thing done, and not done at the same time, which is a
contradiction. An Injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in
conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.

IV. From these grounds it followes, that an injury can be done to no man
[1] but him with whom we enter Covenant, or to whom somewhat is made
over by deed of gift, or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain.
And therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master
command his Servant, who hath promis'd to obey him, to pay a summe of
money, or carry some present to a third man; the Servant, if he doe it
not, hath indeed damag'd this third party, but he injur'd his Master
onely. So also in a civill government, if any man offend another, with
whom he hath made no Contract, he damages him to whom the evill is done,
but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs: for
if he, who receives the hurt, should expostulate the mischief; and he
that did it, should answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I
rather doe according to yours, than mine owne will, since I do not
hinder, but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where
there hath no manner of pre-contract past, I see not, I confesse, what
is reprehensible.

V. These words just, and unjust, as also justice, and injustice, are
equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to
Persons, another when to actions: When they are attributed to Actions,
Just signifies as much as what's done with Right, and unjust, as what's
done with injury: he who hath done some just thing is not therefore said
to be a just Person, but guiltlesse, and he that hath done some unjust
thing, we doe not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty man. But
when the words are applyed to Persons; to be just, signifies as much as
to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to doe righteousnesse, or
to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and to be unjust,
is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not
according to my contract, but some present benefit; so as the justice or
injustice of the mind, the intention, or the man, is one thing; that of
an action, or omission, another; and innumerable actions of a just man
may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just: But that man is to be
accounted just, who doth just things because the Law commands it, unjust
things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be
unjust who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annext unto the
Law, and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his mind.

VI. The justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds;
Commutative, and Distributive, the former whereof they say consists in
Arithmeticall, the latter in Geometricall proportion: and that is
conversant in exchanging, in buying, selling, borrowing, lending,
location, and conduction, and other acts whatsoever belonging to
Contracters, where, if there be an equall return made, hence they say
springs a commutative justice: But this is busied about the dignity, and
merits of men; so as if there be rendred to every man kata pen axian
more to him who is more worthy, and lesse to him that deserves lesse,
and that proportionably, hence they say ariseth distributive justice: I
acknowledge here some certaine distinction of equality; to wit, that one
is an equality simply so called, as when two things of equall value are
compar'd together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same
silver; the other is an equality, secundum quod; as when a 1000 pound is
to be divided to an hundred men, 600 pounds are given to 60 men, and 400
to 40 where there is no equality between 600 and 400. But when it
happens, that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom
it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equall part, whence
it is called an equall distribution: But such like equality is the same
thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is all this to Justice? for
neither, if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, doe I
injure the buyer, who sought, and desir'd them of me? neither if I
divide more of what is mine to him who deserves lesse, so long as I give
the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either? which truth our
Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospell. This therefore is
no distinction of Justice, but of equality; yet perhaps it cannot be
deny'd, but that Justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this
onely; that since we are all equall by nature, one should not arrogate
more Right to himselfe, than he grants to another, unlesse he have
fairly gotten it by Compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against
this distinction of Justice, although now almost generally receiv'd by
all, lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else, than
the breach of Faith, or Contract, as hath been defin'd above.

VII. It is an old saying, Volenti non fit iniuria (the willing man
receives no injury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our
Principles. For grant, that a man be willing that that should be done,
which he conceives to be an injury. to him; why then that is done by his
will, which by Contract was not lawfull to be done; but he being willing
that should be done, which was not lawfull by Contract, the Contract it
self (by the 15. Article of the foregoing Chapter) becomes void: The
Right therefore of doing it returnes, therefore it is done by Right;
wherefore it is no injury.

VIII. The third precept of the Naturall Law, is, That you suffer not him
to be the worse for you, who out of the confidence he had in you, first
did you a good turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind to
endeavour, that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of
his gift. For without this he should act without reason that would
conferre a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this meanes
all beneficence, and trust, together with all kind of benevolence would
be taken from among men, neither would there be ought of mutuall
assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour;
by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarily remain, contrary
to the fundamentall Law of Nature: But because the breach of this Law is
not a breach of trust, or contract, (for we suppose no Contracts to have
pass'd among them) therefore is it not usually termed an injury, but
because good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each other, it is
called INGRATITUDE.

IX. The fourth precept of Nature, is, That every man render himself
usefull unto others: which, that we may rightly understand, we must
remember that there is in men, a diversity of dispositions to enter into
society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that
which is found in stones, brought together in the Building, by reason of
the diversity of their matter, and figure. For as a stone, which in
regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other
stones than it fils up it selfe, neither because of the hardnesse of its
matter cannot well be prest together, or easily cut, and would hinder
the building from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for
use: so a man, who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining
superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others, and
being incorrigible, by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections, is
commonly said to be uselesse, and troublesome unto others. Now, because
each one not by Right onely, but even by naturall necessity is suppos'd,
with all his main might, to intend the procurement of those things which
are necessary to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the
other side for superfluities, by his default there will arise a Warre,
because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending, he
therefore acts against the fundamentall Law of Nature: Whence it
followes (which wee were to shew) that it is a precept of nature; That
every man accommodate himselfe to others. But he who breaks this Law may
be called uselesse, and troublesome. Yet Cicero opposeth inhumanity to
this usefulnesse, as having regard to this very Law.

X. The fifth precept of the Law of nature is: That we must forgive him
who repents, and asketh pardon for what is past; having first taken
caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the
remission of an offence, is nothing else but the granting of Peace to
him that asketh it, after he hath warr'd against us, & now is become
penitent. But Peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him
that retains an hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the future;
that is, seeks not Peace, but oportunity, is not properly Peace but
feare, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will
not pardon the penitent, and that gives future caution, peace it selfe
it seems is not pleasing; which is contrary to the naturall Law.

XI. The sixth precept of the naturall Law is, That in revenge and
punishments we must have our eye not at the evill past, but the future
good. That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other
end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by
his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from
hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one
another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been shewed in
the foregoing Article. Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be
onely considered, is nothing else but a certain triumph, and glory of
minde, which points at no end, (for it contemplates onely what is past;
but the end is a thing to come) but that which is directed to no end is
vain; That revenge therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from
vaine glory, and therefore without reason. But to hurt another without
reason introduces a warre, and is contrary to the fundamentall Law of
Nature; It is therefore a precept of the Law of nature, that in revenge
wee look not backwards but forward. Now the breach of this Law, is
commonly called CRUELTY.

XII. But because all signes of hatred, and contempt provoke most of all
to brawling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their
lives, (that I say not their Peace) than suffer reproach; it followes in
the seventh place, That it is prescribed by the Law of nature, that no
man either by deeds, or words, countenance, or laughter, doe declare
himselfe to hate, or scorne another. The breach of which Law is called
Reproach. But although nothing be more frequent than the scoffes and
jeers of the powerfull against the weak, and namely of Judges against
guilty persons, which neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor
the duty of the Judges, yet these kind of men do act against the Law of
nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

XIII. The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to
the naturall, but civill state; for it hath been shewed before, Chap. I.
Art. 3. that all men by nature are equall, and therefore the inequality
which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come
from the civill Law. I know that Aristotle in his first book of
Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science,
that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others onely to
serve; as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men,
but by an aptnesse, that is, a certain kind of naturall knowledge, or
ignorance; which foundation is not onely against reason (as but now hath
been shewed) but also against experience: for neither almost is any man
so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by
himselfe, than to yeeld himselfe to the government of another; neither
if the wiser and stronger doe contest, have these ever, or often the
upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equall by nature, the
equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequall, because they are
like to contest for dominion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace,
that they be esteemed as equall; and therefore it is in the eight place
a precept of the Law of nature, That every man be accounted by nature
equall to another, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE.

XIV. As it was necessary to the conservation of each man, that he should
part with some of his Rights, so it is no lesse necessary to the same
conservation, that he retain some others, to wit the Right of bodily
protection, of free enjoyment of ayre, water, and all necessaries for
life. Since therefore many common Rights are retained by those who enter
into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones are also acquired,
hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the naturall Law, to wit, That what
Rights soever any man challenges to himselfe, he also grant the same as
due to all the rest: otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged
in the former Article. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of
persons in the making up of society, but to attribute equall Right and
Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society?
But to ascribe equall things to equalls, is the same with giving things
proportionall to proportionals. The observation of this Law is called
MEEKNES, the violation pleonexia, the breakers by the Latines are styled
Immodici et immodesti.

XV. In the tenth place it is commanded by the Law of nature, That every
man in dividing Right to others, shew himselfe equall to either party.
By the foregoing Law we are forbidden to assume more Right by nature to
our selves, than we grant to others. We may take lesse if we will, for
that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of
Right be to be divided by us unto others, we are forbidden by this Law
to favour one more or lesse than another. For he that by favouring one
before another, observes not this naturall equality, reproaches him whom
he thus undervalues: but it is declared above, that a reproach is
against the Lawes of Nature. The observance of this Precept is called
EQUITY; the breach, Respect of Persons. The Greeks in one word term it
prosopolepsia.

XVI. From the foregoing Law is collected this eleventh, Those things
which cannot be divided, must be used in common, (if they can) and (that
the quantity of the matter permit) every man as much as he lists, but if
the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proportionally to the
number of the users: for otherwise that equality can by no means be
observed, which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded
by the Law of Nature.

XVII. Also what cannot be divided, nor had in common, it is provided by
the Law of nature (which may be the twelfth Precept) that the use of
that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one onely by lot, and that
in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot who shall have the
first use of it; For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no
other can be found, but that of lot.

XVIII. But all lot is twofold; arbitrary, or naturall; Arbitrary is that
which is cast by the consent of the Contenders, and it consists in meer
chance (as they say) or fortune. Naturall is primogeniture (in Greek
klironomia, as it were given by lot) or first possession. Therefore the
things which can neither be divided, nor had in common, must be granted
to the first possessour, as also those things which belonged to the
Father are due to the Sonne, unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly
conveighed away that Right to some other. Let this therefore stand for
the thirteenth Law of Nature.

XIX. The 14. Precept of the Law of nature is; That safety must be assured
to the mediators for Peace. For the reason which commands the end,
commands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of
Reason is Peace. All the rest are means to obtain it, and without which
Peace cannot be had. But neither can Peace be had without mediation, nor
mediation without safety; it is therefore a dictate of Reason, that is,
a Law of nature, That we must give all security to the Mediators for
Peace.

XX. Furthermore, because, although men should agree to make all these,
and whatsoever other Lawes of Nature, and should endeavour to keep them,
yet doubts, and controversies would daily arise concerning the
application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done,
were against the Law, or not, (which we call, the question of Right)
whence will follow a fight between Parties, either sides supposing
themselves wronged; it is therefore necessary to the preservation of
Peace (because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought
on) that both the disagreeing Parties refer the matter unto some third,
and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in
deciding the controversie. And he to whom they thus refer themselves is
called an Arbiter. It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall Law,
That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit
themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third.

XXI. But from this ground, that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the
differing Parties to determine the controversie, we gather, that the
Arbiter must not be one of the Parties: for every man is presumed to
seek what is good for himselfe naturally, and what is just, onely for
Peaces sake, and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same
equality commanded by the Law of nature so exactly as a third man would
do: It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of
nature, That no man must be Judge or Arbiter in his own cause.

XXII. From the same ground followes in the seventeenth place, That no
man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit, or
glory, from the victory of either part: for the like reason swayes here,
as in the foregoing Law.

XXIII. But when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe, to wit,
whether that bee done or not, which is said to bee done, the naturall
Law wills, that the Arbiter trust both Parties alike, that is, (because
they affirm contradictories) that hee believe neither: He must therefore
give credit to a third, or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be
able to give judgement of the fact, as often as by other signes he
cannot come to the knowledge of it. The 18. Law of nature therefore
injoynes Arbiters, and Judges of fact, That where firm and certain
signes of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence by such
witnesses, as seem to be indifferent to both Parts.

XXIV. From the above declared definition of an Arbiter may be
furthermore understood, That no contract or promise must Passe between
him and the parties whose Judge he is appointed, by vertue whereof he
may be engaged to speak in favour of either part, nay, or be oblig'd to
judge according to equity, or to pronounce such sentence as he shall
truly judge to be equall. The Judge is indeed bound to give such
sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature recounted
in the 15. Article. To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added
by way of Compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besides, if
giving wrong judgement, he should contend for the equity of it, except
such Compact be of no force, the Controversie would remain after
Judgement given, which is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiter,
who is so chosen, as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to
the judgement which he should pronounce. The Law of Nature therefore
commands the Judge to be disengaged, which is its 19. precept.

XXV. Farthermore, forasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought else but
the dictates of Reason, so as, unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the
faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the Lawes of Nature, it is
manifest, that he, who knowingly, or willingly, doth ought, whereby the
rationall faculty may be destroyed, or weakned, he knowingly, and
willingly, breaks the Law of nature: For there is no difference between
a man who performes not his Duty, and him who does such things
willingly, as make it impossible for him to doe it. But they destroy and
weaken the reasoning faculty, who doe that which disturbs the mind from
its naturall state; that which most manifestly happens to Drunkards and
Gluttons; we therefore sin in the 20. place against the Law of Nature by
Drunkennesse.

XXVI. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by
a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us to look
to the preservation, and safegard of our selves, will say, That the
deduction of these Lawes is so hard, that it is not to be expected they
will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will they prove obliging:
for Lawes, if they be not known, oblige not, nay, indeed are not Lawes.
To this I answer, it's true, That hope, fear, anger, ambition,
covetousnesse, vain glory, and other perturbations of mind, doe hinder a
man so, as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these Lawes, whilst
those passions prevail in him: But there is no man who is not sometimes
in a quiet mind; At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him
to know, though he be never so rude and unlearn'd, than this only Rule,
That when he doubts, whether what he is now doing to another, may be
done by the Law of Nature, or not, he conceive himselfe to be in that
others stead. Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to
the fact, being now cast into the other scale, disswade him as much: And
this Rule is not onely easie, but is Anciently celebrated in these
words, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris: Do not that to
others, you would not have done to your self.

XXVII. But because most men, by reason of their perverse desire of
present profit, are very unapt to observe these Lawes, although
acknowledg'd by them, if perhaps some others more humble than the rest
should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates, those
not practising the same, surely they would not follow Reason in so
doing; nor would they hereby procure themselves peace, but a more
certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey
to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be imagin'd, that by
Nature, (that is, by Reason) men are oblig'd to the exercise of all
these Lawes [2] in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by
others. We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to
observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the
end for which they were ordain'd. We must therefore conclude, that the
Law of Nature doth alwayes, and every where oblige in the internall
Court, or that of Conscience, but not alwayes in the externall Court,
but then onely when it may be done with safety.

XXVIII. But the Lawes which oblige Conscience, may be broken by an act,
not onely contrary to them, but also agreeable with them, if so be that
he who does it be of another opinion: for though the act it self be
answerable to the Lawes, yet his Conscience is against them.

XXIX. The Lawes of Nature are immutable, and eternall; What they forbid,
can never be lawfull; what they command, can never be unlawfull: For
pride, ingratitude, breach of Contracts (or injury), inhumanity,
contumely, will never be lawfull; nor the contrary vertues to these ever
unlawfull, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that is, as
they are considered in the Court of Conscience, where onely they oblige,
and are Lawes. Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances, and
the Civill Law, that what's done with equity at one time, is guilty of
iniquity at another; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary
to it another. Yet Reason is still the same, and changeth not her end,
which is Peace, and Defence; nor of the minde which the meanes to
attaine them, to wit, those vertues we have declar'd above, and which
cannot be abrogated by any Custome, or Law whatsoever.

XXX. It's evident by what hath hitherto been said, how easily the Lawes
of Nature are to be observ'd, because they require the endeavour onely,
(but that must be true and constant) which who so shall performe, we may
rightly call him JUST. For he who tends to this with his whole might,
namely, that his actions be squar'd according to the precepts of Nature,
he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those Lawes, which
is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature. Now he that hath done all
he is oblig'd to, is a Just Man.

XXXI. All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same with the
Morall. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know therefore, that
Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclination, or
aversion of them by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men
are diverse, according to their diverse Constitutions, Customes,
Opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense, as by
tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the
common actions of life, where what this man commends, (that is to say,
calls Good) the other undervalues, as being Evil; Nay, very often the
same man at diverse times, praises, and dispraises the same thing.
Whilst thus they doe, necessary it is there should be discord, and
strife: They are therefore so long in the state of War, as by reason of
the diversity of the present appetites, they mete Good and Evill by
diverse measures. All men easily acknowledge this state, as long as they
are in it, to be evill, and by consequence that Peace is good. They
therefore who could not agree concerning a present, doe agree concerning
a future Good, which indeed is a work of Reason; for things present are
obvious to the sense, things to come to our Reason only. Reason
declaring Peace to be good, it followes by the same reason, that all the
necessary means to Peace be good also, and therefore, that Modesty,
Equity, Trust, Humanity, Mercy (which we have demonstrated to be
necessary to Peace) are good Manners, or habits, (that is) Vertues. The
Law therefore, in the means to Peace, commands also Good Manners, or the
practise of Vertue: And therefore it is call'd Morall.

XXXII. But because men cannot put off this same irrationall appetite,
whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict
consequence, many unforeseen evills doe adhere) before the future, it
happens, that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the
foresaid vertues, yet they disagree still concerning their Nature, to
wit, in what each of them doth consist; for as oft as anothers good
action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of some
neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions, which please them, are ever
entituled to some Vertue; whence it comes to passe that the same Action
is prais'd by these, and call'd Vertue, and dispraised by those, and
termed vice. Neither is there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers
for this matter; for since they could not observe the goodnesse of
actions to consist in this, that it was in order to Peace, and the evill
in this, that it related to discord, they built a morall Philosophy
wholly estranged from the morall Law, and unconstant to it self; for
they would have the nature of vertues seated in a certain kind of
mediocrity betweene two extremes, and the vices in the extremes
themselves; which is apparently false: For to dare is commended, and
under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertue, although it be an
extreme, if the cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing given,
whether it be great, or little, or between both, makes not liberality,
but the cause of giving it. Neither is it injustice, if I give any man
more, of what is mine own, than I owe him. The Lawes of Nature therefore
are the summe of Morall Philosophy, whereof I have onely delivered such
precepts in this place, as appertain to the preservation of our selves
against those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other
precepts of rationall nature, from whence spring other vertues: for
temperance also is a precept of Reason, because intemperance tends to
sicknesse, and death. And so fortitude too, (that is) that same faculty
of resisting stoutly in present dangers, (and which are more hardly
declined than overcome) because it is a means tending to the
preservation of him that resists.

XXXIII. But those which we call the Lawes of nature (since they are
nothing else but certain conclusions understood by Reason, of things to
be done, and omitted; but a Law to speak properly and accurately, is the
speech of him who by Right commands somewhat to others to be done, or
omitted) are not (in propriety of speech) Lawes, as they proceed from
nature; yet as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures, (as we
shall see in the Chapter following) they are most properly called by the
name of Lawes: for the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding
over all things by greatest Right.

____________

1. Injury can be done to no man. The word injustice relates to some Law:
Injury to some Person, as well as some Law. For what's unjust, is unjust
to all; but there may an injury be done, and yet not against me, nor
thee, but some other; and sometimes against no private Person, but the
Magistrate only; sometimes also neither against the Magistrate, nor any
private man, but onely against God; for through Contract, and
conveighance of Right, we say, that an injury is done against this, or
that man. Hence it is (which we see in all kind of Government) that what
private men contract between themselves by word, or writing, is releast
againe at the will of the Obliger. But those mischiefes which are done
against the Lawes of the Land, as theft, homicide, and the like, are
punisht not as he wills, to whom the hurt is done, but according to the
will of the Magistrate; that is, the constituted Lawes.

2. The exercise of all these Lawes. Nay among these Lawes some things
there are, the omission whereof (provided it be done for Peace, or
Self-preservation) seemes rather to be the fulfilling, than breach of
the Naturall Law; for he that doth all things against those that doe all
things, and plunders plunderers, doth equity; but on the other side, to
doe that which in Peace is an handsome action, and becomming an honest
man, is dejectednesse, and Poornesse of spirit, and a betraying of ones
self in the time of War, But there are certain naturall Lawes, whose
exercise ceaseth not even in the time of War it self; for I cannot
understand what drunkennesse, or cruelty (that is, Revenge which
respects not the future good) can advance toward Peace, or the
preservation of any man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what's just,
and unjust, is not to be esteem'd by the Actions, but by the Counsell,
and Conscience of the Actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of
endeavour for Peace, for the preservation of our selves, is done with
Right; otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the
naturall Law, and an injury against God.


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Chapter IV.

That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law.

I. The same Law which is Naturall, and Morall, is also wont to be called
Divine, nor undeservedly, as well because Reason, which is the law of
Nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as
because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same
with those which have been delivered from the divine Majesty, for the
LAWES of his heavenly Kingdome, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and his holy
Prophets and Apostles. What therefore by reasoning we have understood
above concerning the law of nature, we will endeavour to confirme the
same in this Chapter by holy writ.

II. But first we will shew those places in which it is declared, that
the Divine Law is seated in right reason. Psalm 37:30,31. The mouth of
the righteous will be exercised in wisdome, and his tongue will be
talking of Judgement: The law of God is in his heart. Jerem. 31:33. I
will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts.
Psal. 19:7. The law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the
soule. ver. 8. The Commandement of the Lord is Pure, and giveth light
unto the eyes. Deuteron. 30:11. This Commandement which I command thee
this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off, &c. vers.
14. But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thine
heart; that thou maist doe it. Psal. 119:34. Give me understanding, and
I shall keep thy law. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a
light unto my paths. Proverbs 9:10. The knowledge of the holy is
understanding. Christ the Law-giver himselfe is called (John 1:1.) the
word. The same Christ is called (vers. 9.) the true light that lighteth
every man that cometh in the world. All which are descriptions of right
reason, whose dictates, we have shewed before, are the lawes of nature.

III. But that which wee set downe for the fundamentall law of nature,
namely, that Peace was to be sought for, is also the summe of the divine
law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. 3:17. Righteousnesse, (which
is the summe of the law) is called the way of Peace Psal. 85:10.
Righteousnesse and Peace have kissed each other. Matth. v. 9. Blessed
are the Peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God. And
after Saint Paul in his 6. Chapter to the Hebrewes, and the last verse
had called Christ (the Legislator of that law we treat of) an
High-Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedeck; he addes in the
following Chapter, the first verse, This Melchizedeck was King of Salem,
Priest of the most high God, &c. vers. 2. First being by interpretation
King of Righteousnesse, and after that also King of Salem, which is,
King of peace. Whence it is cleare, that Christ the King in his Kingdome
placeth Righteousnesse and Peace together. Psal. 34. Eschue evill and
doe good, seek Peace and pursue it. Isaiah 9:6,7. Unto us a child is
born, unto us a Sonne is given, and the government shall be upon his
shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the
mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace. Isaiah 52:7.
How beautifull upon the mountaines are the feet of him that bringeth
good tidings, that publisheth Peace, that bringeth good tidings of good,
that publisheth salvation, that saith unto Sion, thy God reigneth! Luke
2:14. In the Nativity of Christ, the voice of them that praised God
saying, Glory be to God on high, and in earth Peace, good will towards
men. And Isaiah 53:5. The Gospell is called the chastisement of our
Peace. Isaiah 59:8. Righteousnesse is called the way of Peace. The way
of Peace they know not, and there is no judgement in their goings. Micah
5:4,5. speaking of the Messias, he saith thus, He shall stand and feed
in the strength of the Lord, in the Majesty of the name of the Lord his
God, and they shall abide, for now shall he be great unto the end of the
earth; And this man shall be your Peace, &c. Prov. 3:1,2. My sonne
forget not my law, but let thine heart keep my Commandements, for length
of dayes, and long life, and Peace, shall they adde to thee.

IV. What appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all
things, or concerning the introduction of meum & tuum, We perceive in
the first place how great an adversary this same Community is to Peace,
by those words of Abraham to Lot, Gen. 13:8,9. Let there be no strife I
Pray thee, between thee and me, and between thy heard-men, and my
heard-men, for we be brethren. Is not the whole land before thee?
Separate thy selfe I Pray thee from me. And all those places of
Scripture by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon our neighbours,
as, Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not
steal, &c. doe confirm the law of distinction between Mine, and Thine.
for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away.

V. The same precepts establish the second law of nature of keeping
trust: for what doth, Thou shalt not invade anothers right, import, but
this? Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by thy contract
ceaseth to be thine; but expressely set down, Psal. 15: vers. 1. To him
that asked, Lord who shall dwell in thy Tabernacle? It is answered,
vers. 4: He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and disappointeth him not;
and Prov. 6:1,2. My sonne if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou have
stricken thy hand with a stranger, Thou art snared with the words of thy
mouth.

VI. The third Law concerning gratitude is proved by these places, Deut.
25:4. Thou shalt not muzzle the Oxe when he treadeth out the corn; which
Saint Paul I. Cor. 9:9. interprets to be spoken of men, not Oxen onely.
Prov. 17:13. Who so rewardeth evill for good, evill shall not depart
from his house. And Deut. 20:10,11. When thou comest nigh unto a city to
fight against it, then proclaim Peace unto it. And it shall be if it
make thee answer of Peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all
the people that is found therein, shall be tributaries unto thee, and
they shall serve thee. Proverbs 3:29. Devise not evill against thy
neighbour, seeing he dwelleth securely by thee.

VII. To the fourth Law of accommodating our selves, these precepts are
conformable, Exod. 23:4,5. If thou meet thine enemies Oxe, or his Asse
going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again; if thou see
the Asse of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest
forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him. Also, vers. 9.
Thou shalt not oppresse a stranger. Prov. 3:30. Strive not with a man
without a cause, if he have done thee no harme. Prov. 15:18. A wrathfull
man stirreth up strife, but he that is slow to anger, appeaseth strife.
Prov. 18:24. There is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother. The
same is confirmed, Luke 10, by the Parable of the Samaritan, who had
compassion on the Jew that was wounded by theeves, and by Christs
precept, Matth. v. 39. But I say unto you, that ye resist not evill, but
whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other
also, &c.

VIII. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are
some. Matth. 6:14,15. If you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly
Father will also forgive you: but if you forgive not men their
trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. Matth.
18:21, 22. Lord how oft shall my Brother sinne against me, and I forgive
him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say not till seven times,
but till seventy times seven times: that is, toties quoties.

IX. For the confirmation of the sixth law, all those places are
pertinent which command us to shew mercy; such as Mat. v. 7. Blessed are
the mercifull, for they shall obtain mercy. Levit. 19:18. Thou shalt not
avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people. But
there are, who not onely think this law is not proved by Scripture, but
plainly disproved from hence, that there is an eternall punishment
reserved for the wicked after death, where there is no place either for
amendment, or example. Some resolve this objection by answering, That
God, whom no law restrains, refers all to his glory, but that man must
not doe so; as if God sought his glory, (that is to say) pleased
himselfe in the death of a sinner. It is more rightly answered, that the
institution of eternall punishment was before sin, and had regard to
this onely, that men might dread to commit sinne for the time to come.

X. The words of Christ prove this seventh, Matth. v. 22. But I say unto
you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be
in danger of the judgement, and whosoever shall say unto his Brother
Racha, shall be in danger of the Counsell, but whosoever shall say, thou
foole, shall be in danger of hell fire. Prov. 10:18. Hee that uttereth a
slander is a foole. Prov. 14:21. Hee that despiseth his neighbour,
sinneth. Prov. 15:1. Grievous words stir up anger. Prov. 22:10. Cast out
the scorner, and contention shall goe out, and reproach shall cease.

XI. The eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature, that is, of
humility, is established by these places. Mat. 5:3. Blessed are the Poor
in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of heaven. Prov. 6:16-19. These six
things doth the Lord hate, yea seven are an abomination unto him: A
proud look, &c. Prov. 16:5. Every one that is proud is an abomination
unto the Lord, though hand joyne in hand, he shall not be unpunished.
Prov. 11:2. When pride cometh, then cometh shame, but with the lowly, is
wisdome. Thus Isaiah 40:3. (where the comming of the Messias is shewed
forth, for preparation towards his Kingdome) The voyce of him that cryed
in the wildernesse, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make
strait in the desart a high way for our God. Every valley shall be
exalted, and every mountain, and hill, shall be made low; which
doubtlesse is spoken to men, and not to mountains.

XII. But that same Equity which we proved in the ninth place to be a Law
of Nature, which commands every man to allow the same Rights to others
they would be allowed themselves, and which containes in it all the
other Lawes besides, is the same which Moses sets down, Levit. 19:18.
Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self; and our Saviour calls it the
summe of the morall Law, Mat. 22:36-40. Master, which is the great
Commandement in the Law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord
thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy
mind; this is the first and great Commandement, and the second is like
unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. On these two
Commandements hang all the Law and the Prophets. But to love our
neighbor as our selves, is nothing else, but to grant him all we desire
to have granted to our selves.

XIII. By the tenth Law respect of Persons is forbid; as also by these
places following, Mat. v. 45. That ye may be children of your Father
which is in Heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the Evill, and on
the Good, &c. Collos. 3:11. There is neither Greek, nor Jew,
circumcision, nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, or Scythian, bond, or free,
but Christ is all, & in all. Acts 10:34. Of a truth, I perceive, that
God is no respecter of Persons. 2 Chron. 19:7. There is no iniquity with
the Lord our God, nor respect of Persons, nor taking of gifts. Eccles.
35:12. The Lord is Judge, and with him is no respect of Persons. Rom.
2:11. For there is no respect of Persons with God.

XIV. The eleventh Law, which commands those things to be held in common
which cannot be divided, I know not whether there be any expresse place
in Scripture for it, or not; but the practise appears every where in the
common use of Wels, Wayes, Rivers, sacred things, &c. for else men could
not live.

XV. We said in the twelfth place, that it was a Law of Nature, That
where things could neither be divided, nor possess'd in common, they
should be dispos'd by lot, which is confirmed as by the example of
Moses, who by Gods command, Numb. 26:55. divided the severall parts of
the land of promise unto the Tribes by Lot: So Acts 1:24. by the example
of the Apostles, who receiv'd Matthias, before Justus, into their
number, by casting Lots, and saying, Thou Lord, who knowest the hearts
of all men, shew whether of these two thou hast chosen, &c. Prov. 16:33.
The lot is cast into the lappe, but the whole disposing thereof is of
the Lord. And which is the thirteenth Law, the Succession was due unto
Esau, as being the First-born of Isaac, if himself had not sold it,
(Gen. 25:30.) or that the Father had not otherwise appointed.

XVI. Saint Paul writing to the Corinthians, 1 Epist. 6, reprehends the
Corinthians of that City for going to Law one with another before
infidell Judges who were their enemies, calling it a fault, that they
would not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be defrauded; for
that is against that Law, whereby we are commanded to be helpful to each
other. But if it happen the Controversie be concerning things necessary,
what is to be done? Therefore the Apostle, Ver. 5. speaks thus, I speak
to your shame. Is it so that there is not one wise man among you, no,
not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? He therefore,
by those words confirmes that Law of Nature which we call'd the
fifteenth, to wit, Where Controversies cannot be avoided, there by the
consent of Parties to appoint some Arbiter, and him some third man; so
as (which is the 16 Law) neither of the Parties may be judge in his own
Cause.

XVII. But that the Judge, or Arbiter, must receive no reward for his
Sentence, (which is the 17. Law) appears, Exod. 23:8. Thou shalt take no
gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and perverteth the words of the
righteous. Eccles. 20:29. Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise.
Whence it followes, that he must not be more oblig'd to one part than
the other, which is the 19. Law, and is also confirm'd, Deut. 1:17. Ye
shall not respect Persons in Judgment, ye shall hear the small as well
as the great; and in all those places which are brought against respect
of Persons.

XVIII. That in the judgement of Fact, witnesses must be had, (which is
the 18. Law) the Scripture not only confirmes, but requires more than
one, Deut. 17:6. At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses,
shall he that is worthy of death be put to death. The same is repeated,
Deut. 19:15.

XIX. Drunkennesse, which we have therefore in the last place numbred
among the breaches of the Naturall Law, because it hinders the use of
right Reason, is also forbid in sacred Scripture for the same reason.
Prov. 20:1. Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, whosoever is
deceived thereby is not wise. And Prov. 31:4,5. It is not for Kings to
drink wine, lest they drink, and forget the Law, and pervert the
judgement of any of the afflicted: but that we might know that the
malice of this vice consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink,
but in that it destroyes Judgement and Reason, it followes in the next
Verse, Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish, and wine to
those that be heavy of heart. Let him drink, and forget his poverty, and
remember his misery no more. Christ useth the same reason in prohibiting
drunkenesse, Luk. 21:34. Take heed to your selves, lest at any time your
hearts be overcharg'd with surfetting and drunkennesse.

XX. That we said in the foregoing Chapter, The Law of Nature is
eternall, is also prov'd out of Matth. 5:18. Verily I say unto you, till
Heaven and Earth Passe, one jot, or one tittle, shall in no wise Passe
from the Law, and Psal. 119:160. Every one of thy righteous judgements
endureth for ever.

XXI. We also said, That the Lawes of Nature had regard chiefly unto
Conscience; that is, that he is just, who by all possible endeavour
strives to fulfill them. And although a man should order all his actions
(so much as belongs to externall obedience) just as the Law commands,
but not for the Lawes sake, but by reason of some punishment annext unto
it, or out of Vain glory, yet he is unjust. Both these are proved by the
Holy Scriptures. The first, Isaiah 60:7. Let the wicked forsake his way,
and unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and
he wil have mercy upon him, and to our God, for he will abundantly
pardon. Ezek. 18:31. Cast away from you all your transgressions whereby
you have transgressed, & make you a new heart, and a new spirit; for why
will you die O house of Israel? By which, and the like places, we may
sufficiently understand that God will not punish their deeds whose heart
is right. The second out of Isaiah 29:13,14. The Lord said, Forasmuch as
this people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips doe
honour me, but have removed their heart far from me, therefore I will
proceed, &c. Mat. 5:20. Except your righteousnesse shall exceed the
righteousnesse of the Scribes and Pharisees ye shall in no case enter
into the Kingdom of Heaven; and in the following verses our Saviour
explains to them how that the commands of God are broken, not by Deeds
only, but also by the Will; for the Scribes and Pharises did in outward
act observe the Law most exactly, but for Glories sake onely; else they
would as readily have broken it. There are innumerable places of
Scripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that God accepts the Will
for the Deed, and that as well in good, as in evill actions.

XXII. That the Law of Nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares in
Matthew 11:28-30. Come unto me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of
me, &c. for my yoke is easie, and my burthen light.

XXIII. Lastly, the Rule by which I said any man might know whether what
he was doing, were contrary to the Law, or not, to wit, what thou
wouldst not be done to, doe not that to another, is almost in the self
same words delivered by our Saviour, Mat. 7:12. Therefore all things
whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them.

XXIV. As the law of nature is all of it Divine, so the Law of Christ by
conversion, (which is wholly explain'd in the 5. 6. and 7. Chapter of
S. Matthewes Gospell) is all of it also (except that one Commandement of
not marrying her who is put away for adultery, which Christ brought for
explication of the divine positive Law, against the Jewes, who did not
rightly interpret the Mosaicall Law) the doctrine of Nature: I say the
whole Law of Christ is explain'd in the fore-named Chapters, not the
whole Doctrine of Christ; for Faith is a part of Christian Doctrine,
which is not comprehended under the title of a Law; for Lawes are made,
and given, in reference to such actions as follow our will, not in order
to our Opinions, and, Belief which being out of our power, follow not
the Will.


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Dominion

Chapter V.

Of the causes, and first begining of civill Government

I. It is of it selfe manifest, that the actions of men proceed from the
will, and the will from hope, and feare, insomuch as when they shall see
a greater good, or lesse evill, likely to happen to them by the breach,
than observation of the Lawes, they'l wittingly violate them. The hope
therefore which each man hath of his security, and self-preservation,
consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his
neighbour, either openly, or by stratagem. Whence we may understand,
that the naturall lawes, though well understood, doe not instantly
secure any man in their practise, and consequently, that as long as
there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there remains to
every man that same primitive Right of selfe-defence, by such means as
either he can or will make use of (that is) a Right to all things, or
the Right of warre; and it is sufficient for the fulfiling of the
naturall law, that a man be prepared in mind to embrace Peace when it
may be had.

II. It is an old saying, That all lawes are silent in the time of warre,
and it is a true one, not onely if we speak of the civill, but also of
the naturall lawes, provided they be referr'd not to the mind, but to
the actions of men, by the third Chapter, Art. 29. And we mean such a
war as is of all men against all men; such as is the meer state of
nature; although in the warre of nation against nation a certain mean
was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time there was a manner of
living, and as it were a certain oeconomy, which they called leotrikon,
living by Rapine, which was neither against the law of nature, (things
then so standing) nor voyd of glory to those who exercised it with
valour, not with cruelty. Their custome was, taking away the rest, to
spare life, and abstain from Oxen fit for plough, and every instrument
serviceable to husbandry, which yet is not so to be taken, as if they
were bound to doe thus by the law of nature, but that they had regard to
their own glory herein, lest by too much cruelty, they might be
suspected guilty of feare.

III. Since therefore the exercise of the naturall law is necessary for
the preservation of Peace, and that for the exercise of the naturall law
security is no lesse necessary, it is worth the considering what that is
which affords such a security: for this matter nothing else can be
imagined, but that each man provide himselfe of such meet helps, as the
invasion of one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous, as either of
them may think it better to refrain, than to meddle. But first it is
plain, that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a
security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other
side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and hartens
the enemy to attacque us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the
security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them who
conspire in a mutuall assistance be so great, that the accession of some
few to the enemies party may not prove to them a matter of moment
sufficient to assure the victory.

IV. Farthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on
selfe-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent
means whereby to compasse this, but every man after his own manner shall
make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that divided
in their opinions they will be an hinderance to each other, or if they
agree well enough to some one action through hope of victory, spoyle, or
revenge, yet afterward through diversity of wits, and Counsels, or
emulation, and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so
torne and rent, as they will neither give mutuall help, nor desire
peace, except they be constrained to it by some common feare. Whence it
followes, that the consent of many, (which consists in this onely, as we
have already defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all
their actions to the same end, and the common good) that is to say, that
the society proceeding from mutuall help onely, yeelds not that security
which they seek for, who meet, and agree in the exercise of the
above-named lawes of nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that
those who have once consented for the common good, to peace and mutuall
help, may by fear be restrained, lest afterward they again dissent, when
their private Interest shall appear discrepant from the common good.

V. Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls Politique, not
man only, but divers others; as the Ant, the Bee, &c. which though they
be destitute of reason, by which they may contract, and submit to
government, notwithstanding by consenting, (that is to say) ensuing, or
eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end,
that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not
their gathering together a civill government, and therefore those
animals not to be termed politicall, because their government is onely a
consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in
civill government) one will. It is very true that in those creatures,
living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable,
as there is no need of any thing more to secure it, and (by consequence)
to preserve peace among them, than barely their naturall inclination.
But among men the case is otherwise. For first among them there is a
contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none:
whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and warre, is among
men; among beasts no such matter. Next, the naturall appetite of Bees,
and the like creatures, is conformable, and they desire the common good
which among them differs not from their private; but man scarce esteems
any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment,
more than that which others doe possesse. Thirdly, those creatures which
are voyd of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the
administration of their Common-weales; but in a multitude of men there
are many who supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to
innovate, and divers Innovators innovate divers wayes, which is a meer
distraction, and civill warre. Fourthly, these brute creatures,
howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their
affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is
necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is
represented to it as being better, and evill as worse than in truth it
is; But the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre, and sedition; and it is
reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches
thundered, and lightened, and confounded whole Greece it selfe. Fiftly,
they cannot distinguish between injury and harme; Thence it happens that
as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellowes: But
those men are of most trouble to the Republique, who have most leasure
to be idle; for they use not to contend for publique places before they
have gotten the victory over hunger, and cold. Last of all, the consent
of those brutall creatures is naturall, that of men by compact onely,
(that is to say) artificiall; it is therefore no matter of wonder if
somewhat more be needfull for men to the end they may live in peace.
Wherefore consent, or contracted society, without some common power
whereby particular men may be ruled through feare of punishment, doth
not suffice to make up that security which is requisite to the exercise
of naturall justice.

VI. Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth
not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is
requisite that in those necessary matters which concern Peace and
selfe-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be
done, unlesse every man will so subject his will to some other one, to
wit, either Man or Counsell, that whatsoever his will is in those things
which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of
all men in generall, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering
together of many men who deliberate of what is to be done, or not to be
done, for the common good of all men, is that which I call a COUNSELL.

VII. This submission of the wils of all those men to the will of one
man, or one Counsell, is then made, when each one of them obligeth
himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of
that one man, or counsell, to which he hath submitted himselfe; that is,
that he refuse him not the use of his wealth, and strength, against any
others whatsoever (for he is supposed still to retain a Right of
defending himselfe against violence) and this is called UNION. But we
understand that to be the will of the counsell, which is the will of the
major part of those men of whom the Counsell consists.

VIII. But though the will it self be not voluntary, but only the
beginning of voluntary actions (for we will not to will, but to act) and
therefore falls least of all under deliberation, and compact; yet he who
submits his will to the will of an other, conveighs to that other the
Right of his strength, and faculties; insomuch as when the rest have
done the same, he to whom they have submitted hath so much power, as by
the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto
unity, and concord.

IX. Now union thus made is called a City, or civill society, and also a
civill Person; for when there is one will of all men, it is to be
esteemed for one Person, and by the word (one) it is to be knowne, and
distinguished from all particular men, as having its own Rights and
properties; insomuch as neither any one Citizen, nor all of them
together (if we except him whose will stands for the will of all) is to
be accounted the City. A CITY therefore (that we may define it) is one
Person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for
the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of
each particular person, to the maintenance of peace, and for common
defence.

X. But although every City be a civill Person, yet every civill Person
is not a City; for it may happen that many Citizens, by the permission
of the City, may joyne together in one Person, for the doing of certain
things. These now will be civill Persons, as the companies of Merchants,
and many other Convents; but Cities they are not, because they have not
submitted themselves to the will of the company simply, and in all
things, but in certain things onely determined by the City; and on such
termes as it is lawfull for any one of them to contend in judgement
against the body it selfe of the sodality; which is by no means
allowable to a Citizen against the City; such like societies therefore
are civill Persons subordinate to the City.

XI. In every city, That Man, or Counsell, to whose will each particular
man hath subjected his will (so as hath been declared) is said to have
the SUPREME POWER, or CHIEFE COMMAND, or DOMINION; which Power, and
Right of commanding, consists in this, that each Citizen hath conveighed
all his strength and power to that man, or Counsell; which to have done
(because no man can transferre his power in a naturall manner) is
nothing else than to have parted with his Right of resisting. Each
Citizen, as also every subordinate civill Person, is called the SUBJECT
of him who hath the chiefe command.

XII. By what hath been sayed, it is sufficiently shewed, in what manner,
and by what degrees many naturall Persons, through desire of preserving
themselves, and by mutuall feare, have growne together into a civill
Person, whom we have called a City. But they who submit themselves to
another for feare, either submit to him whom they feare, or some other
whom they confide in for protection; They act according to the first
manner who are vanquished in warre, that they may not be slain; they
according to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be
overcome. The first manner receives its beginning from naturall Power,
and may be called the naturall beginning of a City; the latter from the
Counsell, and constitution of those who meet together, which is a
beginning by institution. Hence it is, that there are two kinds of
Cities, the one naturall, such as is the paternall, and despoticall; the
other institutive, which may be also called politicall. In the first the
Lord acquires to himselfe such Citizens as he will; in the other the
Citizens by their own wills appoint a Lord over themselves, whether he
be one man, or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe. But
we will speak in the first place of a City politicall or by institution,
and next of a City naturall.


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Chapter VI.

Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath the
supreme power in the City

I. We must consider first of all what a multitude [1] of men (gathering
themselves of their owne free wills into society) is, namely, that it is
not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his owne will, and
his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be propos'd. And
though by particular Contracts each single man may have his own Right,
and Propriety, so as one may say This is mine, the other, That is his;
yet will there not be any thing of which the whole multitude, as a
Person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, This is mine, more
than anothers. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as
it's one, but (if all, or more of them doe agree) it will not be an
Action, but as many actions, as Men. For although in some great
Sedition, it's commonly said, That the People of that City have taken up
Armes; yet is it true of those onely who are in Armes, or who consent to
them. For the City, which is one Person, cannot take up Armes against it
selfe. Whatsoever therefore is done by the multitude, must be understood
to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who
being in the Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the
things that were done by it, must be judg'd to have done nothing.
Besides, in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person, in that manner
as hath been said, there remaines that same state of nature in which all
things belong to all men and there is no place for Meum & Tuum, which is
call'd Dominion, and Propriety, by reason that that security is not yet
extant which we have declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the
practise of the Naturall Laws.

II. Next, we must consider that every one of the Multitude (by whose
meanes there may be a beginning to make up the City) must agree with the
rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the
Assembly, that be received for the will of all which the major part
shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a
Multitude of Men, whose Wills and Votes differ so variously. Now if any
one will not consent, the rest notwithstanding shall among themselves
constitute the City without him: Whence it will come to passe, that the
City retaines its primitive Right against the Dissentour, that is, the
Right of war, as against an Enemy.

III. But because we said in the foregoing Chapter, the sixth Article,
That there was requir'd to the security of men, not onely their Consent,
but also the Subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary
to Peace and Defence; and that in that Union, and Subjection, the nature
of a City consisted; We must discerne now in this place, out of those
things which may be propounded, discuss'd, and stated in an Assembly of
men, (all whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part) what
things are necessary to Peace, and common defence: But first of all, it
is necessary to Peace, that a man be so farre forth protected against
the violence of others, that he may live securely, that is, that he may
have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury.
Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutuall harmes, so as they
cannot be hurt, or injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and therefore
comes not within deliberation. But care may be had there be no just
cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves
to others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to have submitted
himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all things, before
that there was a care had of his security.

IV. It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those
who are now growing up into a City, doe covenant with the rest, either
by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like
Lawes; for the pravity of humane disposition is manifest to all, and by
experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are
kept to their duties, through conscience of their promises. We must
therefore provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments;
and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great
punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater
evill to have done it, than not to have done it: for all men, by a
necessity of nature, chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse
evill.

V. Now the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one,
when every man Contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I
will call this Right, The Sword of Justice. But these kind of contracts
men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves, or
their near friends are to suffer.

VI. Because therefore for the security of particular men, and, by
consequence for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of
using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to some Man or Counsell,
that Man or Counsell is necessarily understood by Right to have the
supreme Power in the City. For he that by Right punisheth at his own
discretion, by Right compells all men to all things which he himselfe
wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.

VII. But in vain doe they worship peace at home, who cannot defend
themselves against forrainers; neither is it possible for them to
protect themselves against forrainers, whose forces are not united; and
therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that
there be some one Counsell, or one man, who hath the Right to arm, to
gather together, to unite so many Citizens in all dangers, and on all
occasions, as shall be needfull for common defence against the certain
number, and strength of the enemy; and again, (as often as he shall
finde it expedient) to make peace with them. We must understand
therefore, that particular Citizens have conveighed their whole Right of
Warre, and Peace, unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this right
(which we may call the Sword of Warre) belongs to the same Man, or
Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no Man can by Right
compell Citizens to take up armes, and be at the expences of Warre, but
he who by Right can punish him who doth not obey. Both Swords therefore,
as well this of War, as that of Justice, even by the constitution it
selfe of a City, and essentially, doe belong to the chiefe command.

VIII. But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but to have
power by right to use the sword at his own will, it followes, that the
judgement of its right use pertaines to the same party: for if the Power
of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing
would be done. For in vain would he give judgement, who could not
execute his commands; or if he executed them by the power of another, he
himselfe is not said to have the Power of the Sword, but that other, to
whom he is onely an Officer. All judgement therefore in a City belongs
to him who hath the swords, (i.e.) to him, who hath the supreme
authority.

IX. Furthermore, since it no lesse, nay it much more conduceth to Peace
to prevent brawles from arising, than to appease them being risen; and
that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men
differ concerning Meum & Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and
unprofitable, good and evill, honest and dishonest, and the like, which
every man esteems according to his own judgement; it belongs to the same
chiefe power to make some common Rules for all men, and to declare them
publiquely, by which every man may know what may be called his, what
anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what
good, what evill, that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be
avoyded in our common course of life. But those Rules and measures are
usually called the civill Lawes, or the Lawes of the City, as being the
Commands of him who hath the supreme power in the City. And the CIVILL
LAWES (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him
who hath the chiefe authority in the City, for direction of the future
actions of his Citizens.

X. Furthermore, since the affaires of the City, both those of Warre, and
Peace, cannot possibly be all administred by one man, or one Counsell,
without Officers and subordinate Magistrates, and that it appertains to
Peace, and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge
of controversies, to search into neighbouring counsels, prudently to
wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the City,
should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason,
that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command
both in War, and in Peace.

XI. It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning
from, and necessarily depend on the will, and that the will of doing, or
omitting ought, depends on the opinion of the good and evill of the
reward, or punishment, which a man conceives he shall receive by the
act, or omission; so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions
of each; wherefore by evident and necessary inference, we may understand
that it very much concerns the interest of Peace, that no opinions or
doctrines be delivered to Citizens, by which they may imagine, that
either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City, that is, the
commands of that man, or Counsell, to whom the supreme power is
committed, or that it is lawfull for to resist him, or that a lesse
punishment remaines for him that denies, than him that yeelds obedience.
For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of naturall death,
another forbids it under pain of eternall death, and both by their own
Right, it will follow that the Citizens, although innocent, are not
onely by Right punishable, but that the City it selfe is altogether
dissolved; for no man can serve two Masters: nor is he lesse, but rather
more, a Master, whom we believe we are to obey for feare of damnation,
than he whom we obey for feare of temporall death. It followes
therefore, that this one, whether Man, or Court, to whom the City hath
committed the supreme Power, have also this Right, That he both judge
what opinions [2] and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he
forbid them to be taught.

XII. Last of all, from this consideration, that each Citizen hath
submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command in the City, so
as he may not employ his strength against him; it followes manifestly,
that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punisht;
for as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him naturally; so
neither can he punish him by Right, who by Right hath not sufficient
power.

XIII. It is most manifest by what hath been said, That in every perfect
City (that is, where no Citizen hath Right to use his faculties, at his
owne discretion, for the preservation of himselfe, or where the Right of
the private Sword is excluded) there is a Supreme Power in some one,
greater than which cannot by Right be conferr'd by men, or greater than
which no mortall man can have over himself. But that power, greater than
which cannot by men, be conveigh'd on a man, we call ABSOLUTE: [3] for
whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City, That he
can, unpunisht, doe any thing, make Lawes, judge Controversies, set
Penalties, make use, at his own pleasure, of the strength, and wealth of
men, and all this by Right, truly he hath given him the greatest
dominion that can be granted. This same may be confirm'd by experience
in all the Cities which are, or ever have beene; for though it be
sometimes in doubt, what Man, or Counsell, hath the Chief Command, yet
ever there is such a Command, and alwayes exercis'd, except in the time
of Sedition, and Civill War, and then there are two Chiefe Commands made
out of one: Now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute
Authority, doe not so much care to destroy it, as to conveigh it on
others; for removing this power, they together take away Civill Society,
and a confusion of all things returnes. There is so much obedience
joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief Ruler, as is necessarily
requir'd for the Government of the City, that is to say, so much as that
Right of his may not be granted in vaine. Now this kind of obedience,
although for some reasons it may sometimes, by Right, be deny'd, yet
because a greater cannot be perform'd, we will call it SIMPLE. But the
obligation to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by
which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City, but mediately from
hence, That, without obedience, the Cities Right would be frustrate, and
by consequence there would be no City constituted. For it is one thing
if I say, I give you Right to Command what you will; another, if I say,
I will doe whatsoever you Command; and the Command may be such, as I
would rather die than doe it; forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound
to will being kill'd, much lesse is he tyed to that, which to him is
worse than death: if therefore I be commanded to kill my self, I am not
bound to doe it; for though I deny to doe it, yet the Right of dominion
is not frustrated, since others may be found, who being commanded, will
not refuse to doe it; neither doe I refuse to doe that which I have
contracted to doe. In like manner, if the Chief Ruler command any man to
kill him, he is not tyed to doe it, because it cannot be conceiv'd that
he made any such Covenant; nor if he command to execute a Parent,
whether he be innocent, or guilty, and condemned by the Law, since there
are others, who, being commanded, will doe that, and a Son will rather
die, than live infamous, and hated of all the world. There are many
other cases, in which, since the Commands are shamefull to be done by
some, and not by others, Obedience may, by Right, be perform'd by these,
and refus'd by those; and this, without breach of that absolute Right
which was given to the Chief Ruler. For in no case is the Right taken
away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they
who thus kill men, although by Right given them from him that hath it,
yet if they use that Right otherwise than right Reason requires, they
sin against the Lawes of Nature, (that is) against God.

XIV. Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe; for he is already
suppos'd to have what he can give himself; nor can he be oblig'd to
himselfe, for the same party being both the obliged, and the Obliger,
and the Obliger having power to release the obliged, it were meerly in
vain for a man to be obliged to himselfe, because he can release himself
at his own pleasure; and he that can doe this, is already actually free.
Whence its plaine, that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes; for
the Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City, by which, if she were
engag'd, she should be engag'd to her selfe. Neither can the City be
oblig'd to her Citizen, because, if he will, he can free her from her
obligation; and he will, as oft as she wills, (for the will of every
Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the City); the City
therefore is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free;
but the will of a Councell, or one who hath the Supreme Authority given
him, is the will of the City; he therefore containes the wills of all
particular Citizens: Therefore neither is he bound to the Civill Lawes
(for this is to be bound to himself) nor to any of his Citizens.

XV. Now because (as hath been shewn above) before the constitution of a
City all things belong'd to all men, nor is there that thing which any
man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same Right, claime as
his own, (for where all things are common, there can be nothing proper
to any man) it followes, that propriety receiv'd its beginning [4] when
Cities receiv'd theirs, and that that onely is proper to each man which
he can keep by the Lawes, and the power of the whole City, (that is) of
him on whom its chief command is conferr'd. Whence we understand, that
each particular Citizen hath a propriety, to which none of his
fellow-Citizens hath Right, because they are tyed to the same Lawes; but
he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler (whose Commands are the
Lawes, whose will contains the will of each man, and who, by every
single person, is constituted the Supreme Judge) hath not a Right. But
although there be many things which the City permits to its Citizens,
and therefore they may sometimes goe to Law against their Chief; yet is
not that action belonging to Civill Right, but to Naturall Equity;
neither is it concerning what by Right he may doe [5] who hath the
Supreme power, but what he hath been willing should be done, and
therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause
being well understood) he could not give wrong judgment.

XVI. Theft, Murther, Adultery, and all injuries are forbid by the Lawes
of nature; but what is to be called Theft, what Murther, what Adultery,
what injury in a Citizen, this is not to be determined by the naturall,
but by the civill Law: for not every taking away of the thing which
another possesseth, but onely another mans goods is theft; but what is
ours, and what anothers, is a question belonging to the civill Law. In
like manner, not every killing of a man is murther, but onely that which
the civill Law forbids; neither is all encounter with women Adultery,
but onely that which the civill Law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of
promise is an injury, where the promise it selfe is lawfull, but where
there is no Right to make any compact, there can be no conveighance of
it, and therefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the
second Chapter, Artic. 17. Now what we may contract for, and what not,
depends wholly upon the civill Lawes. The City of Lacedoemon therefore
rightly ordered that those young men who could so take away certain
goods from others as not to be caught, should goe unpunisht; for it was
nothing else, but to make a Law that what was so acquired should be
their own, and not anothers. Rightly also is that man every where slain,
whom we kill in warre, or by the necessity of selfe-defence. So also
that copulation which in one City is Matrimony, in another will be
judged Adultery. Also those contracts which make up Marriage in one
Citizen, doe not so in another, although of the same City; because that
he who is forbidden by the City (that is by that one man, or Councell,
whose the supreme power is) to contract ought, hath no Right to make any
contract, and therefore having made any, it is not valid, and by
consequence, no Marriage. But his contract which received no
prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was Matrimony: neither addes
it any force to any unlawfull contracts, that they were made by an Oath,
or Sacrament, [6] for those adde nothing to the strengthning of the
contract, as hath been said above Chap. 2. Artic. 22. What therefore
Theft, what Murther, what Adultery, and in generall what injury is, must
be known by the civill Lawes, that is, the commands of him who hath the
supreme authority.

XVII. This same supreme command, and absolute power, seems so harsh to
the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them; which
happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what humane nature, and the
civill Lawes are, and partly also through their default, who when they
are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to their own
lust. That they may therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority, some
of them will have a City well enough constituted, if they who shall be
the Citizens convening, doe agree concerning certaine Articles
propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved; and doe command
them to be observed, and punishments prescribed to be inflicted on them
who shall break them: to which purpose, and also to the repelling of a
forraign enemy, they appoint a certain and limited return, with this
condition, that if that suffice not, they may call a new convention of
estates. Who sees not in a City thus constituted, that the Assembly who
prescribed those things had an absolute power? If therefore the assembly
continue, or from time to time have a certain day, and place of meeting,
that power will be perpetuall. But if they wholly dissolve, either the
City dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of War, or
else there is somewhere a power left to punish those who shall
transgresse the Lawes, whosoever, or how many soever they be that have
it, which cannot possibly be without an absolute power: for he that by
right hath this might given, by punishments to restrain what Citizens he
pleaseth, hath such a power, as a greater cannot possibly be given by
any Citizens.

XVIII. It is therefore manifest, that in every City there is some one
man, or Councell, or Court, who by Right hath as great a power over each
single Citizen, as each man hath over himselfe considered out of that
civill state, that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited onely by the
strength and forces of the City it selfe, and by nothing else in the
world: for if his power were limited, that limitation must necessarily
proceed from some greater power; For he that prescribes limits, must
have a greater power than he who is confin'd by them; now that confining
power is either without limit, or is again restrained by some other
greater than it selfe, and so we shall at length arrive to a power which
hath no other limit, but that which is the terminus ultimus of the
forces of all the Citizens together. That same is called the supreme
command, and if it bee committed to a councell, a supreme councell, but
if to one man, the supreme Lord of the City. Now the notes of supreme
command are these, To make and abrogate Lawes. To determine War and
peace, to know, and judge of all controversies, either by himselfe, or
by Judges appointed by him; to elect all Magistrates; Ministers, and
Counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by Right can doe some one
action which is not lawfull for any Citizen or Citizens to doe beside
himselfe, that man hath obtained the supreme power: For those things
which by Right may not be done by any one or many Citizens, the City it
selfe can onely doe: He therefore that doth those things useth the
Cities Right, which is the supreme power.

XIX. They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and his
members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the City,
is in relation to the whole City, such as the head is to the whole man;
But it appeares by what hath been already said, that he who is endued
with such a power, (whether it be a man, or a Court) hath a relation to
the City, not as that of the head, but of the soule to the body. For it
is the soule by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will, or
nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the City
hath a will, and can either will or nill. A Court of Counsellors is
rather to be compared with the head, or one Counsellor, whose only
Counsell (if of any one alone) the chief Ruler makes use of in matters
of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to counsell, as the
soules is to command.

XX. Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by vertue of the
compacts which each single Citizen, or subject, mutually makes with the
other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the
contractors, so by their consent they lose it again, and are broken;
perhaps some may inferre hence, that by the consent of all the subjects
together, the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which
inference if it were true, I cannot discerne what danger would thence by
Right arise to the supreme Commanders. For since it is supposed, that
each one hath obliged himselfe to each other, if any one of them shall
refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to doe, he is bound
notwithstanding; neither can any man without injury to me, doe that
which by contract made with me, he hath obliged himselfe not to doe. But
it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects
together, not so much as one excepted, will combine against the supreme
power; wherefore there is no feare for Rulers in chiefe, that by any
Right they can be despoyled of their authority. If notwithstanding it
were granted, that their Right depended onely on that contract which
each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen,
that they might be robbed of that Dominion under pretence of Right; for
subjects being called either by the command of the City, or seditiously
flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are contained
in the votes of the greater part. Which in truth is false; for it is not
from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for
the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults, but it proceeds from
civill institution, and is then onely true, when that Man or Court which
hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the
greatnesse of their number, allowes those that are elected a power of
speaking for those who elected them, and will have the major part of
voyces, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discust, to be as
effectuall as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who is chiefe,
ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his
Right, unlesse, weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain
termes, that he renounces and abandons his government. Now because most
men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of
Citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their
opinion, for the consent of the whole City, it may very well seem to
them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be
done in some great Assembly of Citizens by the votes of the greater
number; But though a government be constituted by the contracts of
particular men with particulars, yet its Right depends not on that
obligation onely; there is another tye also toward him who commands; for
each Citizen compacting with his fellow, sayes thus, I conveigh my Right
on this party, upon condition, that you passe yours to the same; by
which means, that Right which every man had before to use his faculties
to his own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man, or
Councell, for the common benefit; wherefore what by the mutuall
contracts each one hath made with the other, what by the donation of
Right which every man is bound to ratifie to him that commands, the
government is upheld by a double obligation from the Citizens, first
that which is due to their fellow citizens, next that which they owe to
their prince. Wherefore no subjects how many soever they be, can with
any Right despoyle him who bears the chiefe Rule, of his authority, even
without his own consent.



1. Multitude, &c. The Doctrine of the Power of a City over it's
Citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference
which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled: For
such is the nature of a City, That a multitude, or company of Citizens,
not onely may have command, but may also be subject to command, but in
diverse senses; which difference I did beleeve was clearly enough
explained in this first Article; but by the objections of many against
those things which follow, I discern otherwise; wherefore it seemed good
to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to adde these few
things.

By Multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more than
one, so as a multitude of men is the same with many men; The same word,
because it is of the singular number, signifies one thing, namely, one
multitude; but in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have
one will given to it by nature, but to either a severall; and therefore
neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it: therefore a
Multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire Right, conveigh Right, act,
have, Possesse, and the like, unlesse it be every one apart, and Man by
Man; so as there must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and
actions, as Men. Wherefore a Multitude is no naturall Person; but if the
same Multitude doe Contract one with another, that the will of one man,
or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for
the will of all, then it becomes one Person; for it is endu'd with a
will, and therefore can doe voluntary actions, such as are Commanding,
making Lawes, acquiring and transferring of Right, and so forth; and it
is oftner call'd the People, than the Multitude. We must therefore
distinguish thus. When we say the People, or Multitude, wills, commands,
or doth any thing, it is understood that the City which Commands, wills
and Acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more, which
cannot be done, but in an Assembly; But as oft as any thing is said to
be done by a Multitude of Men, whether great, or small, without the will
of that man, or assembly of men, that's understood to be done by a
subjected People, that is, by many single Citizens together, and not
proceeding from one will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are
Citizens, and Subjects, but not a City.

2. Judge what opinions, &c. There is scarce any Principle, neither in
the worship of God, nor humane sciences, from whence there may not
spring dissentions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war it selfe;
neither doth this happen by reason of the falshood of the Principle, but
of the disposition of men, who seeming wise to themselves, will needs
appear such to all others: But though such dissentions cannot be
hindered from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the
supreme Power, that they Prove no hinderance to the publique peace. Of
these kind of opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place.
There are certain doctrines wherewith Subjects being tainted, they
verily believe that obedience may be refused to the City, and that by
Right they may, nay ought, to oppose, and fight against chiefe Princes,
and dignities. Such are those, which whether directly, and openly, or
more obscurely, and by consequence require obedience to be given to
others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed. I deny
not, but this reflects on that Power which many living under other
government, ascribe to the chiefe head of the Church of Rome, and also
on that, which elsewhere out of that Church, Bishops require in theirs,
to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower
sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to themselves;
for what civill war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not
either grow from, or was nourisht by this Root? The judgement therefore
of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civill obedience or not, and
if they be repugnant, the Power of prohibiting them to be taught, I doe
here attribute to the civill authority; for since there is no man who
grants not to the City the judgement of those things which belong to its
Peace, and defence, and it is manifest, that the opinions which I have
already recited do relate to its Peace, it followes necessarily, that
the examination of those opinions, whether they be such, or not, must be
referred to the City, that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.

3. Absolute. A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and
the Citizens oppose it not, for in the gathering together of many men,
they acknowledge the face of a City; and even the unskilfull understand,
that matters there are rul'd by Counsell. Yet monarchy is no lesse a
City, than Democraty, and absolute Kings have their Counsellours, from
whom they will take advice, and suffer their Power, in matters of
greater consequence, to be guided, but not recall'd. But it appears not
to most men how a City is contain'd in the person of a King; and
therefore they object against Absolute Command: First, that if any man
had such a Right, the condition of the Citizens would be miserable: For
thus they think, he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man
counts it his onely happinesse that he is not already spoil'd and
kill'd. But why should he doe thus? Not because he can; for unlesse he
have a mind to it, he will not doe it. Will he, to please one, or some
few, spoil all the rest? First, though by Right, that is, without injury
to them, he may doe it, yet can he not doe it justly, that is, without
breach of the Naturall Lawes, and injury against God. And therefore
there is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which princes take.
Next, if he could justly doe it, or that he made no account of his Oath,
yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it, since he findes no
good in it. But it cannot be deny'd but a prince may sometimes have an
inclination to doe wickedly; but grant then that thou hadst given him a
power which were not absolute, but so much onely as suffic'd to defend
thee from the injuries of others, which, if thou wilt be safe, is
necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared?
For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency
to oppresse all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that humane
affaires cannot be without some inconvenience. And this inconvenience it
self is in the Citizens, not in the Government; for if men could rule
themselves, every man by his own command, that's to say, could they live
according to the Lawes of Nature, there would be no need at all of a
City, nor of a common coercive power. Secondly, they object, That there
is no Dominion in the Christian world Absolute; which indeed is not
true, for all Monarchies, and all other States, are so; for although
they, who have the chief Command, doe not all those things they would,
and what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not the
defect of Right in them, but the consideration of their Citizens, who
busied about their private interest, and carelesse of what tends to the
publique, cannot sometimes be drawn to performe their duties without the
hazard of the City. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of
their Right, and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of
their Right.

4. Propriety receiv'd its beginning, &c. What's objected by some, That
the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was
found in Fathers of Families, that objection is vaine, because I have
already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sonnes of a
Family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their Father,
distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but
not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse
Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a
common Right in all things.

5. What by Right he may doe, &c. As often as a Citizen is granted to
have an action of Law against the Supreme, i.e. against the City, the
question is not in that action, whether the City may, by Right, keep
possession of the thing in controversie, but whether by the Lawes
formerly made she would keep it; for the Law is the declared will of the
Supreme: since then the City may raise money from the Citizens under two
Titles, either as Tribute, or as Debt, in the former case there is no
action of Law allowed; for there can be no question whether the City
have Right to require Tribute: in the latter it is allowed, because the
City will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud, or cunning, and yet
if need require, all they have, openly; and therefore he that condemnes
this place, saying, That by this doctrine it is easie for princes to
free themselves from their Debts, he does it impertinently.

6. That they were made by an Oath or Sacrament, &c. Whether Matrimony
bee a Sacrament (in which sense that word is used by some Divines) or
not, it is not my purpose to dispute: Onely I say, that the legitimate
contract of a man and woman to live together, i.e. granted by the civill
Law, whether it be a Sacrament, or not, is surely a legitimate Marriage;
but that copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage, since
it is of the essence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract. There
were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jewes, the
Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those who
permit no such contracts, but by a Law that they shall never be broke,
Wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the City hath
commanded it to be indissoluble, not because Matrimony is a Sacrament.
Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the
Temple, to blesse, or (if I may say so) to consecrate the husband and
wife, will perhaps belong only to the office of Clergy-men; all the
rest, namely who, when, and by what contracts Marriages may be made,
pertains to the Lawes of the City.


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Chapter VII.

Of the three kindes of Government, Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchie

I. We have already spoken of a City by institution in its Genus; we will
now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of Cities, it is
taken from the difference of the Persons, to whom the Supreme Power is
committed; this Power is committed either to one Man, or Councell, or
some one Court consisting of many men. Furthermore, a Councell of many
men, consists either of all the Citizens, (insomuch as every man of them
hath a Right to Vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest
affaires, if he will himselfe) or of a part onely; from whence there
arise three sorts of Government: The one, when the Power is in a
Councell, where every Citizen hath a right to Vote, and it is call'd a
DEMOCRATY. The other, when it is in a Councell, where not all, but some
part onely have their suffrages, and we call it an ARISTOCRATY. The
third is that, when the Supreme Authority rests onely in one, and it is
stiled a MONARCHY. In the first, he that governes is called demos, The
PEOPLE. In the second, the NOBLES. In the third, the MONARCH.

II. Now, although Ancient Writers of Politiques have introduc'd three
other kindes of Government opposite to these, to wit, Anarchy or
confusion to Democraty, Oligarchy, that is, the command of some few, to
Aristocraty, and Tyranny to Monarchy, yet are not these three distinct
formes of Government, but three diverse Titles given by those who were
either displeas'd with that present Government, or those that bare Rule.
For men, by giving names, doe usually, not onely signifie the things
themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and
the like, whence it happens that what one man calls a Democraty, another
calls an Anarchy; what one counts an Aristocraty, another esteemes an
Oligarchie; and whom one titles a King, another stiles him a Tyrant; so
as we see these names betoken not a diverse kinde of Government, but the
diverse opinions of the Subjects concerning him who hath the Supreme
Power. For first, who sees not that Anarchy is equally opposite to all
the forenam'd Formes? For that word signifies that there is no
Government at all, that is, not any City. But how is it possible that no
City should be the species of a City? Farthermore, what difference is
there between an Oligarchie, which signifies the Command of a few, or
Grandees, or an Aristocraty, which is that of the Prime, or Chief Heads,
more than that men differ so among themselves, that the same things
seeme not good to all men? Whence it happens, that those persons, who by
some are look'd on as the best, are by others esteem'd to be the worst
of all men.

III. But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be perswaded
that a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse kindes of Cities, who
though they would rather have the City subject to one, than many, yet
doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd unlesse it accord with their
judgements: But we must discover by Reason, and not by Passion, what the
difference is between a King, and a Tyrant: but first, they differ not
in this, That a Tyrant hath the greater Power, for greater than the
Supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, That one hath a limited power,
the other not; for he, whose authority is limited, is no King, but his
Subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of
acquisition; for if in a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government
some one Citizen should, by force, possesse himself of the Supreme
Power, if he gain the consent of all the Citizens, he becomes a
legitimate Monarch; if not, he is an Enemy, not a Tyrant. They differ
therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said
to be a King, who governs wel, and he a Tyrant that doth otherwise. The
case therefore is brought to this passe, That a King legitimately
constituted in his Government, if he seeme to his Subjects to Rule well,
and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a King, if not,
they count him a Tyrant. Wherefore we see a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are
not diverse Formes of Government, but one and the self-same Monarch hath
the name of a King given him in point of Honour, and Reverence to him,
and of a Tyrant in way of contumely, and reproach. But what we
frequently finde in bookes said against Tyrants, took its originall from
Greek, and Roman Writers, whose Government was partly Democraticall, and
partly Aristocraticall, and therefore not Tyrants onely, but even Kings
were odious to them.

IV. There are, who indeed doe think it necessary, That a Supreme Command
should be somewhere extant in a City; but if it should be in any one,
either Man, or Councell, it would follow (they say) that all the
Citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that
there may be a certaine Form of Government compounded of those three
kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular, which they
call a mixt Monarchie, or mixt Aristocraty, or mixt Democraty, according
as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent than the rest: For
example, if the naming of Magistrates, and the arbitration of War, and
Peace, should belong to the King, Judicature to the Lords, and
contribution of Monies to the People, and the power of making Lawes too
altogether, this kind of State would they call a mixt Monarchie
forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a State, it
would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject; for as long as they
all agree, each single Citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be;
but if they disagree, the State returns to a Civill War, and the Right
of the private Sword, which certainly is much worse than any subjection
whatsoever: But that there can be no such kind of Government [1] hath
been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic: 6-12.

V. Let us see a little now in the constituting of each Form of
Government, what the constitutours doe. Those who met together with
intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of meeting a
Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are suppos'd oblig'd to
the observation of what shall be determin'd by the major part: which,
while that convent lasts, or is adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and
places, is a clear Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will
of all the Citizens, hath the Supreme Authority; and because in this
Convent every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his voice, it
followes, that it is a Democraty by the definition given in the first
Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the Convent, and
appoint no time, or place, where, and when they shall meet again, the
publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the same state it stood in before
their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The
People therefore retains the supreme power no longer than there is a
certain day and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which
whosoever will, may resort. For except that be known and determined,
they may either meet at divers times, and places, that is in factions,
or not at all; and then it is no longer demos, the People, but a
dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any Action, or
Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie, whereof one (to wit the
perpetuall prescription of Convents) makes demos, the People, the other
(which is a plurality of voyces) to kratos or the power.

VI. Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the People, so as to
maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times, and places of
meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the times be of lesse
distance, than that any thing may in the mean time happen whereby (by
reason of the defect of power) the City may be brought into some danger,
or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the
intervall, granted to some one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be
done, there is not that wary care, and heed taken for the defence and
Peace of single men which ought to be, and therefore will not deserve
the name of a City, because that in it for want of security, every mans
Right of defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.

VII. Democraty is not framed by contract of particular persons with the
People, but by mutuall compacts of single men each with other. But hence
it appears in the first place, that the Persons contracting, must be in
being before the contract it selfe. But the People is not in being
before the constitution of government, as not being any Person, but a
multitude of single Persons; wherefore there could then no contract
passe between the People and the Subject. Now, if after that government
is framed, the subject make any contract with the People, it is in vain,
because the People contains within its will, the will of that subject to
whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and
pleasure disengage it selfe, and by consequence is now actually free.
But in the second place, that single Persons doe contract each with
other may be inferred from hence, that in vain sure would the City have
been constituted, if the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to
doe, or omit what the City should command to be done or omitted. Because
therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to passe as necessary
to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is already shewed)
between the Subject and the People; it followes, that they must be made
between single Citizens, namely that each man contract to submit his
will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also doe
the like, as if every one should say thus, I give up my Right unto the
People for your sake, on condition, that you also deliver up yours, for
mine.

VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of Nobles endued with supreme
authoritie, receives its originall from a Democraty, which gives up its
Right unto it; where we must understand that certain men distinguisht
from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other
Character, are propounded to the People, and by plurality of voyces are
elected; and being elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is
conveighed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before,
the same by Right may this Court of elected Nobles now doe. Which being
done, it is clear that the People, considered as one Person, (its
supreme authority being already transferred on these) is no longer now
in being.

IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an Aristocraty the Court of Nobles
is free from all manner of obligation; for seeing subjects not
contracting with the People, but by mutuall compacts among themselves,
were tyed to all that the People did, hence also they were tyed to that
act of the People in resigning up its Right of government into the hands
of Nobles. Neither could this Court, although elected by the People, be
by it obliged to any thing; for being erected, the People is at once
dissolved, as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a
Person utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the
Person must also vanish, and perish together with it.

X. Aristocraty hath these considerations, together with Democraty;
First, that without an appointment of some certain times, and places, at
which the Court of Nobles may meet, it is no longer a Court, or one
Person, but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power; Secondly,
that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoyned by long
intervalls, without prejudice to the supreme power, unlesse its
administration be transferred to some one man: Now the reasons why this
happens, are the same which we set down in the fifth Article.

XI. As an Aristocratie, so also a monarchy is derived from the Power of
the People, transferring its Right, (that is) its Authoritie on one man:
Here also we must understand, that some one man, either by name, or some
other token, is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest, and
that by a plurality of voyces the whole Right of the People is
conveighed on him, insomuch as whatsoever the People could doe before he
were elected, the same in every Respect may he by Right now doe, being
elected; which being done, the People is no longer one Person, but a
rude multitude, as being only one before by vertue of the supreme
command, whereof they now have made a conveyance from themselves on this
one Man.

XII. And therefore neither doth the Monarch oblige himselfe to any for
the command he receives, for he receives it from the People; but as hath
been shewed above, the People, as soon as that act is done, ceaseth to
be a Person; but the Person vanishing, all obligation to the Person
vanisheth. The subjects therefore are tyed to perform obedience to the
Monarch, by those compacts only by which they mutually obliged
themselves to the observation of all that the People should command
them, (that is) to obey that Monarch, if he were made by the People.

XIII. But a Monarchy differs as well from an Aristocraty, as a
Democratie, in this chiefly, that in those there must be certain set
times and places for deliberation, and consultation of affaires, that
is, for the actuall exercise of it in all times, and places; For the
People, or the Nobles not being one naturall Person must necessarily
have their meetings. The Monarch who is one by nature, is alwayes in a
present capacity to execute his authority.

XIV. Because we have declared above in the 7. 9. and 12. Articles, that
they who have gotten the supreme command are by no compacts obliged to
any man, it necessarily followes, that they can doe no injury to the
subjects; for injury according to the definition made in the third
Article of the third Chapter, is nothing else but a breach of contract:
and therefore where no contracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet
the People, the Nobles, and the Monarch may diverse wayes transgresse
against the other Lawes of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, contumely,
and other like vices, which come not under this strict, and exact notion
of injury. But if the subject yeeld not obedience to the supreme, he
will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious as well to his
fellow subjects, because each man hath compacted with the other to obey,
as to his chief Ruler, in resuming that Right, which he hath given him,
without his consent. And in a Democraty, or Aristocraty, if any thing be
decreed against any Law of nature, the City it selfe (i.e.) the civill
Person sinnes not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was
decreed; for sinne is a consequence of the naturall expresse will, not
of the politicall, which is artificiall; for if it were otherwise, they
would be guilty, by whom the decree was absolutely disliked: But in a
Monarchie, if the Monarch make any decree against the Lawes of nature,
he sins himselfe, because in him the civill will and the naturall are
all one.

XV. The people who are about to make a Monarch, may give him the
supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a certaine
season; and time determined; if simply, we must understand that he who
receives it, hath the selfe-same power which they had, who gave it, on
the same grounds: therefore that the People by Right could make him a
Monarch, may he make another Monarch: insomuch as the Monarch to whom
the command is simply given, receives a Right not of possession onely,
but of succession also, so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his
successor.

XVI. But if the power be given for a time limited, we must have regard
to somewhat more than the bare gift onely: First, whether the People
conveighing its authority, left it selfe any Right to meet at certain
times, and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this power, whether
it were done, so as they might meet before that time were expired, which
they prescribed to the Monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to
meet onely at the will of that temporary Monarch and not otherwise.
Suppose now the People had delivered up its Power to some one man for
term of life onely; which being done, let us suppose in the first place,
that every man departed from the Counsell without making any order at
all concerning the place where (after his death) they should meet again
to make a new election. In this case it is manifest by the fifth Article
of this Chapter, that the People ceaseth to be a Person, and is become a
dissolute multitude, every one whereof hath an equall, to wit, a
naturall Right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what
places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engrosse the supreme
power to himselfe, and settle it on his own head. What Monarch soever
therefore hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the Law of
nature (set down in the [8.] Article of the third Chapter of not
returning evill for good) prudently to provide, that by his death the
City suffer not a dissolution, either by appointing a certain day &
place, in which those subjects of his who have a mind to it may assemble
themselves, or else by nominating a successor: whether of these shall to
him seem most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore who on
this foresaid manner hath received his command during life, hath an
absolute Power, and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In
the next place, if we grant that the people departed not from the
election of the temporary Monarch, before they decreed a certain time
and place of meeting after his death, then the Monarch being dead, the
authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of the
subjects, but by vertue of the former Right; for all the supreme command
(as Dominion) was in the People, but the use, and exercise of it was
only in the temporary Monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but
hath not the Right. But if the People after the election of a temporary
Monarch, depart not from the Court before they have appointed certain
times, and places to convene, during the time prescribed him (as the
Dictators in ancient times were made by the People of Rome) such an one
is not to be accounted a Monarch, but the Prime Officer of the People;
and if it shall seem good, the People may deprive him of his office even
before that time, as the People of Rome did, when they conferred an
equall power on Minutius, Master of the horse, with Quintus Fabius
Maximus, whom before they had made Dictator. The reason whereof is, that
it is not to be imagined, that, whether Man or Counsell who hath the
readiest, and most immediate power to act, should hold his command on
such termes as not to be able actually to execute it; for command is
nothing else but a Right of commanding, as oft as nature allowes it
possible. Lastly, if the People having declared a temporary Monarch,
depart from the Court on such termes, as it shall not be lawfull for
them to meet without the command of the Monarch, we must understand the
People to be immediately dissolved, and that his authority who is thus
declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the
subjects to frame the City anew, unlesse he give consent who hath now
alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made any
promise to assemble his Subjects on some certain times, since there
remains no Person now in being, but at his discretion, to whom the
promise was made. What we have spoken of these four cases of a People
electing a Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing
them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the People
is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no Heir but whom
it self doth appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the
subjects meeting may be fitly compar'd to those times wherein the
Monarch sleepes, for in either the Acts of commanding ceases, the Power
remaines: Farthermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet
againe, is the death of the People; just as sleeping, so as he can never
wake more, is the death of a man: As therefore a King, who hath no Heir,
going to his rest, so as never to rise again, (i.e.) dying, if he commit
the exercise of his Regall Authority to any one till he awake, does by
consequence give him the Succession; the People also electing a
Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers up to
him the whole Dominion of the Country: Furthermore, as a King going to
sleep for some season, entrusts the administration of his Kingdome to
some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having elected a
Temporary Monarch, and withall retaining a right to meet at a certain
day, and place, at that day receives its supremacy again. And as a King
who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another, himself in
the mean while waking, can recall this commission againe when he
pleaseth; so the People, who during the time prescribed to the Temporary
Monarch, doth by Right convene, may if they please, deprive the Monarch
of his Authority. Lastly, the King, who commits his Authority to another
while himself sleeps, not being able to wake againe till he whom he
entrusted, give consent, loses at once both his power, and his life; so
the people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch in
such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely
dissolv'd, and the power remaines with him whom they have chosen.

XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to any one, or many subjects
together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer
prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made by Oath, or without it,
is null: for all Compact is a conveyance of Right, which by what hath
been said in the fourth Article of the second Chapter, requires meet,
and proper signes of the Will in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently
signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare
that he quits not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he
who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Supreme Power,
and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens, That he no
otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd
without it. Whensoever therefore it shall appear that what is promis'd
cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the Power, the promise must be
valued as not made, (i.e.) of no effect.

XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, nature dictating, have oblig'd
themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the Supreme Power. We will see
now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd from these
bonds of obedience. And first of all this happens by rejection, namely,
if a man cast off, or forsake, but conveigh not the Right of his Command
on some other; for what is thus rejected, is openly expos'd to all
alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every
subject may heed the preservation of himselfe according to his own
judgement. In the second place, If the Kingdome fall into the power of
the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we
must understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority, hath now
lost it: For when the Subjects have done their full indeavour to prevent
their falling into the enemies hands, they have fulfill'd those
Contracts of obedience which they made each with other, and what, being
conquer'd, they promise afterwards, to avoid death, they must, with no
lesse endeavour, labour to performe. Thirdly, in a Monarchy, (for a
Democraty, and Aristocraty cannot fail) if there be no successour, all
the subjects are discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is
suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a case it were
impossible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all subjects are
restor'd from their civill subjection to that liberty, which all men
have to all things, to wit, naturall, and salvage, (for the naturall
state hath the same proportion to the Civill, I mean liberty to
subjection, which Passion hath to Reason, or a Beast to a Man:)
Furthermore, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by
the will of him who hath the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his
soile, which may be done two wayes, either by permission, as he, who
gets license to dwell in another Country; or Command, as he, who is
Banisht: In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country,
because he is tyed to observe those of the latter.

____________

1. But that there can be no such kinde of Government. Most men grant,
That a Government ought not to be divided, but they would have it
moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it
should be so; but if these men, when they speak of moderating, and
limiting, do understand dividing it, they make a very fond distinction.
Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely Kings, but all other Persons
endued with Supreme Authority would so temper themselves as to commit no
wrong, and onely minding their charges contain themselves within the
limits of the naturall, and divine Lawes: But they who distinguish thus,
they would have the chief Power bounded, and restrain'd by others;
which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the limits,
must needs have some part of the Power, whereby they may be enabled to
doe it, the Government is properly divided, not moderated.


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Chapter VIII.

Of the Rights of Lords over their Servant

I. In the two fore-going Chapters we have treated of an institutive, or
fram'd Government, as being that which receives its originall from the
consent of many, who by Contract and Faith mutually given, have oblig'd
each other. Now followes, what may be said, concerning a naturall
Government, which may also be call'd, Acquired, because it is that which
is gotten by power, and naturall force. But we must know in the first
place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons
of men. Where such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little
Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else but to have Dominion over
many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a Little Kingdome
a Family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men
as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddainly (like
Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each
other: There are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion
over the Person of another; whereof the first is, if by mutuall Contract
made between themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have
willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man, or
Councel of Men, & of this we have already spoken. The 2d is, If a man
taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else distrusting his own
forces, (to avoid Death) promises the Conquerour, or the stronger Party,
his Service, i.e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him; in which
Contract the good which the vanquisht, or inferiour, in strength doth
receive, is the grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the
naturall state of men he might have depriv'd him of, but the good which
he promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue therefore of this
promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the
vanquisht, to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns
the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey the Commands of any man
before he knowes what he will command him, is simply, and without any
restriction tyed to the performance of all Commands whatsoever. Now he
that is thus tyed, is call'd a SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD.
Thirdly, there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man, by
Generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the
following Chapter.

II. Every one that is taken in the War, and hath his life spar'd him, is
not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord; for every one is not
trusted with so much of his naturall liberty, as to be able, if he
desir'd it, either to flie away, or quit his service, or contrive any
mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed but within Prisons, or
bound within Irons, and therefore they were call'd not by the common
name of Servant onely, but by the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at
this day un serviteur, and un serf or un esclave have diverse
significations.

III. The obligation therefore of a Servant to his Lord ariseth not from
a simple grant of his life, but from hence rather, That he keeps him not
bound, or imprison'd, for all obligation derives from Contract; but
where's no trust, there can be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap.
Artic. 9. where a Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is
trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the
benefit of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall
liberty; so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had happen'd,
he might not onely have made his escape, but also have kill'd his Lord,
who was the preserver of his life.

IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants as are restrain'd by imprisonment,
or bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of Servants given
above, because those serve not for the Contracts sake, but to the end
they may not suffer; and therefore if they flie, or kill their Lord,
they offend not against the Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a
plain signe, that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be
sufficiently tyed by any other obligation.

V. The Lord therefore hath no less Dominion over a Servant that is not,
than over one that is bound, for he hath a Supreme Power over both, and
may say of his Servant no lesse than of another thing, whether animate,
or inanimate, This is mine; whence it followes, that whatsoever the
Servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the Lords; and
whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his Lord: for he that can
by Right dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those
things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing
which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will of his Lord;
yet hath he, by his Lords distribution, a propriety, and Dominion over
his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may keep, and defend them against
the invasion of his fellow Servant, in the same manner as hath been
shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly his owne against the
will of the Supreme Authority, but every subject hath a propriety
against his fellow subject.

VI. Since therefore both the Servant himself, and all that belongs to
him are his Lords, and by the Right of Nature every man may dispose of
his owne in what manner he pleases; the Lord may either sell, lay to
pledge, or by Testament conveigh the Dominion he hath over his Servant,
according to his own will and pleasure.

VII. Farthermore, what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects
in an institutive Government, namely, that he who hath the Supreme Power
can doe his subject no injury; is true also concerning Servants, because
they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord; wherefore,
whatsoever he doth, it is done with their wills, but no injury can be
done to him that willeth it.

VIII. But if it happen that the Lord, either by captivity or voluntary
subjection, doth become a Servant or Subject to another, that other
shall not onely be Lord of him, but also of his Servants; Supreme Lord
over these, immediate Lord over him. Now because not the Servant only,
but also all he hath are his Lords; therefore his Servants now belong to
this man, neither can the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them than
shall seeme good to the Supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civill
Governments, the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants, that's
suppos'd to be deriv'd from the Right of Nature, and not constituted,
but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law.

IX. A servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude, that a
Subject in an institutive government, is freed from his subjection;
First, if his Lord enfranchize him, for the Right which the servant
transferred to his Lord over himselfe, the same may the Lord restore to
the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called
MANUMISSION; which is just as if a City should permit a Citizen to
conveigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other City. Secondly,
if the Lord cast off his servant from him, which in a City is
banishment; neither differs it from Manumission in effect, but in manner
onely: for there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment:
In both, the Dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken
prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other
things, so servants also are acquired by warre, whom in equity the Lord
must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is
freed for want of knowledge of a successour, the Lord dying (suppose)
without any Testament, or Heire, for no man is understood to be obliged,
unlesse he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the
servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his
corporall liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract, for
there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be
broken which is not given. But the Lord who himselfe serves another,
cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the
power of the supreme, for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are
not his, but the supreme Lords.

X. We get a right over irrationall Creatures in the same manner, that we
doe over the Persons of men, to wit, by force and naturall strength; for
if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one, by reason of that
warre which is of all against all, to subdue, and also to kill men as
oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good, much more will the same
be lawfull against Brutes; namely at their own discretion, to reduce
those to servitude which by art may be tamed, and fitted for use, and to
persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetuall warre, as dangerous and
noxious. Our Dominion therefore over beasts, hath its originall from the
right of nature, not from divine positive Right: for if such a Right had
not been before the publishing of the sacred Scriptures, no man by right
might have killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine
pleasure was made manifest by holy Writ; a most hard condition for men
indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury, and yet they might
not destroy them: Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of
nature, that a beast may kill a man; it is also by the same Right, that
a man may slay a beast.


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Chapter IX.

Of the right of Parents over their children and of hereditary Government

I. Socrates is a man, and therefore a living creature, is a right
reasoning, and that most evident, because there is nothing needfull to
the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but that the word Man
be understood, because a living creature is in the definition it selfe
of a Man, and every one makes up the proposition which was desired,
namely this, Man is a living Creature; And this, Sophroniscus is
Socrates his Father, and therefore his Lord, is perhaps a true
inference, but not evident, because the word Lord is not in the
definition of a Father: wherefore it is necessary to make it more
evident, that the connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded.
Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Dominion of a Parent
over his children, have brought no other argument than that of
generation, as if it were of it selfe evident, that what is begotten by
me, is mine; just as if a man should think, that because there is a
triangle, it appeares presently without any farther discourse, that its
angles are equall to two Rights. Besides, since Dominion (that is)
supreme Power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve two Masters,
but two Persons male and female, must concurre in the act of generation,
its impossible that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation
onely. Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place, enquire
into the original of paternal Government.

II. Wee must therefore returne to the state of nature, in which, by
reason of the equality of nature all men of riper yeares are to be
accounted equall; There by right of nature the Conqueror is Lord of the
conquered: by the Right therefore of nature, the Dominion over the
Infant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power'd but it's
manifest that he who is newly born is in the Mothers power before any
others, insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own wil, either breed
him up, or adventure him to fortune.

III. If therefore she breed him (because the state of nature is the
state of warre) she is supposed to bring him up on this condition, that
being grown to full age he become not her enemy; (which is) that he obey
her. For since by naturall necessity we all desire that which appears
good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such termes
afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years,
and at once become an enemy; but each man is an enemy to that other whom
he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature, every
woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a Lord. But what
some say, that in this case, the Father by reason of the preeminence of
sexe, and not the Mother, becomes Lord, signifies nothing. For both
reason shewes the contrary, because the inequality of their naturall
forces is not so great, that the man could get the Dominion over the
woman without warre. And custome also contradicts not; for women, namely
Amazons, have in former times waged war against their adversaries, and
disposed of their children at their own wils, and at this day in divers
places, women are invested with the principall authority. Neither doe
their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves; which in truth
they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they who have the supreme
power, are not tyed at all (as hath bin shewed) to the civill lawes.
Adde also that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the
Father but by the testimony of the Mother; the child therefore is his
whose the Mother will have it, and therefore hers; Wherefore originall
Dominion over children belongs to the Mother, and among men no lesse
than other creatures: The birth followes the belly.

IV. The Dominion passes from the Mother to others, divers wayes; first,
if she quit and forsake her Right by exposing the child. He therefore
that shall bring up the childe thus exposed, shall have the same
Dominion over it, which the Mother had. For that life which the Mother
had given it (not by getting, but nourishing it) she now by exposing,
takes from it; Wherefore the obligation also which arose from the
benefit of life, is by this exposition made voyd. Now the preserved,
oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a
Mother, or of his service, as to a Lord; for although the Mother in the
state of nature, where all men have a right to all things, may recover
her sonne again (namely by the same Right that any body else might doe
it) yet may not the Sonne rightly transferre himselfe again unto his
Mother.

V. Secondly, if the Mother be taken prisoner, her Sonne is his that took
her, because that he who hath Dominion over the Person, hath also
Dominion over all belonging to the Person; Wherefore over the Sonne
also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter, in the fifth
Article. Thirdly, if the Mother be a subject under what government
soever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will also
have the Dominion over him that is born of her. for he is Lord also of
the Mother, who is bound to obey him, in all things. Fourthly, if a
woman for societie sake give her selfe to a man on this condition; that
he shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the contribution
of both Parties, is the Fathers, in regard of the command he hath over
the Mother; but if a woman bearing rule shall have children by a
Subject, the children are the Mothers: for otherwise the woman can have
no children without prejudice to her authority. And universally, if the
society of the male and female be such an union, as the one have
subjected himselfe to the other, the children belong to him or her that
commands.

VI. But in the state of nature, if a man, and woman contract so, as
neither is subject to the command of the other, the children are the
Mothers for the reasons above given in the third Article, unlesse by
pacts it be otherwise provided. For the Mother may by pact dispose of
her Right as she lists, as heretofore hath been done by the Amazons, who
of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by
pact allowed them the males, and retained the females to themselves; but
in a civill government, if there be a contract of marriage between a man
and woman, the children are the Fathers; because in all Cities, viz.
constituted of Fathers, not Mothers governing their families, the
domesticall command belongs to the man, and such a contract, if it be
made according to the civill Laws, is called MATRIMONY; but if they
agree only to lye together, the children are the Fathers, or the Mothers
variously, according to the differing civill Lawes of divers Cities.

VII. Now because by the third Article the Mother is originally Lord of
her Children, and from her the Father, or some body else by derived
Right, it is manifest that the Children are no lesse subject to those by
whom they are nourisht, and brought up, than Servants to their Lords,
and Subjects to him who beares the Supreme Rule; and that a Parent
cannot be injurious to his Sonne as long as he is under his power. A Son
also is freed from subjection on the same manner as a subject and
servant are. For emancipation is the same thing with manumission, and
abdication with banishment.

VIII. The enfranchised son, or released servant, doe now stand in lesse
fear of their Lord and Father, being deprived of his naturall and lordly
power over them, and (if regard be had to true and inward Honour) doe
Honour him lesse, than before. For Honour (as hath been said in the
section above) is nothing else but the estimation of anothers power; and
therefore he that hath least power, hath alwayes least Honour. But it is
not to be imagin'd that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the
enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge
a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things, as if he were
become wholly his equall; It must therefore be ever understood, That he
who is freed from subjection, whether he be a servant, sonne, or some
colony, doth promise all those externall signes, at least whereby
Superiours used to be Honour'd by their inferiours. From whence it
followes, That the precept of honouring our Parents, belongs to the law
of nature, not onely under the title of Gratitude, but also of
Agreement.

IX. What then, will some one demand, is the difference between a sonne,
or between a subject, and a servant? Neither doe I know that any Writer
hath fully declared what liberty, and what slavery is. Commonly to doe
all things according to our own phancies, and that without punishment,
is esteem'd to be liberty; not to be able to doe this, is judg'd
bondage; which in a Civill Government, and with the peace of mankind
cannot possibly be done, because there is no City without a Command, and
a restraining Right. LIBERTY, that we may define it, is nothing else but
an absence of the lets, and hinderances of motion, as water shut up in a
vessell is therefore not at liberty, because the vessell hinders it from
running out, which the vessell being broken, is made free. And every man
hath more or lesse liberty, as he hath more or lesse space in which he
employes himself: as he hath more liberty, who is in a large, than he
that is kept in a close prison. And a man may be free toward one part,
and yet not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on this, and
that side with hedges, or stone walls, lest he spoyle the vines, or
corne, neighbouring on the high way. And these kinde of lets are
externall, and absolute; in which sense all Servants, and Subjects are
free, who are not fetter'd and imprisoned. There are others which are
arbitrary, which doe not absolutely hinder motion, but by accident; to
wit, by our own choyce, as he that is in a ship is not so hindered, but
he may cast himselfe into the Sea, if he will: and here also the more
wayes a man may move himselfe, the more liberty he hath, and herein
consists civill liberty; for no man, whether subject, sonne, or servant,
is so hindred by the punishments appointed by the City, the Father, or
the Lord, how cruell soever, but that he may doe all things, and make
use of all meanes necessary to the preservation of his life and health.
For my part therefore I cannot finde what reason a meer servant hath to
make complaints, if they relate onely to want of liberty, unlesse he
count it a misery to be restrained from hurting himselfe, and to receive
that life, (which by warre, or misfortune, or through his own idlenesse
was forfeited) together with all manner of sustenance, and all things
necessary to the conservation of health, on this condition only, that he
will be rul'd: for he that is kept in by punishments layd before him, so
as he dares not let loose the reines to his will in all things; is not
opprest by servitude, but is governed and sustained. But this priviledge
free subjects and sonnes of a family, have above servants, (in every
government, and family, where servants are) that they may both undergoe
the more honourable offices of the City or family, and also enjoy a
larger possession of things superfluous. And herein layes the difference
between a free subject, and a servant, that he is FREE indeed, who
serves his City onely; but a SERVANT is he who also serves his fellow
subject: all other liberty is an exemption from the Lawes of the City,
and proper only to those that bear Rule.

X. A Father, with his sonnes and servants growne into a civill Person by
vertue of his paternall jurisdiction, is called a FAMILY. This family,
if through multiplying of children, and acquisition of servants, it
becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting the uncertain dye of
warre, it cannot be subdued, will be termed an Hereditary Kingdome;
which though it differ from an institutive Monarchy, being acquired by
force in the original, & manner of its constitution; yet being
constituted, it hath al the same properties, and the Right of authority
is every where the same, insomuch as it is not needfull to speak any
thing of them apart.

XI. It hath been spoken, by what Right supreme authorities are
constituted. Wee must now briefly tell you by what right they may be
continued. Now the Right by which they are continued, is that which is
called the right of SUCCESSION. Now because in a Democratie, the supreme
authority is with the People, as long as there be any subjects in being,
so long it rests with the same Person; for the People hath no
Successour. In like manner in an Aristocraty, one of the Nobles dying,
some other by the rest is substituted in his place; and therefore except
they all dye together, which I suppose will never happen, there is no
succession. The Querie therefore of the Right of Succession takes place
onely in an absolute Monarchy. For they who exercise the supreme power
for a time onely, are themselves no Monarchs, but Ministers of state.

XII. But first, if a Monarch shall by Testament appoint one to succeed
him, the Person appointed shall succeed; for if he be appointed by the
People, he shall have all the Right over the City which the People had,
as hath been shewed in the 7. Chap. Art. 11. But the People might choose
him; by the same Right therefore may he choose another; But in an
hereditary Kingdome there are the same Rights as in an institutive;
Wherefore, every Monarch may by his will make a successour.

XIII. But what a man may transferre on another by Testament, that by the
same Right may he yet living, give, or sell away; To whomsoever
therefore he shall make over the supreme power, whether by gift, or
sale, it is rightly made.

XIV. But if living, he have not declared his will concerning his
successour by Testament, nor otherwise, it is supposed, First, that he
would not have his Government reduced to an Anarchy, or the state of
warre, (that is) to the destruction of his subjects; as well because he
could not doe that without breach of the Lawes of nature, whereby he was
obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing to the
preservation of Peace, as also because if that had been his will, it had
not been hard for him to have declared that openly. Next, because the
Right passeth according to the will of the Father, we must judge of the
successour according to the signes of his will. It is understood
therefore, that he would have his subjects to be under a Monarchicall
Government rather than any other, because he himselfe in ruling, hath
before approved of that state by his example, and hath not afterward
either by any word or deed condemned it.

XV. Furthermore, because by naturall necessity all men wish them better
from whom they receive glory, and honour, than others; but every man
after death receives honour and glory from his children, sooner than
from the power of any other men: hence we gather, that a father intends
better for his children, than any other persons. It is to be understood
therefore, that the will of the father, dying without Testament, was,
that some of his children should succeed him; yet this is to be
understood with this proviso, that there be no more apparent tokens to
the contrary: of which kind, after many successions, custome may be one,
for he that makes no mention of his succession, is supposed to consent
to the customes of his Realme.

XVI. Among children the Males carry the preheminence, in the beginning
perhaps, because for the most part (although not alwayes) they are
fitter for the administration of greater matters, but specially of wars;
but afterwards, when it was grown a custome, because that custome was
not contradicted; and therefore the will of the Father, unlesse some
other custome or signe doe clearly repugne it, is to be interpreted in
favour of them.

XVII. Now because the Sonnes are equall, and the power cannot be
divided, the eldest shall succeed; for if there be any difference by
reason of age, the eldest is supposed more worthy, for nature being
judge, the most in years (because usually it is so) is the wisest. But
other judge there cannot be had. But if the Brothers must be equally
valued, the succession shall be by lot. But primogeniture is a naturall
lot, and by this the eldest is already prefer'd; nor is there any that
hath power to judge, whether by this, or any other kind of lots the
matter is to be decided. Now the same reason which contends thus for the
first-born sonne, doth no lesse for the first born daughter.

XVIII. But if he have no children, then the command shall pass to his
Brothers & Sisters, for the same reason, that the children should have
succeeded if he had had them: for those that are nearest to us in
nature, are supposed to be nearest in benevolence; and to his brothers,
sooner than his sisters, and to the elder sooner than the yonger; for
the reason is the same for these which it was for the children.

XIX. Furthermore, by the same reason that men succeed to the power, doe
they also succeed to the Right of succession: for if the first-born dye
before the Father, it will be judged, that he transferred his Right of
succession unto his children, unlesse the Father have otherwise decreed
it, and therefore the Nephewes will have a fairer pretence to the
succession, than the Uncles. I say all these things will be thus, if the
custome of the place (which the Father by not contradicting, will be
judged to have consented to) doe not hinder them.


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Chapter X.

A comparison between three kinds of government, according to their
severall inconveniences

I. What Democraty, Aristocraty, and Monarchy are, hath already been
spoken, but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects
Peace, and procuring their advantages, we must see by comparing them
together. But first let us set forth the advantages, and disadvantages
of a City in generall, lest some perhaps should think it better, that
every man be left to live at his own will, than to constitute any civill
society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civill government
hath a most entire, but unfruitfull liberty; because that he who by
reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason
of the same liberty in others, suffer all at anothers will; but in a
constituted City, every subject retains to himselfe as much freedom as
suffices him to live well, and quietly, & there is so much taken away
from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every
man hath such a Right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing; in it, each
one securely enjoyes his limited Right; Out of it, any man may rightly
spoyle, or kill one another; in it, none but one. Out of it we are
protected by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it no
man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out
of it, there is a Dominion of Passions, war, fear, poverty,
slovinlinesse, solitude, barbarisme, ignorance, cruelty. In it, the
Dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegancy,
sciences, and benevolence.

II. Aristotle, in his seventh book and fourteenth Chapter of his
Politiques saith, that there are two sorts of governments, whereof the
one relates to the benefit of the Ruler, the other to that of the
Subjects; as if where Subjects are severely dealt with, there were one,
and where more mildly, there were another form of government; which
opinion may by no means be subscribed to, for all the profits and
disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the
Ruler, and the Subject; The Dammages which befall some particular
subjects through misfortune, folly, negligence, sloth, or his own
luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the Ruler, but
those relate not to the government it selfe, being such as may happen in
any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first
institution of the City, they will then be truly called the
inconveniencies of government, but they will be common to the Ruler with
his subjects, as their benefits are common; but the first and greatest
benefit, Peace, and defence, is common to both, for both he that
commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his
life, makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects; and in
the greatest inconvenience that can befall a City, namely the slaughter
of subjects, arising from Anarchy, both the Commander, and the Parties
commanded, are equally concerned. Next, if the Ruler levie such a summe
of vast monies from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain
themselves, and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength, and
vigour, the disadvantage is as much his, as theirs, who with never so
great a stock, or measure of riches, is not able to keep his authority
or his riches without the bodies of his subjects; but if he raise no
more than is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is
a benefit equall to himselfe and his subjects, tending to a common
Peace, and defence. Nor is it imaginable which way publick treasures can
be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted, as to
be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their
industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies, and
mindes; for even thus the grievance would concern the Ruler; nor would
it arise from the ill institution, or ordination of the government,
(because in all manner of governments subjects may be opprest) but from
the ill administration of a well established government.

III. Now that Monarchy of the foresaid forms, of Democraty, Aristocraty,
and Monarchy, hath the preheminence, will best appear by comparing the
conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them. Those
arguments therefore that the whole universe is governed by one God; that
the Ancients preferr'd the Monarchicall state before all others,
ascribing the Rule of the Gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of
affairs, and of Nations, the decrees of Princes were held for Laws; that
paternall government instituted by God himselfe in the Creation, was
Monarchicall; that other governments were compacted by the artifice of
men [1] out of the ashes of Monarchy, after it had been ruined with
seditions; and that the people of God were under the jurisdiction of
Kings, although I say these doe hold forth Monarchy as the more eminent
to us, yet because they doe it by examples and testimonies, and not by
solid reason, we will passe them over.

IV. Some there are who are discontented with the government under one,
for no other reason, but because it is under one; as if it were an
unreasonable thing that one man among so many, should so farre excell in
power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest;
these men sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the
Dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by
envie, while they see one man in possession of what all desire: for the
same cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few
commanded, unlesse they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the
number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an
equall Right, surely an Aristocraty must be unreasonable also. But
because we have shewed that the state of equality is the state of warre,
and that therefore inequality was introduc'd by a generall consent; this
inequality whereby he, whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoyes
more, is no longer to be accompted an unreasonable thing. The
inconveniences therefore which attend the Dominion of one man, attend
his Person, not his Unity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it
the greater grievances to the subject, the command of one man, or of
many.

V. But first, we must remove their opinion who deny that to be any City
at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under
a common Lord. In the 9. Artic. of the 5. Chapter, a City is defined to
be one Person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is
to be esteemed as the wills of them all, insomuch as he may use the
strength and faculties of each single Person for the publick Peace and
safety; and by the same article of the same Chapter, One Person is that,
when the wills of many are contained in the will of one. But the will of
each servant is contained in the will of his Lord, as hath been declared
in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter, so as he may employ all their
forces and faculties according to his own will, and pleasure; it
followes therefore that that must needs be a city, which is constituted
by a Lord, and many servants; neither can any reason be brought to
contradict this which doth not equally combat against a City constituted
by a Father, and his Sonnes; for to a Lord who hath no children,
servants are in the nature of sonnes; for they are both his honour, and
safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their Lords, than
children to their Parents, as hath been manifested above in the 5.
Article of the 8. Chapter.

VI. Among other grievances of supreme authority one is, that the Ruler,
beside those monies necessary for publick charges, as the maintaining of
publick Ministers, building, and defending of Castles, waging warres,
honourable sustaining his own houshold, may also, if he will, exact
others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sonnes, kindred,
favourites, and flatterers too. I confesse this is a grievance, but of
the number of those which accompany all kindes of government, but are
more tolerable in a Monarchy than in a Democraty; for though the Monarch
would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one.
But in a Democraty, look how many Demagoges, (that is) how many
powerfull Oratours there are with the people (which ever are many, and
daily new ones growing) so many Children, Kinsmen, friends, &
Flatterers, are to be rewarded; for every of them desire not onely to
make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as may be, but
also to oblige others to them by benefits for the better strengthning of
themselves. A Monarch may in great part satisfie his Officers and
Friends, because they are not many, without any cost to his Subjects, I
mean, without robbing them of any of those Treasures given in for the
maintenance of War, and Peace; In a Democraty, where many are to be
satisfied, and alwayes new ones, this cannot be done without the
Subjects oppression. Though a Monarch may promote unworthy Persons, yet
oft times he will not doe it; but in a Democraty all the popular men are
therefore suppos'd to doe it, because it is necessary; for else, the
power of them who did it would so encrease, as it would not onely become
dreadfull to those others, but even to the whole City also.

VII. Another grievance is, that same perpetuall fear of death which
every man must necessarily be in, while he considers with himself that
the Ruler hath power not onely to appoint what punishments he lists on
any Transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath, and sensuality,
slaughter his innocent Subjects, and those who never offended against
the Lawes. And truly this is a very great grievance in any forme of
Government wheresoever it happens: (for it is therefore a grievance
because it is; not, because it may be done) but it is the fault of the
Ruler, not of the Government; For all the acts of Nero are not
essentiall to Monarchie; yet Subjects are lesse often undeservedly
condemn'd under one Ruler, than under the People: For Kings are onely
severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent Counsells,
or oppose them with reproachfull words, or controule their Wills; but
they are the cause that that excesse of power which one Subject might
have above another becomes harmlesse. Wherefore some Nero or Caligula
reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer, but such as are known to him,
namely Courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent Charge;
and not all neither, but they onely who are possessed of what he desires
to enjoy; for they that are offensive, and contumelious, are deservedly
punisht. Whosoever therefore in a Monarchy will lead a retired life, let
him be what he will that Reignes, he is out of danger: for the ambitious
onely suffer, the rest are protected from the injuries of the more
potent. But in a popular Dominion there may be as many Nero's, as there
are Oratours who sooth the People; for each one of them can doe as much
as the People, and they mutually give way to each others appetite (as it
were by this secret pact, Spare me to day, and Ile spare thee to morrow)
while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfie their lust, and
private hatred, have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects.
Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it
exceed, it may prove pernicious to the Realme, and by reason whereof it
is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to have a care that the common-weale
do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in
the multitude of Riches, they lessened it by diminishing their heaps;
but if it were in popular applause, the powerfull party without any
other crime laid to his charge, was taken from among them. The same was
usually practised in Democraties; for the Athenians inflicted a
punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull, meerly
because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime; and those
who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the common people, were put
to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a Kingdome. In this Democraty and
Monarchy were eaven; yet differ'd they much in fame, because fame
derives from the People, and what is done by many, is commended by many:
and therefore what the Monarch does, is said to be done out of envie to
their vertues, which if it were done by the People, would be accounted
Politie.

VIII. There are some who therefore imagine Monarchy to bee more grievous
than Democraty, because there is lesse liberty in that, than in this. If
by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to
the Lawes (i.e.) the commands of the People, neither in Democraty, nor
in any other state of government whatsoever, is there any such kind of
liberty. If they suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few
lawes, few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were
forbidden, there could be no Peace; then I deny that there is more
liberty in Democraty than Monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth with
such a liberty, as the other. For although the word liberty, may in
large, and ample letters be written over the gates of any City
whatsoever, yet is it not meant the Subjects, but the Cities liberty,
neither can that word with better Right be inscribed on a City which is
governed by the people, than that which is ruled by a Monarch. But when
private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they
ask not for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of understanding,
they little consider; for if every man would grant the same liberty to
another, which he desires for himselfe, as is commanded by the law of
nature, that same naturall state would return again, in which all men
may by Right doe all things, which if they knew, they would abhor, as
being worse than all kind of civill subjection whatsoever. But if any
man desire to have his single freedome, the rest being bound, what does
he else demand but to have the Dominion? For who so is freed from all
bonds, is Lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects
therefore have no greater liberty in a Popular, than in a Monarchicall
State. That which deceives them, is the equall participation of command,
and publique places; for where the authority is in the People, single
subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are parts of the People
ruling; and they equally partake in publique Offices so far forth as
they have equall voices in choosing Magistrates, and publique Ministers.
And this is that which Aristotle aim'd at, himself also, through the
custome of that time, mis-calling Dominion liberty, in his sixth Book,
and second Chapter of Politiques. In a popular State there is liberty by
supposition; which is a speech of the vulgar, as if no man were free out
of this State. From whence, by the way, we may collect, That those
Subjects, who in a Monarchy deplore their lost liberty, doe onely
stomack this, that they are not receiv'd to the steerage of the
Common-weal.

IX. But perhaps for this very reason some will say, That a Popular State
is much to be preferr'd before a Monarchicall; because that, where all
men have a hand in publique businesses, there all have an opportunity to
shew their wisedome, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters
of the greatest difficulty and moment; which by reason of that desire of
praise which is bred in humane nature, is to them who excell in such
like faculties, and seeme to themselves to exceed others, the most
delightfull of all things. But in a Monarchy, this same way to obtain
praise, and honour, is shut up to the greatest part of Subjects; and
what is a grievance, if this be none? Ile tell you: To see his opinion
whom we scorne, preferr'd before ours; to have our wisedome undervalued
before our own faces; by an uncertain tryall of a little vaine glory, to
undergoe most certaine enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we
have the better, or the worse); to hate, and to be hated, by reason of
the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret Counsells, and
advises to all, to no purpose, and without any benefit; to neglect the
affaires of our own Family: These, I say, are grievances. But to be
absent from a triall of wits, although those trialls are pleasant to the
Eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them, unlesse we will say,
that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting,
because they delight in it.

X. Besides, there are many reasons why deliberations are lesse
successefull in great Assemblies, than in lesser Councells; whereof one
is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation
of a Common-weal, we must not onely understand matters at home, but
Forraign Affaires too: at Home, by what goods the Country is nourished,
and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make
Garrisons of; by what means Souldiers are best to be raised, and
maintained; what manner of affections the Subjects bear toward their
Prince, or Governours of their Country, and many the like: Abroad, what
the power of each neighbouring Country is, and wherein it consists; what
advantage, or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their
dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among
themselves, and what Counsell daily passeth among them. Now, because
very few in a great Assembly of men understand these things, being for
the most part unskilfull (that I say not incapable) of them, what can
that same number of advisers with their impertinent Opinions contribute
to good Counsells, other than meer letts and impediments?

XI. Another reason why a great Assembly is not so fit for consultation
is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to
make a long continued Speech, and to gain the more esteem from his
Auditours, he polishes, and adornes it with the best, and smoothest
language. Now the nature of Eloquence is to make Good and Evill,
Profitable and Unprofitable, Honest and Dishonest, appear to be more or
lesse than indeed they are, and to make that seem just, which is unjust,
according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh. For this is
to perswade; and though they reason, yet take they not their rise from
true Principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which, for the most
part, are erroneous; neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech
to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the Passions of their
mindes to whom they speak; whence it happens that opinions are delivered
not by right reason, but by a certain violence of mind. Nor is this
fault in the Man, but in the nature it selfe of Eloquence, whose end (as
all the Masters of Rhetorick teach us) is not truth (except by chance)
but victory, and whose property is not to inform, but to allure.

XII. The third reason why men advise lesse successfully in a great
convent is, because that thence arise Factions in a commonweal, and out
of Factions, Seditions, and Civill War; for when equall Oratours doe
combat with contrary Opinions, and Speeches, the conquered hates the
Conquerour, and all those that were of his side, as holding his
Counsell, and wisedome in scorne: and studyes all meanes to make the
advise of his adversaries prejudiciall to the State, for thus he hopes
to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself. Farthermore,
where the Votes are not so unequall, but that the conquered have hopes
by the accession of some few of their own opinion at another sitting to
make the stronger Party, the chief heads do call the rest together; they
advise apart how they may abrogate the former judgment given; they
appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent; they determine
what, and in what order each man shall speak, that the same businesse
may again be brought to agitation, that so what was confirmed before by
the number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in some
measure become of no effect to them, being negligently absent. And this
same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people, is
commonly called a faction. But when a faction is inferiour in votes, and
superiour, or not much inferiour in power, than what they cannot obtain
by craft, and language, they attempt by force of armes, and so it comes
to a civill warre. But some will say, these things doe not necessarily,
nor often happen; he may as well say, that the chief Parties are not
necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of them seldom
disagree in great matters.

XIII. It followes hence, that when the legislative power resides in such
convents as these, the Laws must needs be inconstant, and change, not
according to the alteration of the state of affaires, nor according to
the changeablenesse of mens mindes, but as the major part, now of this,
then of that faction, do convene; insomuch as the Laws do flote here,
and there, as it were upon the waters.

XIV. In the fourth place, the counsels of great assemblies have this
inconvenience, that whereas it is oft of great consequence, that they
should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the
enemy before they can be brought to any effect, and their power, and
will, is as soon known abroad, as to the People it selfe commanding at
home.

XV. These inconveniences which are found in the deliberations of great
assemblies do so farre forth evince Monarchy to be better than
Democraty, as in Democraty affairs of great consequence are oftner
trusted to be discussed by such like Committees, than in a Monarchy.
Neither can it easily bee done otherwayes; for there is no reason why
every man should not naturally rather minde his own private, than the
publique businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his
eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenuous, and
wise, and returning home to his friends, to his Parents, to his wife,
and children, rejoyce, and triumph in the applause of his dexterous
behaviour: As of old all the delight Marcus Coriolanus had in his
warlike actions, was, to see his praises so well pleasing to his Mother.
But if the People in a Democraty would bestow the power of deliberating
in matters of Warre, and Peace, either on one, or some very few, being
content with the nomination of Magistrates, and publique Ministers, that
is to say, with the authority without the ministration, then it must be
confest, that in this particular, Democraty and Monarchy would be
equall.

XVI. Neither do the conveniencies or inconveniences which are found to
be more in one kind of government than another, arise from hence,
namely, because the government it self, or the administration of its
affairs, are better committed to one, than many; or on the other side,
to many, than to some few. For Government is the power, the
administration of it is the act. Now the Power in all kind of government
is equall; the acts only differ, that is to say the actions and motions
of a common-weale, as they flow from the deliberations of many, or few,
of skilfull, or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the
conveniences, or inconveniences of any government, depend not on him in
whom the authority resides, but on his Officers; and therefore nothing
hinders, but that the common-weale may be well governed, although the
Monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for
affaires, who are endued with the publique Offices, and charges; And
that which is said, Woe to the land whose King is a childe, doth not
signifie the condition of a Monarchy to be inferiour to a Popular state,
but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grievance of a Kingdome,
that the King being a childe, it often happens, that many by ambition,
and power, intruding themselves into publique counsels, the government
comes to be administred in a Democraticall manner, and that thence arise
those infelicities which for the most part accompany the Dominion of the
People.

XVII. But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute Monarchy is the
best state of government, that not onely Kings, but even those Cities
which are subject to the people, or to Nobles, give the whole command of
warre to one only, and that so absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein
by the way this must be noted also, that no King can give a Generall
greater authority over his army, than he himselfe by Right may exercise
over all his subjects). Monarchy therefore is the best of all
governments in the Camps. But what else, are many Common-wealths, than
so many Camps strengthened with armes, and men against each other, whose
state (because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an
uncertain peace, like a short truce, may passe between them) is to be
accounted for the state of nature, which is the state of War.

XVIII. Lastly, since it was necessary for the preservation of our selves
to be subject to some Man, or Councell, we cannot on better condition be
subject to any, than one whose interest depends upon our safety, and
welfare; and this then comes to passe when we are the inheritance of the
Ruler; for every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of
his inheritance. But the Lands, and Monies of the Subjects are not onely
the Princes Treasure, but their bodies, and active minds; which will be
easily granted by those who consider at how great rates the Dominion of
lesser Countries is valued, and how much easier it is for men to procure
mony, than money men; nor doe we readily meet with any example that
shewes us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his
Prince been despoiled of his life, or goods, through the sole
licenciousnesse of his Authority.

XIX. Hitherto we have compared a Monarchicall, with a Popular State; we
have said nothing of Aristocracy; we may conclude of this, by what hath
been said of those, that, that which is hereditary, and content with the
election of Magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few,
and those most able; which simply imitates the government of Monarchs
most, and the People least of all, is for the Subjects both better, and
more lasting than the rest.

____________

1. Compacted by the artifice of men, &c. It seems the Ancients who made
that same fable of Prometheus pointed at this. They say, that Prometheus
having stolne fire from the Sunne, formed a man out of clay, and that
for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetuall gnawing in
his liver. Which is, that by humane invention (which is signified by
Prometheus) Laws and Justice were by imitation taken from Monarchy, by
vertue whereof (as by fire removed from its naturall orbe) the multitude
(as the durt and dregs of men) was as it were quickned and formed into a
civill Person, which is termed Aristocraty, or Democraty; but the
Awthours and Abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have
lived under the naturall jurisdiction of Kings, doe thus smart for it,
that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with
perpetuall cares, suspitions, and dissentions.


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Chapter XI.

Places and Examples of Scripture of the Rights of Government agreeable
to what hath been said before

I. We have in the 6. Chapter, and the 2. Article, so derived the
Originall of institutive, or politicall Government from the consent of
the Multitude, that it appears they must either all consent, or be
esteem'd as Enemies. Such was the beginning of Gods Government over the
Jewes instituted by Moses, If ye will obey my voice indeed, &c. Ye shall
be unto me a Kingdome of Priests, &c. And Moses came, and called the
Elders of the People, &c. And all the people answered, and said: All
that the Lord hath spoken we will do, Exod. 19. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. Such
also was the beginning of Moyses his power under God, or of his
Vicegerency. And all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings, and
the noyse of the Trumpet, &c. And they said unto Moyses, speak thou unto
us, and we will hear. Exod. 20:18,19. The like beginning also had Sauls
Kingdome. When yee saw that Nahash King of the children of Ammon came
out against you, yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall raign over us,
when the Lord your God was your King; Now therefore behold the King whom
yee have chosen, and whom yee have desired. 1 Sam. 12:12. But the major
part only consenting, and not all (for there were certain Sons of
Belial, who said, How shall this man save us? And they dispised him, 1
Sam. 10:27.) Those who did not consent were put to death as Enemies; And
the people said unto Samuel, Who is he that said, shall Saul reign over
us? Bring the men that we may put them to death. 1 Sam. 11.

II. In the same 6. Chapter, the 6. and 7. Articles, I have shewed, that
all judgment and Wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who
beares the Supreme Authority; that is to say, in a Monarchy, on a
Monarch, or King; and this is confirmed by the Peoples owne judgement.
Wee also will be like all the Nations, and our King shall JUDGE us, and
goe out before us, and fight our BATTELS. 1 Sam. 8:20. And what
pertaines to judgements, and all other matters, whereof there is any
controversie, whether they be Good, or Evill, is confirmed by the
testimony of King Solomon. Give therefore thy Servant an understanding
heart to JUDGE thy People, that I may discerne between GOOD and EVILL.
1. Kings 3:9. And that of Absolom, There is no man deputed of the King
to heare thee. 2. Sam. 15:3.

III. That Kings may not be punished by their subjects, as hath been
shewed above in the sixth Chapter, and the twelfth Article, King David
also confirmes, who, though Saul sought to slay him, did notwithstanding
refrain his hand from killing him, and forbad Abishai, saying, Destroy
him, not; for who can stretch forth his hand against the Lords Anointed,
and be innocent? 1 Sam: 4:9. And when he had cut off the skirt of his
garment, The Lord forbid (saith he) that I should doe this thing unto my
Master the Lords Anointed, to stretchforth mine hand against him. 1 Sam.
24:7. And commanded the Amalekite, who for his sake had slain Saul, to
be put to death. 2 Sam. 1:15.

IV. That which is said in the 17. Chapter of Judges, at the 6. verse. In
those dayes there was no King in Israel, but every man did that which
was right in his own eyes (as though where there were not a Monarchy,
there were an Anarchy or confusion of all things) may be brought as a
testimony to prove the excellency of Monarchy above all other forms of
government, unlesse that by the word King may perhaps be understood, not
one man onely, but also a Court, provided that in it there reside a
supreme power; which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may
follow, that without a supreme and absolute power (which we have
endeavoured to prove in the sixth Chapter) there will be a liberty for
every man to doe what hee hath a minde, or whatsoever shall seem right
to himselfe; which cannot stand with the preservation of mankinde, and
therefore in all Government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power
understood to be somewhere existent.

V. We have in the 8. Chapter, the 7. and 8. Article, said, that Servants
must yeeld a simple obedience to their Lords, and in the 9. Chapter,
Article 7. that Sonnes owe the same obedience to their Parents. Saint
Paul sayes the same thing concerning Servants, Servants obey in all
things your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye service, as
men-pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, fearing God. Colos. 3:22.
Concerning Sonnes, Children obey your Parents in all things, for this is
well pleasing unto the Lord. Colos. 3:20. Now as wee by simple obedience
understand ALL THINGS which are not contrary to the Lawes of God; so in
those cited places of Saint Paul, after the word ALL THINGS, we must
suppose, excepting those which are contrary to the Lawes of God.

VI. But that I may not thus by peecemeale prove the right of Princes, I
will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole
power, (namely that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to
them from their subjects). And first out of the new Testament. The
Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses seat; all therefore, whatsoever they
bid you observe, that observe, and doe. Mat. 23:2. Whatsoever they bid
you, (sayes he) observe, that is to say, obey simply: Why? Because they
sit in Moyses seat; namely, the civill Magistrates, not Aaron, the
Priests. Let every soule be subject to the higher powers, for there is
no Power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever
therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they
that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. Rom. 13:1. Now
because the powers that were in Saint Pauls time were ordained of God,
and all Kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from
their subjects, it followes that such a power was ordained of God.
Submit your selves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake,
whether it bee to the King as supreme, or unto Governours, as unto them
that are sent by him, for the punishment of wicked doers, and for the
praise of them that doe well, for so is the will of God. 1 Pet. 2:13.
Again Saint Paul to Titus, Put them in mind to bee subject to
Principalities and Powers, to obey Magistrates, &c. Chap. 3. vers. 1.
What Principalities? Was it not to the Principalities of those times,
which required an absolute obedience? Furthermore, that we may come to
the example of Christ himselfe, to whom the Kingdome of the Jewes
belonged by hereditary Right, derived from David himselfe; He when he
lived in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto Caesar, and
pronounced it to be due to him. Give unto Caesar (saith he) the things
which are Caesars, and unto God, the things which are Gods. Mat. 22:21.
When it pleased him to shew himselfe a King, he required entire
obedience. Goe (said he) into the village over against you, and
straightway yee shall finde an Asse tyed, and a Colt with her, loose
them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say ought unto you, yee
shall say the Lord hath need of them. Mat. 21:2,3. This he did therefore
by the right of being Lord, or a King of the Jewes. But to take away a
subjects goods on this pretence onely, because the Lord hath need of
them, is an absolute power. The most evident places in the old Testament
are these, Goe thou near, and heare ALL that the Lord our God shall say,
and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee,
and we will hear it, and doe it. Deut. 5:27. But under the word all, is
contained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua. And they answered Joshua
saying, ALL that thou commandest us, we will doe, and whithersoever thou
sendest us, we will goe; according as we hearkened unto Moyses in ALL
things, so will we hearken unto thee, onely the Lord thy God be with
thee, as he was with Moyses; whosoever hee be that doth rebell against
thy Commandement, and will not hearken unto thy words in ALL that thou
commandest him, he shall be put to death. Joshua 1:16-18. And the
Parable of the Bramble. Then said all the trees unto the Bramble, Come
thou, and reign over us; And the Bramble said unto the trees, If in
truth yee anoint me King over you, then come and put your trust in my
shadow; and if not, let fire come out of the Bramble, and devoure the
Cedars of Lebanon. Judges 9. vers. 14, 15. The sense of which words is,
that we must acquiese to their sayings, whom we have truly constituted
to be Kings over us, unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed by the
fire of a civill warre. But the Regall authority is more particularly
described by God himselfe, in the 1. Sam. 8. vers. 9. &c. Shew them the
Right of the King that shall reign over them, &c. This shall be the
Right of the King that shall reign over you; he will take your Sons, and
appoint them for himself, for his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and
some shall runne before his Chariots, &c. And he will take your
daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take your vineyards,
and give them to his Servants, &c. Is not this power absolute? And yet
it is by God himself styled the KINGS RIGHT; neither was any man among
the Jewes, no not the High Priest himselfe, exempted from this
obedience. For when the King (namely Solomon) said to Abiathar the
Priest, Get thee to Anathoth unto thine own fields, for thou art worthy
of death, but I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou
barest the Ark of the Lord God before David my father, and because thou
hast been afflicted in all wherein my Father was afflicted. So Solomon
thrust out Abiathar from being Priest unto the Lord. 1 Kings. 2:26. It
cannot by any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the
Lord; neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his
Person at that time was any whit lesse acceptable to God.


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Chapter XII.

Of the internal causes, tending to the dissolution of any Government

I. Hitherto hath been spoken by what causes, and Pacts, Common-weals are
constituted, and what the Rights of Princes are over their subjects; Now
we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them,
or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of naturall bodies,
three things are to be considered, namely, internall disposition, that
they be susceptible of the motion to be produced; the externall Agent,
whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced; and the
action it selfe: So also in a Common-weale where the subjects begin to
raise tumults, three things present themselves to our regard; First the
Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace, wherewith the mindes of
men are fitted and disposed; next their quality and condition who
sollicite, assemble, and direct them already thus disposed, to take up
armes, and quit their allegiance; Lastly, the manner how this is done,
or the faction it selfe. But one, and the first which disposeth them to
sedition, is this, That the knowledge of good and evill belongs to each
single man. In the state of nature indeed, where every man lives by
equall Right, and have not by any mutuall Pacts submitted to the command
of others, we have granted this to be true, nay in the first Chapter,
Article 9. we have demonstrated it. But in the civil state it is false.
For it was shown in chap. 6. art. 9. that the civill Lawes were the
Rules of good and evill, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that
therefore what the Legislator commands, must be held for good, and what
he forbids for evill; and the Legislator is ever that Person who hath
the supreme power in the Commonweale, that is to say, the Monarch in a
Monarchy. We have confirmed the same truth in the eleventh Chapter,
Article 2. out of the words of Solomon; for if private men may pursue
that as good, and shun that as evill which appears to them to be so, to
what end serve those words of his? Give therefore unto thy servant an
understanding heart to judge thy People, that I may discern between good
and evill. Since therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good
and evill, wicked are those, though usuall sayings, that he onely is a
King who does righteously, and that Kings must not be obeyed, unlesse
they command us just things, and many other such like. Before there was
any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature onely being
relative to some command, and every action in its own nature is
indifferent; that it becomes just, or unjust, proceeds from the right of
the Magistrate: Legitimate Kings therefore make the things they command,
just, by commanding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by
forbidding them; but private men while they assume to themselves the
knowledge of good and evill, desire to be even as Kings, which cannot be
with the safety of the Common weale. The most ancient of all Gods
commands is, Gen. 2:15. Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of
good and evill; and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations,
Chap. 3. vers. 5. Yee shall be as Gods, knowing good and evill; and Gods
first expostulation with man, vers. 11. Who told thee that thou wert
naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou
shouldest not eat? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that
nakedness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shamefull,
except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and evill?

II. Whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sinne, for he
who doth so, contemns the Law. But we must distinguish: That is my sinne
indeed, which committing, I doe beleeve to be my sinne; but what I
beleeve to be another mans sin, I may sometimes doe that without any sin
of mine. For if I be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who
commands me, if I doe it, and he that commands me be by Right, Lord over
me, I sinne not; for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince,
conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken, I doe not therefore doe
unjustly, but rather if I refuse to doe it, arrogating to my selfe the
knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains onely to my Prince.
They who observe not this distinction, will fall into a necessity of
sinning, as oft as any thing is commanded them, which either is, or
seems to be unlawfull to them: for if they obey, they sin against their
conscience, and if they obey not, against Right. If they sin against
their conscience, they declare that they fear not the paines of the
world to come; if they sinne against Right, they doe as much as in them
lyes, abolish humane society, and the civill life of the present world.
Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sinne when they obey
their Princes commands, which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous,
and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civill obedience;
and it depends upon that originall errour which we have observed above
in the foregoing Article; for by our taking upon us to judge of good and
evill, we are the occasion, that as well our obedience, as disobedience,
becomes sin unto us.

III. The third seditious doctrine springs from the same root, That
Tyrannicide is lawfull; Nay, at this day it is by many Divines, and of
old it was by all the Philosophers, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca,
Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek, and Roman
Anarchies, held not only lawful, but even worthy of the greatest praise.
And under the title of Tyrants, they mean not onely Monarchs, but all
those who bear the chief rule in any Government whatsoever; for not
Pisistratus onely at Athens, but those thirty also who succeeded him,
and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom men require to
be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by Right, or without
Right; if without Right, he is an enemy, and by Right to be put to
death; but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant, but an
enemy: if by Right, then the divine interrogation takes place, Who hath
told thee that he was a Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I
commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? For why doest thou call him
a Tyrant, whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private
Person, usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill? But how
pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to that
which is Monarchicall, we may hence discerne, namely, that by it every
King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the
judgement, and slain by the hand of every murtherous villain.

IV. The fourth adversary opinion to Civill Society, is theirs, who hold,
That they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes. Which hath
been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Artic.
14. from this Argument, That a City can neither be bound to it self, nor
to any subject; not to it selfe, because no man can be obliged except it
be to another; not to any Subject, because the single wills of the
Subjects are contained in the will of the City, insomuch, that if the
City will be free from all such obligation, the Subjects will so too;
and by consequence she is so. But that which holds true in a City, that
must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men, who have
the Supreme Authority, for they make a City, which hath no being but by
their Supreme Power. Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very
being of Government, is evident from hence, that by it the knowledge of
what is Good and Evill, that is to say, the definition of what is, and
what is not against the Lawes, would return to each single Person:
Obedience therefore will cease as oft as any thing seemes to be
commanded contrary to the Civill Lawes, and together with it, all
coercive jurisdiction, which cannot possibly be without the destruction
of the very essence of Government. Yet this Errour hath great props,
Aristotle, and others; who, by reason of humane infirmity, suppose the
Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely; but
they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of Government,
who thought that the constraining Power, the interpretation of Lawes,
and the making of Lawes, (all which are powers necessarily belonging to
Government) should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves. Now although
particular Subjects may sometimes contend in judgement, and goe to Law
with the Supreme Magistrate, yet this is onely then, when the question
is not what the Magistrate may, but what by a certain Rule he hath
declared he would doe. As, when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life
of a Subject, the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his
absolute Right deprive him of his life; but whether by that Law his will
was that he should be deprived of it; but his will was, he should, if he
brake the Law; else, his will was he should not: This therefore, that a
Subject may have an action of Law against his Supreme Magistrate, is not
strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own
Lawes. On the contrary, it is evident, that he is not tied to his owne
Lawes, because no man is bound to himself. Lawes therefore are set for
Titius, and Caius, not for the Ruler: however, by the ambition of
Lawyers, it is so ordered, that the Lawes, to unskilfull men seeme not
to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate, but their Prudence.

V. In the fifth place, That the Supreme Authority may be divided, is a
most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales. But diverse men divide it
diverse wayes. For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the
Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace, and the benefits of this
life, but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul they transfer
it on others. Now, because justice is of all things most necessary to
Salvation, it happens, that Subjects measuring justice, not as they
ought, by the Civill Lawes, but by the precepts and doctrines of them
who, in regard of the Magistrate, are either private mens or strangers,
through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their
Princes, through fear falling into that which they most feared: Now what
can be more pernicious to any state, than that men should, by the
apprehension of everlasting torments, be deterred from obeying their
Princes, that is to say, the Lawes, or from being just? There are also
some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War,
and Peace, unto one, (whom they call a Monarch) but the right of raising
Monies they give to some others, and not to him: But because monies are
the sinewes of War, and Peace, they who thus divide the Authority, doe
either really not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them, in
whose power the money is, but give the name of it to another, or if they
doe really divide it, they dissolve the Government: for neither upon
necessity can War be waged, nor can the publique Peace be preserved
without Money.

VI. It is a common doctrine, That faith and holinesse are not acquired
by study, and naturall reason, but are alwayes supernaturally infused,
and inspired into men: which, if it were true, I understand not why we
should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or why any man, who
is truly a Christian, should not be a Prophet; or lastly, why every man
should not judge what's fit for him to doe, what to avoid, rather out of
his own inspiration, than by the precepts of his Superiours, or right
Reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of Good
and Evil; which cannot be granted without the ruine of all Governments.
This Opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole Christian
world, that the number of Apostates from natural reason is almost become
infinite. And it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good
store of Holy Words by frequent reading of the Scriptures, made such a
connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their Sermons,
signifying just nothing, yet to unlearned men seemed most divine; for he
whose non-sense appears to be a Divine speech, must necessarily seeme to
be inspired from above.

VII. The seventh Doctrine opposite to Government, is this, That each
subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods he is in possession of.
That is to say, such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all
the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods, but also of the
Magistrate himself. Which is not true; for they who have a Lord over
them, have themselves no Lordship, as hath been proved, Chap. 8. Artic.
5. Now the Magistrate is Lord of all his Subjects, by the constitution
of Government. Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken, no man
had any Proper Right; all things were common to all men. Tell me
therefore, how gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate? How
got the Magistrates it, but that every man transferred his Right on him?
And thou therefore hast also given up thy Right to him; thy Dominion
therefore, and Propriety, is just so much as he will, and shall last so
long as he pleases; even as in a Family, each Son hath such proper
goods, and so long lasting, as seeme good to the Father. But the
greatest part of men who professe Civill Prudence, reason otherwise; we
are equall (say they) by nature; there is no reason why any man should
by better Right take my goods from me, than I his from him; we know that
mony sometimes is needfull for the defence and maintenance of the
publique; but let them, who require it, shew us the present necessity,
and they shall willingly receive it. They who talk thus, know not, that
what they would have, is already done from the beginning in the very
constitution of Government, and therefore speaking as in a dissolute
multitude, and yet not fashioned Government, they destroy the frame.

VIII. In the last place, it's a great hindrance to Civill Government,
especially Monarchicall, that men distinguish not enough between a
People and a Multitude. The People is somewhat that is one, having one
will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can
properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments,
for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the
will of one man; but the Multitude are Citizens, that is to say,
Subjects. In a Democraty, and Aristocraty, the Citizens are the
Multitude, but the Court is the People. And in a Monarchy, the Subjects
are the Multitude, and (however it seeme a Paradox) the King is the
People. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these
truthes, do alwayes speak of a great number of men, as of the People,
that is to say, the City; they say that the City hath rebelled against
the King (which is impossible) and that the People will, and nill, what
murmuring and discontented Subjects would have, or would not have, under
pretence of the People, stirring up the Citizens against the City, that
is to say, the Multitude against the People. And these are almost all
the Opinions wherewith Subjects being tainted doe easily Tumult. And
forasmuch as in all manner of Government Majesty is to be preserv'd by
him, or them who have the Supreme Authority, the crimen laesae
Majestatis naturally cleaves to these Opinions.

IX. There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than Poverty, or the
want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life,
and honour; and though there be no man but knowes that riches are gotten
with industry, and kept by frugality, yet all the poor commonly lay the
blame on the Evill Government, excusing their own sloth, and luxury, as
if their private goods forsooth were wasted by publique exactions; But
men must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not onely
labour that they may live, but fight too, that they may labour. Every
one of the Jewes, who in Esdras his time built the Walls of Jerusalem,
did the work with one hand, and held the Sword in the other. In all
Government we must conceive that the hand which holds the Sword is the
King, or Supreme Councell, which is no lesse to be sustained, and
nourisht, by the Subjects care and industry, than that wherewith each
man procures himself a private fortune; and that Customes, and Tributes,
are nothing else but their reward who watch in Armes for us, that the
labours and endeavours of single men may not be molested by the
incursion of enemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty
to publick Persons, is not more just, than if they should say that they
are become in want by paying of their debts: But the most part of men
consider nothing of these things, for they suffer the same thing with
them who have a disease they call an Incubus, which springing from
Gluttony, it makes men believe they are invaded, opprest, and stifled
with a great weight: Now it is a thing manifest of it selfe, that they
who seeme to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the
Common-weal, are prone to be Seditious; and that they are affected with
change, who are distasted at the present state of things.

X. Another noxious disease of the mind is theirs, who having little
employment, want Honour and Dignity. All men naturally strive for
Honour, and Preferment, but chiefly they who are least troubled with
caring for necessary things. For these men are invited by their vacancy
sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the Common-weal,
sometimes to an easie reading of Histories, Politiques, Orations, Poems,
and other pleasant Books; and it happens, that hence they think
themselves sufficiently furnisht both with wit, and learning, to
administer matters of the greatest consequence. Now because all men are
not what they appear to themselves, and if they were, yet all (by reason
of the multitude) could not be received to publique Offices, its
necessary that many must be passed by. These therefore conceiving
themselves affronted, can desire nothing more, partly out of envy to
those who were preferred before them, partly out of hope to overwhelm
them, than ill successe to the publique Consultations; and therefore its
no marvell if with greedy appetites they seek for occasions of
innovations.

XI. The hope of overcomming is also to be numbred among other seditious
inclinations. For let there be as many men as you wil, infected with
opinions repugnant to Peace, and civill Government; let there be as many
as there can, never so much wounded and torne with affronts, and
calumnies, by them who are in Authority; yet if there be no hope of
having the better of them, or it appear not sufficient, there will no
sedition follow; every man will dissemble his thoughts, and rather
content himself with the present burthen, than hazard an heavier weight.
There are four things necessarily requisite to this hope: Numbers,
Instruments, mutuall trust, and Commanders. To resist publique
Magistrates without a great number, is not Sedition, but Desperation. By
Instruments of war I mean all manner of armes, munition, and other
necessary provision, without which Number can doe nothing, nor Arms
neither without mutuall trust; Nor all these without union under some
Commander, whom of their own accord, they are content to obey; not as
being engaged by their submission to his command (for we have already in
this very Chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand, being
obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes) but
for some opinion they have of his vertue, or military skill, or
resemblance of humours. If these four be near at hand to men grieved
with the present state, and measuring the justice of their actions by
their own judgements, there will be nothing wanting to sedition and
confusion of the Realme, but one to stirre up and quicken them.

XII. Salust his Character of Catiline, (than whom there never was a
greater Artist in raising seditions) is this, That he had great
eloquence, and little wisdome. He separates wisdome from eloquence,
attributing this as necessary to a man born for commotions, adjudging
that as an instructresse of Peace, and quietnesse. Now, eloquence is
twofold. The one is an elegant, and cleare expression of the conceptions
of the mind, and riseth partly from the contemplation of the things
themselves, partly from an understanding of words taken in their own
proper, and definite signification; the other is a commotion of the
Passions of the minde (such as are hope, fear, anger, pitty) and derives
from a metaphoricall use of words fitted to the Passions: That forms a
speech from true Principles, this from opinions already received, what
nature soever they are of. The art of that is Logick, of this Rhetorick;
the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its use, that in
deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never disjoyned from
wisdome, but this almost ever. But that this kind of powerfull
eloquence, separated from the true knowledge of things, that is to say,
from wisdome, is the true character of them who sollicite, and stirre up
the people to innovations, may easily be gathered out of the work it
selfe which they have to doe; for they could not poyson the people with
those absurd opinions contrary to Peace and civill society, unlesse they
held them themselves, which sure is an ignorance greater than can well
befall any wise man. For he that knows not whence the Lawes derive their
power, which are the Rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest,
good and evill; what makes and preserves Peace among men, what destroyes
it; what is his, and what anothers; Lastly, what he would have done to
himselfe (that he may doe the like to others) is surely to be accounted
but meanly wise. But that they can turn their Auditors out of fools into
madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected seem
worse, to them who are well-affected seem evil; that they can enlarge
their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason: this they have from
that sort of eloquence, not which explains things as they are, but from
that other, which by moving their mindes, makes all things to appear to
bee such as they in their mindes prepared before, had already conceived
them.

XIII. Many men who are themselves very well affected to civill society,
doe through want of knowledge, cooperate to the disposing of subjects
mindes to sedition, whilst they teach young men a doctrine conformable
to the said opinions in their Schooles, and all the people in their
Pulpits. Now they who desire to bring this disposition into Act, place
their whole endeavour in this, First, that they may joyn the ill
affected together into faction and conspiracy; next, that themselves may
have the greatest stroke in the faction: They gather them into faction,
while they make themselves the relators, and interpretors of the
counsels and actions of single men, and nominate the Persons and Places,
to assemble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government
may be reformed, according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now
to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction,
the faction must be kept in a faction, that is to say, they must have
their secret meetings apart with a few, where they may order what shall
afterward be propounded in a general meeting, and by whom, and on what
subject, and in what order each of them shall speak, and how they may
draw the powerfullest, and most popular men of the faction to their
side: And thus when they have gotten a faction big enough, in which they
may rule by their eloquence, they move it to take upon it the managing
of affaires; and thus they sometimes oppresse the Commonwealth, namely
where there is no other faction to oppose them, but for the most part
they rend it, and introduce a civill warre. For folly and eloquence
concurre in the subversion of government in the same manner (as the
fable hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Pelias King of Thessaly,
conspired with Medea against their father; They going to restore the
decrepit old man to his youth again, by the counsell of Medea, they cut
him into peeces, and set him in the fire to boyle, in vain expecting
when he would live again; So the common people through their folly (like
the daughters of Pelias) desiring to renew the ancient government, being
drawne away by the eloquence of ambitious men, as it were by the
witchcraft of Medea, divided into faction, they consume it rather by
those flames, than they reforme it.


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Chapter XIII.

Concerning the duties of them who bear Rule

I. By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of Citizens and in any
kind of government whatsoever, and the Power of the supreme Ruler over
them are apparent; but we have as yet said nothing of the duties of
Rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their Subjects;
We must then distinguish between the Right, and the exercise of supreme
authority, for they can be divided; as for example, when he who hath the
Right, either cannot, or will not be present in judging trespasses, or
deliberating of affaires: For Kings sometimes by reason of their age
cannot order their affaires, sometimes also though they can doe it
themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choyce of
their Officers and Counsellors, to exercise their power by them. Now
where the Right and exercise are severed, there the government of the
Commonweale, is like the ordinary government of the world, in which God,
the mover of all things, produceth naturall effects by the means of
secondary causes; but where he, to whom the Right of ruling doth belong,
is himselfe present in all judicatures, consultations, and publique
actions, there the administration is such, as if God beyond the ordinary
course of nature, should immediately apply himself unto all matters. We
will therefore in this Chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat
concerning their duties, who exercise authority, whether by their own or
others Right. Nor is it my purpose to descend into those things, which
being divers from others, some Princes may doe, for this is to be left
to the Politicall Practices of each Common weale.

II. Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one sentence, The
safety of the people is the supreme Law; for although they who among men
obtain the chiefest Dominion, cannot be subject to Lawes properly so
called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief, and
subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as
much as possibly they can, to yeeld obedience unto right reason, which
is the naturall, morall, and divine Law. But because dominions were
constituted for Peaces sake, and Peace was sought after for safeties
sake, he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise
than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of Peace,
that is to say, against the Lawes of nature; Now as the safety of the
People dictates a Law by which Princes know their duty, so doth it also
teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of
the Citizens, is the power of the City, that is to say, his that bears
the chief Rule in any state.

III. By the people in this place we understand, not one civill Person,
namely the City it selfe which governs, but the multitude of subjects
which are governed; for the City was not instituted for its own, but for
the subjects sake; and yet a particular care is not required of this or
that man; for the Ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety
of his people, than by his Lawes, which are universall; and therefore he
hath fully discharged himselfe, if he have throughly endeavoured by
wholesome constitutions, to establish the welfare of the most part, and
made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer ill, but by his own
default, Or by some chance which could not be prevented; but it
sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part, that wicked men doe
suffer.

IV. But by safety must be understood, not the sole preservation of life
in what condition soever, but in order to its happines. For to this end
did men freely assemble themselves, and institute a government, that
they might, as much as their humane condition would afford, live
delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the administration of
power in such a kinde of government, would sinne against the Law of
nature (because against their trust who had committed that power unto
them) if they should not study, as much as by good Laws could be
effected, to furnish their subjects abundantly, not only with the good
things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to
delectation. They who have acquired Dominion by arms, doe all desire
that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that they may serve
them the better; wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them,
not only with such things whereby they may live, but also with such
whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they would act against their own
scope and end.

V. And first of all, Princes doe beleeve that it mainly concerns
eternall salvation, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what manner
of worship he is to be adored with; which being supposed, it may be
demanded, whether chief Rulers, and whosoever they be, whether one or
more, who exercise supreme authority, sin not against the Law of nature,
if they cause not such a doctrine, and worship, to be taught and
practised (or permit a contrary to be taught and practised) as they
beleeve necessarily conduceth to the eternall salvation of their
subjects? It is manifest that they act against their conscience, and
that they will, as much as in them lies, the eternall perdition of their
subjects; for if they willed it not, I see no reason why they should
suffer, (when being supreme they cannot be compelled) such things to be
taught and done, for which they beleeve them to be in a damnable state.
But we will leave this difficulty in suspence.

VI. The benefits of subjects respecting this life only, may be
distributed into foure kindes. 1. That they be defended against forraign
enemies. 2. That Peace be preserved at home. 3. That they be enrich't as
much as may consist with publique security. 4. That they enjoy a
harmelesse liberty; For supreme Commanders can conferre no more to their
civill happinesse, than that being preserved from forraign and civill
warres, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by
their own industry.

VII. There are two things necessary for the Peoples defence; To be
warned, and to be forearmed; for the state of Common-wealths considered
in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile; neither if they
cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called Peace, but rather a
breathing time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance
of the other, values his security not according to the Pacts, but the
forces and counsels of his adversary; And this by naturall Right, as
hath been shewed in the second Chapter, 10. Artic. from this, that
contracts are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any just fear
doth intervene; It is therefore necessary to the defence of the City,
First, that there be some who may as near as may be, search into, and
discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For
discoverers to Ministers of State, are like the beames of the Sunne to
the humane soule, and we may more truly say in vision politicall, than
naturall, that the sensible, and intelligible Species of outward things,
not well considered by others, are by the ayre transported to the soule,
(that is to say to them who have the Supreme Authority) and therefore
are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the State, than the
rayes of the light are to the conservation of man; or if they be
compared to Spiders webs, which extended on all sides by the finest
threds, doe warn them, keeping in their small holds, of all outward
motions; They who bear Rule can no more know what is necessary to be
commanded for the defence of their Subjects without Spies, than those
Spiders can when they shall goe forth, and whether they shall repair,
without the motion of those threds.

VIII. Farthermore, its necessarily requisite to the peoples defence,
that they be fore-armed. Now to be fore-armed is to be furnisht with
Souldiers, Armes, Ships, Forts and Monies, before the danger be instant;
for the listing of Souldiers, and taking up of Armes after a blow is
given, is too late at least, if not impossible. In like manner, not to
raise Forts, and appoint Garrisons in convenient places, before the
Frontiers are invaded, is to be like those Country Swains (as
Demosthenes said) who ignorant of the art of Fencing, with their
Bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first felt the smart
of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise
Monies for the maintenance of Souldiers, and other Charges of War, when
the danger begins to shew it self, they consider not surely how
difficult a matter it is to wring suddainly out of close-fisted men so
vast a proportion of Monies; for almost all men, what they once reckon
in the number of their goods, doe judge themselves to have such a right
and propriety in it, as they conceive themselves to be injured
whensoever they are forced to imploy but the least part of it for the
publique good. Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the Country
with Armes, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of Imposts, and
Customes; we must therefore, for fear of War, in time of Peace hoord up
good summs, if we intend the safety of the Common-weal. Since therefore
it necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety to discover the
Enemies Counsell, to keep Garrisons, and to have Money in continuall
readinesse, and that Princes are by the Law of Nature bound to use their
whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their Subjects, it followes,
that its not onely lawfull for them to send out Spies, to maintain
Souldiers, to build Forts, and to require Monies for these purposes, but
also, not to doe thus, is unlawfull. To which also may be added,
whatsoever shall seeme to conduce to the lesning of the power of
forraigners whom they suspect, whether by sleight, or force. For Rulers
are bound according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect,
lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence.

IX. But many things are required to the conservation of inward Peace,
because many things concur (as hath been shewed in the foregoing
Chapter) to its perturbation. We have there shewed, that some things
there are which dispose the minds of men to sedition, others which move
and quicken them so disposed. Among those which dispose them, we have
reckoned in the first place certaine perverse doctrines. Its therefore
the duty of those who have the chief Authority; to root those out of the
mindes of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terrour of
penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons; the Lawes whereby this
evill may be withstood are not to be made against the Persons erring,
but against the Errours themselves. Those errours which in the foregoing
Chapter we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the Common-weal,
have crept into the mindes of ignorant men, partly from the Pulpit,
partly from the daily discourses of men, who by reason of little
employment, otherwise, doe finde leasure enough to study; and they got
into these mens mindes by the teachers of their youth in publique
schooles. Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man would introduce
sound Doctrine, he must begin from the Academies: There, the true, and
truly demonstrated foundations of civill Doctrine are to be laid,
wherewith young men being once endued, they may afterward both in
private and publique instruct the vulgar. And this they will doe so much
the more cheerfully, and powerfully, by how much themselves shall be
more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess, and
teach; for seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false,
and no more intelligible, than if a man should joyne together a company
of termes drawn by chance out of an urne, by reason of the frequent use
of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason entertain
true doctrines suitable to their own understandings, and the nature of
things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of Supreme Officers to
cause the true elements of civill Doctrine to be written, and to command
them to be taught in all the Colledges of their severall Dominions.

X. In the next place we shewed that grief of mind arising from want did
dispose the Subjects to Sedition, which want, although deriv'd from
their own luxury, and sloth, yet they impute it to those who govern the
Realm, as though they were drained and opprest by publique Pensions.
Notwithstanding it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just,
namely, when the burthens of the Realm are unequally imposed on the
Subjects; For that which to all together is but a light weight, if many
withdraw themselves, it wil be very heavy, nay, even intollerable to the
rest: Neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen it self, as
at the inequality. With much earnestnes therefore men strive to be freed
from taxes, & in this conflict the lesse happy, as being overcome, do
envy the more fortunate. To remove therefore all just complaint, its the
interest of the publique quiet, and by consequence it concernes the duty
of the Magistrate, to see that the publique burthens be equally born.
Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to publick use, is
nothing else but the price of their bought Peace, its reason good, that
they who equally share in the peace, should also pay an equall part
either by contributing their Monies, or their labours to the
Common-weal. Now it is the Law of Nature (by the 15. Article of the 3.
Chapter) that every man in distributing right to others, doe carry
himself equall to all; wherefore Rulers are by the naturall Law obliged
to lay the burthens of the Common-weal equally on their Subjects.

XI. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of Money, but of
Burthen, that is to say, an equality of reason between the Burthens, and
the Benefits. For although all equally enjoy Peace, yet the benefits
springing from thence, are not equall to all; for some get greater
possessions, others lesse; and againe, some consume lesse, others more.
It may therefore be demanded whether Subjects ought to contribute to the
publique, according to the rate of what they gain, or of what they
spend, that is to say, whether the persons must be taxt, so as to pay
contribution according to their wealth, or the goods themselves, that
every man contribute according to what he spends. But if we consider,
where Monies are raised according to wealth, there they who have made
equall gain, have not equall possessions, because that one preserves
what he hath got by frugality, another wastes it by luxury, and
therefore equally rejoycing in the benefit of Peace, they doe not
equally sustaine the Burthens of the Common-weal: and on the other side,
where the goods themselves are taxt, there every man, while he spends
his private goods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably
payes part due to the Common-weal, according to, not what he hath, but
what by the benefit of the Realm he hath had. It is no more to be
doubted, but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity,
and therefore against the duty of Rulers, the latter is agreeable to
reason, and the exercise of their authority.

XII. In the third place, we said that that trouble of minde which riseth
from ambition was offensive to publique Peace. For there are some who
seeming to themselves to be wiser than others, and more sufficient for
the managing of affaires than they who at present doe govern, when they
can no otherwise declare how profitable their vertue would prove to the
Common-weale, they shew it, by harming it; but because ambition and
greedinesse of honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men, its
not the duty of Rulers to endeavour it; but by constant application of
rewards, and punishments, they may so order it, that men may know that
the way to honour is, not by contempt of the present government, nor by
factions, and the popular ayre, but by the contraries. They are good men
who observe the Decrees, the Lawes and Rights of their Fathers; if with
a constant order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factious
punisht, and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be
more ambition to obey, than withstand. Notwithstanding it so happens
sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much
fiercenesse, so a stiffe-neckt subject must be flatter'd for fear of his
power; but as that happens when the rider, so this, when the Commander
is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those, whose authority and
power is intire. Their duty (I say) it is to cherish obedient subjects,
and to depresse the factious all they can; nor can the publique power be
otherwise preserved, nor the subjects quiet without it.

XIII. But if it be the duty of Princes to restrain the factious, much
more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions
themselves. Now I call a faction, a multitude of subjects gathered
together, either by mutuall contracts among themselves, or by the power
of some one, without his or their authority who bear the supreme Rule: A
faction therefore is as it were a City in a City; for as by an Union of
men in the state of nature a City receives its being, so by a new union
of subjects, there ariseth a faction. According to this definition, a
multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any
forreign Prince, or Subject, or have made any Pacts, or Leagues of
mutuall defence between themselves against all men, not excepting those
who have the supreme power in the City, is a faction. Also favour with
the vulgar if it be so great, that by it an Army may be rais'd, except
publique caution be given, either by hostages, or some other pledges,
contains faction in it; The same may be said of private wealth, if it
exceed, because all things obey mony. Forasmuch therefore as it is true,
that the state of Cities among themselves is naturall, and hostile,
those Princes who permit factions, doe as much as if they received an
enemy within their walls, which is Contrary to the subjects safety, and
therefore also against the Law of nature.

XIV. There are two things necessary to the enriching of Subjects, Labour
and thrift; there is also a third which helps, to wit the naturall
increase of the earth and water; and there is a fourth too, namely the
Militia, which sometimes augments, but more frequently lessens the
subjects stock. The two first are only necessary. For a City constituted
in an Island of the Sea, no greater than will serve for dwelling, may
grow rich without sowing, or fishing, by merchandize, and handicrafts
only; but there is no doubt if they have a territory, but they may be
richer with the same number, or equally rich, being a greater number.
But the fourth, namely the Militia, was of old reckoned in the number of
the gaining Arts, under the notion of Booting or taking Prey; and it was
by mankind, (disperst by families) before the constitution of civill
societies, accounted just and honourable; for preying, is nothing else
but a warre waged with small forces; And great Common-weales, namely
that of Rome, and Athens, by the spoyles of warre, forraigne tribute,
and the territories they have purchased by their armes, have sometimes
so improved the Common-wealth, that they have not onely not required any
publique monies from the poorer sort of subjects, but have also divided
to each of them both monies and lands. But this kind of increase of
riches, is not to be brought into rule and fashion: For the Militia in
order to profit, is like a Dye wherewith many lose their estates, but
few improve them. Since therefore there are three things only, the
fruits of the earth and water, Labour and Thrift, which are expedient
for the enriching of subjects, the duty of Commanders in chief, shall be
conversant onely about those three. For the first, those lawes will be
usefull which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the
earth, and water, such as are husbandry, and fishing. For the second,
all Lawes against idlenesse, and such as quicken industry, are
profitable; the art of Navigation (by help whereof the commodities of
the whole world, bought almost by labour only, are brought into one
City) and the Mechanicks, (under which I comprehend all the arts of the
most excellent workmen) and the Mathematicall sciences, the fountains of
navigatory and mechanick employments, are held in due esteem and honour.
For the third, those lawes are usefull, whereby all inordinate expence,
as well in meats, as in clothes, and universally in all things which are
consumed with usage, is forbidden. Now because such lawes are
beneficiall to the ends above specified, it belongs also to the Office
of supreme Magistrates, to establish them.

XV. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the Lawes
of the City, or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what
Laws they have a mind to; but because all the motions and actions of
subjects, are never circumscribed by Lawes, nor can be, by reason of
their variety, it is necessary that there be infinite cases, which are
neither commanded, nor prohibited, but every man may either doe, or not
doe them, as he lists himselfe. In these, each man is said to enjoy his
liberty, and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place,
namely, for that part of naturall Right, which is granted and left to
Subjects by the civill Lawes. As water inclosed on all hands with banks,
stands still and corrupts; having no bounds, it spreds too largely, and
the more passages it findes, the more freely it takes its current; so
subjects, if they might doe nothing without the commands of the Law
would grow dull, and unwildly, if all, they would be disperst, and the
more is left undetermined by the Lawes, the more liberty they enjoy.
Both extremes are faulty, for Lawes were not invented to take away, but
to direct mens actions, even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay,
but to guide the course of the streame. The measure of this liberty is
to be taken from the subjects, and the Cities good. Wherefore in the
first place it is against the charge of those who command, and have the
authority of making lawes, that there should be more lawes than
necessarily serve for good of the Magistrate, and his Subjects; for
since men are wont commonly to debate what to do, or not to do, by
naturall reason, rather than any knowledge of the Lawes, where there are
more Lawes than can easily be remembred, and whereby such things are
forbidden, as reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity, they must
through ignorance, without the least evill intention, fall within the
compasse of Lawes, as gins laid to entrap their harmelesse liberty,
which supreme Commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the
Lawes of nature.

XVI. It is a great part of that liberty, which is harmlesse to civill
government, and necessary for each subject to live happily, that there
be no penalties dreaded, but what they may both foresee, and look for;
and this is done, where there are either no punishments at all defined
by the Lawes, or greater not required than are defined. Where there are
none defined, there he that hath first broken the Law, expects an
indefinite or arbitrary punishment, and his feare is supposed
boundlesse, because it relates to an unbounded evill; now the Law of
nature commands them who are not subject to any civill Lawes, (by what
we have said in the third Chapter, Artic. 11.) and therefore supreme
Commanders, that in taking revenge and punishing, they must not so much
regard the past evill, as the future good, and they sin, if they
entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment than the publique
benefit. But where the punishment is defined, either by a Law
prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words, that he that shall
doe thus, or thus, shall suffer so and so; or by practice, as when the
penalty, (not by any Law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning)
is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent (for
naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally punished);
there to impose a greater penalty than is defined by the Law, is against
the Law of nature. For the end of punishment is not to compell the will
of man, but to fashion it, & make it such as he would have it who hath
set the penalty. And deliberation is nothing else but a weighing, as it
were in scales, the conveniencies, and inconveniencies of the fact we
are attempting; where, that which is more weighty, doth necessarily
according to its inclination prevaile with us. If therefore the
Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime, than will make our feare
more considerable with us, than our lust; that excesse of lust above the
feare of punishment, whereby sinne is committed, is to be attributed to
the Legislator (that is to say) to the supreme; and therefore if he
inflict a greater punishment, than himselfe hath determined in his
Lawes, he punisheth that in another, in which he sinned himselfe.

XVII. It pertaines therefore to the harmlesse and necessary liberty of
subjects, that every man may without feare, enjoy the rights which are
allowed him by the Lawes; for it is in vain to have our own distinguisht
by the Lawes from anothers, if by wrong judgement; robbery, theft, they
may bee again confounded. But it falls out so, that these doe happen
where Judges are corrupted; for the fear whereby men are deterred from
doing evill, ariseth not from hence, namely, because penalties are set,
but because they are executed; for we esteeme the future by what is
past, seldome expecting what seldome happens. If therefore Judges
corrupted either by Gifts, Favour, or even by pitty it self, do often
forbear the execution of the Penalties due by the Law, and by that
meanes put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht: honest Subjects
encompast with murtherers, theeves and knaves, will not have the liberty
to converse freely with each other, nor scarce to stirre abroad without
hazard; nay, the City it self is dissolved, and every mans right of
protecting himself at his own will returnes to him. The Law of Nature
therefore gives this precept to Supreme Commanders, that they not onely
doe righteousnesse themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the
Judges, by them appointed, to doe the same; that is to say, that they
hearken to the complaints of their Subjects; and as oft as need
requires, make choice of some extraordinary Judges, who may hear the
matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.


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Chapter XIV.

Of Lawes and Trespasses

I. They who lesse seriously consider the force of words, doe sometimes
confound Law with Counsell, sometimes with Covenant, sometimes with
Right. They confound Law with Counsell, who think, that it is the duty
of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their Counsellours, but also to
obey them, as though it were in vaine to take Counsell, unlesse it were
also followed. We must fetch the distinction between Counsell, and Law,
from the difference between Counsell, and Command. Now COUNSELL is a
precept in which the reason of my obeying it, is taken from the thing it
self which is advised; but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my
obedience depends on the will of the Commander. For it is not properly
said, Thus I will, and thus I Command, except the will stand for a
Reason. Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes, not for the thing it
self, but by reason of the advisers will, the Law is not a Counsell, but
a Command, and is defined thus, LAW is the command of that Person
(whether Man, or Court) whose precept containes in it the reason of
obedience; as the Precepts of God in regard of Men, of Magistrates in
respect of their Subjects, and universally of all the powerfull in
respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their Lawes. Law and
Counsell therefore differ many ways; Law belongs to him who hath power
over them whom he adviseth, Counsell to them who have no power. To
follow what is prescribed by Law, is duty, what by Counsell, is
free-will. Counsell is directed to his end that receives it; Law, to his
that gives it. Counsell is given to none but the willing; Law even to
the unwilling. To conclude, the right of the Counsellour is made void by
the will of him to whom he gives Counsell, the right of the Law-giver is
not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed.

II. They confound Law, and Covenant, who conceive the Lawes to be
nothing else but certain omologemata or forms of living, determined by
the common consent of men: Amongst whom is Aristotle, who defines Law on
this manner, Nomos esti logos orismenos kath omologian koinen poleos,
minuon pos dei prattein ekasta, that is to say, Law is a speech, limited
according to the common consent of the City, declaring every thing that
we ought to doe. Which definition is not simply of Law, but of the
Civill Law; for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the
consent of men, nor yet the Lawes of Nature; for if they had their
originall from the consent of men, they might also by the same consent
be abrogated; but they are unchangeable. But indeed that's no right
definition of a Civill Law; for in that place a City is taken either for
one civill person, having one will, or for a multitude of men who have
each of them the liberty of their private wills. If for one person,
those words, common consent, are ill placed here, for one person hath no
common consent; neither ought he to have said, (declaring what was
needfull to be done) but commanding; for what the City declares, it
commands its Subjects. He therefore by a City understood a multitude of
men declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirm'd by
Votes) some certain formes of living; but these are nothing else but
some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man (and therefore are no
Lawes) before that a Supreme Power being constituted which can compell,
have sufficient remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not likely to
keep them. Lawes therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle,
are nothing else, but naked, and weak contracts, which then at length,
when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power, shall
either become Lawes, or no Lawes, at his will and pleasure: Wherefore he
confounds Contracts with Lawes, which he ought not to have done; for
Contract is a promise, Law a command. In Contracts we say, I will do
this; In Lawes, Doe this. Contracts oblige us, [1] Lawes tie us fast,
being obliged. A Contract obligeth of it self, The Law holds the party
obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience;
Therefore in Contract its first determined what is to be done, before we
are obliged to doe it; But in Law we are first obliged to performe, and
what is to be done, is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought
to have defined a civill law thus, A civill law is a speech limited by
the will of the City, commanding every thing behoofefull to be done,
which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art. 9.
to wit, that the civill lawes are the command of him (whether man, or
Court of men) who is endued with supreme Power in the city, concerning
the future actions of his Subjects.

III. They confound Lawes with Right, who continue still to doe what is
permitted by divine Right, notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill
Law: That which is prohibited by the divine Law, cannot bee permitted by
the civill, neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law, be
prohibited by the civill. Notwithstanding that which is permitted by the
divine Right, that is to say, that which may be done by divine Right,
doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill
Lawes; for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the
superiour, although they cannot enlarge them. Now naturall liberty is a
Right not constituted, but allowed by the Lawes. For the Lawes being
removed, our liberty is absolute; This is first restrained by the
naturall, and divine Lawes, the residue is bounded by the civill Law,
and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of
particular Towns, and Societies. There is great difference therefore
between Law, and Right; For Law is a fetter, Right is freedome, and they
differ like contraries.

IV. All Law may be divided, first according to the diversity of its
Authors into Divine and humane. The Divine, according to the two wayes
whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold, naturall (or
morall) and positive; naturall is that which God hath declared to all
men by his eternall word borne with them, to wit, their naturall Reason;
and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to
unfold. Positive is that, which God hath revealed to us by the word of
Prophesie, wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man: Such are the Lawes
which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government, and divine
worship, and they may be termed the Divine civill Lawes, because they
were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes, his peculiar
people. Again, the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men, which
alone hath obtained the title of the Law of nature, and that of Cities,
which may be called that of Nations, but vulgarly it is termed the Right
of Nations. The precepts of both are alike, but because Cities once
instituted doe put on the personall proprieties of men, that Law, which
speaking of the duty of single men, we call naturall, being applyed to
whole Cities, and Nations, is called the Right of Nations. And the same
Elements of naturall law, and Right, which have hitherto been spoken of,
being transferred to whole Cities and Nations, may be taken for the
Elements of the lawes, and Right of Nations.

V. All humane law is civill. For the state of men considered out of
civill society, is hostile, in which, because one is not subject to
another, there are no other Lawes, beside the dictates of naturall
reason, which is the divine Law. But in civill government the City
onely, that is to say, that man, or Court, to whom the supreme power of
the City is committed, is the Legislator, and the Lawes of the City are
civill. The civill Lawes may be divided according to the diversity of
their subject matter, into sacred, or secular; sacred are those which
pertain to Religion, that is to say, to the ceremonies, and worship of
God (to wit what Persons, things, places, are to be consecrated, and in
what fashion, what opinions concerning the Deity are to be taught
publiquely, and with what words, and in what order supplications are to
be made, and the like) and are not determined by any divine positive
Law. For the civill sacred Lawes are the humane Lawes (which are also
called Ecclesiasticall) concerning things sacred; but the secular under
a generall notion, are usually called the civill Lawes.

VI. Again, the civill Law (according to the two offices of the
Legislator, whereof one is to judge; the other to constrain men to
acquiesce to his judgements) hath two parts; the one distributive, the
other vindicative, or penall. By the distributive it is, that every man
hath his proper Right, that is to say, it sets forth Rules for all
things, whereby we may know what is properly ours, what another mans; so
as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own;
and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of theirs; and
what is lawfull for every man to doe or omit, and what is not lawfull.
Vindicative is that whereby it is defined what punishment shall be
inflicted on them who break the Law.

VII. Now distributive, and vindicative, are not two severall Species of
the Lawes, but two parts of the same Law. For if the Law should say no
more, but (for example) whatsoever you take with your net in the Sea, be
it yours, its in vain; For although another should take that away from
you which you have caught, it hinders not, but that it still remains
yours; for in the state of nature where all things are common to all,
yours, and others, are all one, insomuch as what the Law defines to be
yours, was yours even before the Law, and after the Law ceases not to
bee yours, although in another mans possession. Wherefore the Law doth
nothing, unlesse it bee understood to bee so yours, as all other men be
forbidden to interrupt your free use, and secure enjoyment of it at all
times, according to your own will, and pleasure. For this is that which
is required to a propriety of goods, not that a man may be able to use
them, but to use them alone, which is done by prohibiting others to be
an hinderance to him. But in vain doe they also prohibit any men, who
doe not withall strike a fear of punishment into them; in vain therefore
is the Law, unlesse it contain both parts, that which forbids injuries
to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first of
them which is called distributive, is Prohibitory, and speaks to all;
the second which is styled vindicative, or paenary, is mandatory, and
onely speaks to publique Ministers.

VIII. From hence also we may understand, that every civill Law hath a
penalty annexed to it, either explicitly, or implicitly; For where the
penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor by example of any
one who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed Law there the
penalty is understood to be arbitrary, namely, to depend on the will of
the Legislator, that is to say, of the supreme Commander. For in vain is
that Law which may be broken without punishment.

IX. Now because it comes from the civill Lawes, both that every man have
his proper Right, and distinguisht from anothers, and also that he is
forbidden to invade anothers Rights, it followes, that these Precepts
(Thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defin'd by the Lawes unto thy
Parents: Thou shalt not kill the man whom the Lawes forbid thee to kill:
Thou shalt avoid all copulation forbidden by the Laws: Thou shalt not
take away anothers goods against the Lords will: Thou shalt not
frustrate the Laws and Judgements by false testimony) are Civill Lawes.
The naturall Lawes command the same things but implicitly. For the law
of nature (as hath been said in the 3. Chap. Art. 2.) commands us to
keep contracts, and therefore also to performe obedience when we have
covenanted obedience, and to abstaine from anothers goods when it is
determin'd by the civill Law what belongs to another. But all Subjects
(by the 13. Art. of the 6. Chap.) do covenant to obey his commands who
hath the supreme power, that is to say the civill Lawes, in the very
constitution of government, even before it is possible to break them.
For the Law of nature did oblige in the state of nature, where first
(because nature hath given all things to all men) nothing did properly
belong to another, and therefore it was not possible to invade anothers
right; next, where all things were common, and therefore all carnall
copulations lawfull; Thirdly, where was the state of Warre, and
therefore lawfull to kill; Fourthly, where all things were determined by
every mans own judgement, and therefore paternall respects also: Lastly,
where there were no publique judgements, and therefore no use of bearing
witnesse, either true, or false.

X. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those Laws is more ancient
than the promulgation of the Laws themselves, as being contained in the
very constitution of the City, by the vertue of the naturall Law which
forbids breach of Covenant, the Law of nature commands us to keep all
the civill Laws; for where we are tyed to obedience, before we know what
will be commanded us, there we are universally tyed to obey in all
things. Whence it followes, that no civil Law whatsoever, which tends
not to a reproach of the Deity (in respect of whom, Cities themselves
have no right of their own, and cannot be said to make Lawes) can
possibly be against the Law of nature; for though the Law of nature
forbid theft, adultery, &c. yet if the civill Law command us to invade
any thing, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c. For when the
Lacedemonians of old permitted their youths by a certaine Law, to take
away other mens goods, they commanded that these goods should not bee
accounted other mens, but their own who took them; and therefore such
surreptions were no thefts. In like manner, copulations of heathen
Sexes, according to their Lawes, were lawfull marriages.

XI. Its necessary to the essence of a Law, that the Subjects be
acquainted with two things, First, what man or Court hath the supreme
power, that is to say, the Right of making Lawes. Secondly, what the Law
it self sayes; for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is
tyed to, cannot obey, and by consequence is in such a condition, as if
he were not tyed at all. I say not that it is necessary to the essence
of a Law, that either one, or the other be perpetually known, but onely
that it be once knowne; and if the Subject afterward forget either the
Right he hath who made the Law, or the Law it self, that makes him no
lesse tyed to obey, since he might have remembred it, had he had a will
to obey.

XII. The knowledge of the Legislator depends on the Subject himselfe;
for the right of making Lawes could not be conferr'd on any man without
his owne consent, and covenant, either exprest, or suppos'd; exprest,
when from the beginning the Citizens doe themselves constitute a forme
of governing the City, or when by promise they submit themselves to the
Dominion of any one; or suppos'd at least, as when they make use of the
benefit of the Realme, and Lawes, for their protection and conservation
against others. For to whose Dominion we require our fellow Subjects to
yeeld obedience for our good, his Dominion we acknowledge to be
legitimate by that very request. And therefore ignorance of the power of
making Lawes, can never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knowes
what he hath done himselfe.

XIII. The knowledge of the lawes depends on the Legislator, who must
publish them, for otherwise they are not Lawes; for Law is the command
of the Law-maker, and his command is the Declaration of his Will; it is
not therefore a Law, except the will of the Law-maker be declar'd, which
is done by promulgation. Now in promulgation two things must be
manifest, whereof one is, that he or they who publish a Law, either have
a right themselves to make Lawes, or that they doe it by authority
deriv'd from him or them who have it; the other is the sense of the Law
it selfe. Now, that the first, namely publisht Lawes proceed from him
who hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly and
philosophically) to any, but them who have received them from the mouth
of the Commander; the rest beleeve, but the reasons of their beliefe are
so many, that it is scarce possible they should not believe. And truly
in a Democratical City where every one may be present at the making of
Laws if he will, he that shall be absent, must beleeve those that were
present; but in monarchies and Aristocraties, because its granted but to
few to be present, and openly to heare the commands of the monarch or
the Nobles, it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of
publishing them to the rest. And thus we beleeve those to be the Edicts
and Decrees of Princes, which are propounded to us for such, either by
the writings, or voices of them, whose office it is to publish them. But
yet when we have these causes of beliefe, that we have seen the Prince,
or supreme Councell constantly use such Counsellors, Secretaries,
Publishers, and Seales, and the like arguments for the declaring of his
will; that he never took any authority from them; that they have bin
punisht who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgrest
the Law; not onely he who thus believing shall not obey the Edicts and
Decrees set forth by them is every where accus'd, but he that not
believing, shall not yield obedience, is punisht. For the constant
permission of these things is a manifest signe enough, and evident
declaration of the Commanders will; provided there be nothing contain'd
in the Law, Edict or Decree, derogatory from his supreme power: For it
is not to be imagin'd that he would have ought taken from his power by
any of his Officers as long as he retaines a will to governe. Now the
sense of the law, when there is any doubt made of it, is to be taken
from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of
causes, or Judgements; for to judge is nothing else than by
interpretation to apply the lawes to particular cases. Now we may know
who they are that have this Office granted them, in the same manner, as
we know who they be that have authority given them to publish Laws.

XIV. Againe the civill law according to its two fold manner of
publishing, is of two sorts, written & unwritten; By written, I
understand that which wants a voice, or some other signe of the will of
the Legislator that it may become a Law. For all kind of Laws are of the
same age with mankinde, both in nature, and time, and therefore of more
antiquity than the invention of letters, and the Art of writing.
Wherefore not a writing, but a voice is necessary for a written law;
this alone is requisite to the being, that to the Remembrance of a Law;
for we reade, that before letters were found out for the help of memory,
that Lawes contracted into Meetre, were wont to be sung. The unwritten
is that which wants no other publishing than the voice of nature, or
naturall reason; such are the lawes of nature. For the naturall Law
although it be distinguisht from the civill, for as much as it commands
the Will, yet so farre forth as it relates to our actions it is civill;
for example, this same, Thou shalt not covet, which onely appertaines to
the minde, is a naturall Law, onely; but this, Thou shalt not invade, is
both naturall and civill. For seeing it is impossible to prescribe such
universall Rules, whereby all future contentions which perhaps are
infinite, may be determined, its to be understood that in all cases not
mentioned by the written lawes, the law of naturall equity is to be
followed, which commands us to distribute equally to equals; and this by
the vertue of the civill law, which also punisheth those who knowingly
and willingly doe actually transgresse the lawes of nature.

XV. These things being understood, it appeares first, That the Lawes of
Nature, although they were describ'd in the Books of some Philosophers,
are not for that reason to be termed Written lawes: and that the
Writings of the Interpreters of the Lawes, were no Lawes, for want of
the Supreme Authority; nor yet those orations of the Wise, (that is to
say) Judges, but so farre forth as by the consent of the Supreme power
they part into custome; and that then they are to be received among the
Written lawes, not for the Customes sake (which by its own force doth
not constitute a Law) but for the Will of the Supreme Commander, which
appeares in this, that he hath suffer'd his Sentence, whether equall, or
unequall, to passe into custome.

XVI. Sinne, in its largest signification, comprehends every deed, word
and thought, against right reason. For every man by reasoning seeks out
the meanes to the end which he propounds to himselfe. If therefore he
reason right (that is to say, beginning from most evident principles, he
makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary,) he will
proceede in a most direct way; otherwise hee'l goe astray, that is to
say, he will either doe, say, or endeavour, somewhat against his proper
end: which when he hath done, he will indeed in reasoning be said to
have erred, but in action and will to have sinned; for sin followes
errour, just as the Will doth the understanding: And this is the most
generall acception of the word, under which is contain'd every imprudent
action, whether against the Law, as to overthrow another mans house, or
not against the Law, as to build his owne upon the Sand.

XVII. But when we speak of the Lawes, the word Sinne is taken in a more
strict sense, and signifies not every thing done against right reason,
but that onely which is blameable, and therefore is call'd malum culpae,
the evill of fault; but yet if any thing be culpable it is not presently
to be term'd a sinne, or fault, but onely if it be blameable with
reason. We must therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason,
what against reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls
that good which he desires, and evill which he eschewes; and therefore
through the diversity of our affections, it happens that one counts that
good, which another counts evill; and the same man what now he esteem'd
for good, he immediately looks on as evill; and the same thing which he
calls good in himselfe, he tearmes evill in another. For we all measure
good and evill by the pleasure or paine we either feele at present, or
expect hereafter. Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because
they increase their honours, goods, and power) and of equalls, (by
reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seeme and are
irkesome, and therefore evill to all; and men use to repute those evill,
that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge from whom they receive
evill; its impossible to be determined by the consent of single men whom
the same things doe not please and displease, what actions are, and what
not to be blam'd. They may agree indeed in some certaine generall
things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sinnes, as if they
should say that all men account those things evill to which they have
given names which are usually taken in an evill sense; but we demand not
whether theft be a Sinne, but what is to be term'd theft, and so
concerning other in like manner. For as much therefore as in so great a
diversity of censurers, what is by reason blameable, is not to bee
measur'd by the reason of one man more than another, because of the
equality of humane nature, and there are no other reasons in being, but
onely those of particular men, and that of the City, it followes, that
the City is to determine what with reason is culpable: So as a fault,
that is to say, a SINNE, is that, which a man do's, omits, sayes, or
wills, against the reason of the City, that is, contrary to the Lawes.

XVIII. But a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through humane
infirmity, although he desire to fulfill them, and yet his action as
being against the Lawes, is rightly blam'd, and call'd a Sinne. But
there are some, who neglect the Lawes, and as oft as any hope of gain
and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of contracts and
betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only the
deeds, but even the mindes of these men are against the Lawes. They who
sinne onely through infirmity, are good men even when they sinne; but
these even when they doe not sin, are wicked. For though both the
action, and the mind be repugnant to the Lawes, yet those repugnancies
are distinguisht by different appellations, for the irregularity of the
action is called adikema, unjust deed; that of the mind adikia, and
kakia, injustice, and malice; that is, the infirmity of a disturbed
soule, this the pravity of a sober mind.

XIX. But seeing there is no sin which is not against some Law, and that
there is no Law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme
power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him
by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sinne, who either
denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any
other reproach upon him? For he will say, that he never submitted his
will to Gods will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being. And
granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet
were it to be numbred among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by
right cannot be punished. This speech seems so farre forth to be
admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful,
yet is it to be refer'd to sins of imprudence; [2] but that it should be
excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the Atheist is
punisht either immediately by God himselfe, or by Kings constituted
under God; not as a Subject is punished by a King, because he keeps not
the Lawes, but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of
the Lawes; that is to say, by the Right of warre, as the Giants warring
against God: For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord,
or one to another, are enemies among themselves.

XX. Seeing that from the vertue of the Covenant whereby each Subject is
tyed to the other to perform absolute and universall obedience (such as
is defined above Chap. 6. art. 13.) to the City, that is to say, to the
Soveraign power, whether that be one man or Councel, there is an
obligation derived to observe each one of the civill Lawes, so that that
Covenant contains in it self all the Laws at once; it is manifest that
the subject who shall renounce the generall Covenant of obedience, doth
at once renounce all the Lawes. Which trespasse is so much worse than
any other one sinne, by how much to sinne alwayes, is worse than to
sinne once. And this is that sin which is called TREASON; and it is a
word or deed whereby the Citizen, or Subject, declares that he will no
longer obey that man or Court to whom the supreme power of the City is
entrusted. And the Subject declares this same will of his by deed, when
he either doth, or endeavours to do violence to the Soveraigns Person,
or to them who execute his commands; of which sort are Traytors,
Regicides, and such as take up armes against the City, or during a
warre, flye to the enemies side. And they shew the same will in word,
who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tyed to any such
kind of obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that wee
must not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God intire)
simply, absolutely, and universally; or in part, as he who should say,
that he had no Right to wage warre at his own will, to make Peace, list
souldiers, levie monies, electing Magistrates, and publique Ministers,
enacting Lawes, deciding controversies, setting penalties, or doing
ought else, without which the State cannot stand. And these and the like
words and deeds are Treason by the naturall, not the civill Law. But it
may so happen, that some action which before the civill Law was made,
was not Treason, yet will become such, if it be done afterwards. As if
it be declared by the Law, that it shall be accounted for a sign of
renouncing publique obedience (that is to say for Treason) if any man
shall coyn monies, or forge the Privie Seale, he that after that
Declaration shall doe this, will be no lesse guilty of Treason than the
other. Yet he sinnes lesse, because he breakes not all the Laws at once,
but one Law only; for the Law by calling that Treason which by nature is
not so, doth indeed by Right set a more odious name, and perhaps a more
grievous punishment on the guilty persons, but it makes not the sinne it
selfe more grievous.

XXI. But that sinne which by the Law of nature is Treason, is a
Transgression of the naturall, not the civill Law. For since our
obligation to civill obedience, by vertue whereof the civill Lawes are
valid, is before all civill Law, and the sin of Treason is naturally
nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it followes that by the
sin of Treason, that Law is broken which preceded the civill Law, to
wit, the naturall, which forbids us to violate Covenants, and betrothed
faith. But if some Soveraign Prince should set forth a Law on this
manner, Thou shalt not rebell, he would effect just nothing: For except
Subjects were before obliged to obedience, that is to say, not to
rebell, all Law is of no force; now the obligation which obligeth to
what we were before obliged to, is superfluous.

XXII. Hence it followes, that Rebels, Traytors, and all others convicted
of Treason, are punisht not by civill, but naturall Right; that is to
say, not as civill Subjects, but as Enemies to the Government, not by
the Right of Soveraignty, and Dominion, but by the Right of Warre.

XXIII. There are some who think that those acts which are done against
the Law, when the punishment is determined by the Law it selfe, are
expiated, if the punished willingly undergoe the punishment; and that
they are not guilty before God of breaking the naturall Law (although by
breaking the civill Lawes, we break the naturall too, which command us
to keep the civill) who have suffered the punishment which the Law
required; as if by the Law, the fact were not prohibited, but a
punishment were set instead of a price, whereby a licence might be
bought of doing what the Law forbids. By the same reason they might
inferre too, that no transgression of the Law were a sin, but that every
man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own perill. But
we must know that the words of the Law may be understood in a twofold
sense, the one as containing two parts (as hath been declared above in
the seventh Art.) namely that of absolutely prohibiting, as, Thou shalt
not doe this; and revenging, as, he that doth this, shall be punisht;
The other, as containing a condition, for example, Thou shalt not doe
this thing, unlesse thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus, the Law
forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the first
sense, he that doth it, sins, because he doth what the Law forbids to be
done; if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to doe
what is forbidden him, that performs the condition; For in the first
sense, all men are forbidden to doe it; in the second, they only who
keep themselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative
part of the Law obligeth not the guilty, but the Magistrate to require
punishment; in the second, he himselfe that owes the punishment is
obliged to exact it, to the payment whereof, if it be capitall, or
otherwise grievous, he cannot be obliged. But in what sense the Law is
to be taken, depends on the will of him who hath the Soveraignty. When
there is therefore any doubt of the meaning of the Law, since we are
sure they sinne not who doe it not, it will be sin if we doe it,
howsoever the Law may afterward be explained; for so to doe that which a
man doubts whether it be a sin or not, when he hath freedome to forbear
it, is a contempt of the Lawes, and therefore by the 28. Art. of the
third Chapter, a sin against the Law of nature. Vain therefore is that
same distinction of obedience into Active and Passive, as if that could
be expiated by penalties constituted by humane decrees, which is a sinne
against the Law of nature, which is the Law of God; or as though they
sinned not, who sinne at their own perill.

____________

1. Contracts oblige us. To be obliged, and to be tyed being obliged,
seems to some men to be one, and the same thing, and that therefore here
seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More cleerly
therefore, I say thus, That a man is obliged by his contracts, that is,
that he ought to performe for his promise sake; but that the Law tyes
him being obliged, that is to say, it compells him to make good his
promise, for fear of the punishment appointed by the Law.

2. Yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence. Many find fault that
I have referr'd Atheisme to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by
some it is taken so, as if I had not declared my selfe an enemy bitter
enough against Atheists: They object farther, that since I had elsewhere
said that it might be knowne there is a God, by naturall reason, I ought
to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the Law of nature,
and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But
I am so much an enemy to Atheists, that I have both diligently sought
for, and vehemently desired to find some Law whereby I might condemne
them of injustice; but when I found none, I enquired next what name God
himselfe did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the
Atheist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Wherefore I
placed their sinne in that rank which God himselfe referres to; next, I
shew them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to
be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an unjust man. Lastly, I
affirme that they may under that notion be justly punisht both by God,
and supreme Magistrates, and therefore by no meanes excuse or extenuate
this sinne. Now that I have said that it might be known by naturall
reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had
meant that all men might know this, except they think that because
Archimedes by naturall reason found out what proportion the circle hath
to the square, it followes thence, that every one of the vulgar could
have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be knowne
to some by the light of reason that there is a God, yet men that are
continually engaged in pleasures, or seeking of riches and honour, also
men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to
doe it, lastly, fools, in which number are Atheists, cannot know this.


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Religion

Chapter XV.

Of the Kingdome of God, by Nature

I. Wee have already in the foregoing Chapters, proved both by reason,
and testimonies of holy Writ, that the estate of nature, that is to say,
of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, who neither govern, nor are
governed, is an Anarchy, or hostile state; that the precepts whereby to
avoyd this state, are the Lawes of nature; that there can be no civill
government without a Soveraigne; and that they who have gotten this
Soveraigne command must be obey'd simply, that is to say, in all things
which repugne not the Commandments of God: There is this one thing only
wanting to the complete understanding of all civill duty, & that is, to
know which are the Laws and Commandments of God. For else we cannot tell
whether that which the civill power commands us, be against the Lawes of
God, or not; whence it must necessarily happen, that either by too much
obedience to the civill authority, we become stubborne against the
divine Majesty; or for feare of sinning against God, we runne into
disobedience against the civill power: To avoid both these rocks, its
necessary to know the Divine Lawes. Now because the knowledge of the
Lawes, depends on the knowledge of the Kingdome, we must in what
followes, speak somewhat concerning the Kingdome of God.

II. The Lord is King, the earth may be glad there of; saith the Psalmist,
Psal. 97 v. 1. And againe the same Psalmist, Psal. 99. v. 1. The Lord is
King, be the People never so unpatient; he sitteth betweene the
Cherubins, be the Earth never so unquiet; to wit, whether men will, or
not, God is THE King over all the Earth, nor is he mov'd from his
Throne, if there be any who deny either his existence, or his
providence. Now although God governe all men so by his power, that none
can doe any thing which he would not have done, yet this, to speake
properly, and accurately, is not to reigne; for he is sayed to reigne,
who rules not by acting, but speaking, that is to say, by precepts and
threatnings. And therefore we account not inanimate, nor irrationall
bodies, for Subjects in the Kingdome of God, although they be
subordinate to the Divine power; because they understand not the
commands, and threats of God; nor yet the Atheists, because they beleeve
not that there is a God; nor yet those who beleeving there is a God, doe
not yet beleeve that he rules these Inferiour things; for even these,
although they be govern'd by the power of God, yet doe they not
acknowledge any of his Commands, nor stand in awe of his threats. Those
onely therefore are suppos'd to belong to Gods Kingdome, who acknowledge
him to be the Governour of all things, and that he hath given his
Commands to men, and appointed punishments for the transgressours; The
rest, we must not call Subjects, but Enemies of God.

III. But none are said to governe by commands, but they who openly
declare them to those who are govern'd by them; for the Commands of the
Rulers are the Lawes of the Rul'd. But lawes they are not, if not
perspicuously publisht, in so much as all excuse of Ignorance may be
taken away. Men indeed publish their Lawes by word or voice, neither can
they make their will universally knowne any other way; But Gods lawes
are declar'd after a threefold manner: first, by the tacit dictates of
Right reason; next, by immediate revelation, which is suppos'd to be
done either by a supernaturall voice, or by a vision or dreame, or
divine inspiration; Thirdly, by the voice of one man whom God recommends
to the rest, as worthy of beliefe, by the working of true miracles. Now
he whose voice God thus makes use of to signifie his will unto others,
is called a PROPHET. These three manners may be term'd the threefold
word of God, to wit the Rationall word, the sensible word, and the word
of Prophecy: To which answer, the three manners whereby we are said to
heare God; Right reasoning, sense, and faith. Gods sensible word hath
come but to few; neither hath God spoken to men by Revelation except
particularly to some, and to diverse diversely; neither have any Lawes
of his Kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any people.

IV. And according to the difference which is between the Rationall word
and the word of Prophecy, we attribute a twofold Kingdome unto God:
Naturall, in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason, and which
is universall over all who acknowledge the Divine power, by reason of
that rationall nature which is common to all; and Propheticall, in which
he rules also by the word of Prophecy, which is peculiar, because he
hath not given positive Lawes to all men, but to his peculiar people,
and some certaine men elected by him.

V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a Right to rule, and to punish
those who break his Lawes, from his sole irresistable power. For all
Right over others is either from nature, or from Contract. How the Right
of governing springs from Contract, we have already shewed in the 6.
Chapter. And the same Right is derived from nature, in this very thing,
that it is not by nature taken away. For when by nature all men had a
Right over all things, every man had a Right of ruling over all as
ancient as nature it selfe; but the reason why this was abolisht among
men, was no other but mutuall fear; as hath been declared above in the
second Chapter, the 3. art; reason namely dictating that they must
foregoe that Right for the preservation of mankinde, because the
equality of men among themselves according to their strength and
naturall powers was necessarily accompanied with warre, and with warre
joynes the destruction of mankinde. Now if any man had so farre exceeded
the rest in power, that all of them with joyned forces could not have
resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that Right
which nature had given him; The Right therefore of Dominion over all the
rest, would have remained with him, by reason of that excesse of power
whereby he could have preserved both himselfe and them. They therefore
whose power cannot be resisted, and by consequence God Almighty, derives
his Right of Soveraignty from the Power it selfe. And as oft as God
punisheth, or slayes a sinner, although he therefore punish him because
he sinned, yet may we not say that he could not justly have punisht or
killed him although he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in
punishing, may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it
therefore follow, that the Right of afflicting, and killing, depends not
on divine Power, but on mens sins.

VI. That question made famous by the disputations of the Antients, why
evill things befell the good, and good things the evill, is the same
with this of ours, by what Right God dispenseth good and evill things
unto men. And with its difficulty, it not only staggers the faith of the
vulgar concerning the divine providence, but also of Philosophers, and
which is more, even of holy men. Psal. 73. v. 1, 2, 3. Truly God is good
to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for me, my feet
were almost gone, my steps had well nigh slipt. And why? I was grieved
at the wicked, I doe also see the ungodly in such prosperity. And how
bitterly did Job expostulate with God, that being just, he should yet be
afflicted with so many calamities? God himselfe with open voyce resolved
this difficulty in the case of Job, and hath confirmed his Right by
arguments drawn not from Jobs sinne, but from his own power. For Job and
his friends had argued so among themselves, that they would needs make
him guilty, because he was punisht; and he would reprove their
accusation by arguments fetcht from his own innocence: But God when he
had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation, not by
condemning him of injustice, or any sin, but by declaring his own power,
Job. 38. v. 4. Where wast thou (sayes he) when I laid the foundation of
the earth, &c. And for his friends, God pronounces himself angry against
them, Job. 42. v. 7. Because they had not spoken of him the thing that
is right, like his servant Job. Agreeable to this is that speech of our
Saviours in the mans case who was born blind, when, his Disciples asking
him whether he or his Parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he
answered, John 9. v. 3. Neither hath this man sinned, nor his Parents,
but that the works of God should be manifest in him. For though it be
said, Rom. 5:12. That death entred into the world by sinne, it followes
not, but that God by his Right might have made men subject to diseases,
and death, although they had never sinned, even as he hath made the
other animalls mortall, and sickly, although they cannot sinne.

VII. Now if God have the Right of Soveraignty from his power, it is
manifest, that the obligation of yeelding him obedience lyes on men by
reason of their weaknesse; [1] for that obligation which rises from
Contract, of which we have spoken in the second Chapter, can have no
place here, where the Right of Ruling (no Covenant passing between)
rises only from nature. But there are two Species of naturall
obligation, one when liberty is taken away by corporall impediments,
according to which we say that heaven and earth, and all Creatures, doe
obey the common Lawes of their Creation: The other when it is taken away
by hope, or fear, according to which the weaker despairing of his own
power to resist, cannot but yeeld to the stronger. From this last kinde
of obligation, that is to say from fear, or conscience of our own
weaknesse (in respect of the divine power) it comes to passe, that we
are obliged to obey God in his naturall Kingdome; reason dictating to
all, acknowledging the divine power and providence, that there is no
kicking against the pricks.

VIII. Because the word of God ruling by nature onely, is supposed to be
nothing else but right reason, and the Laws of Kings can be known by
their word only, its manifest that the Laws of God ruling by nature
alone, are onely the naturall Lawes; namely those which we have set down
in the second and third Chapters, and deduced from the dictates of
reason, Humility, Equity, Justice, Mercy, and other Morall vertues
befriending Peace, which pertain to the discharge of the duties of men
one toward the other, and those which right reason shall dictate
besides, concerning the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty. We
need not repeat what those Naturall Laws, or Morall vertues are; but we
must see what honours, and what divine worship, that is to say, what
sacred Lawes, the same naturall reason doth dictate.

IX. Honour, to speak properly, is nothing else but an opinion of
anothers Power joyned with goodnesse; and to honour a man, is the same
with highly esteeming him, and so honour is not in the Party honoured,
but in the honourer. Now three Passions do necessarily follow honour
thus placed in opinion; Love, which referres to goodnesse; hope, and
feare, which regard Power. And from these arise all outward actions,
wherewith the powerfull are appeased, and become Propitious, and which
are the effects, and therefore also the naturall signes of honour it
selfe. But the word honour is transferred also to those outward effects
of honour, in which sense, we are said to honour him, of whose power we
testifie our selves, either in word, or deed, to have a very great
respect; insomuch as honour is the same with worship. Now WORSHIP is an
outward act, the sign of inward honour; and whom we endeavour by our
homage to appease, if they be, angry or howsoever to make them
favourable to us, we are said to worship.

X. All signes of the mind are either words or deeds, and therefore all
worship consists either in words or deeds. Now both the one and the
other are referred to three kindes; whereof the first is Praise, or
publique declaration of goodnesse; The second, a publique declaration of
Present Power, which is to magnify, megalunein; The third, is a publique
declaration of happinesse, or of Power, secure also for the future,
which is called, makariomos. I say, that all kindes of honour may be
discerned, not in words only, but in deeds too. But we then praise, and
celebrate in words, when we doe it by way of Proposition, or
Dogmatically, that is to say by Attributes, or Titles, which may be
termed praysing, and celebrating, categorically, and plainly, as when we
declare him whom we honour to be liberall, strong, wise; And then, in
deeds, when it is done by consequence, or by hypothesis, or supposition,
as by Thanksgiving, which supposeth goodnesse; or by Obedience, which
supposeth Power; or by Congratulation, which supposeth happinesse.

XI. Now whether we desire to praise a man in words, or deeds, we shall
find some things which signify honour with all men, such as among
attributes, are the generall words of vertues and powers, which cannot
be taken in ill sense, As Good, Faire, Strong, Just, and the like; and
among actions, Obedience, Thanksgiving, Prayers, and others of that
kinde, by which an acknowledgement of vertue and power is ever
understood: Others, which signify honour, but with some, and scorne with
others, or else neither; such as in Attributes, are those words which
according to the diversity of opinions, are diversly referred to vertues
or vices, to honest or dishonest things; As that a man slew his enemy,
that he fled, that he is a Philosopher, or an Orator, and the like,
which with some are had in honour, with others in contempt. In deeds,
such as depend on the custome of the place, or prescriptions of civill
Lawes, as in saluting to be bareheaded, to put off the shoes, to bend
the body, to petition for any thing standing, prostrate, kneeling, forms
of ceremony, and the like. Now that worship which is alwayes, and by all
men accounted honourable, may be called Naturall; the other, which
followes places, and customes, Arbitrary.

XII. Furthermore, worship may be enjoyned, to wit by the command of him
that is worshiped, and it may bee voluntary, namely such as seems good
to the worshipper: If it be enjoyned, the actions expressing it, do not
signify honour, as they signify actions, but as they are enjoyned: for
they signify obedience immediately, obedience power; insomuch as worship
enjoyned consists in obedience. Voluntary is honourable onely in the
nature of the actions, which if they doe signify honour to the
beholders, it is worship, if not, it is Reproach. Again worship may be
either publique or private. But publique, respecting each single
worshipper, may not be voluntary; respecting the City it may. For seeing
that which is done voluntarily, depends on the will of the Doer, there
would not one worship be given, but as many worships as worshippers,
except the will of all men were united by the command, of one. But
Private worship may be voluntary, if it be done secretly; for what is
done openly is restrained, either by Lawes, or through modesty, which is
contrary to the nature of a voluntary action.

XIII. Now that we may know what the scope and end of worshipping others
is, we must consider the cause why men delight in worship: And we must
grant what we have shewed elsewhere, that Joy consists in this, that a
man contemplate vertue, strength, science, beauty, friends, or any Power
whatsoever, as being, or as though it were his own; and it is nothing
else but a Glory, or Triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured,
that is to say, lov'd and fear'd, that is to say, having the services
and assistances of men in readinesse. Now because men beleeve him to be
powerfull whom they see honoured (that is to say) esteemed powerfull by
others, it falls out that honour is increased by worship; and by the
opinion of power, true power is acquired. His end therefore who either
commands, or suffers himself to be worshipt, is, that by this means he
may acquire as many as he can, either through love, or fear, to be
obedient unto him.

XIV. But that we may understand what manner of Worship of God naturall
reason doth assigne us, let us begin from his Attributes: where, first
it is manifest, that existence is to be allowed him; for there can be no
will to honour him, who, we think, hath no being. Next, those
Philosophers who said, that God was the World, or the worlds Soul, (that
is to say, a part of it) spake unworthily of God, for they attribute
nothing to him, but wholly deny his being. For by the word God we
understand the Worlds cause; but in saying that the World is God, they
say, that it hath no cause, that is as much, as there is no God. In like
manner, they who maintain the world not to be created, but eternall;
because there can be no cause of an eternall thing, In denying the world
to have a Cause, they deny also that there is a God. They also have a
wretched apprehension of God, who imputing idlenesse to him, doe take
from him the Government of the world, and of mankind. For say they
should acknowledge him omnipotent, yet if he minde not these inferiour
things, that same thred-bare Sentence will take place with them, Quod
supra nos, nihil ad nos; What is above us, doth not concern us. And
seeing there is nothing for which they should either love, or fear him,
truly he will be to them as though he were not at all. Moreover in
Attributes which signifie Greatnesse, or Power, those which signifie
some finite, or limited thing, are not signes at all of an honouring
mind. For we honour not God worthily if we ascribe lesse Power, or
greatnesse to him than possibly we can; but every finite thing is lesse
than we can, for most easily we may alwayes assigne and attribute more
to a finite thing; No shape therefore must be assigned to God, for all
shape is finite; nor must he be said to be conceived, or comprehended by
imagination, or any other faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we
conceive is finite: And although this word Infinite signifie a
conception of the mind, yet it followes not, that we have any conception
of an infinite thing: For when we say that a thing is infinite, we
signifie nothing really, but the impotency in our owne mind, as if we
should say we know not whether, or where it is limited: Neither speak
they honourably enough of God, who say we have an Idea of him in our
mind; for an Idea is our conception, but conception we have none, except
of a finite thing: Nor they, who say that he hath Parts, or that he is
some certaine intire thing; which are also attributes of finite things:
Nor that he is in any place; for nothing can be said to be in a place,
but what hath bounds and limits of its greatnesse on all sides: Nor that
he is moved, or is at rest; for either of them suppose a being in some
place: Nor that there are more Gods; because not more infinites.
Farthermore concerning attributes of happinesse, those are unworthy of
God which signify sorrow (unlesse they be taken not for any Passion, but
by a Metonomy for the effect) such as Repentance, Anger, Pity: Or Want,
as Appetite, Hope, Concupiscence, and that love which is also called
lust, for they are signes of Poverty, since it cannot be understood,
that a man should desire, hope, and wish for ought, but what he wants
and stands in need of. Or any Passive faculty; for suffering belongs to
a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we therefore
attribute a will to God, it is not to be conceived like unto ours, which
is called a rationall desire; for if God desires, he wants, which for
any man to say, is a contumelie; but we must suppose some resemblance
which we cannot conceive. In like manner when wee attribute sight and
other acts of the senses to him, or knowledge, or understanding, which
in us are nothing else but a tumult of the minde raised from outward
objects pressing the Organes, wee must not think that any such thing
befalls the Deity; for it is a signe of power depending upon some other,
which is not the most blessed thing. He therefore who would not ascribe
any other titles to God, than what reason commands, must use such as are
either Negative, as infinite, eternall, incomprehensible, &c. or
superlative, as most good, most great, most powerfull, &c. or
Indefinite, as good, just, strong, Creatour, King, and the like; in such
sense, as not desiring to declare what he is (which were to circumscribe
him within the narrow limits of our phantasie), but to confesse our own
admiration, and obedience, which is the property of humility, and of a
minde yeelding all the honour it possibly can doe. For Reason dictates
one name alone, which doth signify the nature of God (i.e.) Existent, or
simply, that he is; and one in order to, and in relation to us, namely
God, under which is contained both King, and Lord, and Father.

XV. Concerning the Outward actions wherewith God is to be worshipped (as
also concerning his Titles) its a most generall command of Reason, that
they be signes of a mind yeelding honour; under which are contained in
the first place, Prayers;

     Qui fingit sacros auro, vel marmore vultus,
     Non facit ille Deos, qui rogat, ille facit.

For Prayers are the signes of hope, and hope is an acknowledgement of
the divine Power, or goodnesse.

In the second place, Thanksgiving; which is a signe of the same
affection, but that prayers goe before the benefit, and thanks follow
it.

In the third, Guifts, that is to say oblations and sacrifices, for these
are thanksgivings.

In the fourth, not to sweare by any other. For a mans Oath is an
Imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knowes
whether he doe, or not, and can punish him if he doe, though he be never
so powerfull; which only belongs to God: for if there were any man from
whom his subjects malice could not lye hid, and whom no humane power
could resist, plighted faith would suffice without swearing, which,
broken, might be punisht by that Man; and for this very reason there
would be no need of an Oath.

In the fifth place, To speak warily of God; for that is a sign of fear,
and feare is an acknowledgement of Power. It followes from this precept:
That we may not take the name of God in vain, or use it rashly; for
either are inconsiderate. That wee must not swear where there is no
need; for that is in vain; but need there is none, unlesse it be between
Cities to avoyd or take away contention by force, which necessarily must
arise, where there is no faith kept in promises, or in a City, for the
better certainty of Judicature. Also, That we must not dispute of the
Divine nature: For it is supposed that all things in the naturall
Kingdom of God are enquired into by reason only, that is to say, out of
the Principles of naturall Science; but we are so far off by these to
attain to the knowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot so much as
reach to the full understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies,
or of any other Creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these
disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the divine Majesty,
according to the small measure of our conceptions. It followes also
(which belongs to the Right of Gods Kingdome) that their speech is
inconsiderate, and rash, who say, That this, or that, doth not stand
with divine justice; for even men count it an affront that their
children should dispute their Right, or measure their justice otherwise
than by the rule of their Commands.

In the sixth, Whatsoever is offered up in Prayers, thanksgivings, and
sacrifices, must in its kind be the best, and most betokening honour;
namely, Prayers must not be rash, or light, or vulgar, but beautifull,
and well composed. For though it were absurd in the Heathen to worship
God in an image, yet was it not against reason to use Poetry, and
Musick, in their Churches.

Also Oblations must be clean, and Presents sumptuous, and such as are
significative either of submission, or gratitude, or commemorative of
benefits received; for all these proceed from a desire of honouring.

In the seventh, That God must be worshipt not privately onely, but
openly, and publiquely in the sight of all men; because that worship is
so much more acceptable, by how much it begets honour, and esteem in
others (as hath been declared before in the 13. art.). Unlesse others
therefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship, vanisheth.

In the last place, That we use our best endeavour to keep the Lawes of
Nature. For the undervaluing of our Masters command, exceeds all other
affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, Obedience is more acceptable
than all other sacrifices. And these are principally the naturall Lawes
concerning the worship of God, those I mean which Reason dictates to
every Man; but to whole Cities, every one whereof is one Person, the
same naturall Reason farther commands an uniformity of publique worship.
For the actions done by particular Persons, according to their private
Reasons, are not the Cities actions, and therefore not the Cities
worship; but what is done by the City, is understood to be done by the
command of him, or them who have the Soveraignty, wherefore also
together with the consent of all the subjects, that is to say,
Uniformly.

XVI. The naturall Lawes set down in the foregoing Article concerning the
divine worship, only command the giving of naturall signes of honour;
but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes, the one
naturall, the other done upon agreement, or by expresse, or tacite
composition. Now because in every language, the use of words, and names,
come by appointment, it may also by appointment be altered; for that
which depends on, and derives its force from the will of men, can by the
will of the same men agreeing be changed again, or abolisht. Such names
therefore as are attributed to God by the appointment of men, can by the
same appointment be taken away; now what can be done by the appointment
of men, that the City may doe; The City therefore by Right (that is to
say, they who have the power of the whole City) shall judge what names
or appellations are more, what lesse honourable for God, that is to say,
what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of God,
and his operations. Now actions doe signify not by mens appointment, but
naturally, even as the effects are signes of their causes; whereof some
are alwayes signes of Scorn to them before whom they are committed, as
those, whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered, and whatsoever men
are ashamed to doe before those whom they respect; Others are alwayes
signes of honour, as to draw near, and discourse decently and humbly, to
give way, or to yeeld in any matter of private benefit: In these actions
the City can alter nothing. But there are infinite others, which, as
much as belongs to honour, or reproach, are indifferent; now these, by
the institution of the City, may both be made signes of honour, and
being made so, doe in very deed become so. From whence we may
understand, that we must obey the City in whatsoever it shall command to
be used for a sign of honouring God, that is to say, for Worship;
provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour, because that is a
sign of honour, which by the Cities command is us'd for such.

XVII. We have already declared which were the Laws of God, as wel sacred
as secular, in his government by the way of Nature onely. Now because
there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that it so falls
out, that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions, it
may be demanded farther, whom God would have to be the Interpreter of
right Reason, that is to say, of his Lawes. And as for the Secular
Lawes, I mean those which concern justice, and the carriage of men
towards men; by what hath been said before of the constitution of a
City, we have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason, that all
Judicature belongs to the City, and that Judicature is nothing else but
an Interpretation of the Laws, and by consequence, that everywhere
Cities, that is to say, those who have the Soveraign power, are the
Interpreters of the Lawes. As for the Sacred Lawes, we must consider
what hath been before demonstrated in the fifth Chap. the 13. art. that
every Subject hath transferr'd as much right as he could on him, or
them, who had the supreme authority, but he could have transferred his
right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured, and therefore
also he hath done it; That he could, it appeares hence, that the manner
of honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetcht from
every mans private Reason; but every man can subject his private Reason
to the Reason of the whole City. Moreover, if each Man should follow his
own reason in the worshipping of God, in so great a diversity of
worshippers, one would be apt to judge anothers worship uncomely, or
impious; neither would the one seem to the other to honour God: Even
that therefore which were most consonant to reason, would not be a
worship, because that the nature of worship consists in this, that it be
the sign of inward honour; but there is no sign but whereby somewhat
becomes known to others, and therefore is there no sign of honour but
what seems so to others. Again, that's a true sign which by the consent
of men becomes a sign; therefore also that is honourable, which by the
consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the City, becomes a
sign of honour. It is not therefore against the will of God, declared by
the way of reason onely, to give him such signs of honour as the City
shall command. Wherefore Subjects can transferre their Right of judging
the manner of Gods worship on him or them who have the Soveraign power.
Nay, they must doe it, for else all manner of absurd opinions,
concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous ceremonies which have
been used by any Nations, will bee seen at once in the same City. Whence
it will fall out, that every man will beleeve that all the rest doe
offer God an affront; so that it cannot be truly said of any that he
worships God; for no man worships God, that is to say, honours him
outwardly, but he who doth those things, whereby hee appeares to others
for to honour him. It may therefore bee concluded, that the
Interpretation of all Lawes, as well Sacred, as Secular, (God ruling by
the way of nature only) depends on the authority of the City, that is to
say, that man, or councell, to whom the Soveraign power is committed;
and that whatsoever God commands, he commands by his voyce. And on the
other side, that whatsoever is commanded by them, both concerning the
manner of honouring God, and concerning secular affaires, is commanded
by God himselfe.

XVIII. Against this, some Man may demand, first, Whether it doth not
follow, that the City must be obeyed if it command us directly to
affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not follow,
neither must we obey. For to affront, or not to worship at all, cannot
by any Man be understood for a manner of worshipping; neither also had
any one, before the constitution of a City, of those who acknowledge God
to rule, a Right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him; nor
could he therefore transfer a Right on the City of commanding any such
things. Next, if it be demanded whether the City must be obeyed if it
command somewhat to be said, or done, which is not a disgrace to God
directly, but from whence by reasoning disgracefull consequences may be
derived: as for example, if it were commanded to worship God in an
image, before those who account that honourable? Truly it is to be done.
[2] For Worship is instituted in signe of Honour; but to Worship him thus,
is a signe of honour, and increaseth Gods Honour among those who do so
account of it. Or if it be commanded to call God by a name which we know
not what it signifies, or how it can agree with this word, God? That
also must be done; for what we do for Honours sake, (and we know no
better), if it be taken for a signe of Honour, it is a signe of Honour;
and therefore if we refuse to doe it, we refuse the enlarging of Gods
Honour. The same judgement must be had of all the Attributes and Actions
about the meerly rationall Worship of God which may be controverted, and
disputed; for though these kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to
right reason, and therefore sins in them who command them, yet are they
not against right reason, nor sins in Subjects, whose right reason in
points of Controversie is that, which submits its selfe to the reason of
the City. Lastly, if that Man, or Councell, who hath the Supreme Power,
command himselfe to be Worshipt with the same Attributes, and Actions,
wherewith God is to be Worshipt, the question is, whether we must obey?
There are many things which may be commonly attributed both to God, and
Men; for even Men may be Praised, and Magnified; and there are many
actions whereby God, and Men, may be Worshipt. But the significations of
the Attributes, and Actions, are onely to be regarded: Those Attributes
therefore, whereby we signify our selves to be of an opinion, that there
is any man endued with a Soveraignty independent from God, or that he is
immortall, or of infinite power, and the like, though commanded by
Princes, yet must they be abstained from. As also from those Actions
signifying the same, as Prayer to the absent; to aske those things which
God alone can give, as Rain, and Fair weather; to offer him what God can
onely accept, as Oblations, Holocausts; or to give a Worship, than which
a greater cannot be given, as Sacrifice. For these things seeme to tend
to this end, that God may not be thought to rule, contrary to what was
supposed from the beginning. But genuflection, prostration, or any other
act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civill Worship.
for they may signifie an acknowledgment of the civill power onely. For
Divine Worship is distinguisht from civill, not by the motion, placing,
habit, or gesture of the Body, but by the declaration of our opinion of
him whom we doe Worship; as if we cast down our selves before any man,
with intention of declaring by that Signe that we esteeme him as God, it
is Divine Worship; if we doe the same thing as a Signe of our
acknowledgment of the civill Power, it is civill Worship. Neither is the
Divine Worship distinguished from Civill by any action usually
understood by the words latreia and douleia, whereof the former marking
out the Duty of Servants, the latter their Destiny, they are words of
the same action in degree.

XIX. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God reigning by the
way of naturall reason onely, Subjects doe sinne, First, if they break
the morall Laws, which are unfolded in the second and third Chapters.
Secondly, if they break the Lawes, or commands of the City in those
things which pertain to Justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God, kata
ta nomika. Fourthly, if they confesse not before men, both in words, and
deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most blessed, the
Supreme King of the World, and of all worldly Kings; that is to say, if
they doe not worship God. This fourth sinne in the naturall Kingdome of
God, by what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter, in the second
Article, is the sinne of Treason against the Divine Majesty; for it is a
denying of the Divine Power, or Atheisme. For sinnes proceed here, just
as if we should suppose some man to be the Soveraign King, who being
himselfe absent, should rule by his Vice-Roy; against whom sure they
would transgresse who should not obey his Vice-Roy in all things, except
he usurpt the Kingdome to himself, or would give it to some other; but
they who should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this
exception, might be said to be guilty of Treason.

____________

1. By reason of their weaknesse. If this shall seem hard to any man, I
desire him with a silent thought to consider, if there were two
Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey; I beleeve he will confesse that
neither is bound: if this be true, then it is also true what I have set
down, that men are subject unto God because they are not omnipotent. And
truly our Saviour admonishing Paul (who at that time was an enemy to the
Church) that he should not kick against the pricks, seems to require
obedience from him for this cause, because he had not Power enough to
resist.

2. Truly it is to be done. We said in the 14. Article of this Chapter,
That they who attributed limits to God, transgrest the naturall Law
concerning Gods Worship. Now they who worship him in an Image, assigne
him limits; wherefore they doe that which they ought not to doe, and
this place seemes to contradict the former. We must therefore know
first, that they who are constrained by Authority, doe not set God any
bounds, but they who command them; for they who worship unwillingly, doe
worship in very deed, but they either stand or fall there, where they
are commanded to stand or fall by a lawfull Soveraign. Secondly, I say
it must be done, not at all times, and every where, but on supposition
that there is no other rule of worshipping God beside the dictates of
humane reason; for then the will of the City stands for Reason. But in
the Kingdome of God by way of Covenant, whether old, or new, where
idolatry is expressely forbid, though the City commands us to worship
thus, yet must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived
some repugnancy between this, and the 14. Article, will surely cease to
think so any longer.


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Chapter XVI.

Of the Kingdome of God under the Old Covenant

I. Mankind, from conscience of its own weaknesse, and admiration of
naturall events, hath this, that most men beleeve God to be the
invisible Maker of all visible things, whom they also fear, conceiving
that they have not a sufficient protection in themselves; but the
imperfect use they had of their Reason, the violence of their Passions
did so clowd them, that they could not rightly worship him. Now the fear
of invisible things, when it is sever'd from right reason is
superstition. It was therefore almost impossible for men without the
speciall assistance of God to avoyd both Rocks of Atheisme and
Superstition: for this proceeds from fear without right reason, that,
from an opinion of right reason, without feare. Idolatry therefore did
easily fasten upon the greatest part of men, and almost all nations did
worship God in Images, and resemblances of finite things; and they
worshipt spirits, or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them
Devills. But it pleased the Divine Majesty (as we read it written in the
sacred history) out of all mankind to call forth Abraham, by whose means
he might bring men to the true worship of him, and to reveal himselfe
supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous Covenant with him
and his seed, which is called the old Covenant, or Testament. He
therefore is the head of true Religion; he was the first that after the
Deluge taught, that there was one God, the Creatour of the Universe; And
from him the Kingdome of God by way of Covenants, takes its beginning.
Joseph. Antiq. Jewes. lib. I. cap. 7.

II. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not onely
naturally, but also by way of Covenant, over Adam, and Eve; so as it
seems he would have no obedience yeelded to him, beside that which
naturall Reason should dictate, but by the way of Covenant, that is to
say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this Covenant was
presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the originall of Gods
Kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet
this is to be noted by the way, that by that precept of not eating of
the tree of the knowledge of good and evill (whether the judicature of
good and evill, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden)
God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute
whether that were good, or evill, which was commanded; for the fruit of
the tree, if the Command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature,
whereby the eating of it could be morally evill, that is to say, a
sinne.

III. Now the Covenant between God and Abraham, was made in this manner.
Gen. 17. v. 7, 8. I will establish my Covenant between me and thee, and
thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting Covenant, to
be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto
thee, and to thy seed after thee, the Land wherein thou art a stranger,
all the Land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession, and I will be
their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign whereby Abraham
and his seed should retain the memory of this Covenant; wherefore
Circumcision was added to the Covenant, but yet as a sign onely. vers
10: This is my Covenant which yee shall keep between me and thee, and
thy seed after thee, every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and
ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a token
of the Covenant between me and you. It is therefore Covenanted, that
Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God, and the God of his seed;
that is to say, that he shall submit himselfe to be governed by him, and
that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance of that Land wherein he
then dwelt, but as a Pilgrim, and that Abraham for a memoriall sign of
this Covenant, should take care to see himselfe, and his male seed
circumcised.

IV. But seeing that Abraham even before the Covenant acknowledged God to
be the Creatour and King of the world, (for he never doubted either of
the being, or the Providence of God) how comes it not to be superfluous,
that God would purchase to himself with a price, and by contract, an
obedience which was due to him by nature; namely by promising Abraham
the Land of Canaan, upon condition that he would receive him for his
God, when by the Right of nature he was already so? By those words
therefore, To be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee, wee
understand not that Abraham satisfied this Covenant by a bare
acknowledgement of the power, and Dominion which God had naturally over
men, that is to say, by acknowledging God indefinitely, which belongs to
naturall reason; but he must definitely acknowledge him, who said unto
him, Gen. 12. v. 1. Get thee out of thy Country, &c. Gen. 13. v. 14.
Lift up thine eyes. &c. who appear'd unto him, Gen. 18. v. 1. in the
shape of three celestiall men, and Gen. 15. v. 1. In a vision; and vers.
13. In a dream, which is matter of faith. In what shape God appeared
unto Abraham, by what kinde of sound he spake to him, is not exprest,
yet it is plain that Abraham beleeved that voyce to be the voyce of God,
and a true Revelation; and would have all his to worship him, who had so
spoken unto him, for God the Creatour of the world; and that his faith
was grounded on this, not that he beleeved God to have a being, or that
he was true in his promises, that which all men beleeve, but that he
doubted not him to be God, whose voice, and promises he had heard; and
that the God of Abraham signified not simply God, but that God which
appeared unto him, even as the worship which Abraham owed unto God in
that notion, was not the worship of reason, but of Religion, and Faith,
and that, which not reason, but God had supernaturally revealed.

V. But we read of no Lawes given by God to Abraham, or by Abraham to his
family, either then, or after, secular, or sacred (excepting the
Commandement of Circumcision, which is contained in the Covenant it
selfe); whence it is manifest, that there were no other Lawes, or
worship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the Lawes of nature,
rationall worship, and circumcision.

VI. Now Abraham was the Interpreter of all Lawes, as well sacred as
secular, among those that belonged to him, not meerly naturally, as
using the Lawes of nature onely, but even by the form of the Covenant it
selfe, in which obedience is promised by Abraham not for himselfe onely,
but for his seed also; which had been in vain, except his children had
been tyed to obey his Commands: And how can that be understood, which
God sayes Gen. 18. vers. 18, 19. (All the Nations of the earth shall be
blessed in him; for I know him, that he will command his children, and
his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to doe
justice, and judgement) unlesse his children and his houshold were
supposed to be obliged to yeeld obedience unto his Commands.

VII. Hence it followes, that Abrahams subjects could not sinne in
obeying him, provided that Abraham commanded them not, to deny Gods
Existence, or Providence, or to doe somewhat expresly contrary to the
honour of God. In all other things, the word of God was to be fetcht
from his lips only, as being the Interpreter of all the Lawes, and words
of God. For Abraham alone could teach them who was the God of Abraham,
and in what manner he was to be worshipped. And they who after Abrahams
death were subject to the Soveraignty of Isaac or Jacob, did by the same
reason obey them in all things without sin, as long as they
acknowledged, and profest the God of Abraham to be their God. For they
had submitted themselves to God simply, before they did it to Abraham;
and to Abraham before they did it to the God of Abraham; againe, to the
God of Abraham before they did it to Isaac. In Abrahams subjects
therefore, To deny God was the only Treason against the Divine Majesty;
but in their posterity it was also Treason to deny the God of Abraham,
that is to say, to worship God otherwise than was instituted by Abraham,
to wit, in Images made with hands, [1] as other Nations did, which for
that reason were called Idolators. And hitherto subjects might easily
enough discern what was to be observed, what avoyded in the Commands of
their Princes.

VIII. To goe on now, following the guidance of the holy Scripture, The
same Covenant was renewed, Gen. 26. vers. 3, 4. with Isaac, and Gen. 28.
vers. 14. with Jacob, where God stiles himselfe not simply God, whom
nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the God of Abraham and
Isaac; afterward being about to renew the same Covenant, by Moyses, with
the whole People of Israel, Exod. 3. v. 6. I am, saith he, the God of
thy Father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.
Afterward when that People, not only the freest, but also the greatest
enemy to humane subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their
AEgyptian bondage, abode in the wildernesse near mount Sinai, that
antient Covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this
manner, Exod. 19. ver. 5. Therefore if yee will obey my voice indeed,
and keep my Covenant, (to wit, that Covenant which was made with
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob) then shall yee be a peculiar Treasure unto
me, above all People; for all the earth is mine, and yee shall be to me
a Kingdome of Priests, and an holy Nation. And all the People answered
together, and said, All that the Lord hath spoken, will we doe, vers. 8.

IX. In this Covenant, among other things, we must consider well the
appellation of Kingdom not used before. For although God both by nature
& by Covenant made with Abraham, was their King, yet owed they him an
obedience and worship only naturall, as being his subjects; & religious
such as Abraham instituted, as being the Subjects of Abraham, Isaac, &
Jacob, their naturall Princes; For they had received no word of God
beside the naturall word of right reason, neither had any Covenant past
between God and them, otherwise than as their wils were included in the
will of Abraham, as their Prince. But now by the Covenant made at mount
Sinai, the consent of each man being had, there becomes an institutive
Kingdome of God over them. That Kingdom of God so renowned in Scriptures
and writings of Divines, took its beginning from this time, and hither
tends that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites asked a King,
1. Sam. 8:7. They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me,
that I should not reign over them; and that which Samuel told the
Israelites, 1. Sam. 12:12. Yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall
reign over us, when the Lord your God was your King; and that which is
said, Jer. 31. vers. 31. I will make a new Covenant, &c. Although I was
an Husband unto them; And the doctrine also of Judas Galilaeus, where
mention is made in Joseph. Antiq. of the Jewes, 18. Book, 2. Chap. in
these words: But Judas Galilaeus was the first authour of this fourth
way of those who followed the study of wisdome. These agree in all the
rest with the Pharisees, excepting that they burn with a most constant
desire of liberty, beleeving God alone to be held for their Lord and
Prince, and will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of
torments, together with their kinsfolks, and dearest friends, than call
any mortall man their Lord.

X. The Right of the Kingdome being thus constituted by way of Covenant,
let us see in the next place, what lawes God propounded to them; now
those are knowne to all, to wit, the Decalogue, and those other, as well
judiciall as ceremoniall lawes, which we find from the 20. Chap. of
Exodus to the end of Deuteronomie, and the death of Moyses. Now of those
lawes deliver'd in generall by the hand of Moyses, some there are which
oblige naturally, being made by God, as the God of nature, and had their
force even before Abrahams time; others there are which oblige by vertue
of the Covenant made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of
Abraham, which had their force even before Moyses his time, by reason of
the former Covenant; but there are others which oblige by vertue of that
Covenant onely which was made last with the people themselves, being
made by God, as being the Peculiar King of the Israelites. Of the first
sort are all the Precepts of the Decalogue which pertaine unto manners,
such as, Honour thy Parents, thou shalt not Kill, thou shalt not commit
Adultery, thou shalt not Steale, thou shalt not beare false witnesse,
thou shalt not Covet; For they are the Lawes of nature; Also the precept
of not taking Gods name in vaine, for it is a part of naturall worship,
as hath beene declar'd in the foregoing Chap. Art. 15. In like manner
the second Commandement of not worshipping by way of any Image made by
themselves; for this also is a part of naturall Religion, as hath beene
shewed in the same Article. Of the second sort is the first Commandment
of the Decalogue, of not having any other Gods; for in that consists the
essence of the Covenant made with Abraham, by which God requires nothing
else, but that he should be his God, and the God of his seede: Also the
Precept of keeping holy the Sabbath; for the Sanctification of the
seventh day is instituted in memoriall of the six dayes Creation, as
appeares out of these words, Exod. 31. ver. 16, 17. It is a perpetuall
Covenant, (meaning the Sabbath) and a signe betweene me, and the
Children of Israel for ever, for in sixe dayes the Lord made Heaven, and
Earth, and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed. Of the third
kind are the Politique, judiciall and Ceremoniall lawes, which onely
belong'd to the Jewes. The lawes of the first and second sort written in
Tables of stone, to wit the Decalogue, was kept in the Ark it selfe. The
rest written in the volume of the whole Law, were laid up in the side of
the Arke. Deut. 31. ver. 26. For these retaining the faith of Abraham
might be chang'd, those could not.

XI. All Gods Lawes are Gods Word; but all Gods Word is not his Law. I am
the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the Land of AEgypt, is the
word of God, it is no Law: Neither is all that which for the better
declaring of Gods Word is pronounc't, or written together with it,
instantly to be taken for Gods Word: For, Thus saith the Lord, is not
the voice of God, but of the Preacher or Prophet. All that, and onely
that, is the word of God which a true Prophet hath declar'd God to have
spoken. Now the writings of the Prophets comprehending as well those
things which God, as which the Prophet himselfe speaks, are therefore
called the word of God, because they containe the word of God. Now
because all that, and that alone, is the Word of God which is
recommended to us for such, by a true Prophet, it cannot be knowne what
Gods Word is, before we know who is the true Prophet; nor can we beleeve
Gods Word, before we beleeve the Prophet. Moyses was beleev'd by the
People of Israel for two things, His Miracles, and his Faith; for how
great, and most evident Miracles soever he had wrought, yet would they
not have trusted him, at least he was not to have beene trusted, if he
had call'd them out of AEgypt to any other worship than the worship of
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their Fathers. For it had beene
contrary to the Covenant made by themselves with God. In like manner two
things there are, to wit, supernaturall Prediction of things to come,
which is a mighty miracle; and Faith in the God of Abraham their
deliverer out of AEgypt, which God propos'd to all the Jews to be kept
for marks of a true Prophet. He that wants either of these is no
Prophet, nor is it to be receiv'd for Gods word which he obtrudes for
such. If Faith be wanting, he is rejected in these words, Deut. 13. ver.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If there arise among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of
dreams, and giveth thee a signe, or a wonder, and the signe or the
wonder come to Passe, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us goe
after other Gods, &c. That Prophet, or that dreamer of dreames shall be
put to death. If Praediction of events be wanting, he is condemn'd by
these, Deut. 18. ver. 21, 22. And if thou say in thine heart, how shall
we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken? When a Prophet speaketh
in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to Passe,
that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet hath
spoken it presumptuously. Now, that that is the word of God which is
publisht for such by a true Prophet, and that he was held to be a true
Prophet among the Jewes, whose faith was true, and to whose praedictions
the events answer'd, is without controversie. But what it is to follow
other Gods, and whether the events which are affirm'd to answer their
praedictions, doe truly answer them, or not, may admit many
controversies, specially in praedictions which obscurely, &
aenigmatically foretell the Event, such as the praedictions of almost
all the Prophets are, as who saw not God apparently like unto Moyses,
but in darke speeches, and in figures. Numb. 12. ver. 8. But of these we
cannot judge otherwise than by the way of naturall reason; because that
Judgment depends on the Prophets interpretation, and on its proportion
with the Event.

XII. The Jewes did hold the booke of the whole Law which was called
Deuteronomie, for the written word of God, and that onely, (forasmuch as
can be collected out of sacred history) untill the Captivity; for this
booke was deliver'd by Moyses himselfe to the Priests to be kept, and
layd up in the side of the Ark of the Covenant, and to be copyed out by
the Kings; and the same a long time after by the authority of King
Josiah acknowledg'd againe for the Word of God. Kings 23. ver. 2. But it
is not manifest when the rest of the books of the Old Testament were
first receiv'd into Canon. But what concernes the Prophets, Isaiah and
the rest, since they foretold no other things than what were to come to
passe, either in or after the Captivity, their writings could not at
that time be held for Prophetique, by reason of the Law cited above.
Deut. 18. ver. 21, 22. Whereby the Israelites were commanded not to
account any man for a true Prophet but him whose Prophecies were
answer'd by the events; And hence peradventure it is that the Jews
esteem'd the writings of those whom they slew when they Prophesied, for
Prophetique afterward, that is to say, for the word of God.

XIII. It being known what Lawes there were under the old Covenant, and
that Word of God receiv'd from the beginning; we must farthermore
consider with whom the authority of judging, whether the writings of the
Prophets arising afterward, were to be receiv'd for the Word of God,
that is to say, whether the Events did answer their praedictions or not,
and with whom also the authority of interpreting the Lawes already
receiv'd, and the written Word of God, did reside; which thing is to be
trac't through all the times, and severall changes of the Commonwealth
of Israel. But it is manifest that this power during the life of Moyses,
was intirely in himselfe; for if he had not been the Interpreter of the
Lawes and Word, that office must have belong'd either to every private
Person, or to a congregation, or Synagogue of many, or to the
High-Priest, or to other Prophets. First, that that office belong'd not
to private men, or any Congregation made of them, appeares hence, that
they were not admitted, nay they were prohibited, with most heavy
threats, to heare God speake, otherwise than by the means of Moyses; for
it is written, Let not the Priests and the people break through to come
up unto the Lord, lest he break forth upon them. So Moyses went downe
unto the people, and spake unto them. Exod. 19:24,25. It is farther
manifestly, and expresly declar'd, upon occasion given by the Rebellion
of Core, Dathan and Abiram, and the two hundred and fifty Princes of the
Assembly, that neither private men, nor the Congregation should pretend
that God had spoken by them, and by Consequence that they had the right
of interpreting Gods Word; for they contending, that God spake no lesse
by them than by Moyses, argue thus, Yee take too much upon you, seeing
all the Congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among
them; wherefore then lift yee up your selves above the Congregation of
the Lord? Numb. 16. ver. 3. But how God determin'd this controversie is
easily understood by the 33. and 35. verses of the same Chapter, where
Corah, Dathan, and Abiram went downe alive into the Pit, and there came
out fire from the Lord, and consumed the two hundred and fifty men that
offer'd Incense: Secondly, that Aaron the high Priest had not this
authority, is manifest by the like controversie betweene him (together
with his Sister Miriam) and Moyses; For the question was, whether God
spake by Moyses only, or by them also, that is to say, whether Moyses
alone, or whether they also were interpreters of the Word of God. For
thus they said, Hath the Lord indeed spoken onely by Moyses? Hath he not
also spoken by us? Numb. 12. ver. 2. But God reprov'd them, and made a
distinction betweene Moyses and other Prophets, saying, If there be a
Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my selfe knowne unto him in a
vision, and will speake unto him in a dreame: My Servant Moyses is not
so, &c. For with him will I speake mouth to mouth, even apparently, and
not in darke speeches, and the Similitude of the Lord shall he behold;
wherefore then were yee not afraid to speake against my Servant Moyses?
Ibid. ver. 6, 7, 8. Lastly, that the interpretation of the Word of God
as long as Moses liv'd, belong'd not to any other Prophets whatsoever,
is collected out of that place which we now cited concerning his
eminency above all others, and out of naturall reason, for as much as it
belongs to the same Prophet who brings the Commands of God to unfold
them too; but there was then no other Word of God, beside that which was
declar'd by Moyses. And out of this also, that there was no other
Prophet extant at that time, who Prophesied to the people, excepting the
70 Elders who Prophesied by the Spirit of Moyses; and even that Joshuah,
who was then Moyses his Servant, his successour afterward, beleev'd to
be injuriously done, till he knew it was by Moyses his Consent; which
thing is manifest by Text of Scripture, And the Lord came downe in a
clowd, &c. and tooke of the spirit that was upon Moyses, and gave it
unto the 70 Elders. Numb. 11. ver. 25. Now after it was told that they
Prophesied, Joshuah said unto Moyses, Forbid them my Lord. But Moyses
answered, Why enviest thou for my sake? Seeing therefore Moyses alone
was the Messenger of Gods Word, and that the authority of interpreting
it pertain'd neither to private men, nor to the Synagogue, nor to the
High Priest, nor to other Prophets; it remaines, that Moyses alone was
the Interpreter of Gods Word, who also had the supreme power in civill
matters; And that the conventions of Corah with the rest of his
complices against Moses and Aaron; and of Aaron with his Sister against
Moyses, were rais'd, not for the salvation of their soules, but by
reason of their ambition, and desire of Dominion over the People.

XIV. In Joshuahs time the interpretation of the Lawes, and of the Word
of God, belong'd to Eleazar the High Priest, who was also under God,
their absolute King. Which is collected first of all out of the Covenant
it selfe, in which the Common-wealth of Israel is called a Priestly
Kingdome, or as it is recited in the 1 Pet. 2:9. A Royall Priesthood;
which could in no wise be sayd, unlesse by the institution and Covenant
of the People, the regall power were understood to belong to the High
Priest. Neither doth this repugne what hath beene said before, where
Moyses, and not Aaron, had the Kingdome under God; since it is necessary
that when one man institutes the forme of a future Common-wealth, that
one should governe the Kingdome which he institutes, during his life,
(whether it be Monarchie, Aristocraty, or Democraty) and have all that
power for the present, which he is bestowing on others for the future.
Now, that Eleazar the Priest, had not onely the Priesthood, but also the
Soveraignty, is expressely set downe in Joshuahs call to the
administration; for thus it is written. Take thee Joshuah the Son of
Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit, and lay thine hand upon him, and set
him before Eleazer the Priest, and before all the Congregation, and give
him a charge in their sight, and thou shalt put some of thine honour
uPon him, that all the Congregation of the Children of Israel may be
obedient, and he shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall aske
Counsell for him after the judgment of Urim, before the Lord: at his
word shall they goe out, and at his word shall they come in, and all the
Children of Israel with him, even all the Congregation. Num. 27. ver.
18, 19, 20, 21. where to aske Counsell of God for whatsoever is to be
done, (that is) to interpret Gods word, and in the name of God to
Command in all matters, belongs to Eleazar; and to goe out, and, to come
in at his word, that is to say, to obey, belongs both to Joshuah, and to
all the People. Its to be observ'd also, that that speech, Part of thy
glory; clearely denotes that Joshuah had not a power equall with that
which Moyses had. In the meane time it is manifest, that even in
Joshuahs time, the Supreme power and authority of interpreting the word
of God, were both in one Person.

XV. After Joshuahs death follow the times of the Judges untill King
Saul, in which it is manifest that the right of the Kingdome instituted
by God, remained with the High Priest. For the Kingdome was by Covenant
Priestly, that is to say, Gods government by Priests; and such ought it
to have been untill that form with Gods consent were changed by the
people themselves: which was not done, before that requiring a King God
consented unto them, and said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voyce of the
people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee,
but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them. 1. Sam. 8:7.
The supreme civill power was therefore Rightly due by Gods own
institution to the High-Priest; but actually that power was in the
Prophets, to whom (being raysed by God in an extraordinary manner) the
Israelites (a people greedy of the Prophets) submitted themselves to be
protected, and judged, by reason of the great esteem they had of
Prophecies. The Reason of this thing, was, because that though penalties
were set, and Judges appointed in the institution of Gods priestly
Kingdome, yet, the Right of inflicting punishment, depended wholly on
private judgement; and it belonged to a dissolute multitude, and each
single Person, to punish or not to punish according as their private
zeale should stirre them up. And therefore Moyses by his own command
punisht no man with death; but when any man was to be put to death, one
or many stirred up the multitude against him or them, by divine
authority, and saying, Thus saith the Lord. Now this was conformable to
the nature of Gods peculiar Kingdome. For there God reignes indeed where
his Lawes are obeyed, not for fear of men, but for fear of himselfe. And
truly, if men were such as they should be, this were an excellent state
of civill government; but as men are, there is a coercive power (in
which I comprehend both right and might) necessary to rule them. And
therefore also God from the beginning prescribed Lawes by Moyses for the
future Kings. Deut. 17. vers. 14. and Moyses foretold this in bis last
words to the people, saying, I know that after my death ye will utterly
corrupt your selves, and turn aside from the way that I have commanded
you, &c. Deut. 31:29. When therefore according to this prediction there
arose another generation who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which
he had done for Israel, the children of Israel did evill in the sight of
the Lord, and served Balaam, Jud. 2:10,11. to wit, they cast off Gods
government, that is to say, that of the Priest, by whom God ruled, and
afterward, when they were overcome by their enemies, and opprest with
bondage, they looked for Gods will, not at the hands of the Priest any
more, but of the Prophets. These therefore actually judged Israel, but
their obedience was rightly due to the High Priest; Although therefore
the Priestly Kingdome after the death of Moyses, & Joshuah, was without
power, yet was it not without Right. Now that the interpretation of Gods
word did belong to the same High Priest, is manifest by this, That God,
after the Tabernacle, & the Ark of the Covenant was consecrated, spake
no more in mount Sinai, but in the Tabernacle of the Covenant, from the
propitiatory which was between the Cherubims, whether it was not lawfull
for any to aproach except the High Priest. If therefore regard be had to
the Right of the Kingdome, the supreme civill Power, and the authority
of interpreting Gods word, were joyned in the High Priest; If we
consider the fact, they were united in the Prophets who judged Israel.
For as Judges, they had the civill authority, as Prophets, they
interpreted Gods word, and thus every way hitherto these two powers
continued inseparable.

XVI. Kings being once constituted, its no doubt but the civill authority
belonged to them, for the Kingdome of God by the way of Priesthood, (God
consenting to the request of the Israelites) was ended; which Hierom
also marks speaking of the books of Samuel: Samuel (sayes he) Eli being
dead, and Saul slain, declares the old Law abolisht; Furthermore the
Oaths of the new Priesthood, and new Soveraignty in Zadok, and David, do
testifie, that the Right whereby the Kings did rule, was founded in the
very concession of the People. The Priest could rightfully do only what
God had commanded, but the King had by right whatsoever power over every
man that each man by right had over himself; for the Israelites granted
him a Right to judge of all things, and to wage warre for all men; in
which two are contained all Right whatsoever can be conceived from man
to man. Our King (say they) shall judge us, and goe out before us, and
fight our battails, 1. Sam. 8:20. Judicature therefore belonged to the
Kings; but to judge is nothing else than by interpreting to apply the
facts to the Lawes; to them therefore belonged the interpretation of
Lawes too. And because there was no other written word of God
acknowledged beside the Law of Moyses, untill the Captivity, the
authority of interpreting Gods word, did also belong to the Kings; Nay,
forasmuch as the word of God must be taken for a Law, if there had been
another written word beside the Mosaicall Law, seeing the interpretation
of Lawes belonged to the Kings, the interpretation of it must also have
belonged to them. When the book of Deuteronomie (in which the whole
Mosaicall Law was contained) being a long time lost, was found again,
the Priests indeed asked Counsell of God concerning that book; but not
by their own authority, but by the Commandement of Josiah, and not
immediately neither, but by the meanes of Holda the Prophetesse. Whence
it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of God,
belonged not to the Priest; neither yet followes it that that authority
belonged to the Prophetesse, because others did judge of the Prophets
whether they were to be held for true, or not. For to what end did God
give signes, and tokens to all the People, whereby the true Prophets
might be discerned from the false, namely, the event of predictions, and
conformity with the Religion establisht by Moyses, if they might not use
those marks? The authority therefore of admitting books for the word of
God belonged to the King, & thus that book of the Law was approved, and
received again by the authority of King Josiah, as appears by the fourth
book of the Kings, Chap. 22, 23. where it is reported that he gathered
together all the severall degrees of his Kingdome, the Elders, Priests,
Prophets, and all the people, and he read in their eares all the words
of the Covenant, that is to say, he caused that Covenant to be
acknowledged for the Mosaicall Covenant, that is to say, for the word of
God, and to be again received, and confirmed by the Israelites. The
civill power therefore, and the power of discerning Gods word from the
word of men, and of interpreting Gods word even in the dayes of the
Kings was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent not with
authority, but in the form, and by the Right of Proclaimers, and
Preachers, of whom the hearers did judge; and if perhaps these were
punisht who did not listen to them plainly, teaching easie things, it
doth not thence follow, that the Kings were obliged to follow all things
which they in Gods name did declare, were to be followed. For though
Josiah the good King of Judah were slain because he obeyed not the word
of the Lord from the mouth of Necho King of AEgypt, that is to say,
because he rejected good Counsell though it seemed to come from an
enemy, yet no man I hope will say that Josiah was by any bond either of
divine, or humane Lawes obliged to beleeve Pharoah Necho King of AEgypt,
because he said that God had spoken to him. But what some man may object
against Kings, that for want of learning, they are seldome able enough
to interpret those books of antiquity in the which Gods word is
contained, and that for this cause it is not reasonable that this office
should depend on their authority, he may object as much against the
Priests, and all mortall men, for they may erre; and although Priests
were better instructed in nature, and arts than other men, yet Kings are
able enough to appoint such interpreters under them; and so, though
Kings did not themselves interpret the word of God, yet the office of
interpreting them might depend on their authority; and they who
therefore refuse to yeeld up this authority to Kings, because they
cannot practise the office it selfe, doe as much as if they should say
that the authority of teaching Geometry must not depend upon Kings,
except they themselves were Geometricians. We read that Kings have
prayed for the People, that they have blest the people, that they have
consecrated the Temple, that they have commanded the Priests, that they
have removed Priests from their office, that they have constituted
others. Sacrifices indeed they have not offered, for that was hereditary
to Aaron, and his sonnes; but it is manifest, as in Moyses his life
time, so throughout all ages from King Saul to the captivity of Babylon,
that the Priesthood was not a Maistry, but a Ministry.

XVII. After their returne from Babylonian bondage, the Covenant being
renewed, and sign'd, the Priestly Kingdome was restor'd to the same
manner it was in from the death of Joshuah to the beginning of the
Kings; excepting that it is not expresly set downe that the return'd
Jewes did give up the Right of Soveraignty either to Esdras (by whose
directions they ordred their State) or to any other, beside God
himselfe. That reformation seemes rather to be nothing else than the
bare promises, and vowes of every man to observe those things which were
written in the booke of the Law. Notwithstanding, (perhaps not by the
Peoples intention) by virtue of the Covenant which they then renewed,
(for the Covenant was the same with that which was made at Mount Sinai)
that same state was a Priestly Kingdome, that is to say, the supreme
civill authority, and the sacred were united in the Priests. Now,
howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the Priesthood,
and by the interposition of forraigne Princes, it was so troubled till
our Saviour Jesus Christs time, that it cannot be understood out of the
histories of those times, where that authority resided; yet it's plaine,
that in those times, the power of interpreting Gods Word was not severed
from the supreme civill power.

XVIII. Out of all this, we may easily know how the Jewes in all times
from Abraham unto Christ were to behave themselves in the Commands of
their Princes. For as in Kingdomes meerly humane men must obey a
subordinate Magistrate in all things, excepting when his Commands
containe in them some Treason; so in the Kingdome of God, the Jewes were
bound to obey their Princes, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moyses, the Priest,
the King, every one during their time in all things, except when their
commands did containe some treason against the Divine Majesty. Now
treason against the Divine Majesty was, first, the deniall of his divine
providence, for this was to deny God to be a King by nature; next,
Idolatry, or the worship not of other (for there is but one God) but of
strange Gods, that is to say, a worship though of one God, yet under
other Titles, Attributes, and Rites, than what were establisht by
Abraham, and Moyses. For this was to deny the God of Abraham to be their
King by Covenant made with Abraham, and themselves. In all other things
they were to obey; and if a King or Priest having the Soveraign
authority, had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the
Lawes, that had been his sinne, and not his subjects, whose duty it is,
not to dispute, but to obey the Commands of his superiours.

____________

1. In Images made with hands. In the 15. Chap. 14. Article, There wee
have shewed such a kinde of worship to be irrationall; but if it be done
by the command of a City to whom the written word of God is not known,
nor received, we have then shewed this worship in the 15. Chap. art. 18.
to be rationall. But where God reigns by way of Covenant, in which it is
expresly warned not to worship thus, as in the Covenant made with
Abraham, there, whether it be with, or without the Command of the City,
it is ill done.


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Chapter XVII.

Of the Kingdome of God by the new Covenant

I. There are many cleare prophesies extant in the old Testament
concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, who was to restore the Kingdome of
God by a new Covenant, partly foretelling his regall Dignity, partly his
Humility and Passion. Among others concerning his Dignity, these; God
blessing Abraham, makes him a promise of his sonne Isaac, and addes, And
Kings of People shall be of him, Gen. 17. vers. 16. Jacob blessing his
sonne Judah, The Scepter (quoth he) shall not depart from Judah, Gen.
49. vers. 10. God to Moyses, A Prophet (saith he) will I raise them up
from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his
mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him, and it
shall come to Passe, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words,
which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him, Deut. 18.
vers. 18. Isaias, The Lord himselfe shall give thee a signe, Behold a
Virgin shall conceive, and bear a Sonne, and shall call his name
Emanuel, Isai. 7. v. 14. The same Prophet, Unto us a child is born, unto
us a Sonne is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and
his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the mighty God, the
Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, Isai. 9. vers. 6. And again,
There shall come forth a Rod out of the stemme of Jesse, and a branch
shall grow out of his roots; the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him,
&c. he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove
after the hearing of his eares, but with righteousnesse shall he judge
the Poor, &c. and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth,
and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked, Isai. 11. vers.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Furthermore in the 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 61, 62. Ch. of
the same Isaiah, there is almost nothing else contained but a description
of the coming, and the works of Christ. Jeremias, Behold the days come,
saith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the house of
Israel, and with the house of Judah, Jerem. 31:31. And Baruch, This is
our God. &c. Afterward did he shew himselfe upon earth, and conversed
with men; Baruch 3. vers. 35, 37. Ezekiel, I will set up one Shepheard
over them, and he shall feed them, even my Servant David, And I will
make with them a Covenant of Peace, &c. Ezek. 34. vers. 23-25. Daniel,
I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the Sonne of man came
with the clouds of heaven, and came to the antient of dayes, and they
brought him near before him, and there was given him Dominion, and
Glory, and a Kingdome, that all People, Nations, and Languages should
serve him, his Dominion is an everlasting Dominion, &c. Dan. 7. vers.
13, 14. Haggai, Yet once it is a little while, and I will shake the
Heaven, and the Earth, and the Sea, and the drye Land, and I will shake
all Nations, and the desire of all Nations shall come, Haggai 2. v. 8.
Zachariah, Under the type of Joshuah the High Priest: I will bring forth
my servant the Branch, &c. Zach. 3. v. 8. And again, Behold the man
whose name is the Branch, Zach. 6. v. 12. And again, Rejoyce greatly O
Daughter of Sion, Shout O Daughter of Jerusalem, behold thy King cometh
to thee, he is just, having salvation, Zach. 9. v. 9. The Jewes moved by
these, and other Prophesies, expected Christ their King to be sent from
God, who should redeem them, and furthermore bear rule over all Nations.
Yea this Prophesie had spread over the whole Roman Empire (which
Vespasian too, though falsly, interpreted in favour of his own
enterprises) That out of Judea should come he that should have dominion.

II. Now the Prophesies of Christs Humility and Passion, amongst others
are these. Isa. 53. v. 4 He hath born our griefes, and carried our
sorrowes; yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God, & afflicted,
and by and by, He was oppressed, he was afflicted, yet he opened not his
mouth; He is brought as a Lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before
her Shearer is dumb, so opened he not his mouth, &c. vers. 7. And again,
He was cut out of the Land of the living, for the transgression of my
People was he stricken, &c. vers. 8. Therefore will I divide him a
portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoyle with the strong,
because he hath poured out his soule unto death, and he was numbred with
the transgressours, and he bare the sinne of many, and made intercession
for the transgressours, vers. 12. And that of Zachary, He is lowly,
riding upon an Asse, and upon a Colt the foale of an Asse. Zach. 9.
vers. 9.

III. In the reign of Tiberius Caesar, JESUS our Saviour a Galilaean began
to preach, the sonne (as was supposed) of Joseph, declaring to the
people of the Jewes, that the Kingdome of God expected by them, was now
come; and that himselfe was a King, that is to say, THE CHRIST:
Explaining the Law; choosing twelve Apostles, and seventy Disciples,
after the number of the Princes of the Tribes, and seventy Elders
(according to the pattern of Moyses) to the Ministry; teaching the way
of salvation by himselfe and them; purging the Temple; doing great
signes, and fulfilling all those things which the Prophets had foretold
of Christ to come. That this man, hated of the Pharisees, (whose false
doctrine and hypocriticall sanctity he had reproved) and by their means,
of the People accused of unlawfull seeking for the Kingdome, and
crucified, was the true CHRIST, and King promised by God, and sent from
his father to renew the new Covenant between them and God, both the
Evangelists doe shew (describing his Genealogie, nativity, life,
doctrine, death, and resurrection) and by comparing the things which he
did, with those which were foretold of him, all Christians doe consent
to.

IV. Now from this, That CHRIST was sent from God his Father to make a
Covenant between him and the people, it is manifest, that though Christ
were equall to his Father according to his nature, yet was he inferior
according to the Right of the Kingdom; for this office to speak
properly, was not that of a King, but of a Vice-roy, such as Moyses his
Government was. For the Kingdom was not his, but his Fathers; which
CHRIST himselfe signified when he was baptized as a subject, and openly
profest, when he taught his Disciples to pray, Our Father, Thy Kingdome
come, &c. And when he said, I will not drink of the blood of the grape,
untill that day when I shall drink it new with you in the Kingdome of my
Father, Mat. 26. vers. 29. And Saint Paul. As in Adam all die, so in
Christ shall all be made alive; but every man in his own order; Christ
the first fruits, afterward they that are Christs, who beleeved in his
coming; Then cometh the end when he shall have delivered up the Kingdom
to God even his Father, &c. 1. Cor. 15. vers. 22, 23, 24. The same
notwithstanding is also called the Kingdome of Christ: for both the
Mother of the sonnes of Zebedie petitioned Christ, saying, Grant that
these my two sonnes may sit, the one on thy right hand, the other on thy
left, in thy Kingdome, Mat. 20. vers. 21. And the Theef on the Cross,
Lord remember me when thou comest into thy Kingdom, Luke 23. vers. 42.
And Saint Paul, For this know yee, that no whormonger, &c. shall enter
into the Kingdome of God, and of Christ, Ephes. 5. ver. 5. And
elsewhere, I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who
shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his Kingdome, &c.
2 Tim. 4. ver. 1. And the Lord shall deliver me from every evill worke,
and will Preserve me unto his heavenly Kingdome, ver. 18. Nor is it to
be marvelled at, that the same Kingdome is attributed to them both,
since both the Father, and the Son, are the same God; and the new
Covenant concerning Gods Kingdome, is not propounded in the Name of the
FATHER, but in the name of the FATHER, of the SON, and of the
HOLY-GHOST, as of one God.

V. But the Kingdome of God, for restitution whereof CHRIST was sent from
God his Father, takes not its beginning before his second comming, to
wit, from the day of Judgement, when he shall come in Majesty
accompanied with his Angels: For it is promis'd the Apostles, that in
the Kingdome of God, they shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Ye
which have followed me in the regeneration, when the Sonne of man shall
sit in the Throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve Thrones
judging the twelve tribes of Israel, Mat. 19. ver. 28. which is not to
be done till the day of judgement; CHRIST therefore is not yet in the
throne of his Majesty, nor is that time when CHRIST was conversant here
in the world call'd a Kingdome, but a regeneration, that is to say a
renovation, or restitution of the Kingdome of God, and a calling of them
who were hereafter to be receiv'd into his Kingdome; And where it is
said, When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy
Angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory, and
before him shall be gathered all Nations, and he shall separate them one
from another, as a Shepheard divideth his Sheep from the Goates, Mat.
25. ver. 31. we may manifestly gather, that there will be no Locall
separation of Gods Subjects from his Enemies, but that they shall live
mixt together untill CHRISTS second comming. Which is also confirm'd by
the comparison of the Kingdome of heaven, with wheat mingled with
Darnell; and with a net containing all sorts of fish. But a multitude of
men, Enemies and Subjects, living promiscuously together, cannot
properly be term'd a Kingdome. Besides, the Apostles, when they askt our
Saviour, Whether he would at that time when he ascended into heaven,
restore the Kingdome unto Israel? Did openly testifie, that they then,
when CHRIST ascended, thought the Kingdome of God not to be yet come.
Farthermore, the words of CHRIST, My Kingdome is not of this world; And,
I will not drinke, &c. till the Kingdome of God come: And, God hath not
sent his Son into the World, to judge the World, but that the World
through him might be sav'd. And, If any man heare not my words, and
keepe them, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the World, but to
save the World. And, Man, who made me a judge or divider betweene you?
And the very Appellation of the Kingdome of Heaven testifies as much.
The same thing is gathered out of the words of the Prophet Jeremiah,
speaking of the Kingdome of God by the new Covenant, They shall teach no
more every man his Neighbour, saying, Know the Lord, for they shall all
know me from the least of them, to the greatest of them, saith the Lord,
Jer. 31. v. 34. which cannot be understood of a Kingdome in this World.
The Kingdome of God therefore, for the restoring whereof CHRIST came
into the world, of which the Prophets did Prophesie, and of which
praying wee say, Thy Kingdome come, (if it must have Subjects locally
separated from Enemies, if judicature, if Majesty, according as hath
beene foretold,) shall begin from that time, wherein God shall separate
the Sheep from the Goats; wherein the Apostles shall judge the twelve
Tribes of Israel; wherein CHRIST shall come in Majesty, and glory;
wherein Lastly, all men shall so know God, that they shall not need to
be taught, that is to say, at CHRIST his second comming, or the day of
Judgement. But if the Kingdome of God were now already restor'd, no
reason could be rendered why CHRIST having compleated the work for which
he was sent, should come againe, or why we should pray, Thy Kingdome
come.

VI. Now, although the Kingdome of God by CHRIST to be establisht with a
new Covenant, were Heavenly, we must not therefore thinke, that they,
who beleeving in CHRIST would make that Covenant, were not so to be
govern'd here on the Earth too, as that they should persevere in their
faith, and obedience promis'd by that Covenant. For in vaine had the
Kingdome of heaven beene promis'd, if we were not to have been led into
it. But none can be led, but those who are directed in the way. Moyses,
when he had instituted the Priestly Kingdome, himselfe though he were no
Priest, yet rul'd, and conducted the People all the time of their
Peregrination untill their entrance into the promis'd Land. In the same
manner is it our Saviours office (whom God in this thing would have like
unto Moyses) as he was sent from his Father, so to governe the future
Subjects of his heavenly Kingdome in this life, that they might attaine
to, and enter into that, although the Kingdome were not properly his,
but his Fathers. But the government whereby CHRIST rules the faithfull
ones in this life, is not properly a Kingdome, or Dominion, but a
Pastorall charge, or the Right of teaching, that is to say, God the
father gave him not a power to judge of Meum and Tuum as he doth to the
Kings of the Earth; nor a Coercive power; nor legislative; but of
shewing to the world, and teaching them the way, and knowledge of
Salvation, that is to say, of Preaching, and declaring what they were to
doe, who would enter into the Kingdome of Heaven. That CHRIST had
receiv'd no power from his father to judge in questions of Meum and
Tuum, that is to say, in all questions of Right among those who beleev'd
not; those words above cited doe sufficiently declare: Man, who made me
a judge, or divider betweene you? And it is confirm'd by reason; for
seeing CHRIST was sent to make a Covenant between God and men, and no
man is oblig'd to performe obedience before the Contract be made, if he
should have judg'd of questions of Right, no man had been tyed to obey
his sentence. But that the discerning of Right was not committed to
CHRIST in this world, neither among the faithfull, nor among infidels,
is apparent in this, that that Right without all controversie belongs to
Princes as long as it is not by, But it is not derogated God himselfe
derogated from their authority; before the day of Judgement, as appeares
by the words of Saint Paul, speaking of the day of Judgement, Then
commeth the end when He shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God even
the Father, when He shall have put downe all rule, and all authority,
and Power, 1 Cor. 15. ver. 24. Secondly, the words of our Saviour
reproving James, and John, when they had said, Wilt thou that we call
for Fyer from Heaven, that it may consume them (namely the Samaritans,
who had denyed to receive him going up to Jerusalem) and replying, The
Son of Man is not come to destroy soules, but to save them; And those
words, Behold I send you as Sheep among Wolves; Shake off the dust of
your Feet, and the like; And those words, God sent not his Son into the
world, to judge the world, but that the world through him might be
sav'd; and those, If any man heare my words, and keep them not, I judge
him not, for I came not to judge the world, &c. doe all shew, that he
had no power given him, to condemne or punish any man. We reade indeed
that the Father judgeth no Man, but hath committed all judgement to the
Son, but since that both may, and must be understood of the day of
future judgement, it doth not at all repugne what hath beene sayed
before. Lastly, that he was not sent to make new Lawes, and that
therefore by his Office, and mission, he was no Legislatour properly so
called, nor Moyses neither, but a bringer and Publisher of his Fathers
Lawes, (for God only, and neither Moyses, nor CHRIST, was a King by
Covenant) is collected hence, that he sayed, I came not to destroy (to
wit the Lawes before given from God by Moyses, which he presently
interprets) but to fulfill; And, He that shall break one of the least of
these Commandements, and shall teach men so, He shall be called least in
the Kingdome of Heaven. CHRIST therefore had not a Royall, or Soveraigne
power committed to him from his Father in this world, but consiliary,
and doctrinall onely; which himselfe signifies, as well then when he
call his Apostles, not Hunters, but Fishers of men; as when he compares
the Kingdome of God to a graine of mustard seed, and to a little Leaven
hid in meale.

VII. God promis'd unto Abraham first, a numerous seed, the possession of
the Land of Canaan, and a blessing upon all Nations in his seed, on this
Condition, that he, and his seed should serve him; next unto the seed of
Abraham according to the flesh, a Priestly Kingdome, a Government most
free, in which they were to be Subject to no humane power, on this
Condition, that they should serve the God of Abraham on that fashion
which Moyses should teach. Lastly, both to them, and to all Nations, a
heavenly, and eternall Kingdome, on Condition that they should serve the
God of Abraham, on that manner which Christ should teach. For by the
new, that is to say, the Christian Covenant, it's covenanted on mens
part, to serve the God of Abraham, on that manner which JESUS should
teach: On Gods part, to pardon their sinnes, and bring them into his
caelestiall Kingdome. We have already spoken of the quality of the
heavenly Kingdome above in the 5. Article; but it is usually call'd,
sometimes the Kingdome of Heaven, sometimes the Kingdome of Glory,
sometimes the life Eternall. What's required on mens part, namely to
serve God as CHRIST should teach, containes two things, Obedience to be
performed to God, (for this is to serve God) and Faith in JESUS, to wit,
That we beleeve JESUS TO BE THAT CHRIST who was promis'd by God: for
that only is the cause why his Doctrine is to be followed, rather than
any others. Now in holy Scriptures, Repentance is often put in stead of
Obedience, because Christ teacheth every where, that with God the Will
is taken for the deed; but Repentance is an infallible sign of an
obedient mind. These things being understood, it will most evidently
appear out of many places of sacred Scripture, that those are the
Conditions of the Christian Covenant which we have nam'd, to wit, giving
remission of sins, and eternall life on Gods part; and Repenting, and
Beleeving in JESUS CHRIST, on Mens part. First, the words, The Kingdom
of God is at hand. Repent yee and beleeve the Gospell, Mark 1:15.
contain the whole Covenant: In like manner those, Thus it is written,
and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the
third day; and that repentance, and remission of sinnes should be
preached in his Name among all Nations, begining at Jerusalem, Luke 24.
vers. 46, 47. And those, Repent and be converted, that your sins may be
blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come, &c. Acts 3. vers.
19. And sometimes one part is expresly propounded, and the other
understood, as here, He that beleeveth in the Sonne, hath everlasting
life; He that beleeveth not the Sonne, shall not see life, but the wrath
of God abideth on him, John 3. vers. 36, Where Faith is exprest,
Repentance not mentioned. And in CHRISTS preaching, Repent, for the
Kingdome of heaven is at hand, Mat. 4:17. Where Repentance is exprest,
Faith is understood. But the parts of this new Contract are most
manifestly, and formally set down there, where a certain Ruler
bargaining as it were for the Kingdom of God, asketh our Saviour, Good
Waster, what shall I doe to inherit eternall life, Luke 18. v. 18. But
CHRIST first propounds one part of the price, namely observation of the
Commandements, or obedience, which when he answered that he had kept, he
adjoynes the other, saying, Yet lackest thou one thing; Sell all that
thou hast, and distribute to the Poor, and thou shalt have Treasure in
Heaven, and come, follow me, v. 22. This was matter of Faith. He
therefore not giving sufficient credit to CHRIST, and his heavenly
Treasures, went away sorrowfull. The same Covenant is contained in these
words: Hee that beleeveth, and is baptized, shall be saved, he that
beleeveth not, shall be damned, Mark 16. vers. 15, 16. Where Faith is
exprest, Repentance is supposed in those that are baptized; and in these
words, Except a man be born again of water, and the Holy Ghost, he
cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven, John 3. vers. 5. Where to be
born of water, is the same with regeneration, that is to say, Conversion
to CHRIST. Now that Baptisme is required in the two places cited just
before, and in divers others, we must understand, that what Circumcision
was to the old Covenant, that Baptisme is to the new: Seeing therefore,
that was not of the Essence, but served for a memoriall of the old
Covenant, as a Ceremony or signe (and was omitted in the wildernesse) in
like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to the Essence, but in
memory, and for a signe of the New Covenant which wee make with God; and
provided the will be not wanting, the Act through necessity may be
omitted; but Repentance and Faith, which are of the Essence of the
Covenant, are alwayes required.

VIII. In the Kingdome of God after this life there will be no Lawes;
partly because there is no roome for Lawes, where there is none for
sinne; partly because Laws were given us from God, not to direct us in
Heaven, but unto Heaven. Let us now therefore enquire what Laws CHRIST
(establisht not himselfe, for he would not take upon him any Legislative
authority, as hath been declared above in the sixth Article, but)
propounded to us for his Fathers. Wee have a place in Scripture, where
he contracts all the Lawes of God publisht till that time, into two
Preceps, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all
thy soul, and with all thy minde: this is the greatest, and first
Commandement. And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy
Neighbour as thy selfe. On these two Commandements hangs all the Law,
and the Prophets, Mat. 22. vers. 37, 38, 39, 40. The first of these was
given before by Moyses in the same words, Deut. 6. vers. 5. And the
second even before Moyses; for it is the naturall Law, having its
begining with rationall nature it selfe. And both together is the summe
of all Lawes: for all the Lawes of divine naturall worship, are
contained in these words, Thou shalt love God; and all the Lawes of
divine worship due by the old Covenant, in these words, Thou shalt love
thy God, that is to say, God as being the peculiar King of Abraham, and
his seed; and all the Lawes naturall, and civill, in these words, Thou
shalt love thy Neighbour as thy selfe. For he that loves God and his
neighbour, hath a minde to obey all Lawes, both divine, and humane. But
God requires no more than a minde to obey. Wee have another place, where
CHRIST interprets the Lawes, namely, the fifth, sixth, and seventh
entire Chapters of Saint Matthewes Gospell. But all those Lawes are set
down, either in the Decalogue, or in the morall Law, or are contained in
the faith of Abraham; as that Law of not putting away a wife is
contained in the faith of Abraham: for that same, Two shall be one
flesh, was not delivered either by CHRIST first, or by Moyses, but by
Abraham, who first publisht the Creation of the world. The Lawes
therefore which CHRIST contracts in one place, and explaines in another,
are no other than those to which all mortall men are obliged, who
acknowledge the God of Abraham. Beside these, we read not of any Law
given by CHRIST, beside the institution of the Sacraments of Baptisme,
and the Eucharist.

IX. What may be said then of these kinde of Precepts: Repent, Be
Baptized, Keep the Commandements, Beleeve the Gospell, Come unto me,
Sell all that thou hast, give to the Poor, follow me, and the like? We
must say that they are not Lawes, but a calling of us to the faith, such
as is that of Isa. Come, buy wine, and milk without monie, and without
Price, Isai. 55. vers. 1. Neither if they come not, doe they therefore
sinne against any Law, but against prudence onely; neither shall their
infidelity be punisht, but their former sinnes. Wherefore Saint John
saith of the unbeleever, The wrath of God abideth on him; he saith not,
The wrath of God shall come upon him; And, He that beleeveth not, is
already judged; he saith not, shall be judged, but is already judged.
Nay it cannot be well conceived, that remission of sinnes should be a
benefit arising from faith, unlesse we understand also on the other
side, that the punishment of sinnes is an hurt proceeding from
infidelity.

X. From hence, that our Saviour hath prescribed no distributive Lawes,
to the Subjects of Princes, and Citizens of Cities, that is to say, hath
given no rules whereby a Subject may know, and discerne what is his
owne, what another mans, not by what forms, words, or circumstances, a
thing must be given, delivered, invaded, possest, that it may be known
by Right to belong to the Receiver, Invader, or Possessour, we must
necessarily understand that each single subject (not only with
unbeleevers, among whom CHRIST himselfe denyed himselfe to be a judge
and distributer, but even with Christians) must take those rules from
his City, that is to say, from that Man, or Councell, which hath the
supreme power. It followes therefore, that by those Lawes, Thou shalt
not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steale, Honour
thy Father and Mother, nothing else was commanded, but that Subjects,
and Citizens, should absolutely obey their Princes in all questions
concerning Meum & Tuum, their own and others Right. For by that Precept,
Thou shalt not kill, all slaughter is not prohibited; for he that said,
Thou shalt not kill, said also, Whosoever doth work upon the Sabbath,
shall be put to death, Exod 35. vers. 2. No, nor yet all slaughter the
cause not being heard; for he said, Slay every man his Brother, and
every man his Companion, and every man his Neighbour, Exo. 32. v. 27.
And there fell of the People about three thousand men, v. 28. Nor yet
all slaughter of an innocent Person; for Jephte vowed, Whosoever cometh
forth, &c. I will offer him up for a burnt offering unto the Lord, Jud.
11. vers. 31. and his vow was accepted of God. What then is forbidden?
Onely this: that no man kill another, who hath not a Right to kill him,
that is to say, that no man kill, unlesse it belong to him to doe so.
The Law of CHRIST therefore concerning killing, and consequently all
manner of hurt done to any man, and what penalties are to be set,
commands us to obey the City only. In like manner, by that Precept, Thou
shalt not commit adultery, all manner of Copulation is not forbidden,
but only that of lying with another mans wife; but the judgment which is
another mans wife, belongs to the City, and is to be determined by the
rules which the City prescribes: This precept therefore commands both
male and female to keep that faith intire which they have mutually
given, according to the statutes of the City. So also by the precept,
Thou shalt not steal, all manner of invasion, or secret surreption is
not forbidden, but of another mans only. The subject therefore is
commanded this only, that he invade not, nor take away ought which the
City prohibits to be invaded or taken away; and universally not to call
any thing murder, adultery, or theft, but what is done contrary to the
civill Lawes. Lastly, seeing CHRIST hath commanded us to honour our
Parents, and hath not prescribed, with what Rites, what appellations,
and what manner of obedience they are to be honoured, it is to be
supposed that they are to be honoured with the will indeed, and
inwardly, as Kings and Lords over their Children, but outwardly, not
beyond the Cities permission, which shall assign to every man (as all
things else, so also) his honour. But since the nature of justice
consists in this, that every Man have his own given him, its manifest,
that it also belongs to a Christian City to determin what is justice,
what injustice, or a sinne against justice; Now what belongs to a City,
that must be judg'd to belong to him or them who have the Soveraigne
power of the City.

XI. Moreover, because our Saviour hath not shewed Subjects any other
Lawes for the government of a City beside those of nature, that is to
say, beside the Command of obedience, no Subject can privately determine
who is a publique friend, who an enemy, when Warre, when Peace, when
Truce is to be made; nor yet what Subjects, what authority, and of what
men, are commodious, or prejudiciall to the safety of the Common-weale.
These, and all like matters therefore are to be learned, if need be,
from the City, that is to say, from the Soveraign powers.

XII. Furthermore, all these things, to build Castles, Houses, Temples;
to move, carry, take away mighty weights; to send securely over Seas; to
contrive engines, serving for all manner of uses; to be well acquainted
with the face of the whole world, the Courses of the Starres, the
seasons of the yeare, the accounts of the times, and the nature of all
things; to understand perfectly all naturall and civill Rights; and all
manner of Sciences, which (comprehended under the Title of Philosophy)
are necessary partly to live, partly to live well; I say, the
understanding of these (because CHRIST hath not delivered it) is to be
learnt from reasoning, that is to say by making necessary consequences,
having first taken the beginning from experience. But mens reasonings
are sometimes right, sometimes wrong, and consequently that which is
concluded, and held for a truth, is sometimes truth, sometimes errour.
Now, errours even about these Philosophicall points doe sometimes
publique hurt, and give occasions of great seditions, and injuries: It
is needfull therefore, as oft as any controversie ariseth in these
matters contrary to publique good, and common Peace, that there be some
body to judge of the reasoning, that is to say, whether that which is
inferred, be rightly inferred or not, that so the controversie may be
ended. But there are no rules given by CHRIST to this purpose; neither
came he into the world to teach Logick. It remaines therefore that the
Judges of such controversies be the same with those whom God by nature
had instituted before, namely those who in each City are constituted by
the Soveraign. Moreover, if a controversie be raised of the accurate and
proper signification (i.e.) the definition of those names or
appellations which are commonly us'd, in so much as it is needfull for
the peace of the City, or the distribution of right, to be determin'd,
the determination will belong to the City; for men by reasoning doe
search out such kind of definitions in their observation of diverse
conceptions, for the signification whereof, those appellations were us'd
at divers times, and for divers causes. But the decision of the question
whether a man doe reason rightly, belongs to the City. For Example, if a
woman bring forth a Child of an unwonted shape, and the Law forbid to
kill a man, the question is, whether the Childe be a man. It is demanded
therefore what a man is. No man doubts, but the City shall judge it, and
that without taking an account of Aristotles definition, that man is a
rationall Creature. And these things (namely Right, Politie, and
naturall Sciences) are Subjects concerning which CHRIST denies that it
belongs to his Office to give any Praecepts, or teach any thing, beside
this onely, that in all Controversies about them, every single Subject
should obey the Lawes, and determinations of his City. Yet must we
remember this, that the same Christ as God could not onely have taught,
but also commanded what he would.

XIII. The summe of our Saviours Office was to teach the way, and all the
meanes of Salvation, and aeternall life; but justice and civill
obedience, and observation of all the naturall Lawes is one of the
meanes to Salvation. Now these may be taught two wayes; one, as Theorems
by the way of naturall reason, by drawing Right and the natural Lawes
from humane Principles, and contracts; and this Doctrine thus deliver'd
is subject to the censure of civill powers: The other, as Lawes, by
divine authority, in shewing the will of God to be such; and thus to
teach, belongs onely to him to whom the Will of God is supernaturally
knowne, that is to say, to Christ. Secondly, it belong'd to the Office
of Christ to forgive sinnes to the Penitent, for that was necessary for
the Salvation of men who had already sinn'd; neither could it be done by
any other; for remission of sinnes followes not Repentance naturally,
(as a Debt) but it depends (as a free gift) on the will of God
supernaturally to be reveal'd. Thirdly, it belongs to the Office of
Christ to teach all those Commandements of God, whether concerning his
worship, or those points of faith which cannot be understood by naturall
reason, but onely by revelation; of which nature are those that he was
the Christ; that his Kingdome was not terrestriall, but celestiall; that
there are rewards, and punishments after this life; that the soule is
immortall; that there should be such, and so many Sacraments, and the
like.

XIV. From what hath beene sayed in the foregoing Chapter, it is not hard
to distinguish betweene things Spirituall, and Temporall. For since by
Spirituall, those things are understood which have their foundation on
the authority, and Office of CHRIST, and unlesse CHRIST had taught them,
could not have beene known; and all other things are temporall; it
followes, that the definition, and determination of whats just, and
unjust, the cognizance of all controversies about the meanes of Peace,
and publique defence, and the Examination of doctrines, and books in all
manner of rationall science, depends upon the temporall Right. But those
which are mysteries of faith, depending on CHRIST his word, and
authority onely, their judgements belong to spirituall Right. But it is
reasons inquisition, and pertaines to temporall Right to define what is
spirituall, and what temporall, because our Saviour hath not made that
distinction; For although Saint Paul in many places distinguish betweene
spirituall things, and carnall things, and calls those things
spirituall, which are of the spirit, to wit, the word of wisdome, the
word of knowledge, faith, the gift of healing, the working of miracles,
Prophesie, divers kindes of tongues, interpretation of tongues, Rom.
8:5. 1 Cor. 12:8,9. All supernaturally inspired by the Holy Ghost, and
such as the carnall man understands not, but he only who hath known the
mind of CHRIST, 2. Cor. 2:14-16. And those things carnall which belong
to worldly wealth, Rom. 15:27. And the men carnall men, 1 Cor. 3. vers.
1, 2, 3. yet hath he not defined, nor given us any rules whereby we may
know what proceeds from naturall reason, what from supernaturall
inspiration.

XV. Seeing therefore it is plain that our Saviour hath committed to, or
rather not taken away from Princes, and those who in each City have
obtained the Soveraignty, the supreme authority of judging &
determineing al manner of controversies about temporall matters, we must
see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in matters
spirituall. Which because it cannot bee known, except it be out of the
word of God, and the Tradition of the Church, we must enquire in the
next place what the word of God is, what to interpret it, what a Church
is, and what the will and command of the Church. To omit that the word
of God is in Scripture taken sometimes for the Sonne of God, it is used,
three manner of wayes; First, most properly for that which God hath
spoken; Thus whatsoever God spake unto Abraham, the Patriarchs, Moses,
and the Prophets, our Saviour to his Disciples, or any others, is the
word of God. Secondly, whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the
motion, or by Command of the Holy Ghost; in which sense we acknowledge
the Scriptures to be the word of God. Thirdly, in the New Testament
indeed the word of God most frequently signifies the Doctrine of the
Gospell, or the word concerning God, or the word of the Kingdome of God
by CHRIST: as where it is said that CHRIST preach't the Gospell of the
Kingdome, Mat. 4. vers. 23. Where the Apostles are said to preach the
word of God, Acts 13. vers. 46. Where the word of God is called the word
of life, Acts 5. vers. 20. The word of the Gospell, Acts 15. vers. 7.
The word of faith, Rom. 10. vers. 8. The word of truth, that is to say,
(adding an interpretation) The Gospel of salvation, Eph. 1:13. And where
it is called the word of the Apostles; For Saint Paul sayes, If any man
obey not our word, &c. 2. Thess. 3. vers. 14. which places cannot be
otherwise meant than of the doctrine Evangelicall. In like manner where
the word of God is said to be sowen, to encrease, and to be multiplied,
Acts 12. vers. 24. and Chap. 13. vers. 49. it is very hard to conceive
this to be spoken of the voyce of God, or of his Apostles; but of their
doctrine, easie. And in this third acception is all that doctrine of the
Christian faith which at this day is preacht in Pulpits, and contained
in the books of divines, the word of God.

XVI. Now the sacred Scripture is intirely the word of God in this second
acception, as being that which we acknowledge to be inspired from God.
And innumerable places of it, in the first. And seeing the greatest part
of it is conversant either in the prediction of the Kingdome of Heaven,
or in prefigurations before the incarnation of CHRIST, or in
Evangelization, and explication after, The sacred Scripture is also the
word of God, and therefore the Canon and Rule of all Evangelicall
Doctrine, in this third signification, where the word of God is taken
for the word concerning God, that is to say, for the Gospel. But because
in the same Scriptures we read many things Politicall, Historicall,
Morall, Physicall, and others which nothing at all concern the Mysteries
of our faith, those places although they contain true doctrine, and are
the Canon of such kind of doctrines, yet can they not be the Canon of
the Mysteries of Christian Religion.

XVII. And truly it is not the dead voyce, or letter of the word of God,
which is the Canon of Christian doctrine, but a true and genuine
determination; For the minde is not governed by Scriptures, unlesse they
be understood. There is need therefore of an Interpreter to make the
Scriptures Canon. And hence followes one of these two things, that
either the word of the Interpreter is the word of God, or that the Canon
of Christian doctrin is not the word of God. The last of these must
necessarily be false; for the rule of that doctrine which cannot be
knowne by any humane reason, but by divine revelation only, cannot be
lesse than divine; for whom we acknowledge not to be able to discern
whether some doctrin be true or not, its impossible to account his
opinion for a rule in the same doctrine. The first therefore is true,
That the word of an Interpreter of Scriptures, is the word of God.

XVIII. Now that Interpreter whose determination hath the honour to be
held for the word of God, is not every one that translates the
Scriptures out of the Hebrew, and Greek tongue, to his Latine Auditors
in Latine, to his French, in French, and to other Nations in their
mother tongue; for this is not to interpret. For such is the nature of
speech in generall, that although it deserve the chiefe place among
those signes whereby we declare our conceptions to others, yet cannot it
perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances; For
the living voice hath its interpreters present, to wit, time, place,
countenance, gesture, the Counsell of the Speaker, and himselfe
unfolding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is. To recall
these aids of interpretation, so much desired in the writings of old
time, is neither the part of an ordinary wit, nor yet of the quaintest,
without great learning, and very much skill in antiquity. It sufficeth
not therefore for interpretation of Scriptures, that a man understand
the language wherein they speak. Neither is every one an authentique
Interpreter of Scriptures, who writes Comments upon them: For men may
erre, they may also either bend them to serve their own ambition, or
even resisting, draw them into bondage by their forestallings; whence it
will follow that an erroneous sentence must be held for the word of God.
But although this could not happen, yet as soon as these Commentators
are departed, their Commentaries will need explications, and in processe
of time, those explications, expositions; those expositions new
Commentaries without any end: so as there cannot in any written
Interpretation whatsoever be a Canon, or Rule of Christian doctrine,
whereby the Controversies of Religion may be determined. It remains,
that there must bee some Canonicall Interpreter whose legitimate Office
it is to end Controversies begun, by explaining the word of God in the
judgements themselves; and whose authority therefore must be no lesse
obeyed, than theirs who first recommended the Scripture it selfe to us
for a Canon of faith; and that one, and the same Person be an
Interpreter of Scripture, and a supreme Judge of all manner of
doctrines.

XIX. What concerns the word Ecclesia, or Church: originally it signifies
the same thing that Concio, or a congregation does in Latin; even as
Ecclesiastes, or Church man, the same that concionator, or Preacher,
that is to say, He who speaks to the Congregation. In which sense wee
read in the Acts of the Apostles, of a Church confused, and of a Lawfull
Church, Acts 19. vers. 32, 39. that, taken for a Concourse of people
meeting in way of tumult; this, for a convocated Assembly. But in holy
writ by a Church of Christians, is sometimes understood the Assembly,
and sometimes the Christians themselves, although not actually
assembled, if they be permitted to enter into the Congregation, and to
communicate with them. For example, Tell it to the Church, Mat. 18.
vers. 17. is meant of a Church assembled; for otherwise it is impossible
to tell any thing to the Church: But, Hee laid waste the Church, Acts 8.
vers. 3. is understood of a Church not assembled. Sometimes a Church is
taken for those who are baptized, or for the professors of the Christian
faith, whether they be Christians inwardly, or feignedly, as when we
reade of somewhat said or written to the Church, or said or decreed, or
done by the Church; sometimes for the Elect onely, as when it is called
holy, and without blemish, Ephes. 5. vers. 27. But the Elect, as they
are militant, are not properly called a Church; for they know not how to
assemble, but they are a future Church, namely in that day when sever'd
from the reprobate, they shall bee triumphant. Againe a Church may bee
sometimes taken (for all Christians collectively,) as when Christ is
called the head of his Church, and the head of his body the Church, Eph.
5. vers. 23. Colos. 1. vers. 18. sometimes for its parts, as the Church
of Ephesus, The Church which is in his house, the seven Churches, &c.
Lastly, a Church as it is taken for a Company actually assembled,
according to the divers ends of their meeting, signifies sometimes those
who are met together to deliberate, and judge, in which sense it is also
called a Councell, & a Synod; sometimes those who meet together in the
house of prayer to worship God, in which signification it is taken in
the 1 Cor. 14. vers. 4, 5. 23. 28. &c.

XX. Now a Church which hath personall Rights, and proper actions
attributed to it, and of which that same must necessarily be understood,
Tell it to the church, and, he that obeys not the church, and all such
like formes of speech, is to be defin'd so, as by that word may be
understood, A Multitude of men who have made a new Covenant with God in
Christ, (that is to say, a multitude of them who have taken upon them
the Sacrament of Baptisme) which multitude, may both lawfully be call'd
together by some one into one place, and he so calling them, are bound
to be present either in Person, or by others. For a multitude of men, if
they cannot meet in assembly, when need requires, is not to be call'd a
Person; For a Church can neither speak, nor discerne, nor heare, but as
it is a congregation. Whatsoever is spoken by particular men, (to wit,
as many opinions almost as heads) that's the speech of one man, not of
the Church; farthermore, if an assembly be made, and it be unlawfull, it
shall be considered as null. Not any one of these therefore who are
present in a tumult shall be tyed to the decree of the rest, but
specially if he dissent; and therefore neither can such a Church make
any decree; for then a multitude is sayd to decree somewhat, when every
man is oblig'd by the decree of the major part. We must therefore grant
to the definition of a Church (to which we attribute things belonging to
a Person) not onely a possibility of assembling, but also of doing it
lawfully. Besides, although there be some one who may lawfully call the
rest together, yet if they who are called may lawfully not appeare
(which may happen among men who are not subject one to another) that
same Church is not one Person. For by what Right they, who being call'd
to a certaine time, and place, doe meet together, are one Church; by the
same, others flocking to another place appointed by them, are another
Church. And every number of men of one opinion is a Church, and by
Consequence there will be as many Churches as there are divers opinions,
that is to say, the same multitude of men will at once prove to be one,
and many Churches. Wherefore a Church is not one, except there be a
certaine, and known, that is to say, a lawfull power, by meanes whereof
every man may be oblig'd to be present in the Congregation, either
himselfe in person, or by Proxie. And that becomes One, and is capable
of personall functions, by the union of a lawfull power of convocating
Synods, and assemblies of Christians; not by uniformity of Doctrine: and
otherwise, it is a multitude, and Persons in the plurall, howsoever
agreeing in opinions.

XXI. It followes what hath beene already said by necessary connexion,
that a City of Christian men, and a Church, is altogether the same
thing, of the same men, term'd by two names, for two causes: For the
matter of a City & a Church is one, to wit the same Christian men. And
the forme which consists in a Lawfull power of assembling them is the
same too; for 'tis manifest that every Subject is oblig'd to come
thither, whither he is summon'd by his City. Now that which is call'd a
City, as it is made up of men, the same, as it consists of Christians,
is styled a Church.

XXII. This too is very cohaerent with the same points, If there be many
Christian Cities, they are not altogether personally one church. They
may indeed by mutuall consent become one Church, but no otherwise, than
as they must also become one City; For they cannot assemble but at some
certaine time, and to some place appointed. But Persons, places, and
times, belong to civill Right; neither can any Subject or stranger
lawfully set his foot on any place, but by the permission of the City,
which is Lord of the place. But the things which cannot lawfully be done
but by the permission of the City, those, if they be lawfully done, are
done by the Cities authority. The Universall church is indeed one
mysticall body, whereof CHRIST is the head, but in the same manner, that
all men together acknowledging God for the Ruler of the world, are one
Kingdome, and one City, which notwithstanding is neither one Person, nor
hath it one common action, or determination. Farthermore where it is
said that CHRIST is the head of his body the Church, it manifestly
appeares, that that was spoken by the Apostle of the Elect, who as long
as they are in this world, are a Church onely in potentia, but shall not
actually be so before they be separated from the reprobate, and gather'd
together among themselves, in the day of Judgement. The Church of Rome
of old was very great, but she went not beyond the bounds of her Empire;
and therefore neither was she Universall, unlesse it were in that sense,
wherein it was also said of the City of Rome, Orbem jam totum victor
Romanus habebat, when as yet he had not the twentieth part of it. But
after that the civill Empire was divided into parts, the single Cities
thence arising were so many Churches; and that power which the Church of
Rome had over them, might perhaps wholy depend on the authority of those
Churches, who having cast off the Emperours were yet content to admit
the Doctours of Rome.

XXIII. They may be called Church-men who exercise a publique office in
the Church. But of offices there was one a Ministery, another a
Maistery; The office of the Ministers was to serve Tables, to take care
of the temporall goods of the Church, and to distribute (at that time
when all propriety of riches being abolisht, they were fed in common) to
each man his portion; The Maisters according to their order, were called
some Apostles, some Bishops, some Presbyters, that is to say Elders; yet
not so, as that by the name of Presbyter, the age, but the office might
be distinguisht; For Timothy was a Presbyter although a young man; but
because for the most part the Elders were receiv'd into the Maistership,
the word, denoting age, was us'd to signifie the office. The same
Maisters, according to the diversity of their employments were called
some of them Apostles, some Prophets, some Evangelists, some Pastors or
Teachers. And the Apostolicall worke indeed was universall; the
Propheticall to declare their owne revelations in the Church; the
Evangelicall to preach, or to be publishers of the Gospell among the
infidels; that of the Pastors to teach, confirme, and rule the minds of
those who already beleev'd.

XXIV. In the Election of Church-men two things are to be considered, the
Election of the Persons, and their consecration, or institution, which
also is called ordination. The first twelve Apostles CHRIST himselfe
both elected, and ordain'd. After CHRISTS ascension Matthias was elected
in the roome of Judas the Traitour, the Church (which at that time
consisted of a Congregation of about one hundred and twenty men)
choosing two men: And they appointed two, Joseph and Matthias; but God
himselfe by lot approving of Mathias. And Saint Paul calls these twelve
the first, and great Apostles, also the Apostles of the Circumcision.
Afterward were added two other Apostles, Paul, and Barnabas; ordain'd
indeed by the Doctours, and Prophets of the Church of Antioch, (which
was a particular Church) by the imposition of hands, but elected by the
command of the Holy Ghost. That they were both Apostles is manifest in
the 13. of the Acts v. 2, 3. That they receiv'd their Apostleship from
hence, namely because they were separated by command of the spirit for
the work of God, from the rest of the Prophets, and Doctours of the
Church of Antioch, Saint Paul himselfe shewes, who calls himselfe for
distinctions sake an Apostle separated unto the Gospell of God, Rom. 1.
ver. 1. But if it be demanded further; by what authority it came to
passe that that was receiv'd for the command of the Holy Ghost, which
those Prophets and Doctours did say proceeded from him, it must
necessarily be answer'd; by the Authority of the church of Antioch. For
the Prophets & Doctours must be examined by the Church before they be
admitted; For Saint John saith, Beleeve not every Spirit, but try the
Spirits, whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone
out into the world; but by what Church, but that to which that Epistle
was written? In like manner Saint Paul reprooves the Churches of
Galatia, because they Judaized, Gal. 2. v. 14. although they seemed to
doe so by the Authority of Peter; for when he had told them that he had,
reprehended Peter himselfe with these words, If thou being a Jew, livest
after the manner of Gentiles, and not as doe the Jewes, why compellest
thou the Gentiles to live as doe the Jewes? Not long after he questions
them, saying, This onely would I learne of you: Received ye the Spirit
by the works of the Law, or by the hearing of faith? Gal. 3. ver. 2.
Where it is evident, that it was Judaisme which he reprehended the
Galathians for, notwithstanding that the Apostle Peter compelled them to
Judaize. Seeing therefore it belonged to the Church, and not to Peter,
and therefore also not to any man, to determine what Doctors they should
follow, it also pertained to the authority of the Church of Antioch to
elect their Prophets and Doctors. Now because the Holy Ghost separated
to himself the Apostles Paul & Barnabas, by the imposition of hands from
Doctors thus elected; its manifest, that imposition of hands, &
consecration, of the prime Doctors in each Church, belongs to the
Doctors of the same Church. But Bishops, who were also called
Presbyters, although all Presbyters were not Bishops, were ordain'd
somtimes by Apostles (for Paul & Barnabas when they had taught in Derbe,
Lystra, and Iconium, ordained Elders in every Church, Acts 14. v. 23.)
sometimes by other Bishops, for Titus was by Paul left in Crete, that he
should ordain Elders in every City, Tit. 1. v. 5. And Timothy was
advised not to neglect the gift that was in him, which was given him by
Prophesy with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, 1. Tim. 4.
v. 14. And he had rules given him concerning the Election of Presbyters.
But that cannot be understood otherwise, than of the ordination of those
who were elected by the Church; for no man could constitute a Doctor in
the Church, but by the Churches permission. For the duty of the Apostles
themselves was not to command, but to teach; and although they who were
recommended by the Apostles, or Presbyters, were not rejected, for the
esteem that was had of the recommenders, yet seeing they could not be
elected without the will of the Church, they were also suppos'd elected
by the authority of the Church. In like manner Ministers, who are called
Deacons, were ordained by the Apostles; yet elected by the Church. For
when the seven Deacons were to bee elected, and ordained, the Apostles
elected them not, but look yee out, (say they) among you Brethren seven
men of honest report, &c. And they chose Stephen, &c. And they set them
before the Apostles, Acts 6. vers. 3, 5, 6. It is apparent therefore by
the custome of the Primitive Church under the Apostles, that the
ordination, or consecration of all Church-men, which is done by Prayer,
and imposition of hands, belonged to the Apostles, and Doctors; but the
Election of those who were to be consecrated, to the Church.

XXV. Concerning the power of binding, and loosing, that is to say of
remitting, and retaining of sinnes, there is no doubt, but it was given
by Christ to the Pastors then yet for to come, in the same manner as it
was to the present Apostles. Now the Apostles had all the power of
remitting of sins given them, which Christ himselfe had; As the Father
hath sent me (sayes Christ) so send I you, John 20. vers. 21. and he
addes, Whose soever sins yee remit, they are remitted, and whose soever
sins ye retain, they are retained. vers. 23. But what binding and
loosing, or remitting and retaining of sinnes, is, admits of some
scruple. For first, to retain his sinnes who being baptized into
remission of sins, is truly penitent, seems to be against the very
Covenant it selfe of the new Testament, and therefore could not be done
by Christ himselfe, much lesse by his Pastors. And to remit the
impenitent, seems to be against the will of God the Father, from whom
Christ was sent to convert the world, and to reduce men unto obedience.
Furthermore, if each Pastor had an authority granted him to remit and
retain sinnes in this manner, all awe of Princes, and civill
Magistrates, together with all kind of civill Government would be
utterly destroyed. For Christ hath said it, nay even nature it selfe
dictates, that we should not feare them who slay the body, but cannot
kill the soule; but rather feare him who can cast both soule and body
into hell, Mat. 10. vers. 28. Neither is any man so mad as not to choose
to yeeld obedience rather to them who can remit, and retain their
sinnes, than to the powerfullest Kings. Nor yet on the other side, it is
to be imagined, that remission of sinnes is nothing else but an
exemption from Ecclesiasticall punishments; for what evill hath
excommunication in it, beside the eternall pains which are consequent to
it? Or what benefit is it to be received into the Church if there were
salvation out of it? We must therefore hold, That Pastors have Power,
truly, and absolutely to forgive sinnes, but, to the penitent; and to
retain them, but, of the impenitent. But while men think that to Repent,
is nothing else but that every one condemn his Actions, and change those
Counsels which to himselfe seem sinfull, and blameable, there is an
opinion risen, that there may be repentance before any Confession of
sinnes to men, and that repentance is not an effect, but a cause of
Confession; and thence, the difficulty of those who say that the sins of
the penitent are already forgiven in Baptisme, and theirs who repent
not, cannot be forgiven at al, is against Scripture, and contrary to the
words of Christ, Whose soever sins ye remit, &c. We must therefore to
resolve this difficulty know in the first place, that a true
acknowledgement of sin is Repentance; for he that knows he hath sinned,
knows he hath erred, but to will an errour is impossible; therefore he
that knowes he hath sinned, wishes he had not done it, which is to
repent. Farther, where it may be doubtfull, whether that which is done
be a sin or not, we must consider, that repentance doth not precede
confession of sins, but is subsequent to it: for there is no repentance
but of sinnes acknowledged. The penitent therefore must both acknowledge
the fact, and know it to be a sinne, that is to say, against the Law. If
a man therefore think, that what he hath done, is not against the Law;
its impossible he should repent of it. Before repentance therefore, its
necessary there be an application of the facts unto the Law. But its in
vain to apply the facts unto the Law without an Interpreter; for not the
words of the Law, but the sentence of the Law-giver is the rule of mens
actions; but surely either one man, or some men are the Interpreters of
the Law, for every man is not judge of his own fact whether it be a sin
or not; wherefore the fact of which we doubt whether it be a sinne or
not, must be unfolded before some man or men, and the doing of this is
confession. Now when the Interpreter of the Law hath judged the fact to
bee a sinne, if the sinner submit to his judgement, and resolve with
himselfe not to do so any more, tis repentance; and thus, either it is
not true repentance, or else it is not antecedent, but subsequent to
confession. These things being thus explained, it is not hard to
understand what kinde of power that of binding and loosing is. For
seeing in remission of sinnes there are two things considerable, one the
Judgement or Condemnation whereby the fact is judged to be a sinne; the
other, (when the Party condemned does acquiesce, and obey the sentence,
that is to say, Repents) the remission of the sinne, or, (if he repent
not) the Retention: The first of these, that is to say, the Judging
whether it be a sinne or not, belongs to the Interpreter of the Law,
that is, the Soveraign Judge; the second, namely Remission, or retention
of the sinne, to the Pastor, and it is that concerning which the power
of binding and loosing is conversant. And that this was the true meaning
of our Saviour Christ in the institution of the same power, is apparent
in the 18 of Mat. vers. 15, 16, 17, 18. thus, He there speaking to his
Disciples, sayes, If thy Brother sinne against thee, goe, and tell him
his fault betweene thee and him alone, (where we must observe by the
way, that if thy Brother sinne against thee, is the same with, if he doe
thee injury; and therefore Christ spake of those matters which belonged
to the civill Tribunall) he addes, if he heare thee not (that is to say,
if he deny that he hath done it, or if having confest the fact, he
denies it to be unjustly done) take with thee yet one or two, and if he
refuse to heare them, tell it the Church. But why to the Church, except
that she might judge whether it were a sinne or not? But if he refuse to
hear the Church, that is, if he doe not submit to the Churches sentence,
but shall maintain that to be no sin, which She Judges to be a sinne,
that is to say, if he repent not (for certain it is that no man repents
himselfe of that action which She conceives not to be a sinne) he saith
not, Tell it to the Apostles, that we might know that the definitive
sentence in the question, whether it were a sin or not, was not left
unto them, but to the Church; but let him be unto thee (sayes he) as an
Heathen, or Publican, that is, as one out of the Church, as one that is
not baptized, that is to say, as one whose sinnes are retained. For all
Christians were baptized into remission of sinnes. But because it might
have been demanded who it was that had so great a power, as that of
withholding the benefit of Baptisme from the impenitent, Christ shewes
that the same Persons to whom he had given authority to baptize the
penitent into the remission of sinns, and to make them of heathen men,
Christians, had also authority to retain their sins who by the Church
should be adjudged to be impenitent, and to make them of Christian men
Heathens; and therefore presently subjoynes, Verily I say unto you,
Whose soever sinnes yee shall binde upon Earth, they shall bee bound
also in Heaven, and whose soever sins yee shall loose upon Earth, they
shall be loosed also in Heaven. Whence we may understand, that the power
of binding, and loosing, or of remitting, and retaining of sinnes, which
is called in another place, the power of the keyes, is not different
from the power given in another place in these words, Goe, and teach all
Nations, Baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Sonne, and
of the Holy Ghost, Mat. 28. ver. 19. And even as the Pastours cannot
refuse to Baptize him whom the Church judges worthy, so neither can they
retaine his sinnes whom the Church holds fitting to be absolv'd, nor yet
remit his sinnes whom the Church pronounceth disobedient. And it is the
Churches part to judge of the sinne, the Pastours, to cast out, or to
receive into the Church those that are judg'd. Thus Saint Paul to the
Church of Corinth (1 Cor. v. 12): Do not ye judge, saith he, of those
that are within? Yet he himself pronounc't the sentence of
Excommunication against the incestuous Person, I indeed (saith he, verse
3) as absent in body, but present in Spirit, &c.

XXVI. The act of retaining sinnes is that which is called by the Church
Excommunication, and by Saint Paul, delivering over to Satan. The word
Excommunication, sounding the same with aposunagogon poiein, casting out
of the Synagogue, seems to be borrowed from the Mosaicall Law, wherein
they who were by the Priest adjudged leprous, were commanded to be kept
apart out of the Camp, untill by the judgement of the Priest they were
againe pronounc't cleane, and by certaine rights (among which the
washing of the body was one) were purified, Levit. 13. ver. 46. From
hence in processe of time it became a custome of the Jewes, not to
receive those who passed from Gentilisme to Judaisme, (supposing them to
be uncleane) unlesse they were first washed; and those who dissented
from the Doctrine of the Synagogue, they cast out of the Synagogue. By
resemblance of this custome, those that came to Christianity, (whether
they were Jewes, or Gentiles) were not receiv'd into the Church without
Baptisme; and those that dissented from the Church were depriv'd of the
Churches Communion. Now, they were therefore said to be deliver'd over
to Satan, because all that was out of the Church, was comprehended
within his Kingdome. The end of this kind of Discipline was, that being
destitute for a time of the grace and spirituall priviledges of the
Church, they might be humbled to salvation. But the effect in regard to
secular matters, that being excommunicated, they should not onely be
prohibited all Congregations, or Churches, and the participation of the
mysteries, but as being contagious they should be avoided by all other
Christians, even more than Heathen: for the Apostle allowed to accompany
with Heathen, but with these not so much as to eate, 1 Cor. 5. ver. 10,
11. Seeing then the effect of Excommunication is such, it is manifest in
the first place, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated. For a
Christian City is a Christian Church, as hath been declar'd above in the
21. Art. and of the same extension. But a Church cannot be
excommunicated; For either she must excommunicate her selfe, which is
impossible; or she must be excommunicated by some other Church, and
this, either universall, or particular. But seeing an Universall Church
is no Person, (as hath been prov'd in the 22. Artic.) and therefore
neither acts, nor does any thing, it cannot excommunicate any man. And a
particular church by excommunicating another Church doth nothing; for
where there is not one common Congregation, there cannot be any
Excommunication. Neither if some one Church (suppose that of Jerusalem)
should have excommunicated an other (suppose that of Rome) would it any
more have excommunicated this, than her selfe: for he that deprives
another of his Communion, deprives himselfe also of the Communion of
that other. Secondly, No man can excommunicate the subjects of any
absolute government all at once, or forbid them the use of their
Temples, or their publique worship of God. For they cannot be
excommunicated by a Church which themselves doe constitute; for if they
could, there would not onely not remain a Church, but not so much as a
common-weale, and they would be dissolved of themselves; and this were
not to be excommunicated, or prohibited. But if they be excommunicated
by some other Church, that church is to esteem them as Heathen. But no
christian Church by the doctrine of Christ, can forbid the Heathen to
gather together, and Communicate among themselves, as it shall seem good
to their Cities, especially if they meet to worship Christ, although it
be done in a singular custome, and manner: therefore also not the
excommunicated, who are to be dealt with as Heathen. Thirdly, a Prince
who hath the Soveraign Power, cannot be excommunicated. For by the
doctrine of Christ, neither one, nor many subjects together can
interdict their Prince any publique, or private places, or deny him
entrance into any Assembly whatsoever, or prohibit him the doing of what
hee will within his own jurisdiction. For it is Treason among all
Cities, for any one, or many subjects joyntly to arrogate to themselves
any authority over the whole City; but they who arrogate to themselves
an authority over him who hath the supreme power of the City, doe
arrogate the same authority over the City it selfe. Besides, a Soveraign
Prince, if he be a Christian, hath this farther advantage, that the City
whose Will is contained in His, is that very thing which we call a
Church; the Church therefore excommunicates no man, but whom it
excommunicates by the authority of the Prince: but the Prince
excommunicates not himselfe, his subjects therefore cannot doe it. It
may be indeed that an Assembly of rebellious Citizens or Traytors, may
pronounce the sentence of excommunication against their Prince, but not
by Right. Much lesse can one Prince be excommunicated by another, for
this would prove not an excommunication, but a provocation to Warre by
the way of affront. For since that is not one church which is made up of
Citizens belonging to two absolute Cities, for want of power of lawfully
assembling them, (as hath been declar'd before in the 22. Art.) they who
are of one Church are not bound to obey an other, and therefore cannot
be excommunicated for their disobedience. Now, what some may say, that
Princes, being they are members of the Universall church, may also by
the authority of the Universall church be excommunicated, signifies
nothing: because the Universall church (as hath beene shewed in the 22.
Art.) is not one Person, of whom it may be said that shee acted,
decreed, determin'd, excommunicated, absolv'd, and the like personall
attributes; neither hath she any Governour upon Earth at whose command
she may assemble, and deliberate: For to be guide of the Universall
church, and to have the power of assembling her, is the same thing as to
be Governour, and Lord over all the Christians in the world, which is
granted to none, but God onely.

XXVII. It hath beene shewed above in the 18. Art. that the authority of
interpreting the Holy Scriptures consisted not in this, that the
interpreter might without punishment, expound, and explicate his
sentence & opinion taken thence, unto others, either by writing, or by
his owne voice; but, that others have not a Right to doe, or teach ought
contrary to his sentence; insomuch as the interpretation we speak of is
the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be
determined by sacred Scriptures. Now we must shew that that power
belongs to each Church, and depends on his, or their authority who have
the Supreme command, provided that they be Christians. For if it depend
not on the civill authority, it must either depend on the opinion of
each private Subject, or some forraigne authority. But among other
reasons, the inconveniencies that must follow private opinions cannot
suffer its dependance on them; of which this is the chiefe, that not
onely all civill obedience would be taken away (contrary to Christ his
praecept) but all humane society and peace would be dissolved (contrary
to the Lawes of nature;) for seeing every man is his owne interpreter of
Scripture, that is to say, since every man makes himselfe judge of what
is pleasing and displeasing unto God, they cannot obey their Princes
before that they have judg'd whether their commands be conformable to
the Word of God, or not. And thus either they obey not, or they obey for
their owne opinions sake, that is to say, they obey themselves, not
their Soveraigne; civill obedience therefore is lost. Againe, when every
man followes his owne opinion, it's necessary that the controversies
which rise among them will become innumerable, and indeterminable;
whence there will breed among men (who by their own naturall
inclinations doe account all dissention an affront) first hatred, then
brawles and warres, and thus all manner of peace and society would
vanish. We have farthermore for an example, that which God under the old
Law required to be observed concerning the book of the Law, namely, that
it should be transcrib'd, and publiquely us'd, and he would have it to
be the Canon of Divine doctrine: but the controversies about it not to
be determined by private Persons, but onely by the Priests. Lastly, it
is our Saviours Precept, that if there be any matter of offence between
private Persons, they should hear the Church. Wherefore it is the
Churches duty to define controversies; it therefore belongs not to
private men, but to the Church, to interpret Scriptures. But that we may
know that the authority of interpreting Gods Word, that is to say, of
determining all questions concerning God, and Religion, belongs not to
any forraign Person whatsoever, we must consider first what esteem such
a power carries in the mindes of the subjects, and their civill actions.
For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men by a
naturall necessity, doe follow those opinions which they have concerning
good, and evill, Reward, and Punishment; whence it happens that
necessarily they would chuse rather to obey those by whose judgement
they beleeve that they shall be eternally happy, or miserable. Now, by
whose judgement it is appointed what Doctrines are necessary to
salvation, by their judgement doe men expect their eternall blisse, or
perdition; they will therefore yeeld them obedience in all things. Which
being thus, most manifest it is, that those subjects who believe
themselves bound to acquiesce to a forraign authority in those Doctrines
which are necessary to salvation, doe not per se constitute a City, but
are the subjects of that forraign power. Nor therefore although some
Soveraign Prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other,
yet so, as he would be understood to have retained the civill power in
his own hands, shall such a Writing be valid, or transferre ought
necessary for the retaining, or good administration of his command. For
by the 2. Chap. 4. artic. no man is said to transferre his Right,
unlesse he give some proper sign, declaring his Will to transferre it;
but he who hath openly declared his will to keep his Soveraignty, cannot
have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the
keeping it. This kinde of Writing therefore will not be a sign of Will,
but of Ignorance in the contractors. We must consider next how absurd it
is for a City, or Soveraign, to commit the ruling of his Subjects
consciences to an enemy. For they are, as hath been shewed above in the
5. Chap. 6. artic. in an hostile state, whosoever have not joyn'd
themselves into the unity of one Person. Nor contradicts it this truth
that they doe not alwayes fight: (for truces are made between enemies)
it is sufficient for an hostile minde, that there is suspition, that the
Frontiers of Cities, Kingdomes, Empires, strengthned with Garisons, doe
with a fighting posture and countenance, though they strike not, yet as
enemies mutually behold each other. Lastly, how unequall is it to demand
that, which by the very reason of your demand, you confesse belongs to
anothers Right? I am the Interpreter of Scriptures to you who are the
Subject of anothers Realme: Why? By what Covenants past between you and
me? By Divine authority. Whence knowne? Out of holy Scripture. Behold
the Book, read it. In vain, unlesse I may also interpret the same for my
self; That interpretation therefore doth by Right belong to me, and the
rest of my private fellow-subjects; which we both deny. It remains
therefore that in all christian Churches, that is to say, in all
christian Cities, the interpretation of sacred Scripture depend on, and
derive from the authority of that man, or Councell, which hath the
Soveraign power of the City.

XXVIII. Now because there are two kindes of controversies, the one about
spirituall matters, that is to say, questions of faith, the truth
whereof cannot be searcht into by naturall reason; such are the
questions concerning the nature, and office of Christ, of rewards and
punishments to come, of the Sacraments, of outward worship, and the
like: the other, about questions of humane science, whose truth is
sought out by naturall reason, and Syllogismes, drawne from the
Covenants of men, and definitions (that is to say, significations
received by use, and common consent of words) such as are all questions
of Right, and Philosophy. For example, when in matter of Right its
questioned whether there be a Promise, and Covenant, or not? That is
nothing else, but to demand, whether such words spoken in such a manner
be by common use, and consent of the Subjects, a Promise or Covenant;
which if they be so called, then it is true that a Contract is made, if
not, then it is false: that truth therefore depends on the compacts, and
consents of men. In like manner when it is demanded in Philosophy
whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once; the
determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common
consent of men about the signification of the word entire: for if men
when they say a thing is entirely somewhere doe signifie by common
consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere, it is
false that the same thing is in divers places at once: that truth
therefore depends on the consents of men, and by the same reason in all
other questions concerning Right, and Philosophy. And they who doe judge
that any thing can be determin'd, (contrary to this common consent of
men concerning the appellations of things) out of obscure places of
Scripture, doe also judge that the use of speech, and at once all humane
society, is to be taken away; for he who hath sold an whole field, will
say, he meant one whole ridge, and will retaine the rest as unsold; nay,
they take away reason it selfe, which is nothing else but a searching
out of the truth made by such consent. These kinde of questions
therefore need not be determin'd by the City by way of interpretation of
Scriptures; for they belong not to Gods Word, in that sense wherein the
Word of God is taken for the Word concerning God, that is to say, for
the Doctrine of the Gospell; neither is he who hath the Soveraigne Power
in the Church, oblig'd to employ any Ecclesiastical Doctours for the
judging of any such kind of matters as these. But for the deciding of
questions of Faith, that is to say, concerning God, which transcend
humane capacity, we stand in need of a divine blessing (that we may not
be deceiv'd at least in necessary points) to be deriv'd from CHRIST
himselfe by the imposition of hands. For, seeing to the end we may
attaine to aeternal Salvation, we are oblig'd to a supernatural
Doctrine, & which therefore it is impossible for us to understand; to be
left so destitute, as that we can be deceiv'd in necessary points, is
repugnant to aequity. This infallibility our Saviour Christ promis'd (in
those things which are necessary to Salvation) to his Apostles untill
the day of judgement; that is to say, to the Apostles, and Pastors
succeeding the Apostles who were to be consecrated by the imposition of
hands. He therefore who hath the Soveraigne power in the City, is
oblig'd as a Christian, where there is any question concerning the
Mysteries of Faith, to interpret the Holy Scriptures by Clergy-men
lawfully ordain'd. And thus in Christian Cities the judgement both of
spirituall and temporall matters belongs unto the civill authority. And
that man, or councell who hath the Supreme power, is head both of the
City, and of the Church; for a Church, and a Christian City is but one
thing.


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Chapter XVIII.

Concerning those things which are necessary for our entrance into the
Kingdome of Heaven

I. It was ever granted that all authority in secular matters deriv'd
from him who had the Soveraigne power, whether he were one Man, or an
Assembly of Men. That the same in spirituall matters depended on the
authority of the Church, is manifest by the next foregoing proofs; and
besides this, that all Christian Cities are Churches endued with this
kind of authority From whence a man though but dull of apprehension may
collect, that in a Christian City, (that is to say, in a City whose
Soveraignty belongs to a Christian Prince, or Councell) all Power, as
well spiritual, as secular, is united under Christ; and therefore it is
to be obey'd in all things. But on the other side, because we must
rather obey God than Men, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may
safely be yeelded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded
by them to be done which CHRIST hath prohibited. The reason of this
difficulty is, that seeing God no longer speakes to us by CHRIST, and
his Prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by divers
men are diversly understood, they know indeed what Princes, and a
congregated Church doe command; but whether that which they doe command
be contrary to the word of God, or not, this they know not, but with a
wavering obedience between the punishments of temporall, and spirituall
death, as it were sailing betweene Scilla and Carybdis, they often run
themselves upon both. But they who rightly distinguish betweene the
things necessary to Salvation, and those which are not necessary, can
have none of this kind of doubt. For if the command of the Prince, or
City be such, that he can obey it without hazard of his aeternall
Salvation, it is unjust not to obey them, and the Apostles praecepts
take place: Servants in all things obey your Masters according to the
flesh. Children obey your Parents in all things. Col. 3. v. 20, 22. And
the command of CHRIST, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses chair,
all things therefore whatsoever they command you, that observe, and doe.
Mat. 23. v. 2. On the contrary, if they command us to doe those things
which are punisht with aeternall death, it were madnesse not rather to
chuse to dye a naturall death, than by obeying, to dye eternally; and
then comes in that which CHRIST sayes, Feare not them who kill the body,
but cannot kill the Soule. Mat. 10. v. 28. We must see therefore what
all those things are, which are necessary to Salvation.

II. Now all things necessary to Salvation are comprehended in two
vertues, Faith, and Obedience. The latter of these if it could be
perfect would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but because
we have all of us beene long since guilty of disobedience against God in
Adam, and besides we our selves have since actually sinned, Obedience is
not sufficient without remission of sinnes. But this, together with our
entrance into the Kingdome of Heaven is the reward of Faith. Nothing
else is requisite to Salvation; for the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to
none but sinners, that is to say, those who have not perform'd due
Obedience to the Lawes; and not to those neither, if they beleeve the
necessary articles of the Christian Faith. Now, if we shall know in what
points Obedience doth consist, and which are the necessary articles of
the Christian Faith, it will at once be manifest what we must doe, and
what abstaine from, at the commands of Cities, and of Princes.

III. But by Obedience in this place is signified not the fact, but the
Will and desire wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much as we can to
obey for the future: in which sense the word Obedience is aequivalent to
Repentance. For the vertue of repentance consists not in the sorrow
which accompanies the remembrance of sinne; but in our conversion to the
way, and full purpose to sinne no more, without which that sorrow is
said to be the sorrow not of a Penitent but a desperate person. But
because they who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine Law, and
they who love their Neighbours cannot but desire to obey the morall Law,
which consists as hath beene shewed above in the 3. Chapter, in the
prohibition of Pride, ingratitude, contumely, inhumanity, cruelty,
injury, and the like offences, whereby our Neighbours are prejudic't,
therefore also Love or charity are aequivalent to Obedience. Justice
also (which is a constant will of giving to every man his due) is
aequivalent with it. But that Faith and Repentance are sufficient for
Salvation, is manifest by the Covenant it selfe of Baptisme; for they
who were by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding him what
they should do? He answered, Repent, and be Baptiz'd every one of you in
the name of Jesus for the remission of your Sins. Act. 2. v. 38. There
was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of Baptisme, that is
to say, for to enter into the Kingdome of God, but to Repent, and
beleeve in the Name of JESUS. For the Kingdome of Heaven is promis'd by
the Covenant which is made in Baptisme; farthermore, by the words of
CHRIST answering the Lawyer who askt him what he should doe to inherit
eternall life, Thou knowest the Commandements, Thou shalt not Kill, Thou
shalt not commit Adultery, &c. which refer to Obedience; and, Sell all
that thou hast, and come, and follow me, which relates to faith, Luke
18. ver. 20. Mar. 10. ver. 18. And by that which is said, The just shall
live by Faith, (not every man, but the just) for justice is the same
disposition of Will which Repentance and Obedience are; And by the words
of Saint Mark, The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdome of God is at
hand, Repent yee, and beleeve the Gospell, by which words is not
obscurely signified that there is no need of other Vertues, for our
entrance into the Kingdome of God, excepting those of Repentance and
Faith. The Obedience therefore which is necessarily requir'd to
Salvation is nothing else but the Will, or endeavour to obey, that is to
say, of doing according to the Lawes of God, that is the morall Lawes,
which are the same to all men; and the civill Lawes, that is to say, the
commands of Soveraignes in temporall matters, and the Ecclesiasticall
Lawes in spirituall; which two kinds of Lawes are divers in divers
Cities, and Churches, and are knowne by their promulgation, and publique
sentences.

IV. That we may understand what the Christian Faith is, we must define
Faith in generall, and distinguish it from those other acts of the minde
wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object of Faith universally
taken, namely for that which is beleev'd, is evermore a proposition,
(that is to say a speech affirmative, or negative) which we grant to be
true. But because Propositions are granted for divers causes, it falls
out, that these kind of concessions are diversly called: But we grant
Propositions sometimes which notwithstanding we receive not into our
mindes; and this either for a time, to wit, so long, till by
consideration of the consequencies, we have well examin'd the truth of
them, which we call supposing; or also simply, as through feare of the
Lawes, which is to professe, or confesse by outward tokens; or for a
voluntary compliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom
they respect, and for love of Peace to others, which is absolute
yeelding. Now the Propositions which we receive for truth, we alwaies
grant for some reasons of our owne, and these are deriv'd either from
the Proposition it selfe, or from the Person propounding. They are
deriv'd from the Proposition it selfe, by calling to minde what things
those words which make up the Proposition doe by common consent usually
signifie: if so, then the assent which we give is called knowledge, or
Science. But if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those
words, but sometimes one thing, sometimes another seeme to be
apprehended by us, then we are said to thinke. For example, if it be
propounded that two and three makes five; and by calling to minde the
order of those numerall words, that it is so appointed by the common
consent of them who are of the same language with us, (as it were by a
certaine contract necessary for humane society) that five shall be the
name of so many unities as are contain'd in two and three taken
together, a man assents, that this is therefore true because two and
three together, are the same with five. This assent shall be called
knowledge, and to know this truth is nothing else but to acknowledge
that it is made by our selves; For by whose will and rules of speaking
the number || is called two, ||| is called three, &c. ||||| is called
five, by their will also it comes to passe, that this Proposition is
true, Two and three taken together makes five. In like manner if we
remember what it is that is called theft, and what injury, we shall
understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that theft is an
injury, or not. Truth is the same with a true Proposition; but the
Proposition is true in which the word consequent, which by Logicians is
called the praedicate, embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude,
which they call the Subject; and to know truth is the same thing as to
remember that it was made by our selves in the common use of words.
Neither was it rashly, or unadvisedly said by Plato of old, that
knowledge was memory. But it happens sometimes that words although they
have a certaine, and defin'd signification by constitution, yet by
vulgar use either to adorne, or deceive, they are so wrested from their
owne significations, that to remember the conceptions for which they
were first impos'd on things is very hard, and not to be maistered but
by a sharpe judgement, and very great diligence. It happens too, that
there are many words which have no proper, determin'd, and every where
the same signification; and are understood not by their owne, but by
vertue of other signes us'd together with them. Thirdly, there are some
words of things unconceivable; of those things therefore whereof they
are the words, there is no conception; and therefore in vaine doe we
seeke for the truth of those Propositions, which they make out of the
words themselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions
of words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the
hope we have of finding it, we thinke it sometimes true, and sometimes
false; either of which apart is called thinking, and also beleeving;
both together, doubting. But when our reasons for which we assent to
some Proposition, derive not from the Proposition it selfe, but from the
Person Propounding, whom we esteeme so learned that he is not deceiv'd,
and we see no reason why he should deceive us; our assent, because it
growes not from any confidence of our owne, but from another mans
knowledge, is called Faith: And by the confidence of whom, we doe
beleeve, we are said to trust them, or to trust in them. By what hath
been said, the difference appeares first betweene Faith, and Profession;
for that is alwaies joyn'd with inward assent, this not alwayes; That is
an inward perswasion of the minde, this an outward obedience. Next,
betweene Faith, and Opinion; for this depends on our owne reason, that
on the good esteeme we have of another. Lastly betweene Faith and
Knowledge; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken, and chewed;
that swallowes downe whole and entire. The explication of words, whereby
the matter enquir'd after is propounded, is conducible to knowledge;
nay, the onely way to know, is by definition. But this is prejudiciall
to Faith; for those things which exceede humane capacity, and are
propounded to be beleev'd, are never more evident by explication, but on
the contrary more obscure, and harder to be credited. And the same thing
befalls a man who endeavours to demonstrate the mysteries of Faith by
naturall reason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before
he will swallow his wholsome, but bitter Pills; whence it comes to
passe, that he presently brings them up againe, which perhaps would
otherwise, if he had taken them well downe, have prov'd his remedy.

V. We have seene therefore what it is to beleeve. But what is it to
beleeve in CHRIST? Or what Proposition is that which is the object of
our Faith in CHRIST? For when we say, I beleeve in CHRIST, we signifie
indeed Whom, but not What we beleeve. Now, to beleeve in CHRIST is
nothing else but to beleeve that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, namely Hee, who
according to the Prophesies of Moyses, and the Prophets of Israel, was
to come into this world to institute the Kingdome of God. And this
sufficiently appeares out of the words of CHRIST himselfe to Martha: I
am (saith he) the Resurrection and the life, HE THAT BELEEVETH IN ME,
though he were dead, yet he shall live, and WHOSOEVER LIVETH, AND
BELEEVETH IN ME, shall never dye. Beleevest thou this? She saith unto
him, Yea Lord, I beleeve that THOU ART THE CHRIST the Son of God, which
should come into the world. John 11. ver. 25, 26, 27. In which words we
see that the question BELEEVEST THOU IN ME? is expounded by the answer,
THOU ART THE CHRIST. To beleeve in CHRIST therefore is nothing else but
to beleeve JESUS HIMSELFE saying that he is THE CHRIST.

VI. Faith and Obedience both necessarily concurring to Salvation, what
kinde of Obedience that same is, and to whom due, hath beene shewed
above in the 3. Article. But now we must enquire what articles of Faith
are requisite: And I say, that to a Christian [1] there is no other
article of Faith requisite as necessary to Salvation, but only this,
THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST. But we must distinguish (as we have already
done before in the 4. Article) betweene Faith, and Profession. A
Profession therefore of more articles (if they be commanded) may be
necessary; for it is a part of our obedience due to the Lawes; but we
enquire not now what Obedience, but what Faith is necessary to
salvation. And this is prov'd first out of the scope of the Evangelists
which was by the description of our Saviours life to establish this one
Article. And we shall know that such was the scope, and counsell of the
Evangelists, if we observe but the History it selfe. Saint Matthew
beginning at his Genealogy shewes that JESUS was of the linage of David,
borne of a Virgin, Chap. 1. that He was adored by the Wise men as King
of the Jewes; that Herod for the same cause sought to slay him, Chap. 2.
That his Kingdome was Preacht both by john the Baptist, and Himselfe,
Chap. 3, 4. That He taught the Lawes, not as the Scribes, but as one
having authority, Chap. 5, 6, 7. That he cur'd diseases miraculously,
Chap. 8, 9. That He sent his Apostles the Preachers of his Kingdome
throughout all the parts of judea, to proclame his Kingdome, Chap. 10.
That He commanded the Messengers sent from john to enquire whether he
were the CHRIST or not, to tell him what they had seene, namely the
miracles which were onely competible with CHRIST, Chap. 11. That he
prov'd and declar'd his Kingdome to the Pharisees, and others by
arguments, parables and signes, Chap: 12. and the following Chapters to
the 21. That He maintain'd himselfe to be the Christ against the
Pharisees, That He was saluted with the title of King, when he entred
into Jerusalem, Chap. 21. That he forewarn'd others of false Christs,
and That He shewed in Parables what manner of Kingdome his should be,
Chap. 22, 23, 24, 25. That He was taken, and accused for this reason,
because He said He was a King; and that a Title was written on his
Crosse, THIS IS JESUS, THE KING OF THE JEWES, Chap. 26, 27. Lastly, that
after his resurrection, He told his Apostles that all power was given
unto Him both in Heaven, and in Earth, Chap. 28. All which tends to this
end, That we should beleeve Jesus to be the Christ. Such therefore was
the Scope of Saint Matthew in describing his Gospell; but such as his
was, such also was the rest of the Evangelists; which Saint John sets
down expresly in the end of his Gospel, These things (saith He) are
written, that ye may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Sonne of the
living God. John 20. vers. 31.

VII. Secondly, this is proved by the preaching of the Apostles. For they
were the Proclamers of his Kingdome, neither did Christ send them to
preach ought but the Kingdome of God, Luke 9. vers. 2. Act. 15. vers. 6.
And what they did after Christ his Ascension may be understood by the
accusation which was brought against them, They drew Jason (saith Saint
Luke) and certain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These
are the men that have turned the world upside down, and are come hither
also, whom Jason hath received; and these all do contrary to the decrees
of Caesar, saying that there is another King, one Jesus. Acts 17. vers.
6, 7. It appears also what the subject of the Apostles Sermons was, out
of these words: Opening, and alleadging out of the Scriptures (to wit,
of the old Testament) that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen
again from the dead, and that THIS JESUS IS THE CHRIST. Acts 17. vers.
2, 3.

VIII. Thirdly, By the places in which the easinesse of those things
which are required by Christ to the attaining of salvation, is declared.
For if an internall assent of the minde were necessarily required to the
truth of all and each Proposition which this day is controverted about
the Christian Faith, or by divers Churches is diversly defined, there
would be nothing more difficult than the Christian Religion. And how
then would that be true, My yoke is easie, and my burthen light? Mat.
11. vers. 30. and that litle ones doe beleeve in Him? Mat. 18. vers. 6.
and that it pleased God by the foolishnesse of Preaching, to save those
that beleeve? 1 Cor. 1. vers. 21. or how was the thiefe hanging on the
Crosse sufficiently instructed to salvation, the confession of whose
Faith was contained in these words, Lord remember me when thou comest
into thy Kingdome; or how could Saint Paul himselfe, from an enemy, so
soon become a Doctor of Christians?

IX. Fourthly, by this, that that Article is the foundation of Faith,
neither rests it on any other foundation. If any man shall say unto you,
Loe here is Christ, or He is there, beleeve it not, for there shall
arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes,
and wonders, &c. Mat. 24. vers. 23. Whence it followes, that for the
Faiths sake which we have in this Article, we must not beleeve any
signes, and wonders. Although we, or an Angell from Heaven (saith the
Apostle) should preach to you any other Gospel, than what we have
preacht, let him be accursed. Gal. 1:8. By reason of this Article
therefore we might not trust the very Apostles, and Angels themselves
(and therefore I conceive not the Church neither) if they should teach
the contrary. Beloved, beleeve not every spirit, but try the spirits
whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into
the world, hereby know yee the spirit of God, every spirit that
confesseth Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God, &c. 1 John 4.
vers. 1, 2. That Article therefore is the measure of the Spirits whereby
the authority of the Doctors, is either received, or rejected. It cannot
be denied indeed, but that all who at this day are Christians, did learn
from the Doctors, that it was Jesus who did all those things whereby he
might be acknowledged to be the Christ; yet it followes not that the
same Persons beleeved that Article for the Doctors, or the Churches, but
for Jesus his own sake. For that Article was before the Christian
Church, although all the rest were after it, and the Church was founded
upon it, not it upon the Church. Mat. 16. vers. 18. Besides, this
Article, that Jesus is the Christ, is so fundamentall, that all the rest
are by Saint Paul said to be built upon it, For other foundation can no
man lay, than that which is layd, which is Jesus Christ (that is to say,
that Jesus is the Christ). Now if any man build upon this foundation,
gold, silver, precious stone, wood, hay, stubble; every mans work shall
be made manifest: If any mans work abide which he hath built thereupon,
he shall receive a reward; if any mans work shall be burnt, he shall
suffer losse, but he himselfe shall be saved. 1 Cor. 3. vers. 11, 12,
13. &c. From whence it plainly appears, that by foundation is understood
this Article, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST. For gold, and silver, precious
stones, wood, hay, stubble (whereby the Doctrines are signified) are not
built upon the Person of Christ; and also, that false Doctrines may be
raised upon this foundation, vet not so, as they must necessarily be
damned who teach them.

X. Lastly, that this Article alone is needfull to be inwardly beleeved,
may be most evidently proved out of many places of holy Scriptures, let
who will be the Interpreter: Search the Scriptures, for in them yee
think yee have eternall life; and they are they which testify of me.
John 5:39. But Christ meant the Scriptures of the old Testament only:
for the new was then not yet written. Now, there is no other testimony
concerning Christ in the old Testament, but that an eternall King was to
come in such a place, that He was to be born of such Parents, that He
was to teach, and doe such things; whereby, as by certain signes, he was
to be knowne: All which testify this one thing, that JESUS who was so
born, and did teach, and doe such things, was THE CHRIST. Other Faith
then was not required to attain eternall life, besides this Article.
Whosoever liveth and beleeveth in me, shall never dye. John 11. vers.
25. But to beleeve in Jesus (as is there exprest) is the same with
beleeving that JESUS WAS THE CHRIST. He therefore that beleeves that,
shall never dye, and by consequence, that Article alone is necessary to
salvation. These are written that yee might beleeve that JESUS IS THE
CHRIST the Sonne of God, and that beleeving yee might have life through
his name. Jo. 20. vers. 31. Wherefore he that beleeves thus, shall have
eternall life, and therefore needs no other Faith. Every spirit that
confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. 1 Jo. 4.
v. 2. And, Whosoever beleeveth that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, is born of God.
1 Jo. 5. vers. 1. And, Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that
beleeveth that JESUS is the Son of God? 1 Jo. 5. v. 5. If therefore
there be no need to beleeve any thing else, to the end a man may be of
God, born of God, and overcome the world, than that JESUS IS THE CHRIST.
that one Article then is sufficient to salvation. See, here is water,
what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou beleevest
with all thine heart, thou maist. And he answered and said, I beleeve
that JESUS CHRIST is the Sonne of God. Acts 8. vers. 36, 37. If then
this Article being beleeved with the whole heart, (that is to say, with
inward Faith) was sufficient for Baptisme, it is also sufficient for
salvation. Besides these places there are innumerable others which doe
clearly, and expresly affirm the same thing. Nay, wheresoever wee read
that our Saviour commended the Faith of any one, or that he said, Thy
Faith hath saved thee, or that he healed any one for his Faiths sake,
there the Proposition beleeved was no other but this, JESUS IS THE
CHRIST, either directly, or consequently.

XI. But because no man can beleeve JESUS TO BE THE CHRIST, who, when he
knowes that by Christ is understood that same King who was promised from
God by Moyses, and the Prophets, for to be the King, and Saviour of the
world, doth not also beleeve Moyses, and the Prophets, neither can he
beleeve these, who beleeves not that God is, and that he governs the
world; it is necessary that the Faith of God, and of the old Testament
be contained in this Faith of the new. Seeing therefore that Atheisme,
and the deniall of the Divine Providence, were the only treason against
the Divine Majesty in the Kingdome of God by Nature; but Idolatry also
in the Kingdome of God by the Old Covenant; now in this Kingdome wherein
God rules by way of a new Covenant, apostasie is also added, or the
renunciation of this article once receiv'd, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST.
Truly other Doctrines, provided they have their determination from a
lawfull Church, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sinne of
disobedience; but it hath been fully declar'd before that they are not
needfull to be beleev'd with an inward Faith.

XII. Faith and Obedience have divers parts in accomplishing the
salvation of a Christian; for this contributes the power, or capacity;
that the Act. And either is said to justifie in its kinde. For Christ
forgives not the sins of all men, but of the Penitent, or the Obedient,
that is to say the just, I say not the guiltlesse, but the just; for
justice is a Will of obeying the Lawes, and may be consistent with a
sinner, and with Christ the Will to obey is Obedience; for not every
man, but the just shall live by Faith. Obedience therefore justifies
because it maketh just in the same manner as temperance maketh
temperate, Prudence Prudent, Chastity chaste, namely essentially; and
puts a man in such a state, as makes him capable of pardon. Againe,
Christ hath not promis'd forgivenesse of sinnes to all just men, but
only those of them who beleeve Him to be the Christ. Faith therefore
justifies in such a sense as a judge may be said to justifie who
absolves; namely by the sentence which actually saves a man. And in this
acception of justification (for it is an aequivocall terme) Faith alone
justifies, but in the other, Obedience onely: but neither Obedience
alone nor Faith alone doe save us, but both together.

XIII. By what hath been said hitherto, it will be easy to discerne what
the duty of Christian Subjects is towards their Soveraignes, who as long
as they professe themselves Christians cannot command their Subjects to
deny Christ, or to offer him any contumely; for if they should command
this, they would professe themselves to be no Christians. For seeing we
have shewed both by naturall reason, and out of holy Scriptures, that
Subjects ought in all things to obey their Princes and Governours,
excepting those which are contrary to the command of God; and that the
commands of God in a Christian City concerning temporall affairs, (that
is to say, those which are to be discust by humane reason) are the Lawes
and sentence of the City deliver'd from those who have receiv'd
authority from the City to make Laws, and judge of controversies; but
concerning spirituall matters; (that is to, say those which are to be
defin'd by the holy Scripture) are the Lawes, and sentences of the City,
that is to say the Church (for a Christian City, and a Church, as hath
beene shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 20. Art. are the same
thing) deliv'rd by Pastors lawfully ordain'd, and who have to that end
authority given them by the City; it manifestly followes, that in a
Christian Common weale, Obedience is due to the Soveraign in all things,
as well Spirituall, as Temporall. And that the same obedience even from
a Christian subject is due in all temporall matters to those Princes who
are no Christians, is without any controversie; but in matters
spirituall, that is to say, those things which concern Gods worship,
some christian Church is to be followed. For it is an hypothesis of the
Christian Faith, that God speaks not in things supernaturall, but by the
way of Christian Interpreters of holy Scriptures. But what? Must we
resist Princes when we cannot obey them? Truly no; for this is contrary
to our civill Covenant. What must we doe then? Goe to Christ by
Martyrdome. Which if it seem to any man to be an hard saying, most
certain it is that he beleeves not with his whole heart THAT JESUS IS
THE CHRIST the Sonne of the living God, (for he would then desire to be
dissolved, and to be with Christ) but he would by a feigned Christian
Faith elude that obedience which he hath contracted to yeeld up unto the
City.

XIV. But some men perhaps will wonder, if, (excepting this one Article,
that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, which only is necessary to salvation in
relation to internall faith) all the rest belong to obedience, which may
be performed, although a man doe not inwardly beleeve, (so he doe but
desire to beleeve, and make an outward profession, as oft as need
requires, of whatsoever is propounded by the Church); how it comes about
that there are so many Tenets which are all held so to concern our
Faith, that except a man doe inwardly beleeve them, He cannot enter into
the Kingdome of Heaven. But if he consider that in most controversies
the contention is about humane Soveraignty; in some, matter of gain, and
profit; in others, the glory of Wits; he will surely wonder the lesse.
The question about the propriety of the Church, is a question about the
Right of Soveraignty; for, it being known what a Church is, it is known
at once to whom the Rule over Christians doth belong. For if every
Christian City be that Church which Christ himselfe hath commanded every
Christian subject to that city, to hear, then every subject is bound to
obey his City, that is to say, Him, or them who have the supreme power,
not only in temporall but also in spirituall matters. But if every
Christian City be not that Church, then is there some other Church more
universall, which must be obeyed. All Christians therefore must obey
that Church just as they would obey Christ if He came upon Earth. She
will therfore rule either by the way of Monarchy, or by some Assembly:
This question then concerns the Right of ruling. To the same end belongs
the question concerning infallibility; for whosoever were truly, and
internally beleeved by all mankinde, that he could not erre, would be
sure of all Dominion, as well temporall as spirituall, over all
mankinde, unlesse himselfe would refuse it; for if he say that he must
be obeyed in temporalls, because it is supposed he cannot erre, that
Right of Dominion is immediately granted him. Hither also tends the
priviledge of interpreting Scriptures. For he to whom it belongs to
interpret the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of
Scriptures, hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine all
manner of controversies whatsoever. But he who hath this, hath also the
command over all men who acknowledge the Scriptures to be the Word of
God. To this end drive all the disputes about the Power of remitting,
and retaining sinnes; or the authority of excommunication. For every
man, if he be in his wits, will in all things yeeld that man an absolute
obedience, by vertue of whose sentence he beleeves himselfe to be either
saved, or damned. Hither also tends the power of instituting societies;
for they depend on him by whom they subsist, who hath as many subjects
as Monks, although living in an Enemies City. To this end also refers
the question concerning the Judge of lawfull Matrimony; for he to whom
that judicature belongs, to him also pertains the knowledge of all those
cases which concern the inheritance, and succession to all the goods,
and Rights, not of private men onely, but also of Soveraign Princes. And
hither also in some respect tends the Virgin-life of Ecclesiasticall
Persons; for unmarried men have lesse coherence than others with civill
society: and besides, it is an inconvenience not to be slighted, that
Princes must either necessarily forgoe the Priesthood (which is a great
bond of civill obedience) or have no hereditary Kingdome. To this end
also tends the canonization of Saints which the Heathen called
Apotheosis; for he that can allure forraign subjects with so great a
reward, may bring those who are greedy of such glory to dare, and doe
any thing. For what was it but an honourable Name with posterity which
the Decii and other Romans sought after, and a thousand others who cast
themselves upon incredible perils? The controversies about Purgatory,
and indulgencies, are matter of gain. The questions of Free-will,
Justification, and the manner of receiving Christ in the Sacrament, are
Philosophicall. There are also questions concerning some Rites not
introduced, but left in the Church not sufficiently purged from
gentilisme; but we need reckon no more. All the world knows that such is
the nature of men, that dissenting in questions which concern their
Power, or profit, or preeminence of Wit, they slander, and curse each
other. It is not therefore to be wondred at, if almost all tenets (after
men grew hot with disputings) are held forth by some or other to be
necessary to salvation, and for our entrance into the Kingdome of
Heaven; insomuch as they who hold them not, are not only condemned as
guilty of disobedience (which in truth they are after the Church hath
once defined them) but of Infidelity, which I have declared above to be
wrong out of many evident places of Scripture; to which I adde this one
of Saint Pauls, Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not;
and let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth; for God hath
received him. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth
every day alike. Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind, Rom.
14. v. 3, 5.

____________

1. I say, that to a Christian. Although I conceive this assertion to be
sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought it worth my
labour to make a more ample explication of it, because I perceive that
being somewhat new, it may possibly be distastfull to many Divines.
First therefore when I say this Article, That Jesus is the Christ, is
necessary to salvation; I say not that Faith onely is necessary, but I
require justice also, or that Obedience which is due to the Lawes of
God, that is to say, a Will to live righteously. Secondly, I deny not
but the profession of many Articles, (provided that that profession be
commanded by the Church) is also necessary to salvation; but seeing
Faith is internall, Profession externall, I say that the former onely is
properly Faith; the latter a part of Obedience; insomuch as that Article
alone sufficeth for inward beleefe, but is not sufficient for the
outward profession of a Christian. Lastly, even as if I had said that
true and inward Repentance of sinnes was onely necessary to salvation,
yet were it not to be held for a Paradox, because we suppose justice,
Obedience, and a mind reformed in all manner of vertues to be contained
in it: so when I say that the Faith of one Article is sufficient to
salvation, it may well be lesse wondred at, seeing that in it so many
other Articles are contained. For these words, Jesus is the Christ, do
signifie that Jesus was that Person whom God had promised by his
Prophets should come into the world to establish his Kingdom, that is to
say, that Jesus is the Sonne of God, the Creatour of Heaven and Earth,
born of a Virgin, dying for the sinnes of them who should beleeve in
Him; that Hee was Christ, that is to say a King; that He reviv'd (for
else He were not like to reign) to judge the world, and to reward every
one according to his works, for otherwise he cannot be a King; also that
men shall rise again, for otherwise they are not like to come to
judgement. The whole Symbol of the Apostles is therefore contained in
this one Article; which notwithstanding I thought reasonable to contract
thus, because I found that many men for this alone, without the rest,
were admitted into the Kingdome of God, both by Christ, and his
Apostles; as the Thief on the Crosse, the Eunuch baptized by Philip, the
two thousand men converted to the Church at once by Saint Peter. But if
any man be displeased that I doe not judge all those eternally damned,
who doe not inwardly assent to every Article defined by the Church (and
yet doe not contradict, but if they be commanded, doe submit) I know not
what I shall say to them; for the most evident Testimonies of Holy Writ
which doe follow, doe withhold me from altering my opinion.

END
