DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 1787
By James Madison

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PREFACE TO DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION [1]

A Sketch Never Finished nor Applied [2]

As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an association of
individuals, under a common authority whereby each may have the
protection of the whole against danger from without, and enjoy in
safety within, the advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange of
the necessaries & comforts of life: in like manner feeble communities,
independent of each other, have resorted to a Union, less intimate, but
with common Councils, for the common safety agst powerful neighbors, and
for the preservation of justice and peace among themselves. Ancient
history furnishes examples of these confederal [3] associations, tho'
with a very imperfect account, of their structure, and of the attributes
and functions of the presiding Authority. There are examples of modern
date also, some of them still existing, the modifications and
transactions of which are sufficiently known.

It remained for the British Colonies, now United States, of North
America, to add to those examples, one of a more interesting character
than any of them: which led to a system without a [4] example ancient or
modern, a system founded on popular rights, and so combing, a federal
form with the forms of individual Republics, as may enable each to
supply the defects of the other and obtain the advantages of both. [5]

Whilst the Colonies enjoyed the protection of the parent Country as it
was called, against foreign danger; and were secured by its
superintending controul, against conflicts among themselves, they
continued independent of each other, under a common, tho' limited
dependence, on the parental Authority. When however the growth of the
offspring in strength and in wealth, awakened the jealousy and tempted
the avidity of the parent, into schemes of usurpation & exaction, the
obligation was felt by the former of uniting their counsels and efforts
to avert the impending calamity.

As early as the year 1754, indications having been given of a design in
the British Government to levy contributions on the Colonies, without
their consent; a meeting of Colonial deputies took place at Albany,
which attempted to introduce a compromising substitute, that might at
once satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own rights from
violation. The attempt had no other effect, than by bringing these
rights into a more conspicuous view, to invigorate the attachment to
them, on [6] one side; and to nourish the haughty & encroaching spirit
on the other.

In 1774. The progress made by G. B. in the open assertion of her
pretensions and in [7] the apprehended purpose of otherwise maintaining
them than by Legislative enactments and declarations, had been such that
the Colonies did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies, in a
formal Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations
whatever measures might be found best adapted to the occasion; without
however losing sight of an eventual reconciliation.

The dissuasive measures of that Congress, being without effect, another
Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific efforts to bring about a change
in the views of the other party, being equally unavailing, and the
commencement of actual hostilities having at length put an end to all
hope of reconciliation; the Congress finding moreover that the popular
voice began to call for an entire & perpetual dissolution of the
political ties which had connected them with G. B., proceeded on the
memorable 4th of July, 1776 to declare the 13 Colonies, Independent
States. [8]

During the discussions of this solemn Act, a Committee consisting of a
member from each colony had been appointed to prepare & digest a form of
Confederation, for the future management of the common interests, which
had hitherto been left to the discretion of Congress, guided by the
exigences of the contest, and by the known intentions or occasional
instructions of the Colonial Legislatures.

It appears that as early as the 21st of July 1775, A plan entitled
"Articles of Confederation & perpetual Union of the Colonies" had been
sketched by Docr Franklin, the plan being on that day submitted by him
to Congress; and tho' not copied into their Journals remaining on their
files in his handwriting. But notwithstanding the term "perpetual"
observed in the title, the articles provided expressly for the event of
a return of the Colonies to a connection with G. Britain.

This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the Come on the 12
of July, now also remaining on the files of Congress, in the handwriting
of Mr Dickinson. The plan, tho' dated after the Declaration of
Independence, was probably drawn up before that event; since the name of
Colonies, not States is used throughout the draught. The plan reported,
was debated and amended from time to time, till the 17th of November
1777, when it was agreed to by Congress, and proposed to the
Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and recommendatory
letter. The ratifications of these by their Delegates in Congs duly
authorized took place at successive dates; but were not compleated till
March 1. [9] 1781, when Maryland who had made it a prerequisite that the
vacant lands acquired from the British Crown should be a Common fund,
yielded to the persuasion that a final & formal establishment of the
federal Union & Govt would make a favorable impression not only on other
foreign Nations, but on G. B. herself.

The great difficulty experienced in so framing the fedl system as to
obtain the unanimity required for its due sanction, may be inferred from
the long interval, and recurring discussions, between the commencement
and completion of the work; from the changes made during its progress;
from the language of Congs when proposing it to the States, wch dwelt on
the impracticability of devising a system acceptable to all of them;
from the reluctant assent given by some; and the various alterations
proposed by others; and by a tardiness in others again which produced a
special address to them from Congs enforcing the duty of sacrificing
local considerations and favorite opinions to to [68] the public safety,
and the necessary harmony: Nor was the assent of some of the States
finally yielded without strong protests against particular articles, and
a reliance on future amendments removing their objections.

It is to be recollected, no doubt, that these delays might be occasioned
in some degree, by an occupation of the public Councils both general &
local, with the deliberations and measures, essential to a Revolutionary
struggle; But there must have been a balance for these causes, in the
obvious motives to hasten the establishment of a regular and efficient
Govt; and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions and
pretensions, which might be inflexible in another state of things.

The principal difficulties which embarrassed the progress, and retarded
the completion of the plan of Confederation, may be traced to 1. [10]
the natural repugnance of the parties to a relinquishment of power: 2
[10] a natural jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own: 3
[10] the rule of suffrage among parties unequal in size, but equal in
sovereignty. 4 the ratio of contributions in money and in troops, among
parties, [11] whose inequality in size did not correspond with that of
their wealth, or of their military or free population. 5 [12] the
selection and definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal
head, and safe to the several members.

To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation of all such
Confederacies, were added two others one of a temporary, the other of a
permanent nature. The first was the case of the Crown lands, so called
because they had been held by the British Crown, and being ungranted to
individuals when its authority ceased, were considered by the States
within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, as devolving on them;
whilst it was contended by the others, that being wrested from the
dethroned authority, by the equal exertion of all, they resulted of
right and in equity to the benefit of all. The lands being of vast
extent and of growing value, were the occasion of much discussion &
heart-burning; & proved the most obstinate of the impediments to an
earlier consummation of the plan of federal Govt. The State of Maryland
the last that acceded to it held out as already noticed, till March 1,
[13] 1781, and then yielded only to the hope that by giving a stable &
authoritative character to the Confederation, a successful termination
of the Contest might be accelerated. The dispute was happily compromised
by successive surrenders of portions of the territory by the States
having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of them by Congress.

The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some
of the States, which having no convenient ports for foreign commerce,
were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, thro whose ports, their
commerce was carryed on. New Jersey, placed between Phila & N. York, was
likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and N. Carolina, between Virga &
S. Carolina to a patient bleeding at both arms. The Articles Of
Confederation provided no remedy for the complaint: which produced a
strong protest on the part of N. Jersey: and never ceased to be a source
of dissatisfaction & discord until the new Constitution, superseded the
old.

But the radical infirmity of the "arts Of Confederation" was the
dependence of Congs on the voluntary and simultaneous compliance with
its Requisitions, by so many independant Communities, each consulting
more or less its particular interests & convenience and distrusting the
compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions of Congs continued
to circulate they were employed as a sinew of war, like gold & silver.
When that ceased to be the case, the fatal defect of the political
System was felt in its alarming force. The war was merely kept alive and
brought to a successful conclusion by such foreign aids and temporary
expedients as could be applied; a hope prevailing with many, and a wish
with all, that a state of peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by
it, would give to the Confederacy in practice, the efficiency which had
been inferred from its theory.

The close of the war however brought no cure for the public
embarrassments. The States relieved from the pressure of foreign danger,
and flushed with the enjoyment of independent and sovereign power;
[instead of a diminished disposition to part with it,] persevered in
omissions and in measures incompatible with thier relations to the
Federal Govt and with those among themselves;

Having served as a member of Cons through the period between Mar. 1780 &
the arrival of peace in 1783, I had become intimately acquainted with
the public distresses and the causes of them. I had observed the
successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy by new grants
of power to Congs. I had found moreover that despair of success hung
over the compromising provision [14] of April 1783 for the public
necessities which had been so elaborately planned, and so impressively
recommended to the States.[*1] Sympathizing, under this aspect of
affairs, in the alarm of the friends of free Govt, at the threatened
danger of an abortive result to the great & perhaps last experiment in
its favour, I could not be insensible to the obligation to co-operate
[16] as far as I could in averting the calamity. With this view I
acceded to the desire of my fellow Citizens of the County that I should
be one of its representatives in the Legislature, hoping that I might
there best contribute to inculcate the critical posture to which the
Revolutionary cause was reduced, and the merit of a leading agency of
the State in bringing about a rescue of the Union and the blessings of
liberty a [17] staked on it, from an impending catastrophe.

It required but little time after taking my seat in the House of
Delegates in May 1784 to discover that, however favorable the general
disposition of the State might be towards the Confederacy the
Legislature retained the aversion of its predecessors to transfers of
power from the State to the Govt of the Union; notwithstanding the
urgent demands of the Federal Treasury; the glaring inadequacy of the
authorized mode of supplying it, the rapid growth of anarchy in the Fedl
System, and the animosity kindled among the States by their conflicting
regulations.

The temper of the Legislature & the wayward course of its proceedings
may be gathered from the Journals of its Sessions in the years 1784 &
1785.

The failure however of the varied propositions in the Legislature for
enlarging the powers of Congress, the continued failure of the efforts
of Cons to obtain from them the means of providing for the debts of
the Revolution; and of countervailing the commercial laws of G.B.,
a source of much irritation & agst which the separate efforts of the
States were found worse than abortive; these Considerations with the
lights thrown on the whole subject, by the free & full discussion it had
undergone led to an [18] general acquiescence in the Resoln passed, on the
21. of Jany 1786, which proposed & invited a meeting of Deputies from
all the States to "insert the Resol (See Journal.) I [19]

The resolution had been brought forward some weeks before on the failure
of a proposed grant of power to Congress to collect a revenue from
commerce, which had been abandoned by its friends in consequence of
material alterations made in the grant by a Committee of the whole. The
Resolution tho introduced by Mr Tyler an influencial member, who having
never served in Congress, had more the ear of the House than those whose
services there exposed them to an imputable bias, was so little
acceptable that it was not then persisted in. Being now revived by him,
on the last day of the Session, and being the alternative of adjourning
without any effort for the crisis in the affairs of the Union, it
obtained a general vote; less however with some of its friends from a
confidence in the success of the experiment than from a hope that it
might prove a step to a more comprehensive & adequate provision for the
wants of the Confederacy.

It happened also that Commissioners who had been [20] appointed by Virga
& Maryd to settle the jurisdiction on waters dividing the two States
had, apart from their official reports recommended a uniformity in the
regulations of the 2 States on several subjects & particularly on those
having relation to foreign trade. It apeared at the same time that Maryd
had deemed a concurrence of her neighbors Pena & Delaware indispensable
in such a case, who for like reasons would require that of their
neighbors. So apt and forceable an illustration of the necessity of a
uniformity throughout all the States could not but favour the passage of
a Resolution which proposed a Convention having that for its object.

The commissioners appointed by the Legisl: & who attended the Convention
were E. Randolph the Attorney of the State, St. Geo: Tucker & J. M. [21]
The designation of the time & place for its meeting to be proposed and
communicated to the States having been left to the Comrs they named for
the time early [22] September and for the place the City of Annapolis
avoiding the residence of Congs and large Commercial Cities as liable to
suspicions of an extraneous influence.

Altho the invited Meeting appeared to be generally favored, five States
only assembled; some failing to make appointments, and some of the
individuals appointed not hastening their attendance, the result in both
cases being ascribed mainly, to a belief that the time had not arrived
for such a political reform, as might be expected from a further
experience of its necessity.

But in the interval between the proposal of the Convention and the time
of its meeting, such had been the advance of public opinion in the
desired direction, stimulated as it had been by the effect of the
contemplated object, of the meeting, in turning the genal attention to
the Critical State of things, and in calling forth the sentiments and
exertions of the most enlightened & influencial patriots, that the
Convention thin as it was did not scruple to decline the limited task
assigned to it and to recommend to the States a Convention with powers
adequate to the occasion. Nor was it [23] unnoticed that the commission
of the N. Jersey Deputation, had extended its object to a general
provision for the exigencies of the Union. A recommendation for this
enlarged purpose was accordingly reported by a Come to whom the subject
had been referred. It was drafted by Col H. [24] and finally agreed to
unanimously [25] in the following form. Insert it. [26]

The recommendation was well recd by the Legislature of Virga which
happened to be the first that acted on it, and the example of her
compliance was made as conciliatory and impressive as possible. The
Legislature were unanimous or very nearly so on the occasion and [27] as
a proof of the magnitude & solemnity attached to it, they placed Genl W.
at the head of the Deputation from the State; and as a proof of the deep
interest he felt in the case he overstepped the obstacles to his
acceptance of the appointment.

The law complying with the recommendation from Annapolis was in the
terms following: [28]

A resort to a General Convention to remodel the Confederacy, was not a
new idea. It had entered at an early date into the conversations and
speculations of the most reflecting & foreseeing observers of the
inadequacy of the powers allowed to Congress. In a pamphlet published in
May 81 at the seat of Congs Pelatiah Webster an able tho' not
conspicuous Citizen, after discussing the fiscal system of the U.
States, and suggesting among other remedial provisions [29] including a
national Bank remarks that "the Authority of Congs at present is very
inadequate to the performance of their duties; and this indicates the
necessity of their calling a Continental Convention for the express purpose
of ascertaining, defining, enlarging, and limiting, the duties & powers
of their Constitution," [30]

On the 1. day of Apl 1783, Col. Hamilton, in a debate in Congs observed
that [31]

He alluded probably to [see Life of Schuyler in Longacre. [32]

It does not appear however that his expectation had been fulfilled.]

In a letter to J. M. from R. H. Lee then President of Congs dated Novr
26, 1784 He says [33]

The answer of J. M. remarks [34]

[35] In 1785, Noah Webster whose pol. & other valuable writings had made
him known to the public, in one of his publications of American policy
brought into view the same resort for supplying the defects of the Fedl
System [see his life in Longacre].

The proposed & expected Convention at Annapolis the first of a general
character that appears to have been realized, & the state of the public
mind awakened by it had attracted the particular attention of Congs and
favored the idea there of a Convention with fuller powers for amending
the Confederacy. [36]

It does not appear that in any of these cases, the reformed system was
to be otherwise sanctioned than by the Legislative authy of the States;
nor whether or how far, a change was to be made in the structure of the
Depository of Federal powers.

The act of Virga providing for the Convention at Philada, was succeeded
by appointments from [37] other States as their Legislatures were
assembled, the appointments being selections from the most experienced &
highest standing Citizens. Rh. I. was the only exception to a compliance
with the recommendation from Annapolis, well known to have been swayed
by an obdurate adherence to an advantage which her position gave her of
taxing her neighbors thro' their consumption of imported supplies, an
advantage which it was foreseen would be taken from her by a revisal of
the "Articles of Confederation.

As the pub. mind had been ripened for a salutary Reform of the pol.
System, in the interval between the proposal & the meeting, of Comrs at
Annapolis, the interval between the last event, and the meeting of Deps
at Phila had continued to develop more & more the necessity & the extent
of a Systematic provision for the preservation and Govt of the Union;
among the ripening incidents was the Insurrection of Shays, [38] in
Massts against her Govt; which was with difficulty suppressed,
notwithstanding the influence on the insurgents of an apprehended
interposition of the Fedl troops.

At the date of the Convention, the aspect & retrospect of the pol:
condition of the U.S. could not but fill the pub. mind with a gloom
which was relieved only by a hope that so select a Body would devise an
adequate remedy for the existing and prospective evils so impressively
demanding it.

It was seen that the public debt rendered so sacred by the cause in
which it had been incurred remained without any provision for its
payment. The reiterated and elaborate efforts of Con. to procure from
the States a more adequate power to raise the means of payment had
failed. The effect of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only
displayed the inefficiency [39] of the authy making them: none of the
States having duly complied with them, some having failed altogether or
nearly so; and [40] in one instance, that of N. Jersey [41] a compliance
was expressly [42] refused; nor was more yielded to the expostulations
of members of Congs deputed to her Legislature, than a mere repeal of
the law, without a compliance. [see letter of Grayson to J. M. [43]

The want of authy in Congs to regulate Commerce had produced in Foreign
nations particularly G. B. a monopolizing policy injurious to the trade
of the U. S. and destructive to their navigation; the imbecilicity and
anticipated dissolution of the Confederacy extinguishg all apprehensions
of a Countervailing policy on the part of the U. States.

The same want of a general power over Commerce, led to an exercise of
the power separately, by the States, wch not only proved abortive, but
engendered rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Besides the vain
attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts, which turned
their commerce into the neighbouring ports, and to coerce a relaxation
of the British monopoly of the W. Inds navigation, which was attempted
by Virga [see the Journal of ] [44] the States having ports for foreign
commerce, taxed & irritated the adjoining States, trading thro' them, as
N. Y. Pena Virga & S. Carolina. Some of the States, as Connecticut,
taxed imports [45] as from Massts higher than imports even from G. B. of
wch Massts complained to Virga and doubtless to other States. [See
letter of J. M. [46] In sundry instances as of N. Y. N. J. Pa & Maryd
[see ] [47] the navigation laws treated the Citizens [48] other States
as aliens.

In certain cases the authy of the Confederacy was disregarded, as in
violations not only of the Treaty of peace; but of Treaties with France
& Holland, which were complained of to Congs.

In other cases the Fedl Authy was violated by Treaties & wars with
Indians, as by Geo: by troops raised & kept up witht the consent of
Congs as by Massts by compacts witht the consent of Congs as between
Pena and N. Jersey, and between Virga & Maryd. From the Legisl: Journals
of Virga it appears, that a vote refusing to apply for a sanction of
Congs was followed by a vote agst the communication of the Compact to
Congs.

In the internal administration of the States a violation of Contracts
had become familiar in the form of depreciated paper made a legal
tender, of property substituted for money, of Instalment laws, and of
the occlusions of the Courts of Justice; although evident that all such
interferences affected the rights of other States, relatively creditor,
[49] as well as Citizens Creditors within the State.

Among the defects which had been severely felt was that of a uniformity
in cases requiring it, as laws of naturalization, [50] bankruptcy, a
Coercive authority operating on individuals and a guaranty of the
internal tranquillity of the States.

As natural consequences [51] of this distracted and disheartening
condition of the union, the Fedl Authy had ceased to be respected
abroad, and dispositions [52] shown there, particularly in G. B., to
take advantage of its imbecility, and to speculate on its approaching
downfall; at home it had lost all confidence & credit; the unstable and
unjust career of the States had also forfeited the respect & confidence
essential to order and good Govt, involving the general decay and
confidence & credit between man & man. It was found moreover, that those
least partial to popular Govt, or most distrustful of its efficacy were
yielding to anticipations, that from an increase of the confusion a Govt
might result more congenial with their taste or their opinions; whilst
those most devoted to the principles and forms of Republics, were
alarmed for the cause of liberty itself, at stake in the American
Experiment, and anxious for a system that wd avoid the inefficacy of a
mere confederacy without passing into the opposite extreme of a
consolidated govt it was known that there were individuals who had
betrayed a bias toward Monarchy [see Knox to G W & him to Jay]
(Marshall's life [53]) and there had always been some not unfavorable to
a partition of the Union into several Confederacies; either from a
better chance of figuring on a Sectional Theatre, or that the Sections
would require stronger Govts, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a
monarchical consolidation. The idea of a [54] dismemberment had recently
made its appearance in the Newspapers.

Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the ominous
prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which
ought never to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the
Constitutional Charter the remedy that was provided.

As a sketch on paper, the earliest perhaps of a Constitutional Govt for
the Union [organized into the regular Departments with physical means
operating on individuals] to be sanctioned by the people of the States,
acting in their original & sovereign character, was contained in [55] a
letter of Apl. 8. 1787 from J. M. to Govr Randolph, a copy of the letter
is here inserted.

The feature in the letter [56] which vested in the general Authy. a
negative on the laws of the States, was suggested by the negative in the
head of the British Empire, which prevented collisions between the parts
& the whole, and between the parts themselves. It was supposed that the
substitution, of an elective and responsible authority for an hereditary
and irresponsible one, would avoid the appearance even of a departure
from the principle of [57] Republicanism. But altho' the subject was so
viewed in the Convention, and the votes on it were more than once
equally divided, it was finally & justly abandoned see note for ___ for
this erasure substitute the amendt marked * for this page [58] [as,
apart from other objections, it was not practicable among so many
states, increasing in number, and enacting, each of them, so many laws
instead of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left as finally
provided for in the Constitution.] [59]

On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Phila it occurred to them
that from the early and prominent part taken by that State in bringing
about the Convention some initiative step might be expected from them.
The Resolutions introduced by Governor Randolph were the result of a
Consultation on the subject; with an understanding that they left all
the Deputies entirely open to the lights of discussion, and free to
concur in any alterations or modifications which their reflections and
judgments might approve. The Resolutions as the Journals shew became the
basis on which the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and to the
developments, variations and modifications of which the plan of Govt
proposed by the Convention may be traced.

The curiosity I had felt during my researches into the History of the
most distinguished Confederacies, particularly those of antiquity, and
the deficiency I found in the means of satisfying it more especially in
what related to the process, the principles, the reasons, & the
anticipations, which prevailed in the formation of them, determined me
to preserve as far as I could an exact account of what might pass in the
Convention whilst executing its trust, with the magnitude of which I was
duly impressed, as I was with [60] the gratification promised to future
curiosity by an authentic exhibition of the objects, the opinions & the
reasonings from which the new System of Govt was to receive its peculiar
structure & organization. Nor was I unaware of the value of such a
contribution to the fund of of materials for the History of a
Constitution on which would be staked the happiness of a people great
even in its infancy, and possibly the cause of Liberty throught the
world.

In pursuance of the task I had assumed I chose a seat in front of the
presiding member, with the other members on my right & left hands. In
this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms
legible & in abbreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was read
from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a moment
unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of the Convention I
was enabled to write out my daily notes [see page 18 - [61] during the
session or within a few finishing days after its close - see pa. 18 [62]
in the extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files.

In the labour & correctness of doing [63] this, I was not a little aided
by practice & by a familiarity with the style and the train of
observation & reasoning which characterized the principal speakers. It
happened, also that I was not absent a single day, nor more than a
cassual fraction of an hour in any day, so that I could not have lost a
single speech, unless a very short one. Insert the Remark on the _____
slip of paper marked A. [64]

[It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few exceptions, the
speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the
speakers, but written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of my
recollections. A further remark may be proper, that views of the subject
might occasionally be presented in the speeches and proceedings, with a
latent reference to a compromise on some middle ground, by mutual
concessions. The exceptions alluded to were, -- first, the sketch
furnished by Mr. Randolph of his speech on the introduction of his
propositions, on the twenty-ninth day of May; secondly, the speech of
Mr. Hamilton, who happened to call on me when putting the last hand to
it, and who acknowledged its fidelity, without suggesting more than a
very few verbal alterations which were made; thirdly, the speech of
Gouverneur Morris on the second day of May, which was communicated to
him on a like occasion, and who acquiesced in it without even a verbal
change. The correctness of his language and the distinctness of his
enunciation were particularly favorable to a reporter. The speeches of
Doctor Franklin, excepting a few brief ones, were copied from the
written ones read to the Convention by his colleague, Mr. Wilson, it
being inconvenient to the Doctor to remain long on his feet.] [65]

Of the ability & intelligence of those who composed the Convention, the
debates & proceedings may be a test; as the character of the work which
was the offspring of their deliberations must be tested by the
experience of the future, added to that of the nearly half century which
has passed. [66]

But whatever may be the judgment pronounced on the competency of the
architects of the Constitution, or whatever may be the destiny, of the
edifice prepared by them, I feel it a duty to express my profound &
solemn conviction, derived from my intimate opportunity of observing &
appreciating the views of the Convention, collectively & individually,
that there never was an assembly of men, charged with a great & arduous
trust, who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or
anxiously [devoted to the object committed to them, than were the
members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object of devising and
proposing a constitutional system which would best supply the defects of
that which it was to replace, and best secure the permanent liberty and
happiness of their country.] [67]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

1. This Preface has been printed from Madison's original manuscript in
the Department of State. There is a transcript of the Preface in an
unknown hand in the Library of Congress which was sent to the printer
and from which Henry D. Gilpin printed The Papers of James Madison, 3
volumes (1840). The text of the Preface as here printed has been read
with the printer's copy thereof and important differences noted.

In the Preface, Madison referred in passing to documents which he
evidently intended to embody in a finished draft which, unfortunately,
he never completed. The matter referred to has been placed in footnotes
or reference has been made to other pages of the present document.

Footnotes bearing an asterisk before the numbers instead of just
numbers, to indicate their order, are Madison's own notes. The editor's
notes and indications of differences between the Madison manuscript and
the transcript of the Preface are not preceded by an asterisk.

2. These are the words which Madison wrote at the head of this document
after he had scratched out the phrase "Preface to Debates in the
Convention of 1787." It is a very rough and uneven draft, full of
insertions and deletions. The last few pages are in Mrs. Madison's hand,
having been written from her husband's dictation when his hands were
crippled with rheumatism. A few words in the draft were written by John
C. Payne (Mrs. Madison's brother) at Madison's direction. The date of
the draft was between 1830 and 1836.

3. The word "confederate" is substituted in the transcript for "confederal".

4. The word "an" is substituted in the transcript for "a".

5. In place of "the advantages of both" the transcript reads "that
advantage of both".

6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "in" is omitted in the transcript.

8. The words "Independent States" are italicized in the transcript.

9. The phrase "the first of March" is substituted in the transcript for
"March 1".

10. The figures 1, 2, and 3 are changed to "first," "secondly" and
"thirdly" in the transcript.

11. The phrase "unequal in size, but equal in sovereignty. 4 the ratio
of contributions in money and in troops, among parties" is erroneously
omitted in the transcript.

12. The figure 5 is changed to "fourthly" in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the date reads "the first of March, 1781".

14. The word "principle" is substituted for "provision" in the
transcript.

*1. See address of Congress. [15]

15. This footnote is omitted in the transcript.

16. The word "aid" is substituted in the transcript for "co-operate".

17. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.

18. The word "a" is substituted in the transcript for "an."

19. The phrase "to 'insert the Resol. (See Journal.) 1" is omitted in
the transcript which substitutes the words "as follows:" and inserts the
resolution which is printed in the Notes of June 1, 1787.

20. The phrase "who had been" is omitted in the transcript.

21. James Madison.

22. In place of the word "early" the transcript reads "the first Monday
in."

23. The words "had it been" are substituted in the transcript for the
words "was it."

24. Alexander Hamilton.

25. The word "unanimously" is omitted in the transcript.

26. Madison's direction "Insert it" is omitted in the transcript, and
there is inserted the text of the proceedings and recommendation of the
Annapolis Convention. The transcript text begins with the words "To the
Honorable", and concludes with the paragraph beginning "Through your
Commissioners", etc.

27. The word "and" is omitted in the transcript.

28. The text of this law of October 16, 1786 (printed ante pages 68-69)
is inserted in the transcript beginning with the words "Whereas, the
Commissioners", etc. and ending with the words " ... States in the
Union".

29. The word "one" is here inserted in the transcript.

30. Madison was in error. The pamphlet was written by William Barton.
See Gaillard Hunt, "Pelatiah Webster and the Constitution", in The
Nation, December 28, 1911.

31. The following is supplied in the transcript: "he wished instead of
them [partial Conventions] to see a general Convention take place; and
that he should soon, in pursuance of instructions, from his
constituents, propose to Congress a plan for that purpose, the object
[of which] would be to strengthen the Federal Constitution." -- See The
Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. I (1900), pp. 438, 439.

32. The phrase "[See Life of Schuyler in Longacre" is omitted in the
transcript and the following quoted matter is substituted: "the
resolutions introduced by General Schuyler in the Senate, and passed
unanimously by the Legislature of New York in the summer of 1782,
declaring, that the Confederation was defective, in not giving Congress
power to provide a revenue for itself, or in not investing them with
funds from established and productive sources; and that it would be
advisable for Congress to recommend to the States to call a general
Convention to revise and amend the Confederation."

The sketch is of Hamilton, not Schuyler, for which see The National
Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans, conducted by Longacre and
Herring, Vol. II (1835), p. 7.

33. The following sentence is supplied in the transcript: "It is by many
here suggested as very necessary step for Congress to take, the calling
on the States to form a Convention for the sole purpose of revising the
Confederation, so far as to enable Congress to execute with more energy,
effect and vigor the powers assigned to it, than it appears by
experience that they can do under the present state of things." The
letter referred to is among the Madison papers in the Manuscript
Division of the Library of Congress.

34. The transcript here inserts the following: "I hold it for a maxim,
that the Union of the States is essential to their safety against
foreign danger and internal contention and that the perpetuity and
efficacy of the present system cannot be confided in. The question,
therefore, is, in what mode, and at what moment, the experiment for
supplying the defects ought to be made." -- See, also, The Writings of
James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol II (1901), pp 99, 100.

35. The paragraph beginning "In 1785" reads as follows in the
transcript: "In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose political and
other valuable writings had made him known to the public, proposed, in
one of his publications, 'a new system of government which should act,
not on the States, but directly on individuals, and vest in Congress
full power to carry its laws into effect.'"

See, also, The National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans,
conducted by Longacre and Herring, Vol II (1835), p 4.

36. In the transcript after the word "Confederacy" the following
footnote is inserted: "The letters of Wm. Grayson, March 22nd, 1786, and
of James Monroe, of April 28th, 1786, both then members, to Mr. Madison,
state that a proposition for such a Convention has been made."

37. The word "the" is inserted in the transcript after "from".

38. The final "s" is crossed off the word "Shays" in the transcript.

39. The transcript substitutes the word "inefficacy" for the word
"inefficiency" but the Gilpin edition prints the word as in the original
notes.

40. In the transcript the word "and" is crossed out and the word "which"
written above it.

41. After the word "Jersey," reference is made in the transcript to the
following footnote: "A letter of Mr Grayson to Mr Madison of March 22d,
1786, relating the conduct of New Jersey states this fact. Editor."

43. The phrase "[see letter of Grayson to J. M." is omitted in the
transcript. An extract from the letter referred to reads as follows:
"The Antients were surely men of more candor than we are; they contended
openly for an abolition of debts in so many words, while we strive as
hard for the same thing under the decent & specious pretense of a
circulating medium.... There has been some serious thoughts in the minds
of some of the members of Congress to recommend to the States the
meeting of a general Convention, to consider, of an alteration of the
Confederation, & there is a motion to this effect now under
consideration it is contended that the present Confederation is utterly
inefficient, and that if it remains much longer in it's present state of
imbecility we shall be one of the most contemptible nations on the face
of the earth," -- Letter from William Grayson to James Madison, March
22, 1786. The Madison Papers (manuscript), Library of Congress.

44. In the transcript the footnote "See the Journal of her Legislature"
is substituted for the phrase in brackets. The allusion is to the act of
the Virginia Assembly passed January 21, 1786, imposing a tonnage tax
of 5s. on vessels of foreigners.

45. After the word "imports" down to the sentence beginning, "In sundry
instances," the transcript reads "from others, as from Mass., which
complained in a letter to the Executive of Virginia, and doubtless to
those of other States.

46. The facts are given in Madison's letter to Jefferson, January 22,
1786. The Writings of James Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. II (1901), p.
218.

47. Madison's direction "[see    ]" is omitted in the transcript.

48. The word "of" is inserted in the transcript after "Citizens".

49. The word "creditor" is plural in the transcript.

50. The word "and" is inserted in the transcript after "naturalization".

51. The words "a natural consequence" are substituted in the transcript
for "natural consequences".

52. The word "were" is inserted in the transcript after "dispositions".

53. The direction in Madison's notes is omitted in the transcript. His
reference was to The Life of George Washington, by John Marshall, Vol.
V (1807), pp. 91 et seq. For the text of the correspondence in question,
see Appendix to Debates, I, Nos. 1, 2, and 3, pp. 585-588.

54. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.

55. The phrase beginning with the words "a letter" down to the end of the
paragraph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: "the letters
of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the nineteenth of March; to
Governor Randolph of the eighth of April; and to General Washington of
the sixteenth of April, 1787, for which see these respective dates."

For the material portions of these letters see Appendix to Debates, II,
Nos. 1, 2, and 3, pp. 589-595.

56. The words "the letter" have been changed to "these letters" in the
transcript.

57. The words "the principle of" are omitted in the transcript.

58. The words "see note for    for this erasure substitute the amendt
marked * for this page" are omitted in the transcript.

59. The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript. The
original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin's edition.

60. The word "by" is substituted in the transcript for "with".

61. Madison's direction "[see page 18-" is omitted in the transcript.

62. Madison's direction "see pa. 18" is omitted in the transcript.

63. The word "doing" is omitted in the transcript.

64. Madison's direction "Insert the Remark", etc. is omitted in the
transcript.

65. The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript.
The original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin's edition.

66. The phrase "of the nearly half century" is changed to "of nearly
half a century" in the transcript.

67. The passage enclosed in brackets is copied from the transcript.
The original notes appear to have been lost since Gilpin's edition.

68. The doubled "to" is not an error.

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Madison's Notes
Introduction by Jon Roland

James Madison is usually credited with being the principal author of the
U.S. Constitution at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia,
but, while he was an active participant in the debates and in the
drafting of the document, he also managed to take the most complete set
of notes on the debates in that convention, capturing the essence, if
not the exact words, of the participants, and giving us a definitive
insight into the intent of the Framers.

His were not the only notes taken, and several of the other participants
wrote of their recollections of the Convention, including the official
recording secretary, William Jackson, but none are nearly as complete,
nor do they differ from Madison's Notes, as they are often called, in
any significant details. Jackson's notes are mere recordings of the
resolutions and votes on them, with little on the content of the
debates.

Madison's Notes were not published until about 1840, perhaps to fulfill
an early decision by the original convention forbidding disclosure of
the proceedings, to which Madison may have felt himself bound while the
other participants lived, and it was after all the rest of them had died
that he did finally publish them. The original manuscript is in somewhat
rough form, evidently the original state in which he wrote it in haste
during or shortly after the Convention itself. One must suppose he intended
an editor to clean it up and expand on his many abbreviations, but scholars
have rather chosen to present editions that reflect that original rough
state, with misspellings, inconsistent abbreviations and numberings
preserved for our edification. That can cause some pause for people when
they first try to read it, until they figure out the abbreviations, but
it is worth the effort, for one gains an important sense of the energy,
the intensity, and sometimes the frustrations of the delegates to that
historic meeting as the hammered out a truly innovative experiment in
self-government.

To the best of my knowledge this is the first online edition of the Notes.
I have had the benefit of both an "official" 1900 edition and later
editions with the footnotes of editors. I have also included Madison's
Preface to the Notes, which provides additional insight into the Convention
and its role in history.

For persons interested in resolving issues of constitutional intent and
interpretation, this is an essential reference. It makes clear what some
of the terms mean that are used in the Constitution, words that are not
commonly heard today, or whose meanings have changed.

Any errors in this edition are my responsibility, and I ask that anyone
finding such errors communicate them to me for correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 [1]
by James Madison


MONDAY  MAY 14, FRIDAY  MAY 25

Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies
in Convention for revising the federal system of Government. On that day
a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till,

Friday 25 of May, when the following members [2] appeared to wit: see
Note A. [3] viz, [3] From Massachusetts Rufus King. N. York Robert
Yates, [4] Alexr. Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill
Houston, [4] William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas
Fitzsimmons, James Wilson, [4] Govurneur Morris. Delaware, George Read,
Richard Basset, [4] Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund
Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, [4]
James Mc.Clurg. N. Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie,
Richard Dobbs Spaight, [4] Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, [4] Pierce Butler.
Georgia, William Few.

Mr. ROBERT MORRIS informed the members assembled that by the instruction
& in behalf, of the deputation of Pena. he proposed George Washington
Esqr. late Commander in chief for president of the Convention. [5] Mr.
JNo. RUTLIDGE seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the
choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Genl.
Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might
otherwise be proper. General WASHINGTON was accordingly unanimously
elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by Mr. R. Morris and Mr.
Rutlidge; from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention
for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of
the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of
better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards
the involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion. [6] [The
nomination came with particular grace from Penna. as Docr. Franklin
alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Docr. was himself
to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the
weather and of his health confined him to his house.

Mr. WILSON moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated Mr. Temple
Franklin.

Col HAMILTON nominated Major Jackson.

On the ballot Majr. Jackson had 5 votes & Mr. Franklin 2 votes. On
reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from
Delaware were prohibited from changing the article in the Confederation
establishing an equality of votes among the States.

The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Messrs. Wythe, Hamilton &
C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr. C. PINCKNEY, [7] to prepare standing
rules & orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.

___________

1. The original notes did not have a title, and Madison's Notes, as they
are sometimes called, have been published under various titles,
including Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention. We are
choosing the most popular title. Text is taken from several sources,
mainly from the third of the five-volume set Documentary History of the
Constitution of the United States of America, Department of State, 1900,
and from The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, edited by
Gailard Hunt and James Brown Scott (Washington, 1920), from which we
take most of the footnotes, with some minor modifications, but use a
sequential numbering system, indicating Madison's own footnotes by
preceding the number with an asterisk. Most of these footnotes cite
differences between Madison's original manuscript and the transcript in
the Library of Congress.

The word "Debates" is used as a heading in the transcript.

2. Madison is not uniform in the spelling of proper names, but the
correct form in each instance is to be found in the credentials of the
delegates.

3. The words "to wit: see Note A. viz," are omitted in the transcript.

4. The work "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The paragraph in brackets beginning with the works "The nomination"
and ending with the work "house" is printed as a footnote in the
transcript with reference mark after the word "Convention."

6. See footnote. [5]

7. The phrase "on the motion of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting," etc.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  MAY 28 [1]

[2] From Massts. Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver
Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James McHenry.
From Penna. B. Franklin, George Clymer, Ths. Mifflin & Jared Ingersol
took their seats.

Mr. WYTHE from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which
employed the deliberations of this day. 

Mr. KING objected to one of the rules in the Report authorising any
member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes.
He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the
Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes;
and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of
the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions. 

Col. MASON seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the
opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on
conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish
handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting. The proposed
rule was rejected nem. contradicente. The standing rules [*3, 4] agreed
to were as follow: [see the Journal & copy here the printed rules] [5]
[viz. [6] A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not
less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the
greater number of these which shall be fully represented: but a less
number than seven may adjourn from day to day. Immediately after the
President shall have taken the chair, and the members their seats, the
minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary. Every
member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and whilst he
shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with
another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed or manuscript-and of
two members rising [7] at the same time, the President shall name him
who shall be first heard. A member shall not speak oftener than twice,
without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second time,
before every other, who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he
choose to speak upon the subject. A motion made and seconded, shall be
repeated, and if written, as it shall be when any member shall so
require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it shall be debated; and
may be withdrawn at any time, before the vote upon it shall have been
declared. Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and
either discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be
introduced. When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other
than to amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate
shall be received.] [A question which is complicated, shall, at the
request of any member, be divided, and put separately on [8] the
propositions, of which it is compounded. The determination of a
question, altho' fully debated, shall be postponed, if the deputies of
any State desire it until the next day. A writing which contains any
matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once throughout for
information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and again, with the
amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards, the
question shall be put on [8] the whole, amended, or approved in its
original form, as the case shall be. 9 Committees shall be appointed by
ballot; and [9] the members who have the greatest number of ballots,
altho' not a majority of the votes present, shall [10] be the Committee.
When two or more members have an equal number of votes, the member
standing first on the list in the order of taking down the ballots,
shall be preferred. A member may be called to order by any other member,
as well as by the President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct
or expressions supposed to be reprehensible. -- And all questions of
order shall be decided by the President without appeal or debate. Upon a
question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time, if it be
seconded, the question shall be put without a debate. When the House
shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place, until the
President pass him.] [11] A letter from sundry persons of the State of
Rho. Island addressed to the Honorable [12] The Chairman of the General
Convention was presented to the Chair by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, and being
read, was ordered to lie on the table for further consideration. [For
the letter see Note in the Appendix] [13]

Mr. BUTLER moved that the House provide agst. interruption of business
by absence of members, and against licentious publications of their
proceedings -- to which was added by -- Mr. SPAIGHT -- a motion to
provide that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote
upon any question, from revising the subject matter of it when they see
cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision,
which was the result of mature discussion. -- Whereupon it was ordered
that these motions be referred to [14] the consideration of the
Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the Committee
make report thereon.

Adjd. till tomorrow [15] 10. OClock.

___________

1. The year " 1787" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The words "In Convention" are here inserted in the transcript.

*3. Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by
which they ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of
conversation among the members present. It was pressed by Governeur
Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should unite
in firmly refusing to the small states an equal vote, as unreasonable,
and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of
Government, which must in the nature of things, be founded on a
violation of that equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that
such an attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large & small
States, and that it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the
course of the deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake of
an effective Government, than on taking the field of discussion to
disarm themselves of the right & thereby throw themselves on the mercy
of the large States, discountenanced & stifled the project.

4. Madison's footnote reference mark after the word "rules" is placed in
the transcript after the word "him" thus placing the footnote at the end
of the rules instead of at the beginning.

5. Madison's direction is omitted from the transcript and the work
"Rules" is inserted. 

6. The word "viz." is omitted in the transcript.

7. The words "to speak" are inserted in the transcript after "rising."

8. The word "upon" is substituted for "on" in the transcript.

9. The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The word "shall" is omitted in the transcript.

11. See footnote 4.

12. The words "the Honorable" are omitted in the transcript.

13. The footnote in the transcript reads as follows: "For the letter,
see Appendix No. blank."

14. The word "for" is substituted in the transcript for the word "to".

15. The word "at" is here inserted in the transcript.

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TUESDAY  MAY 29 [1]

John Dickenson, and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter
from Massts. took their seats. The following rules were added, on the
report of Mr. Wythe from the Committee [see the Journal] -- [2]

Additional rules. [see preceding page] [2] That no member be absent from
the House, so as to interrupt the representation of the State, without
leave.

That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to be,
sitting.

That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of
the House without leave of the House.

That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.

That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or
communicated without leave.

That a motion to reconsider a matter which had [3] been determined by a
majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the same day on
which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one day's previous
notice: in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration,
some future day shall be assigned for the [4] purpose.

Mr. C. PINKNEY moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend the
Minutes.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the
Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A
committee might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry according
to their opinions and wishes.

The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.

Mr. RANDOLPH then opened the main business. [Here insert his speech [5]
including his resolutions.] [6] (Mr. R. Speech A. to be inserted Tuesday
May 29) [6] He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather
than those, who were of longer standing in life and political
experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the
convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed
that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task
on him. He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the
necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American
downfal. He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to
inquire 1. [7] into the properties, which such a government ought to
possess, 2. [7] the defects of the confederation, 3. [7] the danger of
our situation & 4. [7] the remedy.

1. The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. [7] against
foreign invasion: 2. [7] against dissentions between members of the
Union, or seditions in particular states: 3. [7] to procure to the
several States, various blessings, of which an isolated situation was
incapable: 4. [7, 8] to be able to defend itself against incroachment: &
5. [7] to be paramount to the state constitutions.

2. In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high
respect for its authors, and considered them, as having done all that
patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions,
& of confederacies, -- when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown
-- no commercial discord had arisen among any states -- no rebellion had
appeared as in Massts. -- foreign debts had not become urgent -- the
havoc of paper money had not been foreseen -- treaties had not been
violated -- and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the
jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.

He then proceeded to enumerate the defects:

    1. [9] that the confederation produced no security against foreign
invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support
it by their own authority -- Of this he cited many examples; most of
which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties
or of the law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might
by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia
nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, inlistments only
could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.

    2. [9] that the foederal government could not check the quarrels
between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power
nor means to interpose according to the exigency:

    3. [9] that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might
acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation -- such as a
productive impost -- counteraction of the commercial regulations of
other nations -- pushing of commerce ad libitum -- &c &c.

    4. [9] that the foederal government could not defend itself against
the [10] incroachments from the states.

    5. [9] that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions,
ratified, as it was in may of the states.

3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation, [11] appealed to the
sense of the best friends of the U. S. -- the prospect of anarchy from
the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations.

4. He the proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be
the republican principle.

He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which
he explained one by one [Here insert ye Resolutions annexed.] [12]

Resolutions proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention May 29, 1787 [12]

1. Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected
& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution;
namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general welfare."

2. Resd. therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
best in different cases.

3. Resd. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches. 

4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States
every _____ for the term of _____; to be of the age of _____ years at
least, to receive liberal stipends by with they may be compensated for
the devotion of their time to [13] public service; to be ineligible to
any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of
the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of
the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of _____
after its expiration; to be incapable of reelection for the space of
_____ after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject
to recall.

5. Resold. that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper
number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the
age of _____ years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient
to ensure their independency; [14] to receive liberal stipends, by which
they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to [15] public
service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular
State, or under the authority of the United States, except those
peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the
term of service, and for the space of _____ after the expiration
thereof.

6. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or
in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the
exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the
several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature
the articles of Union; [16] and to call forth the force of the Union
agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the
articles thereof.

7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of _____ years, [17] to receive
punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services
rendered, in which no increase or [18] diminution shall be made so as to
affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution,
and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority
to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation.

8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to
examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, &
every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be
final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a
rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed,
or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by _____ of the
members of each branch.

9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and
to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their
services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to
affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or
diminution. that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to
hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to
hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the
high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens
of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or
which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of
any National officers, and questions which may involve the national
peace and harmony.

10. Resolvd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a
voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the
consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the
whole.

11. Resd. that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,
except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government &
territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State

12. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after
the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the
completion of all their engagements.

13. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the
assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.

14. Resd. that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the
several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of
Union

15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the
Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after
the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies
of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be
expressly chosen by the people, to consider & decide thereon. [19]

He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity
of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U.
S. to pass away unimproved. [*20]

It was then Resolved -- That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into
a Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American
Union. -- and that the propositions moved by Mr. Randolph be referred to
the said Committee.

Mr. CHARLES PINKNEY laid before the house the draught of a federal
Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and
independent States of America. [22] -- Mr. P. plan [23] ordered that the
same be referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the
state of the American Union.

adjourned.

___________

1. The words "In convention" are here inserted in the transcript.

2. Madison's directions "[see the Journal]" and "[see preceding page]"
are omitted in the transcript as are also the words "Additional rules."

3. The word "has" is substituted in the transcript for "had."

4. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

5. The speech is in Randolph's handwriting.

6. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

7. The figures indicated are changed in the transcript to "first,"
"secondly," "thirdly," etc.

8. The words "it should" are here inserted in the transcript.

9. The figures indicated are changed in the transcript to "First,"
"Secondly," etc.

10. The word "the" is crossed out in the transcript.

11. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. This direction and the heading are omitted in the transcript.

13. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The word "independency" is changed to "independence" in the transcript.

15. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. The phrase "of any treaty subsisting under the authority of the
Union" is here added in the transcript.

17. The word "years" is omitted in the transcript.

18. The word "or" is changed to "nor" in the transcript.

19. The fifteen resolutions, constituting the "Virginia Plan," are in
Madison's handwriting.

*20. This Abstract of the speech was furnished to J. M. by Mr. Randolph
and is in his handwriting. [21] As a report of it from him had been
relied on, it was omitted by J. M.

21. This sentence is omitted on the transcript.

22. Robert Yates, a delegate from New York, gives the following account
of Pinckney's motion: "Mr. C. Pinkney, a member from South-Carolina,
then added, that he had reduced his ideas of a new government of to a
system, which he read, and confessed that it was grounded on the same
principle as of the above resolutions." (Secret Proceedings of the
Federal Convention (1821), p. 97.)

23. The words, "Mr. P. plan," are omitted in the transcript, and what
purports to be the plan itself is here inserted.

Madison himself did not take a copy of the draft nor did Pinckney
furnish him one, as he did a copy of his speech which he later delivered
in the Convention and which is printed as a part of the debates (session
of Monday, June 25). Many years later, in 1818, when John Quincy Adams,
then Secretary of State, was preparing the Journal of the Convention for
publication, he wrote to Pinckney, requesting a copy of his plan, and,
in compliance with this request, Pinckey sent him what purported to be
the draft, but which appears to have been a copy of the report of the
Committee of Detail of August 6, 1787, with certain alterations and
additions. The alleged draft and Pinckney's letter transmitting it were
written upon paper bearing the water-mark, "Russell & Co. 1797."

The Pinckney draft was not debated; it was neither used in the Committee
of the Whole nor in the Convention. It was however referred to the
Committee of Detail, which appears to have made some use of it, as
extracts from it have been identified by J. Franklin Jameson and an
outline of it discovered by Andrew C. McLaughlin, among the papers and
in the handwriting of James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania,
deposited with the Pennsylvania Historial Society.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  MAY 30

Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union.
Mr. Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.

The propositions of Mr. RANDOLPH which had been referred to the
Committee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris,
that the first of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the articles of
Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the
objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security
of liberty & general welfare: [1] -- should be postponed, in order to
consider the 3 following:

1. that a Union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the
objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common
defence, security of liberty, & genl. welfare.

2. that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as
individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.

3. that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a
supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The motion for postponing
was seconded by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS and unanimously agreed to.

Some verbal criticisms were raised agst. the first proposition, and it
was agreed on motion of Mr. BUTLER seconded by Mr. RANDOLPH, to pass on
to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general
merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national &
supreme.

Mr. CHARLES PINKNEY wished to know of Mr. Randolph whether he meant to
abolish the State Governts. altogether. Mr. R. replied that he meant by
these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which
explained the outlines of the system he had in view.

Mr. BUTLER said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open
to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general
observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of
powers to Congs. heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one
body. The proposed distribution of the powers into [2] different bodies
changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.

Genl. PINKNEY expressed a doubt whether the act of Congs. recommending
the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it, could [3]
authorise a discussion of a System founded on different principles from
the federal Constitution.

Mr. GERRY seemed to entertain the same doubt.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS explained the distinction between a federal and
national, supreme, Govt.; the former being a mere compact resting on the
good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive
operation. He contended that in all Communities there must be one
supreme power, and one only. 

Mr. MASON observed that the present confederation was not only 4
deficient in not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent
States; but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature
of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that
such a Govt. was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and
would punish those only whose guilt required it.

Mr. SHERMAN who took his seat today, [5] admitted that the Confederation
had not given sufficient power to Congs. and that additional powers were
necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would
involve many other powers. He admitted also that the General &
particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed
however not [6] be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing
system; intimating as one reason that it would be wrong to lose every
amendment, by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States.

It was moved by Mr. READ [7] 2ded. by Mr. Chs. COTESWORTH PINKNEY, to
postpone the 3d. proposition last offered by Mr. Randolph viz that a
national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme
Legislative Executive and Judiciary," in order to take up the following
-- viz. "Resolved that in order to carry into execution the Design of
the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects
proposed by the Confederation a more effective Government consisting of
a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary ought to be established."

The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost:

Yeas [8] Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina -- [8] 4
Nays. [9] N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina -- [9] 4.

On the question as moved by Mr. Butler, on the third proposition it was
resolved in Committee of the whole that a national governt. ought to be
established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary."
Massts. being ay -- Connect. -- no. N. York divided [Col. Hamilton ay
Mr. Yates no] Pena. ay. Delaware ay. Virga. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. [10]

Resol: 2. of Mr. R's proposition to wit -- see May 29. [11] The
following Resolution being the 2d. of those proposed by Mr. Randolph was
taken up, viz -- "that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem
best in different cases." [12]

Mr. MADISON observing that the words "or to the number of free
inhabitants," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee
from the general question whether the principle of representation should
be changed, moved that they might be struck out.

Mr. KING observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone
remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because
waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so
collected by the general Govt. that the sums respectively drawn from the
States would not appear; and would besides be continually varying.

Mr. MADISON admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some
better rule ought to be found.

Col. HAMILTON moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that the
rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned
to the number of free inhabitants. Mr. SPAIGHT 2ded. the motion.

It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to.

Mr. RANDOLPH and Mr. MADISON then moved the following resolution --
"that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be
proportioned." It was moved and 2ded. to amend it by adding "and not
according to the present system" -- which was agreed to. It was then
moved and 2ded. to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights
of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to the
present system." It was then moved & 2ded. to postpone the Resolution
moved by Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison, which being agreed to:

Mr. MADISON, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following
resolution -- "that the equality of suffrage established by the articles
of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and
that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted." This
was 2ded. by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, and being generally relished, would have
been agreed to; when,

Mr. REED moved that the whole clause relating to the point of
Representation be postponed; reminding the Come. that the deputies from
Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any
change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be
fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS observed that the valuable assistance of those members
could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of
discord in the Convention as a secession of a State, would add much to
the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an
article in a national Govt. that it could not be dispensed with.

Mr. MADISON observed that whatever reason might have existed for the
equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign
States, it must cease when a national Govermt. should be put into the
place. In the former case, the acts of Congs. depended so much for their
efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both
within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and
importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Genl. Govt. would
take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote
from a small State wd. have the same efficacy & importance as a vote
from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of
representatives from different States, as from Counties of different
extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at
once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the
Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken
in Committee, and the clause on report to the House be postponed without
a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. By
several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of
Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if
the resolution were to be carried thro' the House as well as the
Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be
postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of
representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty
being started from any other quarter than from Delaware.

The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to,

The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House
having resolved to resume the subject in Committee tomorrow,

Adjourned to 10 OClock.

___________

1. The resolution is italicized in the transcript.

2. The word "with" is substituted in the transcript for "into."

3. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "could."

4. The words "not only" are transposed in the transcript, which reads as
follows: "Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confederation
was deficient," ...

5. The phrase "who took his seat today" is omitted in the transcript.

6. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "Yeas" is omitted in the transcript and the word "aye"
inserted before the figure "4."

9. The word "Nays" is omitted in the transcript and word "no" inserted
before the figure "4."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina aye -- 6;
Connecticut, no -- 1; New York, divided (Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr.
Yates, No)." [Note E] [11]

11. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript. 

12. The resolution is italicized in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY  MAY 31 [1]

William Pierce from Georgia took his seat.

In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.

The 3d. Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of
two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of
Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Docr. Franklin who was
understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.

Resol: 4. [2] first clause "that the members of the first branch of the
National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several
States" being taken up,

Mr. SHERMAN opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought
to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should
have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want
information and are constantly liable to be misled.

Mr. GERRY. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily
misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports
circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute.
One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those
employed in the administration of Governmt. It would seem to be a maxim
of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular
clamour in Massts. for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on
that of the Govr. though secured by the spirit of the Constitution
itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still
however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the
levilling spirit.

Mr. MASON, argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the
people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of
the Govtt. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons -- It ought
to know & sympathise with every part of the community; and ought
therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole
republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it,
which had in several instances particularly in Virga., different
interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c.
He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we sd.
incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the
rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the
indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of
humanity & policy; considering that however affluent their
circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a
few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their
posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive
therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of
policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness
of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.

Mr. WILSON contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of
the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the
federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished
to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long
subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government
this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to
increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the
electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the
general and local Governmts. should be obviated as much as possible. On
examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal
measures had proceded much more from the officers of the States, than
from the people at large.

Mr. MADISON considered the popular election of one branch of the
National Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He
observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was
composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body
of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should
be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the
first -- the Executive by the second together with the first; and other
appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the
people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy
between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an
advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by
successive filtrations, but though it might be pushed too far. He wished
the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second
branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of
the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would
be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of
the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of
the Legislatures.

Mr. GERRY did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from
the British constitution were often fallacious when applied to our
situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn
that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not
always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an
election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor &
character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He
seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which
the State legislatures should be bound to choose.

Mr. BUTLER thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.

On the question for an election of the first branch of the national
Legislature by the people.

Massts. ay. Connect. divd. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pena. ay. Delawe.
divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georga. ay.

The remaining Clauses of Resolution 4th. [3] relating to the
qualifications of members of the National Legislature, [3] being pospd.
nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions:

The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. [4] "that the second, [or
senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."

Mr. SPAIGHT contended that the 2d. branch ought to be chosen by the
State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect. Mr. BUTLER
apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the
States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security
of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and
called on Mr. Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the
extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to
assign to this second branch.

Mr. RAND observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions
stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required;
that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with
propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the
number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much
smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the
passionate proceedings to which numberous assemblies are liable. He
observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils
under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their
origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst. this
tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely
to answer the purpose.

Mr. KING reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as
proposed (by Mr. Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be
impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of
proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this
idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice
of one of them. -- Mr. SPAIGHT withdrew his motion.

Mr. WILSON opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an
election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the
second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought
both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the
people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested
the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several
election districts, for one branch, in chusing members for the other
branch, as a good model.

Mr. MADISON observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the
smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the
latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be
found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga. where large &
small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had
illustrated this consequence Local partiality, would often prefer a
resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit
residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known
throughout his own State.

Mr. SHERMAN favored an election of one member by each of the State
Legislatures.

Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out the "nomination by the State
Legislatures." On this question.

[*5] Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del divd. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no. [6]

On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of
nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N.
Jersey. no. Pena. no. Del. no. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Ga. no.
[7]

So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan. 

[8] The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national
Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the
question whether each branch shd. originate laws, there was an unanimous
affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the
Legislative powers of the existing Congs. to this Assembly, there was
also a silent affirmative nem. con.

On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which
the State Legislatures were individually incompetent."

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. RUTLEDGE objected to the vagueness of the term
incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they
should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this
definition. 

Mr. BUTLER repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in
taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolp for the
extent of his meaning.

Mr. RANDOLPH disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the
national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an
inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any
considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion
was fixed on this point.

Mr. MADISON said that he had brought with him into the Convention a
strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers
necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also
brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained un
ltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might
ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing
which should be found essential to such a form of Govt. as would provide
for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the
end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it
must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.

On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not
competent, Massts. ay. Cont. divd. [Sharman no Elseworth ay] N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georga. ay.
[9]

The other clauses [10] giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among
the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the
Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added
after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion
of Dr. FRANKLIN) were agreed to witht. debate or dissent. The last
clause of Resolution 6. [11] authorizing an exertion of the force of the
whole agst. a delinquent State came next into consideration.

Mr. MADISON, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force,
the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of
it when applied to people collectively and not individually. -- A union
of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its
own destruction. The use of force agst. a State, would look more like a
declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably
be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous
compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would
be framed as might render this recourse [12] unnecessary, and moved that
the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to nem. con.

The Committee then rose & the House

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The transcript changes "Resol: 4." to "The fourth Resolution."

3. In the transcript the words "Resolution 4th" are changed to "the
fourth Resolution" and the phrase "the qualifications of members of the
National Legislature" is italicized."

4. In the transcript the words "Resolution 5," are changed to "the fifth
Resolution" and the words of the resolution are italicized.

*5. This question [6] omitted in the printed Journal, & the votes applied
to the succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated [this note to
be in the bottom margin]. [6]

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "*Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9; Delaware divided"; and Madison's direction
concerning the footnote is omitted. The word "is" is inserted after the
word "question."

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, South
Carolina, aye -- 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

8. In this paragraph the transcript italicizes the following phrases:
"the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate,"
"whether each branch shd. originate laws," "for transferring all the
Legislative powers of the existing Cong. to this Assembly"; and the
phrase "a silent affirmative nem. con." is changed to "an unanimous
affirmative, without debate."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Connecticut divided (Sherman, no.
Ellsworth, aye)." 

10. The phrase, "giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the
States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the
Nat. Leg. the articles of union" is italicized in the transcript. 

11. The words "the sixth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "resolution 6" and the phrase "authorizing and exertion of the force
of the whole agst. a delinquent State" is italicized.

12. The word "resource" is substituted in the transcript for "recourse."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  JUNE 1st 1787

William Houston from Georgia took his seat.

The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. [1] "that a
national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national
Legislature -- for the term of ______ years &c to be ineligible
thereafter, to possess the executive powers of Congress &c."

Mr. PINKNEY was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive
powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c., which
would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an
elective one.

Mr. WILSON moved that the Executive consist of a single person.

Mr. C PINKNEY seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to
consist of a single person, be instituted.

A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put
the question, DOCr. FRANKLIN observed that it was a point of great
importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments
on it before the question was put.

Mr. RUTLIDGE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other
subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by
having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them,
which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting
the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him
the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest
responsibility and administer the public affairs best.

Mr. SHERMAN said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more
than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into
effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and
accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depositary of the
supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the
business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and
consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he
wished the number might not be fixed but that the legislature should be
at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.

Mr. WILSON preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch
and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives
of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers. Some of these prerogatives were of Legislative nature. Among
others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he conceived [2] strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not
appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.

Mr. GERRY favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in
order to give weight & inspire confidence. Mr. RANDOLPH strenuously
opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the
foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the
British Governmt. as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw
censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it
he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of
the people of America required a different form of Government. He could
not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor,
despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in
one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in
order to support its independence to consist of more than one.

Mr. WILSON said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus
of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated
that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to
the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the
manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic
would do for it. Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was
postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any
decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz -- "that
a National Executive be instituted."

Mr. MADISON thought it would be proper, before a choice shd. be made
between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of
the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature
Executive, and must be given to that departmt. whether administered by
one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the
judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a
single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before
the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive shd. be struck
out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be
instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to
carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not
otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not
Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be
delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor
judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment in
consequence of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper powers might
otherwise be delegated.

Mr. WILSON seconded this motion -- 

Mr. PINKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member
of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor
Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He
said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the
"power [3] to carry into effect the national laws."

Mr. RANDOLPH seconded the motion.

Mr. MADISON did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or
even the preceding words -- "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being
perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not
however see any inconveniency [4] in retaining them, and cases might
happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.

In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the question on Mr.
Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr. Pinkney
struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y. N. J. Pena. Del. N. C. &
Geo. [5] agst. Mass. Virga. & S. Carolina [5] the preceding part of the
motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided, all the other States
in the affirmative. The next clause in Resolution 7, [6] relating to the
mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under
consideration,

Mr. WILSON said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he
wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear
chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an
election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts.,
shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large,
was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such
cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.

Mr. SHERMAN was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making
him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which
was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme
Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was
any such thing.

Mr. WILSON moves that the blank for the term of duration should be
filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred
this short period, on the supposition that a reeligibility would be
provided for.

Mr. PINKNEY moves for seven years.

Mr. SHERMAN was for three years, and agst. the doctrine of rotation as
throwing out of office the men best qualifyed to execute its duties.

Mr. MASON was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a
re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a
false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit
characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue
with the Legislature for a re-appointment.

Mr. BEDFORD was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He
begged the committee to consider what the situation of the Country would
be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a
period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the
qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his
appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as
an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for
a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine
years.

On the question for seven years, [7] Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N. Y. ay.
N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.
[8] There being 5ays, 4 noes, 1 divd., a question was asked whether a
majority had voted in the affirmative? The President decided that it was
an affirmative vote.

The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.

Mr. WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the
people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature
from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but
the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of
each other, as well as of the States;

Col. MASON favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes
however that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.
-- the clause "to be chosen by the National Legislature" -- was
accordingly postponed. -- 

Mr. RUTLIDGE suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch
only of the national Legislature.

The Committee then rose and the House

Adjourned.

___________

1. The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resolution 7' and the words of the resolution are italicized.

2. The transcript here substitutes the word "considered" for "conceived."

3. The transcript uses the word "power" in the plural.

4. The transcript changes the word "inconveniency" to "inconvenience."

5. In the transcript the figures "7" and "3" are inserted after the
States Georgia and South Carolina respectively.

6. The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resolution 7."

7. The transcript italicizes the phrase "for seven years."

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4; Massachusetts, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  JUNE 2d [1]   IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE

*[Insert the words noted here] [2] *William Saml. Johnson from
Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jennifer, from Maryd. & John Lansing
Jr. from N. York, took their seats.

It was movd. & 2ded. to postpone ye Resol: of Mr. Randolph respecting
the Executive, in order to take up the 2d. branch of the Legislature;
which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: [3] agst.
N. Y. Pena. Maryd. [3]

The mode of appointg ye Executive was resumed.

Mr. WILSON made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode
proposed by Mr. Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy
shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided
into ______ districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each
district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature
elect ______ members for their respective districts to be electors of
the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive
magistracy meet at ______ and they or any ______ of them so met shall
proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body ______ person
in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be
vested."

Mr. WILSON repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the
intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce
more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an
election by the national Legislature.

Mr. GERRY, opposed the election by the national legislature. There would
be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature &
the candidates wd. bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would
be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter,
of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to [4]
their friends. He liked the principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears
it would alarm & give a handle to the State partisans, as tending to
supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not
yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might
not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till people
should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the
suffrages of the States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures
nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people
ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little
informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to
deceptions.

Mr. WILLIAMSON could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors
chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the
State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great
trouble and expence. On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's
substitute, it was negatived: Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. [*5] Pa.
ay. Del. no. Mard. ay. Virga. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geoa. no. [6]

On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature
for the term of seven years, it was agreed to Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N.
Y. ay. Pena. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay. [7]

DOCr. FRANKLIN moved that what related to the compensation for the
services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute -- "whose
necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary,
stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services" -- He said that
being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been
unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support
his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the
permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them.

Mr. WILSON made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted -- The
following is a literal copy of the paper.

Sir.
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one
article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable
gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a
good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of
salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion
may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is
right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will
judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may
possibly change mine. -- I think I see inconveniences in the appointment
of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great
advantages.

Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the
affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and
the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting
men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in
many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men,
a post of honour that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and
they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such
places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are
perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying
sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and often compelling a
submission to dishonorable terms of peace. And of what kind are the men
that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the
bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of
parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate; the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest
for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong
passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These
will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers. -- And
these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation:
For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same
motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the
people.

Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with
moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long
continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations.
And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the
rulers may be able in return to give more to them. -- Hence as all
history informs us, there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant
kind of warfare between the governing & governed: the one striving to
obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has
alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in
dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed
the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly
increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want
of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of
taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and
enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred
who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all
the peoples money, then all their lands, and then make them and their
children servants for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to
establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in
mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from
Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five
hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and
that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive,
that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a
Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our
proposed System we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult,
by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that
tho' we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number
will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a King, as
the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a
King will the sooner be set over us.

It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can
never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying
them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some
existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary
opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office,
but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not
sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by
some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France, the office of
Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable.
It is therefore purchased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the
law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not
amount to more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place.
Therefore as legal interest is there at five per Ct. they in fact pay
two per Ct. for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the
Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of
paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to
recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only
bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving
their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are
sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their
time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary
satisfaction.

Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the
experiment, and practised it with success more than an [8] hundred
years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that
they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to
their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit
with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing
their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty,
and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it was [9] never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites.
And indeed in all cases of public service the less the profit the
greater the honor.

To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and most
important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed for
eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I
will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and
distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends &
Companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And
shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with
public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an
equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our
laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country. I
think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men
to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.

Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an
object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I
apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not
seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having
delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.

The motion was seconded by Col. HAMILTON with the view he said merely of
bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which
was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight.
No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the
consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but
rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its
expediency or practicability.

Mr. DICKENSON moved "that the Executive be made removeable by the
National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of
individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of
removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great
officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for
removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had
no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed
inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required
considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.

Mr. BEDFORD seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN contended that the National Legislature should have power to
remove the Executive at pleasure.

Mr. MASON. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered
indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the
corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the
Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the
fundamental principle of good Government.

Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILSON observed that it would leave an equality of
agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a
minority of the people to prevent ye. removal of an officer who had
rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it
would open a door for intrigues agst. him in States where his
administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay
court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or
wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to
introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency
could be otherwise supplied.

Mr. DICKENSON considered the business as so important that no man ought
to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the
sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary
departments ought to be made as independent. as possible; but that such
an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent
with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited
monarchy. In the British Govt. itself the weight of the Executive arises
from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from
the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must
look out for something else. One source of stability is the double
branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct
States formed the other principal source of stability. This division
ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left
with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future
fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the
States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of
smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best
Governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings
were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings
had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited
Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times -- the
state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was
it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if
these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential
to such a Govt. could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of
the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a
complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But
though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we
must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a
moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly
constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their
diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky
division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some
seemed desirous to abolish altogether. As to the point of representation
in the national Legislature as it might affect States of different
sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that
each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the
National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would
form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of
inhabitants or the quantum of property. A motion being made to strike
out "on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual
States" and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest
no: the question was taken -- 

On Mr. DICKENSON'S motion for making [10] Executive removeable by [10]
Natl.; Legislature at [10] request of [11] majority of State
Legislatures [12] was also rejected -- all the States being in the
negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.

The Question for making ye. Executive ineligible after seven years, [13]
was next taken, and agreed to:

Massts.; ay. Cont.; no. N. Y. ay. Pa. divd. Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no: [*14, 15]

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. by Mr. DAVIE moved to add to the last Clause, the
words -- "and to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of
mal-practice or neglect of duty" -- which was agreed to.

Mr. RUTLIDGE & Mr. C. PINKNEY moved that the blank for the no. of
persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He
supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that
no member would oppose the motion.

Mr. RANDOLPH opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should
not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to
suffer the establishmt. of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt
an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long
as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was
adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. [17] that a unity was
unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of
the department. 3. [17] that the necessary confidence would never be
reposed in a single Magistrate. 4. [17] that the appointments would
generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the
Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal
footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn
from different portions of the Country.

Mr. BUTLER contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to
answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed
he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its
interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts,
there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military
matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on
this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing
the manner in which a plurality of military heads [18] distracted Holland
when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for
directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of
the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.

The motion was then postpd. the Committee rose & the House Adjd.

___________

1. The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

3. In the transcript the figures "7" and "3" are inserted after the
States Georgia and Maryland, respectively.

4. The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.

*5. N.Y. in the printed Journal -- "divided."

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye -- 2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, [5] Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no -- 2."

8. The word "one" is substituted in the transcript for "an."

9. The word "is" is substituted in the transcript for "was."

10. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "which" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. The phrase "ineligible after seven years" is italicized in the
transcript.

*14. In [16] printed Journal Geo. ay.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, Georgia, [14] no -- 2; Pennsylvania, divided."

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed to "first,"
"secondly," "thirdly" and "fourthly."

18. The transcript italicizes the phrase "plurality of military heads."

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MONDAY  JUNE 4th [1]   IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

The Question was resumed on motion of Mr. PINKNEY 2ded. by [2] WILSON,
"shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single
person?"

Mr. WILSON was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the
gentleman from Virga. [Mr. Randolph] but the arguments used had not
convinced him. He observed that the objections of Mr. R. were levelled
not so much agst. the measure itself, as agst. its unpopularity. If he
could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it
should form a part, though the part was [3] an important one, yet he
would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see
no evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people. On the contrary he
was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate
is not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho
agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single
magistrate at the head of the Governt. The idea of three heads has taken
place in none. The degree of power is indeed different; but there are no
co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a
unity, he would mention another. The tranquility not less than the vigor
of the Govt. he thought would be favored by it. Among three equal
members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, & violent
animosities; which would not only interrupt the public administration;
but diffuse their poison thro' the other branches of Govt., thro' the
States, and at length thro' the people at large. If the members were to
be unequal in power the principle of the [4] opposition to the unity was
given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy.
In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the
Legislative & Executive departmts. questions have commonly many sides.
Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.

Mr. SHERMAN. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well
considered before it is determined. Mr. Wilson he said had observed that
in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Govt. It
was so he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to
prevail in the federal Govt. But then it should be also remarked that in
all the States there was a Council of advice, without which the first
magistrate could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the
establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the King has a
Council; and though he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight
with him, and attracts the Confidence of the people.

Mr. WILLIAMSON asks Mr. WILSON whether he means to annex a Council.

Mr. WILSON means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than
prevent malpractices.

Mr. GERRY was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the
Executive. It Wd. be extremely inconvenient in many instances,
particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an
army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.

On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Massts. ay.
Cont. ay. N. Y. no. Pena. ay. Del. no. Maryd. no. Virg. ay. [Mr. R. &
Mr. Blair no -- Docr. Mc.Cg. Mr. M. & Gen W. ay. Col. Mason being no,
but not in house, Mr. Wythe ay but gone home]. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Georga ay. [5]

First Clause of Proposition 8th. [6] relating to a Council of Revision
taken into consideration.

Mr. GERRY doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as
they will have a sufficient check agst. encroachments on their own
department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of
deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had
actually set aside laws as being agst. the Constitution. This was done
too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of
ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He
moves to postpone the clause in order to propose "that the National
Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall
not be afterwards passed by _____ parts of each branch of the
national Legislature."

Mr. KING seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to be able
to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of
having participated in its formation.

Mr. WILSON thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment go
far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct &
independent. The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without
such a self-defense the Legislature can at any moment sink it into
non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to
give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.

On the question to postpone in order to take Mr. Gerry's proposition
into consideration it was agreed to, Masss. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Maryd. no. Virga. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Ga. ay. [7]

Mr. GERRY'S proposition being now before [8] Committee, Mr. WILSON & Mr.
HAMILTON move that the last part of it [viz. "Wch. Sl. not be afterwds.
passed unless [9] by _____ parts of each branch of the National
legislature] be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute
negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power
being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: HAMILTON that the
King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.

Mr. GERRY sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature
as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches
of it.

DOCr. FRANKLIN, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom
he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it
on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on
the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pena. The negative
of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law
whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase
of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at
last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the
Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might
actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the
Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the
concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be
got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from
taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his
property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a
mischievous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such
a power would be less objectionable. It was true the King of G. B. had
not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that
matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the
members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done
according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative
should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be
demanded, till at last eno' would be gotten [10] to influence & bribe
the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.

Mr. SHERMAN was agst. enabling any one man to stop the will of the
whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He
thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws,
but not permit him to overule the decided and cool opinions of the
Legislature.

Mr. MADISON supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should
be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer
the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen
that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be would, have
firmness eno' to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part
of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes
would not be able to withstand ye. unanimous and eager wishes of both
houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be
obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least.

Mr. WILSON believed as others did that this power would seldom be used.
The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain
from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation
would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pena.
formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not
then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as
in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by
a different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now
proposed to be fixed by the Constitution, or if Dr. F.'s idea should be
adopted all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large
proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in
peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which
animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches,
and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself.

Mr. BUTLER had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could
he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to
be given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had
been observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant
course of increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen
seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the
Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in
this Country as well as in others.

Mr. BEDFORD was opposed to every check on the Legislative, [11] even the
Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to
mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative
Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of
the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best
Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external
controul whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient controul
within the Legislature itself.

Col. MASON observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was out
at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among
these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The
probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr. F. as
proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be
opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures
till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees
engrossed all these into his own hands, the American Executive, like the
British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium
of exerting his negative afterwards. We are Mr. Chairman going very far
in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Government,
but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new
principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British Govt.
where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to
pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the
people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do I venture to
tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do
gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of
a a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be
proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppressions & injustice
experienced among us from democracy; the genius of the people is in
favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could
not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved by the
appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen
look forward to the dangerous interval between the extinction of an old,
and the establishment of a new Governmt. and to the scenes of confusion
which may ensue. He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be
attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the
people through the late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the
Executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised,
and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was
required in the first instance. He never could agree to give up all the
rights of the people to a single Magistrate. If more than one had been
fixed on, greater powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. He
hoped this attempt to give such powers would have its weight hereafter
as an argument for increasing the number of the Executive.

DOCr. FRANKLIN. A Gentleman from S. C. [Mr. Butler] a day or two ago
called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the
gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of
that Govt. The people being under great obligations to the Prince of
Orange whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the
Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences however were felt from his
powers; which growing more & more oppressive, they were at length set
aside. Still however there was a party for the P. of Orange, which
descended to his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of
blood, murdered the de Witts, and got the powers revested in the
Stadtholder. Afterwards another Prince had power to excite insurrections
& to [12] make the Stadtholdership hereditary. And the present Stadthder.
is ready to wade thro a bloody civil war to the establishment of a
monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing
officers. He knew how that point would be managed. No new appointment
would be suffered as heretofore in Pensa. unless it be referred to the
Executive; so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The
first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort
may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing here, as
elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy.

On the question for striking out so as to give [13] Executive an
absolute negative -- Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. Pa. no. Dl. no. Md.
no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georga. no. [14]

Mr. BUTLER moved that the Resoln. be altered so as to read -- "Resolved
that the National Executive have a power to suspend any Legislative act
for the term of _____."

DOCtr. FRANKLIN seconds the motion.

Mr. GERRY observed that a [15] power of suspending might do all the
mischief dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answering the
salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.

On [13] question for giving this suspending power" all the States, to wit
Massts. Cont. N. Y. Pa. Del. Maryd. Virga. N. C. S. C. Georgia were No.

On a question for enabling two thirds of each branch of the Legislature
to overrule the revisionary [16] check: it passed in the affirmative sub
silentio; and was inserted in the blank of Mr. Gerry's motion.

On the question on Mr. Gerry's motion which gave the Executive alone
without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws unless
overruled by 2/3 of each branch; Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [17]

It was moved by Mr. WILSON 2ded. by Mr. MADISON -- that the following
amendment be made to the last resolution -- after the words "National
Ex." to add "& a convenient number of the National Judiciary."

An objection of order being taken by Mr. HAMILTON to the introduction of
the last amendment at this time, notice was given by Mr. W. & Mr. M. --
that the same wd. be moved tomorrow, -- where-upon Wednesday (the day
after) [18] was assigned to reconsider the amendment of Mr. Gerry.

It was then moved & 2ded. to proceed to the consideration of the 9th.
resolution submitted by Mr. Randolph -- when on motion to agree to the
first clause namely "Resolved that a National Judiciary be established"
[19] It passed in the affirmative nem. con. It was then moved & 2ded. to
add these words to the first clause of the ninth resolution namely --
"to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior
tribunals," which passed in the affirmative -- 

The Comme. then rose and the House

Adjourned.

___________

1. The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The transcript inserts the word "Mr." before "Wilson."

3. The word "was" is changed to "were" in the transcript.

4. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Blair, no; Doctor McClurg,
Mr. Madison, and General Washington, aye; Colonel Mason being no, but
not in the House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone home), North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- ; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 3."

6. The phrase "the eighth Resolution" is substituted in the transcript
for "Proposition 8th."

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 4."

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The word "unless" is crossed out in the transcript.

10. In the transcript the syllable "ten" is stricken from the word
"gotten."

11. In the transcript the syllable "tive" is stricken from the word
"Legislative" and "ture" is written above it.

12. The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.

13. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. In the transcript the vote reads "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

15. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a."

16. In the transcript the word "provisionary" was erroneously used in
place of "revisionary."

17. In the transcript this vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 8; Connecticut, Maryland, no -- 2."

18. The phrase "(the day after)" is crossed out in the transcript.

19. The phrase "Resolved that a National Judiciary be established" is
italicized in the transcript.

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TEUSDAY  JUNE 5.   IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

GOVERNOR Livingston from [1] New Jersey, took his seat.

The words, "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals" as
an amendment to the last clause of Resoln. 9th [2] The Clause -- "that
the National Judiciary be chose by the National Legislature," being
under consideration.

Mr. WILSON opposed the appointmt. of Judges by the National Legisl:
Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointmts. by numerous
bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary
consequences. A principal reason for unity in the executive was that
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.

Mr. RUTLIDGE was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any
single person. The people will think we are leaning too much towards
Monarchy. He was against establishing any national tribunal except a
single supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to decide in all
cases in the first instance.

DOCr. FRANKLIN observed that two modes of chusing the Judges had been
mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive. He wished
such other modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen; it
being a point of great moment. He would mention one which he had
understood was practiced in Scotland. He then in a brief and
entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination
proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the
profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among
themselves. It was here he said the interest of the electors to make the
best choice, which should always be made the case if possible.

Mr. MADISON disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or
any numerous body. Besides, the danger of intrigue and partiality, many
of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The
Legislative talents which were very different from those of a Judge,
commonly recommended men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was
known too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of
being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the
appointment. On the other hand he was not satisfied with referring the
appointment to the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the
Senatorial branch, as numerous eno' to be confided in -- as not so
numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as
being sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate
judgments. He hinted this only and moved that the appointment by the
Legislature might be struck out, & a blank left to be hereafter filled
on maturer reflection.

Mr. WILSON seconds it.

On the question for striking out. Massts. ay. Cont. no. N.Y. ay. N.J.
ay. Pena.ay. Del. Ay. Md. ay. N.C. ay. S.C.no. Geo.ay. [3]

Mr. WILSON gave notice that he should at a future day move for a
reconsideration of the clause which respects "inferior tribunals."

Mr. PINKNEY gave notice that when the clause respecting the appointment
of the Judiciary should again come before the Committee he should move
to restore the "appointment by the national Legislature."

The following clauses of Resol: 9. [4] were agreed to viz "to hold their
offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually at stated
times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office
at the time of such increase or diminution."

The remaining clause of Resolution 9. [5] was posponed.

Resolution 10 [6] was agreed to-viz -- that provision ought to be made
for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U.
States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory, or
otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National
Legislature less than the whole.

The 11. propos: [7] "for guarantying to States Republican Govt. &
territory &c., being read, Mr. PATTERSON wished the point of
representation could be decided before this clause should be considered,
and moved to postpone it: which was not opposed, and agreed to:
Connecticut & S. Carolina only voting agst. it.

Propos. 12 [8] "for continuing Congs. till a given day and for
fulfilling their engagements," produced no debate.

On the question, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. [*9] ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.

Propos: 13. [10] "that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending
the system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the
Natl. Legislature," being taken up,

Mr. PINKNEY doubted the propriety or necessity of it.

Mr. GERRY favored it. The novelty & difficulty of the experiment
requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also
give intermediate stability to the Govt. Nothing had yet happened in the
States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety.

The proposition was postponed for further consideration: the votes
being, Mas: Con. N. Y. Pa. Del. Ma. N. C. -- ay Virga. S. C. Geo: no

Propos. 14. [11] "requiring oath from the State officers to support
National Govt." was postponed after a short uninteresting conversation:
the votes, Con. N. Jersey. Md. Virga.: S. C. Geo. ay N. Y. Pa. Del. N.
C. -- no Massachusetts -- divided.

Propos. 15 [12] for "recommending Conventions under appointment of the
people to ratify the new Constitution" &c. being taken up.

Mr. SHARMAN thought such a popular ratification unnecessary: the
articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with the
assent of Congs. and ratification of State Legislatures.

Mr. MADISON thought this provision essential. The articles of Confedn.
themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States
on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the
States, and of Congs. especially where the former are of posterior date,
and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must
necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of
the State authority. He suggested also that as far as the articles of
Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among
the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that
a breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other
parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others
he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified
in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the
people themselves.

Mr. GERRY observed that in the Eastern States the Confedn. had been
sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring the
new system to them. The people in that quarter have at this time the
wildest ideas of Government in the world. They were for abolishing the
Senate in Massts. and giving all the other powers of Govt. to the other
branch of the Legislature.

Mr. KING supposed that the last article of ye Confedn. rendered the
legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the Southern
States where the federal articles had been ratified by the Legislatures
only, had since impliedly given their sanction to it. He thought
notwithstanding that there might be policy in varying the mode. A
Convention being a single house, the adoption may more easily be carried
thro' it, than thro' the Legislatures where there are several branches.
The Legislatures also being to lose power, will be most likely to raise
objections. The people having already parted with the necessary powers
it is immaterial to them, by which Government they are possessed,
provided they be well employed.

Mr. WILSON took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of
observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality
of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by
the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the
provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of
such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.
[*14]

Mr. PINKNEY hoped that in case the experiment should not unanimously
take place nine States might be authorized to unite under the same
Governt.

The propos. 15. [15] was postponed nem. cont

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. RUTLIDGE moved that tomorrow be assigned to reconsider
that clause of Propos. 4: [16] which respects the election of the first
branch of the National Legislature -- which passed in [17] affirmative:
Con: N. Y. Pa. Del: d. Va. -- ay -- 6 Mas. N. J. N. C. S. C. Geo. no. 5.

Mr. RUTLIDGE havg. obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for
establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved
that that part of the clause in propos. 9. [18] should be expunged:
arguing that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases
to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme
national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights &
uniformity of Judgmts.: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment
on the jurisdiction of the States and creating unnecessary obstacles to
their adoption of the new system.

Mr. SHERMAN 2ded. the motion.

Mr. MADISON observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed
throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals
would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal
would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper
Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a
dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To
remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new
trial at the Supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their
witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat of the Court. An effective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was
essential. A Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be
the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move.

Mr. WILSON opposed the motion on like grounds. he said the admiralty
jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it
related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to
a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to
happen.

Mr. SHERMAN was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the supposed
expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State
Courts would answer the same purpose. Mr. DICKINSON contended strongly
that if there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a
national Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to
institute the latter. On the question for Mr. Rutlidge's motion to
strike out "inferior tribunals" [19]

Massts. divided. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md.
no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [20]

Mr. WILSON & Mr. MADISON then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed
above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9. [21] the words following
"that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior
tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between
establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the
Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the
necessity of some such provision.

Mr. BUTLER. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will
revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be
useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon
who gave the Athenians not the best Govt. he could devise; but the best
they wd. receive.

Mr. KING remarked as to the comparative expence that the establishment
of inferior tribunals wd. cost infinitely less than the appeals that
would be prevented by them.

On this question as moved by Mr. W. & Mr. M. Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. Y.
divd. N. J. [*22] ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
no. Geo. ay.

The Committee then rose & the House adjourned to 11 OC tomw. [23]

___________

1. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "from."

2. The phrase "the ninth Resolution" is used in the transcript in place
of "Resoln. 9th."

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, no, Georgia, aye -- 9; Connecticut, South Carolina, --
2."

4. The transcript uses the phrase "the ninth Resolution" in place of
"Resol: 9," and italicizes the resolution.

5. The transcript here uses the phrase "the ninth Resolution."

6. The phrase "The tenth Resolution" is here used in the transcript.

7. In place of the words "The 11. propos:" the transcript reads: "The
eleventh Resolution."

8. The transcript changes "Propos. 12" to "The twelfth Resolution."

*9. New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal.

10. The transcript changes "Propos: 13" to read as follows: "The
thirteenth Resolution, to the effect."

11. The transcript changes "Propos. 14" to "The fourteenth Resolution."

12. The transcript changes "Propos. 15" to "The fifteenth Resolution."

*13. The note in brackets to be transferred to bottom margin. [14] [This
hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of N. Jersey &
Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it.]

14. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

15. The transcript changes "The propos. 15" to "the fifteenth
Resolution."

16. The transcript changes "Propos. 4" to "the fourth Resolution."

17. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The transcript changes "propos. 9" to "the ninth Resolution."

19. The phrase "it passed in the affirmative" is here inserted in the
transcript.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 4; Massachusetts, divided." New York
which was "divided" was erroneously placed among the "ayes" in copying,
although the number was correctly given as "5."

21. The transcript changes "Resol: 9" to "the ninth Resolution."

*22. In the printed Journal N. Jersey -- no.

23. The transcript omits the phrase "to 11 OC tomw."

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WEDNESDAY  JUNE 6th  IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Mr. PINKNEY according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved "that
the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State
Legislatures, and not by the people." contending that the people were
less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less
likely to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were to be
excluded from all share in it.

Mr. RUTLIDGE 2ded. the motion.

Mr. GERRY. Much depends on the mode of election. In England, the people
will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion
having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme:
hence in Massts. the worst men get into the Legislature. Several members
of that Body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of
indigence, ignorance & baseness, spare no pains, however dirty to carry
their point agst. men who are superior to the artifices practised. He
was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much principled as ever
agst. aristocracy and monarchy. It was necessary on the one hand that
the people should appoint one branch of the Govt. in order to inspire
them with the necessary confidence. But he wished the election on the
other to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference
of merit. His idea was that the people should nominate certain persons
in certain districts, out of whom the State Legislatures shd. make the
appointment.

Mr. WILSON. He wished for vigor in the Govt., but he wished that
vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all
authority. The Govt. ought to possess not only 1st. the force, but 2dly.
the mind or sense of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be
the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation is made
necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively. The opposition was to be expected he said from the
Governments, not from the Citizens of the States. The latter had parted
as was observed [by Mr. King] with all the necessary powers; [1] and it
was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well exercised.
The State officers were to be the losers of power. The people he
supposed would be rather more attached to the national Govt. than to the
State Govts. as being more important in itself, and more flattering to
their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if made by large
districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts
which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.

Mr. SHERMAN. If it were in view to abolish the State Govts. the
elections ought to be by the people. If the State Govts. are to be
continued, it is necessary in order to preserve harmony between the
National & State Govts. that the elections to the former shd. be made by
the latter. The right of participating in the National Govt. would be
sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State
Legislatures. The objects of the Union, he thought were few. 1. [2]
defence agst. foreign danger. 2 [2] agst. internal disputes & a resort
to force. 3. [2] Treaties with foreign nations. 4 [2] regulating foreign
commerce, & drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser
objects alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All
other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands of the
States. The people are more happy in small than [3] large States. States
may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too subject to
faction. Some others were perhaps too large, the powers of Govt. not
being able to pervade them. He was for giving the General Govt. power to
legislate and execute within a defined province.

Col. MASON. Under the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States
[4] not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States, not
on the individuals. [5] The case will be changed in the new plan of
Govt. The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the
Representatives. The requisites in actual representation are that the
Reps. should sympathize with their constituents; shd. think as they
think, & feel as they feel; and that for these purposes shd. even be
residents among them. Much he sd. had been alledged agst. democratic
elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be
considered that no Govt. was free from imperfections & evils; and that
improper elections in many instances, were inseparable from Republican
Govts. But compare these with the advantage of this Form in favor of the
rights of the people, in favor of human nature. He was persuaded there
was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into
large districts, than by the State Legislatures. Paper money had been
issued by the latter when the former were against it. Was it to be
supposed that the State Legislatures then wd. not send to the Natl.
legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them.

Mr. MADISON considered an election of one branch at least of the
Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free
Govt. and that this mode under proper regulations had the additional
advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too
great an agency of the State Governments in the General one. -- He
differed from the member from Connecticut [Mr. Sharman] in thinking the
objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National
Govt. Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he
combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the
security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice.
Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any
thing else, produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that
republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in
some of the States. The gentleman [Mr. Sharman] had admitted that in a
very small State, faction & oppression wd. prevail. It was to be
inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had
they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest tho' less than
in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere
as far as the nature of the Govt. would admit. This was the only defence
agst. the inconveniencies of democracy consistent with the democratic
form of Govt. All civilized Societies would be divided into different
Sects, Factions, & interests, as they happened to consist of rich &
poor, debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial
interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the
followers of this political leader or that political leader, the
disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases
where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights
of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A
prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by
experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals.
Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number
among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only
remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large
numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may
become a motive to persecution & oppression. -- These observations are
verified by the Histories of every Country antient & modern. In Greece &
Rome the rich & poor, the creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians
& plebians alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness.
What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities
of Rome, Athens & Carthage, & their respective provinces: the former
possessing the power, & the latter being sufficiently distinguished to
be separate objects of it? Why was America so justly apprehensive of
Parliamentary injustice? Because G. Britain had a separate interest real
or supposed, & if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued
that interest at our expence. We have seen the mere distinction of
colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most
oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. What has been the
source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves? Has it not
been the real or supposed interest of the major number? Debtors have
defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the
mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown
a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson
we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a
common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party
become insecure. In a Republican Govt. the Majority if united have
always an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, &
thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests &
parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the
same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or
of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in case they shd. have such
an interest, they may not be [6] apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It
was incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame
a republican system on such a scale & in such a form as will controul
all the evils wch. have been experienced.

Mr. DICKENSON considered it as [7] essential that one branch of the
Legislature shd. be drawn immediately from the people; and as expedient
that the other shd. be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This
combination of the State Govts. with the national Govt. was as politic
as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate we ought to carry
it through such a refining process as will assimilate it as near as may
be to the House of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulogiums on
the British Constitution. He was for a strong National Govt. but for
leaving the States a considerable agency in the System. The objection
agst. making the former dependent on the latter might be obviated by
giving to the Senate an authority permanent & irrevocable for three,
five or seven years. Being thus independent they will speak [8] & decide
with becoming freedom.

Mr. READ. Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Governts. We must
look beyond their continuance. A national Govt. must soon of necessity
swallow all of them [9] up. They will soon be reduced to the mere office
of electing the National Senate. He was agst. patching up the old
federal System: he hoped the idea wd. be dismissed. It would be like
putting new cloth on an old garment. The confederation was founded on
temporary principles. It cannot last: it cannot be amended. If we do not
establish a good Govt. on new principles, we must either go to ruin, or
have the work to do over again. The people at large are wrongly
suspected of being averse to a Genl. Govt. The aversion lies among
interested men who possess their confidence.

Mr. PIERCE was for an election by the people as to the 1st. branch & by
the States as to the 2d. branch; by which means the Citizens of the
States wd. be represented both individually & collectively.

General PINKNEY wished to have a good National Govt. & at the same time
to leave a considerable share of power in the States. An election of
either branch by the people scattered as they are in many States,
particularly in S. Carolina was totally impracticable. He differed from
gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people wd. be a better guard
agst. bad measures, than by the Legislatures. A majority of the people
in S. Carolina were notoriously for paper money as a legal tender; the
Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was that
the latter had some sense of character and were restrained by that
consideration. The State Legislatures also he said would be more
jealous, & more ready to thwart the National Govt., if excluded from a
participation in it. The Idea of abolishing these Legislatures wd. never
go down.

Mr. WILSON, would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from
Mr. Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the State Govts. ought to
be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the National & State
Govts. provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes;
nor any probability of their being devoured by the former. In all
confederated Systems antient & modern the reverse had happened; the
Generality being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts
composing it.

On the question for electing the 1st. branch by the State Legislatures
as moved by Mr. Pinkney: it was negatived:

Mass. no. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [10]

Mr. WILSON moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a
share in the revision of the laws, and to add after "National Executive"
the words "with a convenient number of the national Judiciary";
remarking the expediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence
of that Department.

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion. He observed that the great difficulty in
rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose from the
nature of Republican Govt. which could not give to an individual citizen
that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of
property, that personal interest agst. betraying the national interest,
which appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In a Republic personal
merit alone could be the ground of political exaltation, but it would
rarely happen that this merit would be so pre-eminent as to produce
universal acquiescence. The Executive Magistrate would be envied &
assailed by disappointed competitors: His firmness therefore wd. need
support. He would not possess those great emoluments from his station,
nor that permanent stake in the public interest which wd. place him out
of the reach of foreign corruption: He would stand in need therefore of
being controuled as well as supported. An association of the Judges in
his revisionary function wd. both double the advantage and diminish the
danger. It wd. also enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend
itself agst. Legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made
1st. that the Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a
participation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of
them. 2dly. that the Judiciary Departmt. ought to be separate & distinct
from the other great Departments. The 1st. objection had some weight;
but it was much diminished by reflecting that a small proportion of the
laws coming in question before a Judge wd. be such wherein he had been
consulted; that a small part of this proportion wd. be so ambiguous as
to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few cases wd.
probably arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous passages. How
much good on the other hand wd. proceed from the perspicuity, the
conciseness, and the systematic character wch. the Code of laws wd.
receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 2d. objection, it either
had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to the Executive & to the
Judiciary revision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was
founded required a separation of the Executive as well as of [11] the
Judiciary from the Legislature & from each other. There wd. in truth
however be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present
case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive
had an absolute negative on the laws; and the supreme tribunal of
Justice [the House of Lords] formed one of the other branches of the
Legislature. In short whether the object of the revisionary power was to
restrain the Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate
Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing
laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility
of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive
seemed incontestable.

Mr. GERRY thought the Executive, whilst standing alone wd. be more
impartial than when he cd. be covered by the sanction & seduced by the
sophistry of the Judges.

Mr. KING. If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of
responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as
to the Executive power.

Mr. PINKNEY had been at first in favor of joining the heads of the
principal departmts. the Secretary of War, of foreign affairs & -- in
the council of revision. He had however relinquished the idea from a
consideration that these could be called in [12] by the Executive
Magistrate whenever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed to an
[13] introduction of the Judges into the business.

Col. MASON was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary
institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured agst.
Legislative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get
into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive.

Mr. DICKENSON. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal
properties reqd. in the Executive. Important as these are, that of
responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by leaving it
singly to discharge its functions. He thought too a junction of the
Judiciary to it, involved an improper mixture of powers.

Mr. WILSON remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his
Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated
for collateral purposes.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, was for substituting a clause requiring 2/3 for every
effective act of the Legislature, in place of the revisionary provision.

On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive in the
revisionary business, Mass. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. No. Geo. no. [14]

Mr. PINKNEY gave notice that tomorrow he should move for the
reconsideration of that clause in the sixth Resolution adopted by the
Comme. which vests a negative in the National Legislature on the laws of
the several States.

The Come. rose & the House adjd. to 11 OC. [15]

___________

1. The phrase "with all the necessary powers" is italicized in the
transcript.

2. The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed to "first," "secondly,"
etc. in the transcript.

3. The word "in" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The transcript italicizes the word "individuals."

6. The word "so" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "as" is omitted in the transcript.

8. The word "check" is substituted in the transcript for "speak."

9. The words "them all" are substituted in the transcript for "all of
them."

10. In the transcript the vote reads "Connecticut, New Jersey, South
Carolina, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8.

11. The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.

12. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

13. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "an."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, Virginia,
aye -- 3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

15. The expression "to 11 OC" is omitted in the transcript.

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THURSDAY  JUNE 7th, 1787 [1] --   IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Mr. PINKNEY according to notice moved to reconsider the clause
respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to and tomorrow
for fixed [2] the purpose.

The Clause providing for ye. appointment of the 2d. branch of the
national Legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode
of electing it, to wit, by the 1st. branch, Mr. DICKENSON now moved
"that the members of the 2d. branch ought to be chosen by the individual
Legislatures."

Mr. SHERMAN seconded the motion; observing that the particular States
would thus become interested in supporting the national Governmt. and
that a due harmony between the two Governments would be maintained. He
admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions,
but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other.

Mr. PINKNEY. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the
number will be too great, there will be 80 at least.

Mr. DICKENSON had two reasons for his motion. 1. [3] because the sense
of the States would be better collected through their Governments; than
immediately from the people at large; 2. [3] because he wished the
Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished
for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he
thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State
Legislatures, than in any other mode. The greatness of the number was no
objection with him. He hoped there would be 80 and twice 80. of them. If
their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced
by them. The legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous
body.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that
each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient
number. The different modes of representation in the different branches,
will serve as a mutual check.

Mr. BUTLER was anxious to know the ratio of representation before he
gave any opinion.

Mr. WILSON. If we are to establish a national Government, that
Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it
should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the people, the
two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will
naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the
people as well as the other branch, and the people might be divided into
proper districts for the purpose & [4] moved to postpone the motion of
Mr. Dickenson, in order to take up one of that import.

Mr. MORRIS 2ded. him.

Mr. READ proposed "that the Senate should be appointed by the Executive
Magistrate out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the
individual legislatures." He said he thought it his duty, to speak his
mind frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea.
Nothing short of this approach towards a proper model of Government
would answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the
point at once. -- His proposition was not seconded nor supported.

Mr. MADISON, if the motion [of Mr. Dickenson] should be agreed to, we
must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation; or
admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is
inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use
of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with
more system, & with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their
number and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to
correct. He differed from Mr. D. who thought that the additional number
would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared to
him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their number. [5]
The example of the Roman Tribunes was applicable. They lost their
influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The
reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care of the
popular interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people by reason of
their numbers could not act in concert; [6] were liable to fall into
factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic
adversaries. The more the representatives of the people therefore were
multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their
constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves
either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite
faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When
the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters;
the greater the number the greater the weight. When it depends on the
degree of political authority lodged in them the smaller the number the
greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in
the intended Senate; but the latter was the material one.

Mr. GERRY. 4 modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. 1. [7]
by the 1st. branch of the National Legislature. This would create a
dependence contrary to the end proposed. 2. [7] by the National
Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. 3.
[7] by the people. The people have two great interests, the landed
interest, and the commercial including the stockholders. To draw both
branches from the people will leave no security to the latter interest;
the people being chiefly composed of the landed interest, and
erroneously supposing, that the other interests are adverse to it. 4 [7]
by the Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried thro' this
refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the
commercial interest agst. the landed; without which oppression will take
place, and no free Govt. can last long where that is the case. He was
therefore in favor of this last.

Mr. DICKENSON. [*8] The preservation of the States in a certain degree
of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the
different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each
other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the
Councils of our Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He
compared the proposed National System to the Solar System, in which the
States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their
proper orbits. The Gentleman from Pa. [Mr. Wilson] wished he said to
extinguish these planets. If the State Governments were excluded from
all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from the people at
large, the consequence would be that the national Govt. would move in
the same direction as the State Govts. now do, and would run into all
the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13 small streams
into one great current pursuing the same course without any opposition
whatever. He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed
of a large number, and that their influence from family weight & other
causes would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the Tribunes
lost their weight in proportion as their no. was augmented and gave a
historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning of [Mr. Madison]
was good it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be
reduced below ten, the highest no. of the Tribunitial corps.

Mr. WILSON. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with doubts and
difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Governmt. cannot be
our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our
laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of
the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States
being devoured by the Nationl. Govt. On the contrary, he wished to keep
them from devouring the national Govt. He was not however for
extinguishing these planets as was supposed by Mr. D. -- neither did he
on the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun.
Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for
subordinate purposes for which their existence is made essential by the
great extent of our Country. He could not comprehend in what manner the
landed interest wd. be rendered less predominant in the Senate, by an
election through the medium of the Legislatures then by the people
themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the
commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such
a choice from them as would defeat their own views. He was for an
election by the people in large districts which wd. be most likely to
obtain men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the districts only
for the accomodation of voters.

Mr. MADISON could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as
desired by Mr. D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate
through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes.
The true question was in what mode the best choice wd. be made? If an
election by the people, or thro' any other channel than the State
Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit,
there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those
Legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be
derived thro' that channel than from the people thro' some other. The
great evils complained of were that the State Legislatures run into
schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people, & sometimes
without even the sanction of the people. Their influence then, instead
of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be
expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say
that the Natl. Legislature witht. a proper check, will follow the
example of the State Legislatures, & in the same breath, that the State
Legislatures are the only proper check.

Mr. SHERMAN opposed elections by the people in districts, as not likely
to produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.

Mr. GERRY insisted that the commercial & monied interest wd. be more
secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at
large. The former have more sense of character, and will be restrained
by that from injustice. The people are for paper money when the
Legislatures are agst. it. In Massts. the County Conventions had
declared a wish for a depreciating paper that wd. sink itself. Besides,
in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature, one of which
is somewhat aristocratic. There wd. therefore be so far a better chance
of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he thought to be three
powerful objections agst. elections by districts. 1. [9] it is
impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for the
purpose; and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds
wd. be unavoidable. 2. [9] small States forming part of the same
district with a large one, or [10] large part of a large one, wd. have
no chance of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 3 [9] a
new source of discord wd. be opened between different parts of the same
district.

Mr. PINKNEY thought the 2d. branch ought to be permanent & independent,
& that the members of it wd. be rendered more so by receiving their
appointment [11] from the State Legislatures. This mode wd. avoid the
rivalships & discontents incident to the election by districts. He was
for dividing the States into three classes according to their respective
sizes, & for allowing to the 1st. class three members -- to the 2d. two,
& to the 3d. one. On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's motion
referring the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in
order to consider Mr. Wilson's for referring it to the people.

Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [12]

Col. MASON. whatever power may be necessary for the Natl. Govt. a
certain portion must necessarily be left in [13] the States. It is
impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U.S. so as
to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to
have some means of defending themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl.
Govt. In every other department we have studiously endeavored to provide
for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with
the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than
the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part
of, the Natl. Establishment. There is danger on both sides no doubt; but
we have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State Govts.
Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Congs.
does not apply. Congs. had no power to carry their acts into execution
as the Natl. Govt. will have.

On Mr. DICKINSON's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State
-- Legislatures.

Mass. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. ay. Pa. ay Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [14]

Mr. GERRY gave notice that he wd. tomorrow move for a reconsideration of
the mode of appointing the Natl. Executive in order to substitute an
appointmt. by the State Executives.

The Committee rose & The House adjd.

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The words "for fixed" are corrected in the transcript to "fixed for."

3. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

4. The word "he" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The transcript uses the word "number" is the plural.

6. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed to "First," "Secondly,"
etc., in the transcript.

*8. It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by
the State Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on
by the large State & dreaded by the small ones, namely that of a
proportional representation is the Senate. Such a rule Wd. make the body
too numerous, as the smallest State must elect one member at least.

9. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "First," "Secondly," and
"Thirdly" in the transcript.

10. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "appointment" is used in the plural in the transcript.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye -- 1;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

13. The word "with" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10."

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FRIDAY  JUNE 8th.   IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Natl. Legislature a
negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles
of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations,

Mr. PINKNEY moved "that the National Legislature shd. have authority to
negative all laws which they shd. judge to be improper." He urged that
such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render
it effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the
nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case,
it wd. be impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however
extensive they might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been
defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated
violations; that this universal negative was in fact the corner stone of
an efficient national Govt.; that under the British Govt. the negative
of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the States are more one
nation now, than the Colonies were then.

Mr. MADISON seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite
power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary
to a perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the
States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national
Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to oppress
the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative was
the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these
mischiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to
commit them. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy wd.
lie [1] in an appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? was it
practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost
enforce a national decree agst. Massts. abetted perhaps by several of
her neighbours? It wd. not be possible. A small proportion of the
Community, in a compact situation, acting on the defensive, and at one
of its extremities might at any time bid defiance to the National
authority. Any Govt. for the U. States formed on the supposed
practicability of using force agst. the unconstitutional proceedings of
the States, wd. prove as visionary & fallacious as the Govt. of Congs.
The negative wd. render the use of force unnecessary. The States cd. of
themselves then [2] pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a
Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed without the other.
But in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all
cases. A discrimination wd. only be a fresh source of contention between
the two authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed
from the planetary system. This prerogative of the General Govt. is the
great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of
the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper
orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political System.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was agst. giving a power that might restrain the States
from regulating their internal police.

Mr. GERRY cd. not see the extent of such a power, and was agst. every
power that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance agst.
unreasonable acts of the States wd. reclaim [3] them If it shd. not
force might be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize a negative
to paper money and similar measures. When the confederation was
depending before Congress, Massachussetts was then for inserting the
power of emitting paper money amg. the exclusive powers of Congress. He
observed that the proposed negative wd. extend to the regulations of the
Militia, a matter on which the existence of a [4] State might depend.
The Natl. Legislature with such a power may enslave the States. Such an
idea as this will never be acceded to. It has never been suggested or
conceived among the people. No speculative projector, and there are eno'
of that character among us, in politics as well as in other things, has
in any pamphlet or newspaper thrown out the idea. The States too have
different interests and are ignorant of each other's interests. The
negative therefore will be abused. New States too having separate views
from the old States will never come into the Union. They may even be
under some foreign influence; are they in such case to participate in
the negative on the will of the other States?

Mr. SHERMAN thought the cases in which the negative ought to be
exercised, might be defined. He wished the point might not be decided
till a trial at least shd. be made for that purpose.

Mr. WILSON would not say what modifications of the proposed power might
be practicable or expedient. But however novel it might appear the
principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye, is right. There
is no instance in which the laws say that the individual shd. be bound
in one case, & at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey in
another. The cases are parallel. Abuses of the power over the individual
person may happen as well as over the individual States. Federal liberty
is to [5] States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals. And
States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary
concession of their political sovereignty, that [6] the savage is to
purchase civil liberty by the surrender of his [7] personal sovereignty,
which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases in which
the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion must be
left on one side or the other? will it not be most safely lodged on the
side of the Natl. Govt.? Among the first sentiments expressed in the
first Congs. one was that Virga. is no more, that Masts. is no [8], that
Pa. is no more &c. We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all
local interests & distinctions. This language continued for some time.
The tables at length began to turn. No sooner were the State Govts.
formed than their jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each
endeavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own
morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to the
impotent condition in which it now stands. Review the progress of the
articles of Confederation thro' Congress & compare the first & last
draught of it. To correct its vices is the business of this convention.
One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the whole over
its parts. What danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily
sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy
of each part, and will not the general interest be continually
sacrificed to local interests?

Mr. DICKENSON deemed it impossible to draw a line between the cases
proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must take our
choice of two things. We must either subject the States to the danger of
being injured by the power of the Natl. Govt. or the latter to the
danger of being injured by that of the States. He thought the danger
greater from the States. To leave the power doubtful, would be opening
another spring of discord, and he was for shutting as many of them as
possible. Mr. BEDFORD. In answer to his colleague's question where wd.
be the danger to the States from this power, would refer him to the
smallness of his own State which may be injured at pleasure without
redress. It was meant he found to strip the small States of their equal
right of suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about 1/90 for its
share in the General Councils, whilst Pa. & Va. would posses 1/3 of the
whole. Is there no difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce, of
manufactures? Will not these large States crush the small ones whenever
they stand in the way of their ambitious or interested views. This shews
the impossibility of adopting such a system as that on the table, or any
other founded on a change in the principle of representation. And after
all, if a State does not obey the law of the new System, must not force
be resorted to as the only ultimate remedy, in this as in any other
system. It seems as if Pa. & Va. by the conduct of their deputies wished
to provide a system in which they would have an enormous & monstrous
influence. Besides, How can it be thought that the proposed negative can
be exercised? are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most
urgent cases until they can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and
undergo the deliberations [9] of a body who may be incapable of Judging
of them? Is the National Legislature too to sit continually in order to
revise the laws of the States?

Mr. MADISON observed that the difficulties which had been started were
worthy of attention and ought to be answered before the question was
put. The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for by some
emanation of the power from the Natl. Govt. into each State so far as to
give a temporary assent at least. This was the practice in Royal
Colonies before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient, if
the supreme power of negativing had been faithful to the American
interest, and had possessed the necessary information. He supposed that
the negative might be very properly lodged in the senate alone, and that
the more numerous & expensive branch therefore might not be obliged to
sit constantly. -- He asked Mr. B. what would be the consequence to the
small States of a dissolution of the Union wch. seemed likely to happen
if no effectual substitute was made for the defective System existing,
and he did not conceive any effectual system could be substituted on any
other basis than that of a proportional suffrage? If the large States
possessed the avarice & ambition with which they were charged, would the
small ones in their neighbourhood, be more secure when all controul of a
Genl. Govt. was withdrawn.

Mr. BUTLER was vehement agst. the Negative in the proposed extent, as
cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The people
there would not he was sure give it a hearing.

On the question for extending the negative power to all cases as
proposd. by [Mr. P. & Mr. M.] Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no.
Pa. ay. Del. divd. Mr. Read & Mr. Dickenson ay. Mr. Bedford & Mr. Basset
no. Maryd. no. Va. ay. Mr. R. Mr. Mason no. Mr. Blair, Docr. Mc. g. Mr.
M. ay. Genl. W. not consulted. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [10]

On motion of Mr. GERRY and Mr. KING tomorrow was assigned for
reconsidering the mode of appointing the National Executive: the
reconsideration being voted for by all the States except Connecticut &
N. Carolina.

Mr. PINKNEY and Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to add to Resoln. 4. [11] agreed to
by the Come. the following, viz. "that the States be divided into three
classes, the 1st. class to have 3 members, the 2d. two. & the 3d. one
member each; that an estimate be taken of the comparative importance
of each State at fixed periods, so as to ascertain the number of members
they may from time to time be entitled to"

The Committee then rose and the House adjourned.

___________

1. The word "be" is substituted in the transcript for "lie."

2. The word "then" is omitted in the transcript.

3. The word "restrain" is substituted in the transcript for "reclaim."

4. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a."

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "that" is changed to "than" in the transcript.

7. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "his."

8. The word "more" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The transcript uses the word "deliberations" in the singular.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, [Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason, no; Mr. Blair, Doctor McClurg and
Mr. Madison, aye; General Washington not consulted,] aye -- 3;
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7; Delaware, divided, [Mr. Read and Mr.
Dickinson, aye; Mr. Bedford and Mr. Basset, no]."

11. The words "the fourth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resoln. 4."

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SATURDAY  JUNE 9th.  MR. LUTHER MARTIN FROM MARYLAND TOOK HIS SEAT IN
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Mr. GERRY, according to previous notice given by him, moved "that the
National Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States
whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the
States in the election of the Senate." If the appointmt. should be made
by the Natl. Legislature, it would lessen that independence of the
Executive which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and
corruption between the Executive & Legislature previous to the election,
and to partiality in the Executive afterwards to the friends who
promoted him. Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary. He
proposed that of appointing by the State Executives as most analogous to
the principle observed in electing the other branches of the Natl.
Govt.; the first branch being chosen by the people of the States, & the
2d. by the Legislatures of the States; he did not see any objection
agst. letting the Executive be appointed by the Executives of the
States. He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select the
fittest men, and that it would be their interest to support the man of
their own choice.

Mr. RANDOLPH, urged strongly the inexpediency of Mr. Gerry's mode of
appointing the Natl. Executive. The confidence of the people would not
be secured by it to the Natl. magistrate. The small States would lose
all chance of an appointmt. from within themselves. Bad appointments
would be made; the Executives of the States being little conversant with
characters not within their own small spheres. The State Executives too
notwithstanding their constitutional independence, being in fact
dependent on the State Legislatures will generally be guided by the
views of the latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, or
such as it may be expected will be most partial to the interests of the
State. A Natl. Executive thus chosen will not be likely to defend with
becoming vigilance & firmness the National rights agst. State
encroachments. Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled? He
could not suppose either that the Executives would feel the interest in
supporting the Natl. Executive which had been imagined. They will not
cherish the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.

On the question for referring the appointment of the Natl. Executive to
the State Executives as propd. by Mr. Gerry Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y.
no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. divd. Md. no. Va. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [1]

Mr. PATTERSON moves that the Committee resume the clause relating to the
rule of suffrage in the Natl. Legislature.

Mr. BREARLY seconds him. He was sorry he said that any question on this
point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Congs. at the
time of forming the Confederation, and was then rightly settled by
allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller
States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution
of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness on the face of it; but on a
deeper examination was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of
the States by the quota of Congs. Virga. would have 16 votes, and
Georgia but one. A like proportion to the others will make the whole
number ninity. There will be 3. large states, and 10 small ones. The
large States by which he meant Massts. Pena. & Virga. will carry every
thing before them. It had been admitted, and was known to him from facts
within N. Jersey that where large & small counties were united into a
district for electing representatives for the district, the large
counties always carried their point, and Consequently that [2] the large
States would do so. Virga. with her sixteen votes will be a solid column
indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgie with her Solitary vote, and
the other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly
into the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. He
had come to the convention with a view of being as useful as he could in
giving energy and stability to the federal Government. When the
proposition for destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was
astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair then it will be asked that
Georgia should have an equal vote with Virga.? He would not say it was.
What remedy then? One only, that a map of the U. S. be spread out, that
all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the
whole be made into 13 equal parts.

Mr. PATTERSON considered the proposition for a proportional
representation as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He wd.
premise however to an investigation of this question some remarks on the
nature structure and powers of the Convention. The Convention he said
was formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs. that this act was recited in
several of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. which he
required to be read: that the amendment of the confederacy was the
object of all the laws and commissions on the subject; that the articles
of the Confederation were therefore the proper basis of all the
proceedings of the Convention. [3] We ought to keep within its limits,
or we should be charged by our Constituents with usurpation, that the
people of America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived. But the
Commissions under which we acted were not only the measure of our power,
they denoted also the sentiments of the States on the subject of our
deliberation. The idea of a national Govt. as contradistinguished from a
federal one, never entered into the mind of any of them, and to the
public mind we must accomodate ourselves. We have no power to go beyond
the federal scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other.
We must follow the people; the people will not follow us. -- The
proposition could not be maintained whether considered in reference to
us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sovereignty
in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality. If we are
to be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished,
the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is
made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation. He held up
Virga. Massts. & Pa. as the three large States, and the other ten as
small ones; repeating the calculations of Mr. Brearly as to the
disparity of votes which wd. take place, and affirming that the small
States would never agree to it. He said there was no more reason that a
great individual State contributing much, should have more votes than a
small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen
should have more votes than an indigent one. If the rateable property of
A was to that of B as 40 to 1, ought A for that reason to have 40 times
as many votes as B. Such a principle would never be admitted, and if it
were admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A. has more to
be protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the common
protection. The same may be said of a large State wch. has more to be
protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence in
proportion to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence? Their
ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States will
have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway & some others
that America should be represented in the British Parlt. and then be
bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled to more than 1/3
of the no. of [4] Representatives which would fall to the share of G. B.
Would American rights & interests have been safe under an authority thus
constituted? It has been said that if a Natl. Govt. is to be formed so
as to operate on the people and not on the States, the representatives
ought to be drawn from the people. But why so? May not a Legislature
filled by the State Legislatures operate on the people who chuse the
State Legislatures? or may not a practicable coercion be found. He
admitted that there was none such in the existing System. -- He was
attached strongly to the plan of the existing confederacy, in which the
people chuse their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures
their federal representatives. No other amendments were wanting than to
mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for the
use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to the hint
thrown out heretofore by Mr. Wilson of the necessity to which the large
States might be reduced of confederating among themselves, by a refusal
of the others to concur. Let them unite if they please, but let them
remember that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N.
Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She
would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot,
than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but on his
return home do every thing in his power to defeat it there.

Mr. WILSON hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a
majority, that a minority of the States would unite for their safety. He
entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation,
stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from
the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal no. of
representatives, and different numbers of people different numbers of
representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the
Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the
case of A. & B, stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed that in districts
as large as the States, the number of people was the best measure of
their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were [5]
to form the ratio it would be the same. Mr. P. admitted persons, not
property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the Citizens of Pena.
equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to
balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts ought
clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective
Constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not
confederate on this plan, Pena. & he presumed some other States, would
not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being
sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over
himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this
equality when he becomes a member of Civil Government? He can not. As
little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal
Governt. If N. J. will not part with her Sovereignty it is in vain to
talk of Govt. A new partition of the States is desireable, but evidently
& totally impracticable.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different
States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing
that proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter
case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.

The Question being about to be put Mr. PATTERSON hoped that as so much
depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till
tomorrow, which was done nem. con.

The Come. rose & the House adjourned.

___________

1. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, no; Delaware divided."

2. The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.

3. The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The words "no. of" are omitted in the transcript.

5. The word "was" is substituted in the transcript for "were."

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MONDAY  JUNE 11th.  MR. ABRAHAM BALDWIN FROM GEORGIA TOOK HIS SEAT. IN
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the natl. Legislature
postponed on Saturday was resumed.

Mr. SHARMAN proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st. branch
should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and
that in the second branch or Senate, each State should have one vote and
no more. He said as the States would remain possessed of certain
individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself:
otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in
England he observed had certain particular rights under the
Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the House of
Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.

Mr. RUTLIDGE proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st. branch
should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this
rule he said could not be contested. Mr. BUTLER urged the same idea:
adding that money was power; and that the States ought to have weight
in the Govt. in proportion to their wealth.

Mr. KING & Mr. WILSON, [*1] in order to bring the question to a point
moved "that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national
Legislature ought not to be according [2] the rule established in the
articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of
representation." The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the
first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.

Mr. DICKENSON contended for the actual contributions of the States as
the rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch. By thus
connecting the interest [3] of the States with their duty, the latter
would be sure to be performed.

Mr. KING remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be used in
levying a national revenue; but that it was probable, imposts would be
one source of it. If the actual contributions were to be the rule the
non-importing States, as Cont. & N. Jersey, wd. be in a bad situation
indeed. It might so happen that they wd. have no representation. This
situation of particular States had been always one powerful argument in
favor of the 5 Per Ct. impost.

The question being abt. to be put Docr. FRANKLIN sd. he had thrown his
ideas of the matter on a paper wch. Mr. Wilson read to the Committee
in the words following -- 

Mr. CHAIRMAN
It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the
proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried
on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind, has on
this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent
here to consult, not to contend, with each other; and declarations of a
fixed opinion, and of determined resolution, never to change it, neither
enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side,
naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and augment
discord & division in a great concern, wherein harmony & Union are
extremely necessary to give weight to our Councils, and render them
effectual in promoting & securing the common good. 

I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better if every
member of Congress, or our national Council, were to consider himself
rather as a representative of the whole, than as an Agent for the
interests of a particular State; in which case the proportion of members
for each State would be of less consequence, & it would not be very
material whether they voted by States or individually. But as I find
this is not to be expected, I now think the number of Representatives
should bear some proportion to the number of the Represented; and that
the decisions shd. be by the majority of members, not by the majority of
[4] States. This is objected to from an apprehension that the greater
States would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly
see what advantage the greater States could propose to themselves by
swallowing [5] the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would
attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century, when the
Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch
Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of
Representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the superiority
of the English. They finally agreed however that the different
proportions of importance in the Union, of the two Nations should be
attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members in the House
of Commons, and only sixteen in the House of Lords; A very great
inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect that any
thing has been done in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice
of Scotland; and whoever looks over the lists of public officers, Civil
& military of that nation will find I believe that the North Britons
enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument.

But, Sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally in the
power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater; and this is
mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller States
had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger to have one with
another 6 members; and that upon a question, two members of each smaller
State should be in the affirmative and one in the Negative; they will
[6] make

    Affirmatives ............ 14 .................. Negatives .. 7
    And that all the larger States should be unanimously
    in the negative, they would make ............. Negatives .. 36
    In all .................................................... 43

It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the 43, and
the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of
Assemblies in all Countries and Ages. The greater States Sir are
naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of
the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the
greater. An honorable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a
proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable one,
and I should, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it
might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province
had a different Constitution, some with greater others with fewer
privileges, it was of importance to the borderers when their boundaries
were contested, whether by running the division lines, they were placed
on one side or the other. At present when such differences are done
away, it is less material. The Interest of a State is made up of the
interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State
is not injured. Small States are more easily well & happily governed
than large ones. If therefore in such an equal division, it should be
found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the
giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there
would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting such a
division; and however equally made at first, it would be continually
varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in some States, and their [7]
fixed proportion in others; and thence frequent occasion for new
divisions, I beg leave to propose for the consideration of the Committee
another mode, which appears to me, to be as equitable, more easily
carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature.

Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it is able
and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union.

Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal
proportion.

The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of
Congress.

The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of Delegates
from each State.

And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members voting.

If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions not be
sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more
powerful States for farther aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving to
each State the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid
desired, and of giving more or less as it should be found proper.

This mode is not new, it was formerly practised with success by the
British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies. We
sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just to accept;
and in the last war carried on while we were united, they gave us back
in 5 years a million Sterling. We should probably have continued such
voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions appeared to require them
for the common good of the Empire. It was not till they chose to force
us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary
contributions that we refused & resisted. Those [8] contributions
however were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a Government in which
we had no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that they will not
be refused to one in which the Representation shall be equal My learned
Colleague [Mr. Wilson] has already mentioned that the present method of
voting by States, was submitted to originally by Congress, under a
conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and injustice. This appears
in the words of their Resolution. It is of Sepr. 6. 1774. The words are

"Resolved that in determining questions in this Congs. each Colony or
province shall have one vote: The Congs. not being possessed of or at
present able to procure materials for ascertaining the importance of
each Colony."

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Kings and Mr. Wilsons motion it
passed in the affirmative

Massts. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [9]

It was then moved by Mr. RUTLIDGE 2ded. by Mr. BUTLER to add to the
words "equitable ratio of representation" at the end of the motion just
agreed to, the words "according to the quotas of contribution." On
motion of Mr. WILSON seconded by Mr. C. PINCKNEY, this was postponed; in
order to add, after, after the words "equitable ratio of representation"
the words following "in proportion to the whole number of white & other
free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those
bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other
persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians
not paying taxes, in each State," this being the rule in the Act of
Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue
on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5-7, or 10 years.

Mr. GERRY thought property not the rule of representation. Why then shd.
the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of
representation more than the Cattle & horses of the North.

On the question, -- Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Maryd. Virga. N. C. S. C. &
Geo: were in the affirmative: [10] N. J. & Del: in the negative. [10]

Mr. SHARMAN moved that a question be taken whether each State shall have
one vote in the 2d. branch. Every thing he said depended on this. The
smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than
an equality of suffrage in this branch. Mr. ELSWORTH seconded the
motion. On the question for allowing each State one vote in the 2d.
branch.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [11]

Mr. WILSON & Mr. HAMILTON moved that the right of suffrage in the 2d.
branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1st. branch. On
this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the 2d.
as in the 1st. branch it passed in the affirmative:

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

Resol: 11, [13] for guarantying Republican Govt. & territory to each
State being considered: the words "or partition" were, on motion of Mr.
MADISON, added, after the words "voluntary junction:"

Mas. N. Y. P. Va. N. C. S. C. G. ay [14] Con: N. J. Del. Md. no. [14]

Mr. READ disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea
of distinct States wch. would be a perpetual source of discord. There
can be no cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether and
uniting them all into one great Society. Alterations having been made in
the Resolution, making it read "that a republican Constitution & its
existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States" the
whole was agreed to nem. con.

Resolution 13, [15] for amending the national Constitution hereafter
without consent of [16] Natl. Legislature being considered, several
members did not see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the
propriety of making the consent of the Natl. Legisl. unnecessary.

Col. MASON urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be
formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found
on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be
better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way
than to trust to chance and violence. It would be improper to require
the consent of the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their
power, and refuse their consent [17] on that very account. The
opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution
calling for amendmt.

Mr. RANDOLPH enforced these arguments. The words, "without requiring the
consent of the Natl. Legislature" were postponed. The other provision in
the clause passed nem. con.

Resolution 14, [18] requiring oaths from the members of the State Govts.
to observe the Natl. Constitution & laws, being considered.

Mr. SHARMAN opposed it as unnecessarily intruding into the State
jurisdictions.

Mr. RANDOLPH considered it as [19] necessary to prevent that competition
between the National Constitution & laws & those of the particular
States, which had already been felt. The officers of the States are
already under oath to the States. To preserve a due impartiality they
ought to be equally bound to the Natl. Govt. The Natl. authority needs
every support we can give it. The Executive & Judiciary of the States,
notwithstanding their nominal independence on the State Legislatures are
in fact, so dependent on them, that unless they be brought under some
tie to the Natl. System, they will always lean too much to the State
systems, whenever a contest arises between the two.

Mr. GERRY did not like the clause. He thought there was as much reason
for requiring an oath of fidelity to the States, from Natl. officers, as
vice. versa.

Mr. LUTHER MARTIN moved to strike out the words requiring such an oath
from the State officers, viz "within the several States" observing that
if the new oath should be contrary to that already taken by them it
would be improper; if coincident the oaths already taken will be
sufficient.

On the question for striking out as proposed by Mr. L. Martin Massts.
no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [20]

Question on [21] whole Resolution as proposed by Mr. Randolph;

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [22]

[23] Come. rose & [23] House adjd.

___________

*1. In the printed Journal Mr. Rutlidge is named as the seconder of the
motion.

2. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript

3. The transcript uses the word "interest" in the plural

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The word "up" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "will" is changed to "would" in the transcript.

7. The word "more" is in the Franklin manuscript.

8. The word "These" is substituted in the transcript for "Those."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania,Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 3; Maryland divided."

10. In place of the phrase "were in the affirmative" the transcript
substitutes "aye -- 9;" and instead of "in the negative" the expression
"no -- 2" is used.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye; Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no."

13. The words "The eleventh Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resol: II."

14. The figures "7" and "4" are inserted in the transcript after "ay"
and "no," respectively.

15. The words "The thirteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resolution 13."

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The word "assent" is substituted in the transcript for "consent."

18. The words "The fourteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resolution 14."

19. The word "as" is crossed out in the transcript.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

21. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 5."

23. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TEUSDAY  JUNE 12th.   IN COMMITTEE OF [1] WHOLE

The Question [2] taken on Resolution 15, [3] to wit, referring the new
system to the people of the [4] States for ratification it passed in the
affirmative:

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. [*5] ay. Del. divd. Md.
divd. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [6]

Mr. SHARMAN & Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to fill the blank left in the 4th.
Resolution for the periods of electing the members of the first branch
with the words, "every year." Mr. SHARMAN observing that he did it in
order to bring on some question.

Mr. RUTLIDGE proposed "every two years."

Mr. JENNIFER propd. "every three years," observing that the too great
frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made
the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.

Mr. MADISON seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of
the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be
necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form any
knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not
belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and
affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for
and travelling to & from the seat of national business.

Mr. GERRY. The people of New England will never give up the point of
annual elections, they know of the transition made in England from
triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation
here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections
as the only defence of the people agst. tyranny. He was as much agst. a
triennial House as agst. a hereditary Executive.

Mr. MADISON, observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our
guide, it wd. be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No
member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents
were at this time; much less could he say what they would think if
possessed of the information & lights possessed by the members here; &
still less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We
ought to consider what was right & necessary in itself for the
attainment of a proper Governmt. A plan adjusted to this idea will
recommend itself -- The respectability of this convention will give
weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly
urging the adoption of it, and all the most enlightened & respectable
citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary &
proper point, this influential class of Citizens will be turned against
the plan, and little support in opposition to them can be gained to it
from the unreflecting multitude.

Mr. GERRY repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider what
the people would approve. This had been the policy of all Legislators.
If the reasoning of Mr. Madison were just, and we supposed a limited
Monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, tho' the
genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and having no
hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential
materials for such an innovation.

On the question for [7] triennial election of the 1st. branch

Mass. no. [Mr. King ay.] Mr. Ghorum wavering. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J.
ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [8]

The words requiring members of ye. 1st. branch to be of the age of years
were struck out Maryland alone, no. The words "liberal compensation for
members" being considd. Mr. MADISON moves to insert the words, "& fixt."
He observed that it would be improper to leave the members of the Natl.
legislature to be provided for by the State Legisls. because it would
create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own
wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous one.
He thought wheat or some other article of which the average price
throughout a reasonable period preceding might be settled in some
convenient mode, would form a proper standard.

Col. MASON seconded the motion; adding that it would be improper for
other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the States. 1. [9]
the different States would make different provision for their
representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he
thought they ought to be in all respects equal. 2. [9] the parsimony of
the States might reduce the provision so low that as had already
happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be not
who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.

On the question for inserting the words "and fixt."

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [10]

DOCtr. FRANKLYN said he approved of the amendment just made for
rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word
"liberal." he would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to
substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case,
to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the
progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from
the gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the
papal system. The word "liberal" was struck out nem. con.

On the motion of Mr. PIERCE, that the wages should be paid out of the
National Treasury,

Massts. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay. [11]

Question on the clause relating to term of service & compensation of
[12] 1st. branch

Massts. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [13]

On a question for striking out the "ineligibility of members of [12]
Natl. Legis: to State offices."

Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. divd.
Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no [14]

On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended Massts. ay. Cont.
no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay. [15]

On a question for making Members of [16] Natl. legislature ineligible to
any office under the Natl. Govt. for the term of 3 years after ceasing
to be members.

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [17]

On the question for such ineligibility for one year

Massts. ay. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [18]

On [16] question moved by Mr. PINCKNEY for striking out "incapable of
re-election into [16] 1st. branch of [16] Natl. Legisl. for years, and
subject to recall" agd. to nem. con.

On [16] question for striking out from Resol: 5 [19] the words requiring
members of the senatorial branch to be of the age of years at least

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. divd. [20]

On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the
qualification; it was agreed to.

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no [21]

Mr. SPAIGHT moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointmts.
to the 2d. branch of the National Legislature with the words "7 years.

Mr. SHERMAN, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he
said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be
reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be
allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which wd. be
between the terms of [22] 1st. branch & of the executive

Mr. PIERCE proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great
mischiefs had [23] arisen in England from their septennial act which was
reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.

Mr. RANDOLPH was for the term of 7 years. The democratic
licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm
Senate. The object of this 2d. branch is to controul the democratic
branch of the Natl. Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch
being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will
overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had
been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be
apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some
measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness &
independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it ought
to guard the Constitution agst. encroachments of the Executive who will
be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular
branch.

Mr. MADISON, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we
wished was to give to the Govt. that stability which was every where
called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be
inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much
stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular
branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much
lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The
Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this
part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Maryd. created just
suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have
erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their
opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the
suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other
States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates were
chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and
held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check
whatever agst. the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it
to be of great importance that a stable & firm Govt. organized in the
republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not done,
and the people be left to judge of this species of Govt. by ye.
operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is
much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust,
they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a
rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.

On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2d. branch 

Massts. divided (Mr. King, Mr. Ghorum ay -- Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, no)
Cont. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Vt. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [24]

Mr. BUTLER & Mr. RUTLIDGE proposed that the members of the 2d. branch
should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their services

On the question, [*25] Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P.
no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [27]

It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends &
ineligibility of the 2d. branch be the same as, of the 1st branch: Con:
disagreeing to the ineligibility.

It was moved & 2ded. to alter Resol: 9. [28] so as to read "that the
jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in the
dernier resort, all piracies, felonies &c."

It was moved & 2ded. to strike out "all piracies & felonies on the high
seas," which was agreed to.

It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."

It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two
distinct States of the Union"

It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of Resolution 9,
[28] relating to the Judiciary:

The Come. then rose & the House adjourned.

___________

1. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The words "the fifteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resolution 15."

4. The word "United" is here inserted in the transcript.

*5. Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is there
entered as of June 11th.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, [5]
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, no -- 3; Delaware, Maryland,
divided."

7. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Massachusetts [Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham, wavering] Connecticut, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 4."

9. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the
transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, no -- 3."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no -- 3."

12. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no -- 3."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, North
Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, Georgia, no -- 5; Massachusetts, Maryland, divided."

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; Connecticut, no -- 1."

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, aye -- 1;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye -- 8; New York, Georgia, no -- 2; Maryland, divided."

19. The words "the fifth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol: 5."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 6; North Carolina, Georgia, divided."

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia North Carolina, South Carolina, aye --
7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no -- 4."

22. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. The word "have" is substituted in the transcript for "had."

24. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; Connecticut, no -- 1; Massachusetts [Mr. Gorham and Mr. King,
aye; Mr. Gerry and Mr. Strong, no] New York, Divided."

*25. [It is probable ye. votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if
the salaries were not here provided for the members would be paid by
their respective States]
This note for the bottom margin. [26]

26. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

27. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Delaware, South
Carolina, aye -- 3; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7; Massachusetts, divided."

28. The words "the ninth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol: 9."

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WEDNESDAY  JUNE 13.   IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Resol: 9 [1] being resumed

The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the
Natil. tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room
for their organization.

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MADISON, then moved the following resolution
respecting a National Judiciary, viz "that the jurisdiction of the
National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection
of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and
questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed
to.

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. SHERMAN moved to insert after the words "one supreme
tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the national
Legislature."

Mr. MADISON, objected to an appt. by the whole Legislature. Many of them
were [2] incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were
too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was
present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative
field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their
own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would
without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws
prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but
possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the
appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous &
more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was
sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.

Mr. SHARMAN & Mr. PINKNEY withdrew their motion, and the appt. by the
Senate was agd. to nem. con.

Mr. GERRY. moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating
money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives
of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the
purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills,
they wd. repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of
representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.

Mr. BUTLER saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always
following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not apply.
There was no analogy between the H. of Lords and the body proposed to be
established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such
discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in
favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice
of tacking other clauses to money bills.

Mr. MADISON observed that the Commentators on the Brit: Const: had not
yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money
bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case
before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well
as the 1st. branch. If they sd. have any dangerous influence over it,
they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the
bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a more
capable sett of men, it wd. be wrong to disable them from any
preparation of the business, especially of that which was most
important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The
Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to
the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an
addition of a given sum wd. be equivalent to a distinct proposition of
it.

Mr. KING differed from Mr. GERRY, and concurred in the objections to the
proposition.

Mr. READ favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to
the case of amendments.

Mr. PINKNEY thinks the question premature. If the Senate shd. be formed
on the same proportional representation as it stands at present, they sd
have equal power, otherwise if a different principle sd. be introduced.

Mr. SHERMAN. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger
whichever way the Senate [3] be formed. We establish two branches in
order to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance
business -- The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the
representatives of the people. What a man does by another, he does by
himself is a maxim. In Cont. both branches can originate in all cases,
and it has been found safe & convenient. Whatever might have been the
reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no good
arises from it now even there.

Genl. PINKNEY. This distinction prevails in S. C. & has been a source of
pernicious disputes between ye. 2 branches. The Constitution is now
evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed from ye. Senate to
the other House.

Mr. WILLIAMSON wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion.
The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in
[4] lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.

On the question for excepting money bills as propd. by Mr. Gerry, Mass.
no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no. [5]

[6] Committee rose & Mr. GHORUM made report, which was postponed till
tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The
report was in the words following:

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WHOLE ON Mr. RANDOLPH'S PROPOSITIONS [7]

1. Resd. that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National
Governmt. ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative,
Executive & Judiciary.

2. Resold. that the National Legislature ought to consist of two
branches.

3. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States for
the term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to [6] public service, to be
paid out of the National Treasury: to be ineligible to any office
established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U.
States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first
branch), during the term of service, and under the national Government
for the space of one year after its expiration.

4. Resd. that the members of the second branch of the Natl. Legislature
ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of
30 years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure
their independency, [8] namely, seven years, to receive fixed stipends
by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to [6]
public service to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible
to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority
of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of
the second branch) during the term of service, and under the Natl. Govt.
for the space of one year after its expiration.

5. Resd. that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts

6. Resd. that the Natl. Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the
Legislative rights vested in Congs. by the Confederation, and moreover
to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent;
or in which the harmony of the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise
of individual legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several
States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the
articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union.

7. Resd. that the rights of suffrage in the 1st. branch of the National
Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the
articles of confederation but according to some equitable ratio of
representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white &
other free citizens & inhabitants, of every age sex and condition,
including those bound to servitude for a term of years, & three fifths
of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description,
except Indians not paying taxes in each State:

8. Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2d. branch of the National
Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.

9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist of a
single person, to be chosen by the Natil. Legislature for the term of
seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for -- to be
ineligible a second time, & to be removeable on impeachment and
conviction of malpractices or neglect of duty -- to receive a fixed
stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to
[9] public service to be paid out of the national Treasury.

10. Resold. that the Natl. Executive shall have a right to negative any
Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards passed unless [10] by two
thirds of each branch of the National Legislature.

11. Resold. that a Natl. Judiciary be established, to consist of one
supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to [11] be appointed by the 2d.
branch of the Natl. Legislature, to hold their offices during good
behaviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation
for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so
as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase
or diminution.

12. Resold. that the Natl. Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
Tribunals.

13. Resd. that the jurisdiction of the Natl. Judiciary shall extend to
all cases which respect the collection of the Natl. revenue,
impeachments of any Natl. Officers, and questions which involve the
national peace & harmony.

14. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether from a
voluntary junction of Government & territory or otherwise, with the
consent of a number of voices in the Natl. Legislature less than the
whole.

15. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day after
the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and for the
completion of all their engagements. 

16. Resd. that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be
guaranteed to each State by the U. States.

17. Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Resd. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers within the
several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of
Union.

19. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the
confederation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times after
the approbation of Congs. to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies
recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the
people to consider and decide thereon.

___________

1. The words "the ninth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol: 9."

2. The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "were."

3. The word "may" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, Delaware, Virginia, aye
-- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut. New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia no -- 7."

6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. This heading is omitted in the transcript.

8. The word "independency" is changed to "independence" in the
transcript.

9. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The word "unless" is omitted in the transcript.

11. The word "shall" is substituted in the transcript for "to."

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THURSDAY  JUNE 14.   IN CONVENTION [1]

Mr. PATTERSON, observed to the Convention that it was the wish of
several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time
might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the
Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and
contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have
such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: And the
Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose.

___________

1. The words "In convention" are crossed out in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  JUNE 15th. 1787 [1]

[2] Mr. PATTERSON, laid before the Convention the plan which he said
several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that
proposed by Mr. Randolph. After some little discussion of the most
proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it
should be referred to a Committee of the whole, and that in order to
place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted.
At the earnest desire [3] of Mr. Lansing & some other gentlemen, it was
also agreed that the Convention should not go into Committee of the
whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the
plan proposed by Mr. Patterson wd. be better prepared to explain &
support it, and all would have an opportuy. of taking copies. [*4]

The propositions from N. Jersey moved by Mr. Patterson were in the words
following.

1. Resd. that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised,
corrected & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate to
the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the Union.

2. Resd. that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in
Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be
authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or
duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture,
imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or
parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through
the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they
shall deem proper & expedient; to make rules & regulations for the
collection thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in
such manner as they shall think proper: to pass Acts for the regulation
of trade & commerce as well with foreign nations as with each other:
provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures & penalties to be
incurred for contravening such acts rules and regulations shall be
adjudged by the Common law Judiciaries of the State in which any offence
contrary to the true intent & meaning of such Acts rules & regulations
shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in
the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose in the
superior common law Judiciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for
the correction of all errors, both in law & fact in rendering Judgment,
to an appeal to the Judiciary of the U. States.

3. Resd. that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the
rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of Confederation,
the United States in Congs. be authorized to make such requisitions in
proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens &
inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those bound to
servitude for a term of years & three fifths of all other persons not
comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying
taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with, in the time
specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying
States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing &
authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby vested in
the U. States in Congs. shall be exercised without the consent of at
least _____ States, and in that proportion if the number of Confederated
States should hereafter be increased or diminished.

4. Resd. that the U. States in Congs. be authorized to elect a federal
Executive to consist of _____ persons, to continue in office for the
term of _____ years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed
compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution
shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at the
time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal
treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment
during their time of service and for _____ years thereafter; to be
ineligible a second time, & removeable by Congs. on application by a
majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives
[8] besides their general authority to execute the federal acts ought to
appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, & to direct all
military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the
federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so
as personally to conduct any [9] enterprise as General or in other
capacity.

5. Resd. that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme
Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold
their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated
times a fixed compensation for their services in which no increase or
diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office
at the time of such increase or diminution; that the Judiciary so
established shall have authority to hear & determine in the first
instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by way of appeal in
the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in
all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies & felonies
on the high Seas, in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in
the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of
the Acts for [10] regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal
Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain in
office be capable of receiving or holding any other office or
appointment during their time [11] of service, or for _____ thereafter.

6. Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue & in
pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of Confederation vested
in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U.
States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as
those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their
Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any
State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent yd.
carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive
shall be authorized to call forth ye. power of the Confederated States,
or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an
obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such Treaties.

7. Resd. that provision be made for the admission of new States into the
Union.

8. Resd. the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every
State.

9. Resd. [12] that a Citizen of one State committing an offense in
another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offense
as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the
offense was committed. [*13]

Adjourned.

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The words "In Convention" are here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "request" is substituted in the transcript for "desire."

*4. [this plan had been concerted among the deputations or members
thereof, from Cont. N.Y.N. J Del. and perhaps Mr. Martin from Maryd who
made with them a common cause [5] on different principles Cont. & N.Y.
were agst. a departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing
rather to add a few new powers to Congs. than to substitute a National
Govt. The States of N.J. & Del. were opposed to a National Govt. because
its patrons considered a proportional representation of the States as
the basis of it. The eagourness displayed by the members opposed to a
Natl. Govt. from these different motives began now to produce serious
anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr. Dickenson said to Mr.
Madison -- You see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of
the members from the small States wish for two branches in the General
Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government; But we would
sooner submit to a foreign power than submit to be deprived of an
equality of suffrage, [6] in both branches of the legislature, and
thereby be thrown under the domination of the large States]

The note in brackets for the margin. [7]

5. The word "though" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The phrase "of an equality of suffrage" is transposed so that the
transcript reads "deprived, in both branches of the legislature of an
equality of suffrage, and thereby".

7. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

8. The transcript uses the word "Executives" in the singular.

9. The word "military" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "term" is substituted in the transcript for "time."

12. The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.

*13. This copy of Mr. Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses
from that in the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr.
Brearley a Colleague of Mr. Patterson. A confidence is felt,
notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in the Journal is not
entirely correct is shewn by the ensuing speech of Mr. Wilson [June 16]
in which he refers to the mode of removing the Executive by impeachment
& conviction as a feature in the Virga plan forming one of its contrasts
to that of Mr. Patterson, which proposed a removal on the application of
a majority of the Executives of the States. In the copy printed in the
Journal, the two modes are combined in the same clause; whether through
inadvertence, or as a contemplated amendment does not appear.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  JUNE 16th.  IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON [1] RESOLUTIONS
PROPOSD. BY MR. P. & MR. R

Mr. LANSING called for the reading of the 1st. resolution of each plan,
which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that
of Mr. Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective
States, that of Mr. Randolph distroys it: the latter requires a negative
on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain
general powers for the general good. The plan of Mr. R. in short absorbs
all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of
the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He
grounded his preference of Mr. P.'s plan, chiefly on two objections
agst. [2] that of Mr. R. 1. [3] want of power in the Convention to
discuss & propose it. 2 [3] the improbability of its being adopted.

1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was
restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis
the Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of
the States, the Commissions produced by the several deputations all
proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the
Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary &
improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his
State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the
convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a
consolidation of the States, and a National Government.

2. was it probable that the States would adopt & ratify a scheme, which
they had never authorized us to propose? and which so far exceeded what
they regarded as sufficient? We see by their several Acts particularly
in relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Cong. in 1783, not
authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what were the ideas they
then entertained. Can so great a change be supposed to have already
taken place. To rely on any change which is hereafter to take place in
the sentiments of the people would be trusting to too great an
uncertainty. We know only what their present sentiments are. And it is
in vain to propose what will not accord with these. The States will
never feel a sufficient confidence in a general Government to give it a
negative on their laws. The Scheme is itself totally novel. There is no
parallel to it to be found. The authority of Congress is familiar to the
people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress will be readily
approved by them.

Mr. PATTERSON, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments
on the plan proposed by Mr. R. he would now avoiding repetition as much
as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He
preferred it because it accorded 1. [4] with the powers of the
Convention, 2 [4] with the sentiments of the people. If the confederacy
was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger
powers, not assume them of ourselves. I came here not to speak my own
sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our object is not
such a Governmt. as may be best in itself, but such a one as our
Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If
we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present
exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of
equal sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If
a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If
we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult
the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of
it. He reads the 5th. art: of [5] Confederation giving each State a vote
-- & the 13th. declaring that no alteration shall be made without
unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed [by Mr.
Wilson] that the larger States gave up the point, not because it was
right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession.
Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the
donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine
may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser
States. The large States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the
small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland
were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress
over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant
territory to the benefit of the whole. -- If the sovereignty of the
States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn
immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power
to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure
the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say
that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we
shall see whether the Citizens of Massts. Pena. & Va. accede to it. It
will be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be
more so in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the
quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or
from the individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on
individuals as well as according [6] that of Mr. R. A distinct executive
& Judiciary also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two
branches in the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a
check. But the reason of [7] the precaution is not applicable to this
case. Within a particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check
may be necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and
besides, the delegations of the different States are checks on each
other. Do the people at large complain of Congs.? No, what they wish is
that Congs. may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno',
the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers
Congs. will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Natl.
Legislature; being fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the
mode of election. The plan of Mr. R. will also be enormously expensive.
Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the popular branch
the aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many
for the other branch and you have 270. members coming once at least a
year from the most distant as well as the most central parts of the
republic. In the present deranged state of our finances can so expensive
a system be seriously though of? By enlarging the powers of Congs. the
greatest part of this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be
answered. At least a trial ought to be made.

Mr. WILSON entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two
plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last
proposed. These points were 1. in the Virga. plan there are 2 & in some
degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to
be a single legislature only -- 2. Representation of the people at large
is the basis of the [8] one: -- the State Legislatures, the pillars of
the other -- 3. proportional representation prevails in one: -- equality
of suffrage in the other -- 4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the
head of the one: -- a plurality is held out in the other. -- 5. in the
one the [9] majority of the people of the U. S. must prevail: -- in the
other a minority may prevail. 6. the Natl. Legislature is to make laws
in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent & -- : -- in
place of this Congs. are to have additional power in a few cases only --
7. A negative on the laws of the States: -- in place of this coertion to
be substituted -- 8. The Executive to be removeable on impeachment &
conviction; -- in one plan: in the other to be removeable at the
instance of [10] majority of the Executives of the States -- 9. Revision
of the laws provided for in one: -- no such check in the other -- 10.
inferior national tribunals in one: -- none such in the other. 11. In
ye. one jurisdiction of Natl. tribunals to extend &c -- ; an appellate
jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to
extend to all cases affecting the Nationl. peace & harmony: there, a few
cases only are marked out. 13. finally ye. ratification is in this to be
by the people themselves: -- in that by the legislative authorities
according to the 13 art: of [11] Confederation.

With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived himself
authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any
thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the
two plans.

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it difficult
to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which
one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not
persuade himself that the State Govts. & Sovereignties were so much the
idols of the people, nor a Natl. Govt. so obnoxious to them, as some
supposed. Why sd. a Natl. Govt. be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will
each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen
of Delaware be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United States? [12]
Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which
they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Govts.? no, Sir.
It is from the Natl. Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons
he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a national
Govt. and it will be a further recommendation of Mr. R.'s plan that it
is to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for
ratification.

Proceeding now to the 1st point on which he had contrasted the two
plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the
federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could
ever consent to give powers to Congs. he had two reasons either of wch.
was sufficient. 1. [13] Congs. as a Legislative body does not stand on
the people. 2. [13] it is a single body. 1. He would not repeat the
remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation. he
would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison
contaminating every branch of Govt. In G. Britain where this poison has
had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely
to the purity of Her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are
neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty
of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the
mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any
parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at present. But it
is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B.
are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influence must
also be stronger in small than [14] large bodies of men. When Lord
Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been
seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was
not Holland, but one of the smallest of them. There are facts among
ourselves which are known to all. Passing over others, he [15] will only
remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public was
defeated not by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress is a
single Legislature. Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes,
sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no
danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it.
If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither
liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it
within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House
there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of
those who compose it.

On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan
reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers
in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a
plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must
divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man
will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves
till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of
Rome first Caesar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings
of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of
dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time
he wd. not he sd. proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he
had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves: and on a decision of them, the
fate of the others will depend.

Mr. PINKNEY, the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an
equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Natil.
system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in
recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the evils which
produced this Convention.

Mr. ELSEWORTH proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind
of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the U.
S. should remain in Congs." This was not seconded though it seemed
better calculated for the purpose than the 1st. proposition of Mr.
Patterson in place of which Mr. E. wished to substitute it.

Mr. RANDOLPH, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the
salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our
trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong
colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of
delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the
sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the
Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as
each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for
it to have charged the existing Constitution with all the vices which it
might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this
experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it
was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the
uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly
seasons [16] of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be
dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He wd. not as far as
depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The
present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.

The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or
introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been
fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by
which the end of a Genl. Govt. can be attained: the 1st. is [17] by
coercion as proposed by Mr. P.s plan 2. [18] by real legislation as
propd. by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable,
expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate the
instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the spoils of their fellow
Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of ambition.
We must resort therefor to a National [19] Legislation over individuals,
for which Congs. are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be
blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the recd. maxim
on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Congs. has
been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body.
Congs. are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures
who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their
own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the
views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the
U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade,
naturalization &c. -- for crushing rebellion.

Whenever it may rear its crest -- and for certain other general
benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes, can never be
given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in point of representation,
elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing no more confidence
than they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary,
his own experience satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress
pretty generally prevailed. A Natl. Govt. alone, properly constituted,
will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered that the
present is the last moment for establishing one. After this select
experiment, the people will yield to despair.

The Committee rose & the House adjourned.

___________

1. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "agst."

3. The figure "1" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

4. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "for" is substituted in the transcript for "of."

8. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

9. The word "a" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

10. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The transcript does not italicize the word "States."

13. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

14. The word "in" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The word "we" is substituted in the transcript for "he."

16. The words "certainly seasons" are transposed to read "seasons
certainly" in the transcript; but the word "seasons" was erroneously
printed "reasons," which error has been followed in other editions of
Madison's notes.

17. The word "is" is omitted in the transcript.

18. The figure "2" is changed to "the second" in the transcript.

19. The transcript italicizes the word "National."

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MONDAY  JUNE 18th.  IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON THE PROPOSITIONS OF
Mr. PATTERSON & Mr. RANDOLPH

On motion of Mr. DICKINSON to postpone the 1st. Resolution in Mr.
Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz -- "that the
Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to
render the Government of the U.S. adequate to the exigences, the
preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was
agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.

Mr. HAMILTON, had been hitherto silent on the business before the
Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age &
experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to
theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own
State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues, he could by
no means accede. The crisis however which now marked our affairs, was
too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty
imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety &
happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to
both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being
fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the
States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the
purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the
amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any
general sovereignty that could be substituted. -- As to the powers of
the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen
from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A federal Govt. he conceived
to mean an association of independent Communities into one. Different
Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different
ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies;
in others over individuals, as in the German Diet -- & among ourselves
in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the
signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from
the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate
eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman
from Va. [Mr. R.] that we owed it to our Country, to do on this
emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The States
sent us here to provide for the exigences of the Union. To rely on &
propose any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because it was
not [1] clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to
the end. It may be said that the States can not ratify a plan not within
the purview of the article of [2] Confederation providing for
alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no
constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the
Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In
the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the
Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the people
& ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason
assigned agst. it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient
shackle.

The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of
our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two
plans -- prove that there were essential defects in both -- and point
out such changes as might render a national one, efficacious. -- The
great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government are
I. an active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does
not exist in the States in favor of the federal Govt. They have
evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue
internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their
particular debts -- their particular plans of finance &c. All these when
opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of
Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are
applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a
disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part
with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition
of their demagogues is known to hate the controul of the Genl.
Government. It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not that
anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Genl. Govt. as of the particular
Govts. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former would
still leave the purposes of Govt. attainable to a considerable degree.
Consider what such a State as Virga. will be in a few years, a few
compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its
importance & self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people.
The whole force of this tie is on the side of the State Govt. Its
sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection
is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and
all those acts which familiarize & endear [3] Govt. to a people, are
dispensed to them. 4. Force by which may be understood a coertion of
laws or coertion of arms. Congs. have not the former except in few
cases. In particular States, this coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he
held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military
force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Masss. is now
feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force
be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a
war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle
spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a
dissolution of the Union ensue. 5. influence. he did not mean
corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments,
which produce an attachment to the Govt. Almost all the weight of these
is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States
continue to exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition,
interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall
into the current of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the
Genl. Govt. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the
Genl. Govt. and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious.
Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic
Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in
particular the power of fining and using force agst. delinquent members.
What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The
Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking
advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their
Councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy
affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as
great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising
their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of,
encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal
sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its
head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a
striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other
examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce
any Union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another
-- How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat
sovereignty in the general Governmt. as will turn all the strong
principles & passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of N.
Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy
whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect
of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives
a direct revenue to Congs. but this will not be sufficient. The balance
can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves can not be
relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also
deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as
they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and
countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so
unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia: France or Engd.
with other countries of Europe. Pena. with N. Carola. will the relative
pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative
value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like
comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally
unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different
Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much
depends too on situation. Cont. N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being
commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones,
can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They
will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the
Union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be
drawn? from Commerce? even from exports which notwithstanding the common
opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These
tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destructive
ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so much
desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va. & the
large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd. long
abide by it. It shocks too much the [4] ideas of Justice, and every
human feeling. Bad principles in a Govt. tho slow are sure in their
operation and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether
Congs. at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace.
He leans to the negative. Mr. Ps. plan provides no remedy. -- If the
powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Congs. is such that
they could never be properly & effectually exercised. The members of
Congs. being chosen by the States & subject to recall, represent all the
local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from
time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be
established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves
itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed
up by them. It is agst. all the principles of a good Government to vest
the requisite powers in such a body as Congs. Two Sovereignties can not
co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Congs. must eventuate
in a bad Govt. or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not
do. What then is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the
Country to be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a general Govt
was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence on
the side of the State Govts. as the case would admit. If they were
extinguished, he was persuaded that great oeconomy might be obtained by
substituting a general Govt. He did not mean however to shock the public
opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw no other
necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great
purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities
he was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals:
corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive
apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a
serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing
representatives from the extremes to the center of the Community. What
inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the
1st. branch would [5] only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars
or thereabouts he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate he feared
from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers who wish
for particular offices under the Govt. This view of the subject almost
led to him despair that a Republican Govt. could be established over so
great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it would be
unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion he had
no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many
of the wise & good, that the British Govt. was the best in the world:
and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in
America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in
this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject
which had taken place and was still going on. It was once thought that
the power of Congs. was amply sufficient to secure the end of their
institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most
tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in
declaiming agst. the vices of democracy. This progress of the public
mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself
would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British
Constitution, namely, that it is the only Govt. in the world "which
unites public strength with individual security." -- In every community
where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the
few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be
debtors & creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress
the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both
therefore ought to have [6] power, that each may defend itself agst. the
other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws
&c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of
their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble institution.
Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest by
means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest,
they form a permanent barrier agst. every pernicious innovation, whether
attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary
Senate will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The Senate [of
Maryland] which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been
sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager, in the late
appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they would would have
yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof
of it. -- Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary
checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions.
They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an
adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence &
turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Govt. is
pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild fire,
and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N.
England States whether experience had not there verified the remark. --
As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be
established on Republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits
of the question: for can there be a good Govt. without a good Executive.
The English model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary
interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his
personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of
being corrupted from abroad -- and at the same time was both
sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the
purpose of the institution at home. one of the weak sides of Republics
was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little
character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermedling
Neibours. Sweeden was a striking instance. The French & English had each
their parties during the late Revolution which was effected by the
predominant influence of the former. -- What is the inference from all
these observations? That we ought to go as far in order to attain
stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one
branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least during
good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the
feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would
induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public
trust would require, so so as to ensure the services of the best
Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a
weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a
Republican Govt., it will be asked? Yes if all the Magistrates are
appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of
election originating with the people. He was sensible that an Executive
constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power
and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of
appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but
little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures;
and as the object of his ambition wd. be to prolong his power, it is
probable that in case of a [7] war, he would avail himself of the
emergence, [8] to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An
Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and
will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected
probably, that such an Executive will be an elective Monarch, and will
give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Govt. He wd.
reply that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree
or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate wd. be a monarch for
life -- the other propd. by the Report from the Comtte of the whole, wd.
be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was
also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that
elective monarchies wd. be the best if they could be guarded agst. the
tumults excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not
sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this
character of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular
cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Emperors was
made by the Army. In Poland the election is made by great rival princes
with independent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In the
German Empire, the appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who
have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not
such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as will defend the
community agst. these effects in any dangerous degree? Having made these
observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he
shd. prefer to either of those under consideration. He was aware that it
went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted
out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other
plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union
dissolving or already dissolved -- he sees evils operating in the States
which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies -- he
sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in
the public mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be
unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will
themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr. R. wd.
place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did
not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the
Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas,
and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the
plan of Mr. R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read
[9] his sketch in the words following: towit

I. "The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be
vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the
Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature
of the United States with power to pass all laws whatsoever subject to
the Negative hereafter mentioned.

II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to serve
for three years.

III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good
behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose
by the people: in order to this the States to be divided into election
districts. On the death, removal or resignation of any Senator his place
to be filled out of the district from which he came.

IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in
a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour -- the election
to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts
aforesaid -- The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as
follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the
execution of all laws passed, to have the direction of war when
authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the
Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of
the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and
Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers
(Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or
rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences
except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the
Senate.

V. On the death, resignation or removal of the Governour his authorities
to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor be
appointed.

VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the power of
advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting
all appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of the
departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.

VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in Judges to hold their
offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries. This
Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an
appellative jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the
general Government or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.

VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute
Courts in each State for the determination of all matters of general
concern.

IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to be
liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction
to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding any place of trust
or profit -- All impeachments to be tried by a Court to consist of the
Chief or Judge of the superior Court of Law of each State, provided such
Judge shall hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent
salary.

X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or
laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent
such laws being passed, the Governour or president of each State shall
be appointed by the General Government and shall have a negative upon
the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is [10] Governour
or President.

XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the Militia of all
the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United
States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.

On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations [11]
corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.

[12] Committee rose & the House Adjourned.

___________

1. The word "not" is blotted in the notes but is retained because it is
in the transcript.

2. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "all" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

5. The word "could" is substituted in the transcript for "would."

6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.

8. The word "emergence" is changed to "emergency" in the transcript.

9. The word "reads" is substituted in the transcript for "read."

10. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the following footnote was inserted with reference
mark after "observations": "The speech introducing the plan, as above
taken down & written out was seen by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its
correctness, with one or two verbal changes, which were made as he
suggested. The explanatory observations which did not immediately
follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H. who did not find leisure
at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained. "Judge Yates,
in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the
introductory observations of Mr. Hamilton (under date of June 19th, a
typographical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that
Mr. Hamilton, in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made
the remark attributed to him by Judge Yates, that they were 'but pork
still with a little change of sauce.'"

12. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TEUSDAY  JUNE 19th.  IN COMMITTEE OF [1] WHOLE ON THE PROPOSITIONS OF
MR. PATTERSON

The substitute offered yesterday by Mr. Dickenson being rejected by a
vote now taken on it; Con. N. Y. N. J. Del. ay. [2] Mas. Pa. V. N. C. S.
C. Geo. no. [3] Mayd. divided.

Mr. PATTERSON's plan was again at large before the Committee.

Mr. MADISON. Much stress had [4] been laid by some gentlemen on the want
of power in the Convention to propose any other than a federal plan. To
what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the
characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this objection.
One characteristic, was that in a federal Government, the power was
exercised not on the people individually; [5] but on the people
collectively, on the States. Yet in some instances as in piracies,
captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances, the
amendments to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must operate immediately on
individuals. The other characteristic was that a federal Govt. derived
its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the States
which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the other side.
In two of the States, Connect. and Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs.
were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at large; and
the plan of Mr. P. intended no change in this particular.

It had been alledged [by Mr. Patterson], that the Confederation having
been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous
Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts?
does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of
Confederation? If we consider the federal union as analogous to the
fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which
must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of
the component members, it can not be said that no dissolution of the
compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the
fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would
certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the
breach of any article by any of the parties, does not set the others at
liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the compact itself,
and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indifinite authority
to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circumstance
shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as analogous to the
social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a Majority would have
a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the
whole, which the Gentn. from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit.
If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the social compacts
among individual men: but to the conventions among individual States.
What is the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly,
according to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any
one article, by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty,
to consider the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather
to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties
indeed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular
articles shall not have this consequence, and even that particular
articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is [6]
understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any
exceptions of this sort to the Articles of confederation? So far from it
that there is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used
to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He
observed that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous &
notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself; by
which she expressly refused to comply with a constitutional requisition
of Congs. and yielded no farther to the expostulations of their
deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without passing any
positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences
from these observations. He thought it proper however that the true
nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was
not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now stands.
Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patterson's plan, he stated the
object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1. [7] to preserve the Union. 2.
[7] to provide a Governmt. that will remedy the evils felt by the States
both in their united and individual capacities. Examine Mr. P.s plan, &
say whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.

1. Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties
which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign
wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested
in sundry instances. The files of Congs. contain complaints already,
from almost every nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto
indulgence has been shewn to us. This can not be the permanent
disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the
greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually
provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring
them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does not sufficiently
provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not supply
the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrouled as ever.

2. Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to
such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves,
as well [8] in every other confederated republic antient and Modern. By
the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs.
Yet in several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars
with them. In like manner no two or more States can form among
themselves any treaties &c. without the consent of Congs. Yet Virga. &
Maryd. in one instance -- Pena. & N. Jersey in another, have entered
into compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. No
State again can of right raise troops in time of peace without the like
consent. Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the most
scrupulous observance. Has not Massts, notwithstanding, the most
powerful member of the Union, already raised a body of troops? Is she
not now augmenting them, without having even deigned to apprise Congs.
of Her intention? In fine -- Have we not seen the public land dealt out
to Cont. to bribe her acquiescence in the decree constitutionally
awarded agst. her claim on the territory of Pena.? for no other possible
motive can account for the policy of Congs. in that measure? -- If we
recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of
them the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the
whole. He then reviewed the Amphyctionic & Achaean confederacies among
the antients, and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns,
tracing their analogy to the U. States -- in the constitution and extent
of their federal authorities -- in the tendency of the particular
members to usurp on these authorities; and to bring confusion & ruin on
the whole. -- He observed that the plan of Mr. Pat-son besides omitting
a controul over the States as a general defence of the federal
prerogatives was particularly defective in two of its provisions. 1. [9]
Its ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the
legislatures. It could not therefore render the Acts of Congs. in
pursuance of their powers, even legally paramount to the Acts of the
States. 2. [10] It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate
jurisdiction only -- even in the criminal cases enumerated, The
necessity of any such provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals
[11] in the State tribunals. Of what avail cd. [12] an appellate
tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides in most if not all of the
States, the Executives have by their respective Constitutions the right
of pardg. How could this be taken from them by a legislative [13]
ratification only?

3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of the e
enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virga. & Maryland
which give [14] a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the
Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the
Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper money &
other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States relatively to one
an other being each of them either Debtor or Creditor; The creditor
States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. We
have seen retaliating acts on this subject which threatened danger not
to the harmony only, but the tranquility of the Union. The plan of Mr.
Paterson, not giving even a negative on the acts of the States, left
them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects
agst. each other.

4. Will it secure the internal tranquility of the States themselves? The
insurrections in Massts. admonished all the States of the danger to
which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr. P. contained no provisions
for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point. According
to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both vested in the
majority, are held to be synonimous. According to fact & experience, a
minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for the majority. 1.
[15] If the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill &
habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary
resources, one third may conquer the remaining two thirds. 2. [16] one
third of those who participate in the choice of rulers may be rendered a
majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from
a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons may [17] be more ready to join the
standard of sedition than that of the [18] established Government. 3.
[19] where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more
fallacious.

5. Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to the
particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the political
system of the U.S. it is proper to take into view those which prevail
within the States individually as well as those which affect them
collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the whole; and there is
great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full share in
the motives which produced the present Convention. Under this head he
enumerated and animadverted on 1. [20] the multiplicity of the laws
passed by the several States. 2. [20] the mutability of their laws. 3.
[20] the injustice of them. 4. [21] the impotence of them: observing
that Mr. Patterson's plan contained no remedy for this dreadful class of
evils, and could not therefore be received as an adequate provision for
the exigences of the Community.

6. Will it secure the Union agst. the influence of foreign powers over
its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet
been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would
produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the
intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the
Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: among the
Achaeans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among
the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the
members of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia -- : and
in the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan
of Mr. Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the
will of the particular States, left the door open for the like
pernicious machinations among ourselves.

7. He begged the smaller States which were most attached to Mr.
Pattersons plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them.
In the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of
maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if
they were willing to bear this burden, no others had a right to
complain. As far as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a
representation, by which the public business was delayed, it was
evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of
Congress would satisfy every one that the public business had been
frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most frequently
unrepresented in Congs. were not the larger States. He reminded the
convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State the burden
of maintaining a Representation in Congs. During a considerable period
of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in whom alone before
the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after
that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen &
Resident of Pena. and held an office in his own State incompatible with
an appointment from it to Conga. During another period, the same State
was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penna.
and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been
intended to avoid the burden of supporting delegates from their own
State. But whatever might have been ye. cause, was not in effect the
vote of one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it?
In the 2d. place The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan
depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will
be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He
illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic
Confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb wch.
could entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.

8. He begged them to consider the situation in which they would remain
in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should
prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was
painful; but it would be prudent to submit to the task of examining it
at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be the more readily
embraced. Let the Union of the States be dissolved, and one of two
consequences must happen. Either the States must remain individually
independent & sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed
among them. In the first event would the small States be more secure
agst. the ambition & power of their larger neighbours, than they would
be under a general Government pervading with equal energy every part of
the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part agst.
every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect that their
larger neighbours would confederate with them on the principle of the
present confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or
that they would exact less severe concessions from the smaller States,
than are proposed in the scheme of Mr. Randolph?

The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this
could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by
both the gentlemen from N. Jersey [Mr. Brearly and Mr. Patterson] that
it would not be just to allow Virga. which was 16 times as large as
Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was that it would not be
safe for Delaware to allow Virga. 16 times as many votes. The expedient
proposed by them was that all the States should be thrown into one mass
and a new partition be made into 13 equal parts. Would such a scheme be
practicable? The dissimilarities existing in the rules of property, as
well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of the [22] different
States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been found
impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe
[K. of France] directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and
patriotic Ministers [Mr. Neckar] that any age has produced to equalize
in some points only the different usages & regulations of the different
provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and repartition of the
States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the smaller
States from a proportional representation to be real; would not a
particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neighbours, be
less inconvenient to the whole community, and equally effectual for
their own safety. If N. Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage
would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in which case
they would necessaryly form a junction with their neighbours, why might
not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty by the Constitution
to form such a junction whenever they pleased? And why should they wish
to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the
least, extremely difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States,
and when neither the inconveniency, [23] nor the benefit of the
expedient to themselves, would be lessened, by confining it to
themselves. -- The prospect of many new States to the Westward was
another consideration of importance. If they should come into the Union
at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants. If they
shd. be entitled to vote according to their proportions of inhabitants,
all would be right & safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more
objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.

On a question for postponing generally the 1st. proposition of Mr.
Patterson's plan, it was agreed to: N. Y. & N J. only being no -- 

On the question moved by Mr. King whether the Committee should rise &
Mr. Randolphs propositions be re-reported without alteration, which was
in fact a question whether Mr. R's should be adhered to as preferable to
those of Mr. Patterson:

Massts. ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [24]

Insert here from Printed Journal p. 13 [25] copy of the Resolns. of Mr.
R. as altered in the Come. and reported to the House [26]

[State of the resolutions submitted to the consideration of the House by
the honorable Mr. Randolph, as altered, amended, and agreed to, in a
Committee of the whole House.

1. Resolved that it is the opinion of this Committee that a national
government ought to be established consisting of a Supreme Legislative,
Judiciary, and Executive.

2. Resolved. that the national Legislature ought to consist of Two
Branches.

3. Resolved that the members of the first branch of the national
Legislature ought to be elected by the People of the several States for
the term of Three years. to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be
compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to be paid
out of the National Treasury. to be ineligible to any Office established
by a particular State or under the authority of the United-States
(except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch)
during the term of service, and under the national government for the
space of one year after it's expiration.

4. Resolved. that the members of the second Branch of the national
Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures. to be of
the age of thirty years at least. to hold their offices for a term
sufficient to ensure their independency, namely seven years. to receive
fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of
their time to public service -- to be paid out of the National Treasury
to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term of
service, and under the national government, for the space of one year
after it's expiration.

5. Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
acts.

6. Resolved. that the national Legislature ought to be empowered to
enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation --
and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are
incompetent: or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation. to negative all
laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the
national Legislature, the articles of union, or any treaties subsisting
under the authority of the union.

7. Resolved. that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the
national Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established
in the articles of confederation: but according to some equitable ratio
of representation -- namely, in proportion to the whole number of white
and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition
including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths
of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description,
except Indians, not paying taxes in each State.

8. Resolved. that the right of suffrage in the second branch of the
national Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for
the first.

9. Resolved. that a national Executive be instituted to consist of a
single person. to be chosen by the National Legislature. for the term of
seven years. with power to carry into execution the national Laws, to
appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise provided for to be ineligible
a second time, and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal
practice or neglect of duty. to receive a fixed stipend, by which he may
be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid
out of the national Treasury.

10. Resolved. that the national executive shall have a right to negative
any legislative act: which shall not be afterwards passed unless by two
third parts of each branch of the national Legislature.

11. Resolved. that a national Judiciary be established to consist of One
Supreme Tribunal. The Judges of which to be appointed by the second
Branch of the National Legislature. to hold their offices during good
behaviour to receive, punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation
for their services: in which no encrease or diminution shall be made so
as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such encrease
or diminution.

12. Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals.

13. Resolved. that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall
extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue:
impeachments of any national officers: and questions which involve the
national peace and harmony.

14. Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the admission of
States, lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether
from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise,
with the consent of a number of voices in the national Legislature less
than the whole.

15. Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities until a given day after the reform of the
articles of Union shall be adopted; and for the completion of all their
engagements.

16. Resolved that a republican constitution, and its existing laws,
ought to be guaranteed to each State by the United States.

17. Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.

18. Resolved. that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers
within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the
articles of Union.

19. Resolved. that the amendments which shall be offered to the
confederation by the Convention, ought at a proper time or times, after
the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies
of representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures, to be
expressly chosen by the People to consider and decide thereon.

(Of [27] Mr. Randolph's plan as reported from the Committee) [28]. the
1. propos: "that a Natl. Govt. ought to be established consisting &c."
being taken up in the House. [29]

Mr. WILSON observed that by a Natl. Govt. he did not mean one that would
swallow up the State Govts. as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He
was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He thought, contrary
to the opinion of [Col. Hamilton] that they might not only subsist but
subsist on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely
necessary for certain purposes which the former could not reach. All
large Governments must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions. As
Examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and particularly the divisions &
subdivisions of England by Alfred.

Col. HAMILTON coincided with the proposition as it stood in the Report.
He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he
meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National & State
Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority.
If it were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually
subvert it. Even as Corporations the extent of some of them as Va.
Massts. &c. would be formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be
abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them, subordinate
jurisdictions. The examples of Persia & the Roman Empire, cited by [Mr.
Wilson] were he thought in favor of his doctrine: the great powers
delegated to the Satraps & proconsuls, having frequently produced
revolts, and schemes of independence.

Mr. KING, wished as every thing depended on this proposition, that no
objections might be improperly indulged agst. the phraseology of it. He
conceived that the import of the terms "States" "Sovereignty" "national"
"federal," had been often used & applied in the discussions inaccurately
& delusively. The States were not "Sovereigns" in the sense contended
for by some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty,
they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances nor treaties.
Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not
speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could
not hear any propositions from such Sovereign. They had not even the
organs or faculties of defence or offence, for they could not of
themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war. On the other side,
if the Union of the States comprizes the idea of a confederation, it
comprizes that also of consolidation. A Union of the States is a Union
of the men composing them, from whence a national character results to
the whole. Congs. can act alone without the States -- they can act &
their acts will be binding agst. the Instructions of the States. If they
declare war: war is de jure declared -- captures made in pursuance of it
are lawful -- No acts of the States can vary the situation, or prevent
the judicial consequences. If the States therefore retained some portion
of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested themselves of
essential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in some respects
-- they formed a Nation in others -- The Convention could clearly
deliberate on & propose any alterations that Congs. could have done
under ye. federal articles, and could not Congs. propose by virtue of
the last article, a change in any article whatever: and as well that
relating to the equality of suffrage, as any other. He made these
remarks to obviate some scruples which had been expressed. He doubted
much the practicability of annihilating the States; but thought that
much of their power ought to be taken from them. Mr. MARTIN, said he
considered that the separation from G. B. placed the 13 States in a
state of Nature towards each other; that they would have remained in
that state till this time, but for the confederation; that they entered
into the confederation on the footing of equality; that they met now to
to amend it on the same footing; and that he could never accede to a
plan that would introduce an inequality and lay 10 States at the mercy
of Va. Massts. and Penna.

Mr. WILSON, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became
independent of G. Britain, they became independent also of each other.
He read the declaration of Independence, observing thereon that the
United Colonies were declared to be free & independent States; and
inferring that they were independent, not individually but Unitedly and
that they were confederated as they were independent, States.

Col. HAMILTON, assented to the doctrine of Mr. Wilson. He denied the
doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature He was not
yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy, could be
dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met
now on an equal footing but could see no inference from that against
concerting a change of the system in this particular. He took this
occasion of observing for the purpose of appeasing the fears of the
small States, that two circumstances would render them secure under a
National Govt. in which they might lose the equality of rank they now
held: one was the local situation of the 3 largest States Virga. Masts.
& Pa. They were separated from each other by distance of place, and
equally so, by all the peculiarities which distinguish the interests of
one State from those of another. No combination therefore could be
dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the States
from Va. the largest down to Delaware the smallest, it would always
happen that ambitious combinations among a few States might & wd. be
counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest.
No combination has been seen among [30] large Counties merely as such,
agst. lesser Counties. The more close the Union of the States, and the
more compleat the authority of the whole: the less opportunity will be
allowed [31] the stronger States to injure the weaker.

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "The" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The figure "4" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The figure "6" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "has" is substituted in the transcript for "had."

5. The transcript italicizes the word "individually."

6. The words "in general is" are transposed to read "is in general" in
the transcript.

7. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

8. The word "as" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.

10. The figure "2" is changed to "and in the second place" in the
transcript.

11. The transcript uses the word "acquittals" in the singular.

12. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "cd."

13. The word "legislative" is not italicized in the transcript.

14. The word "gave" is substituted in the transcript for "give."

15. The figure "1" is changed to "in the first place" in the transcript.

16. The figure "2" is changed to "in the second place" in the transcript.

17. The word "must" is substituted in the transcript for "may".

18. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

19. The figure "3" is changed to "and in the third place."

20. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "first," "secondly," and
"thirdly" in the transcript.

21. The figure "4" is changed to "and fourthly" in the transcript.

22. The word "the" is crossed out in the transcript.

23. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

24. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 3; Maryland divided."

25. Found at page 134 instead of page 13, and here printed from the
original manuscript deposited in the Department of State by President
Washington.

26. Madison's direction concerning Mr. Randolph's Resolutions and the
Resolutions themselves are omitted in the transcript.

27. The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.

28. The words "June 13 being before the house" are here inserted in the
transcript.

29. The words "in the House" are omitted in the transcript.

30. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

31. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

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WEDNESDAY  JUNE 20, 1787. [1]   IN CONVENTION

Mr. William Blount from N. Carolina took his seat.

1st. propos: [2] of the Report of Come. of the whole [3] before the
House.

Mr. ELSEWORTH 2ded. by Mr. GORHAM, moves to alter it so as to run "that
the Government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme
legislative, Executive and Judiciary." This alteration he said would
drop the word national, and retain the proper title "the United States."
He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of any of the federal
articles could dissolve the whole. It would be highly dangerous not to
consider the Confederation as still subsisting. He wished also the plan
of the Convention to go forth as an amendment to [4] the articles of [5]
Confederation, since under this idea the authority of the Legislatures
could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be so too. If
the plan goes forth to the people for ratification several succeeding
Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did not like
these conventions. They were better fitted to pull down than to build up
Constitutions.

Mr. RANDOLPH, did not object to the change of expression, but apprised
the gentlemen [6] who wished for it that he did not admit it for the
reasons assigned; particularly that of getting rid of a reference to the
people for ratification. The motion of Mr. Ellsewth. was acquiesced in
nem: con:

The 2d. Resol: "that the national Legislature ought to consist of two
branches" [7] taken up, the word "national" struck out as of course.

Mr. LANSING, observed that the true question here was, whether the
Convention would adhere to or depart from the foundation of the present
Confederacy; and moved instead of the 2d. Resolution, "that the powers
of Legislation be vested in the U. States in Congress." He had already
assigned two reasons agst. such an innovation as was proposed: 1 [8] the
want of competent powers in the Convention. -- 2. [8] the state of the
public mind. It had been observed by [Mr. Madison] in discussing the
first point, that in two States the Delegates to Congs. were chosen by
the people. Notwithstanding the first appearance of this remark, it had
in fact no weight, as the Delegates however chosen, did not represent
the people merely as so many individuals; but as forming a Sovereign
State. [Mr. Randolph] put it, he said, on its true footing namely that
the public safety superseded the scruple arising from the review of our
powers. But in order to feel the force of this consideration, the same
impression must be had of the public danger. He had not himself the same
impression, and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. [Mr. Wilson]
contended that as the Convention were only to recommend, they might
recommend what they pleased. He differed much from him. Any act whatever
of so respectable a body must have a great effect, and if it does not
succeed, will be a source of great dissentions. He admitted that there
was no certain criterion of the public mind on the subject. He therefore
recurred to the evidence of it given by the opposition in the States to
the scheme of an Impost. It could not be expected that those possessing
Sovereignty could ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be
expected from any one State, much less from thirteen. He proceeded to
make some observations on the plan itself and the argumts. urged in
support of it. The point of Representation could receive no elucidation
from the case of England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed
from their comparative smallness: but from the actual fewness of the
inhabitants, some of them not having more than one or two. A great
inequality existed in the Counties of England. Yet the like complaint of
peculiar corruption in the small ones had not been made. It had been
said that Congress represent the State prejudices: will not any other
body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of the States, also
represent their prejudices? It had been asserted by his colleague [Col.
Hamilton] that there was no coincidence of interests among the large
States that ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it
were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among the States,
there was equal safety for all of them, whether the representation
remained as heretofore, or were proportioned as now proposed. It is
proposed that the Genl. Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of
the States. Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a
task? there will on the most moderate calculation, be as many Acts sent
up from the States as there are days in the year. Will the members of
the general Legislature be competent Judges? Will a gentleman from
Georgia be a Judge of the expediency of a law which is to operate in N.
Hamshire. Such a Negative would be more injurious than that of Great
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National Govt. must have the
influence arising from the grant of offices and honors. In order to
render such a Government effectual be believed such an influence to be
necessary. But if the States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse
than in vain to make the proposition. If this influence is to be
attained, the States must be entirely abolished. Will any one say this
would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any Genl. Government equally
beneficial to all can be attained. That now under consideration he is
sure, must be utterly unattainable. He had another objection. The system
was too novel & complex. No man could foresee what its operation will be
either with respect to the Genl. Govt. or the State Govts. One or other
it has been surmised must absorb the whole.

Col. MASON, did not expect this point would have been reagitated. The
essential differences between the two plans, had been clearly stated.
The principal objections agst. that of Mr. R. were the want of power &
the want of practicability. There can be no weight in the first as the
fiat is not to be here, but in the people. He thought with his colleague
Mr. R. that there were besides certain crisises, in which all the
ordinary cautions yielded to public necessity. He gave as an example,
the eventual Treaty with G.B. in forming which the Comrs. of the U. S.
had boldly disregarded the improvident shackles of Congs. had given to
their Country an honorable & happy peace, and instead of being censured
for the transgression of their powers, had raised to themselves a
monument more durable than brass. The impracticability of gaining the
public concurrence he thought was still more groundless. [Mr. Lansing]
had cited the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement of their
powers, and had inferred from the miscarriage of these attempts, the
hopelessness of the plan which he [Mr. L] opposed. He thought a very
different inference ought to have been drawn; viz that the plan which
[Mr. L] espoused, and which proposed to augment the powers of Congress,
never could be expected to succeed. He meant not to throw any
reflections on Congs. as a body, much less on any particular members of
it. He meant however to speak his sentiments without reserve on this
subject; it was a privilege of Age, and perhaps the only compensation
which nature had given for the privation of so many other enjoyments:
and he should not scruple to exercise it freely. Is it to be thought
that the people of America, so watchful over their interests; so jealous
of their liberties, will give up their all, will surrender both the
sword and the purse, to the same body, and that too not chosen
immediately by themselves? They never will. They never ought. Will they
trust such a body, with the regulation of their trade, with the
regulation of their taxes; with all the other great powers, which are in
contemplation? Will they give unbounded confidence to a secret Journal
-- to the intrigues -- to the factions which in the nature of things
appertain to such an Assembly? If any man doubts the existence of these
characters of Congress, let him consult their Journals for the years 78,
79, & 80. -- It will be said, that if the people are averse to parting
with power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to a National
Legislature. The proper answer is that in this case they do not part
with power: they only transfer it from one sett of immediate
Representatives to another sett. -- Much has been said of the unsettled
state of the mind of the people, he believed the mind of the people of
America, as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points; but settled as
to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled. 1. [9] in an
attachment to Republican Government. 2. [9] in an attachment to more
than one branch in the Legislature. Their constitutions accord so
generally in both these circumstances, that they seem almost to have
been preconcerted. This must either have been a miracle, or have
resulted from the genius of the people. The only exceptions to the
establishmt. of two branches in the Legislatures are the State of Pa. &
Congs. and the latter the only single one not chosen by the people
themselves. What has been the consequence? The people have been
constantly averse to giving that Body further powers -- It was
acknowledged by [Mr. Patterson] that his plan could not be enforced
without military coertion. Does he consider the force of this
concession. The most jarring elements of Nature; fire & water themselves
are not more incompatible that [10] such a mixture of civil liberty and
military execution. Will the militia march from one State to [11]
another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent
members of the Republic? Will they maintain an army for this purpose?
Will not the Citizens of the invaded State assist one another till they
rise as one Man, and shake off the Union altogether. Rebellion is the
only case, in which the military force of the State can be properly
exerted agst. its Citizens. In one point of view he was struck with
horror at the prospect of recurring to this expedient. To punish the
non-payment of taxes with death, was a severity not yet adopted by
despotism itself: yet this unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to
a military collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no
discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. He took this
occasion to repeat, that notwithstanding his solicitude to establish a
national Government, he never would agree to abolish the State Govts. or
render them absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the
Genl. Govt. and he would be equally careful to preserve them. He was
aware of the difficulty of drawing the line between them, but hoped it
was not insurmountable. The Convention, tho' comprising so many
distinguished characters, could not be expected to make a faultless
Govt. And he would prefer trusting to posterity the amendment of its
defects, rather than to push the experiment too far.

Mr. LUTHER MARTIN agreed with [Col Mason] as to the importance of the
State Govts. he would support them at the expence of the Genl. Govt.
which was instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw no
necessity for two branches, and if it existed Congress might be
organized into two. He considered Congs as representing the people,
being chosen by the Legislatures who were chosen by the people. At any
rate, Congress represented the Legislatures; and it was the Legislatures
not the people who refused to enlarge their powers. Nor could the rule
of voting have been the ground of objection, otherwise ten of the States
must always have been ready, to place further confidence in Congs. The
causes of repugnance must therefore be looked for elsewhere. -- At the
separation from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the
establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties instead
of incorporating themselves into one: to these they look up for the
security of their lives, liberties & properties: to these they must look
up. The federal Govt. they formed, to defend the whole agst. foreign
nations, in case of war, and to defend the lesser States agst. the
ambition of the larger: they are afraid of granting powers [12]
unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union;
lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the
particular States which the Union was meant to support; and expose the
lesser to being swallowed up by the larger. He conceived also that the
people of the States having already vested their powers in their
respective Legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of
their governments. He was agst. Conventions in the States: was not agst.
assisting States agst. rebellious subjects; thought the federal plan of
Mr. Patterson did not require coercion more than the National one, as
the latter must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on
requisitions & quotas, and that a national Judiciary extended into the
States would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy
inconsistent with its usefulness.

Mr. SHERMAN 2ded & supported Mr. Lansings motion. He admitted two
branches to be necessary in the State Legislatures, but saw no necessity
for them in a Confederacy of States. The examples were all, of a single
Council. Congs. carried us thro' the war, and perhaps as well as any
Govt. could have done. The complaints at present are not that the views
of Congs. are unwise or unfaithful; but that their powers are
insufficient for the execution of their views. The national debt & the
want of power somewhere to draw forth the National resources, are the
great matters that press. All the States were sensible of the defect of
power in Congs. He thought much might be said in apology for the failure
of the State Legislatures to comply with the confederation. They were
afraid of bearing too hard on the people, by accumulating taxes; no
constitutional rule had been or could be observed in the quotas -- the
accounts also were unsettled & every State supposed itself in advance,
rather than in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due
amount had not been drawn from trade which was the most convenient
resource. As almost all the States had agreed to the recommendation of
Congs. on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were
willing to trust Congs. with power to draw revenue from Trade. There is
no weight therefore in the argument drawn from a distrust of Congs. for
money matters being the most important of all, if the people will trust
them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other
necessary powers. Congs. indeed by the confederation have in fact the
right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it
shall be applied: and this right was granted to them in the expectation
that it would in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be
added to Congs. to be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass.
The people would not much interest themselves in the elections, a few
designing men in the large districts would carry their points, and the
people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than
in Congs. He saw no reason why the State Legislatures should be
unfriendly as had been suggested, to Congs. If they appoint Congs. and
approve of their measures, they would be rather favorable and partial to
them. The disparity of the States in point of size he perceived was the
main difficulty. But the large States had not yet suffered from the
equality of votes enjoyed by the small ones. In all great and general
points, the interests of all the States were the same. The State of
Virga. notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation
without, or [13] even proposing, any alteration. Massts. also ratified
without any material difficulty &c. In none of the ratifications is the
want of two branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the States
as some had proposed would dissolve our Treaties with foreign Nations,
which had been formed with us, as confederated States. He did not
however suppose that the creation of two branches in the Legislature
would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of
representation can not be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two
branches, and a proportional representation in one of them; provided
each State had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to secure
the rights of the lesser States; otherwise three or four of the large
States would rule the others as they please. Each State like each
individual had its peculiar habits usages and manners, which constituted
its happiness. It would not therefore give to others a power over this
happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.
Mr. WILSON, urged the necessity of two branches; observed that if a
proper model were [14] not to be found in other Confederacies it was not
to be wondered at. The number of them was small & the duration of some
at least short. The Amphyctionic & Achaean were formed in the infancy of
political Science; and appear by their History & fate, to have contained
radical defects. The Swiss & Belgic Confederacies were held together not
by any vital principle of energy but by the incumbent pressure of
formidable neighbouring nations: The German owed its continuance to the
influence of the H. of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for
the defects of our Confederacy. He had been 6 years in [15] the 12 since
the commencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt
all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others whether on
many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by
the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing
to other causes, than the Constitution of Congress. In many instances it
went on even agst. the difficulties arising from Congs. themselves. He
admitted that the large States did accede as had been stated, to the
Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity
not of choice. There are other instances of their yielding from the same
motive to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation
of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would
exist between the State Legislatures & the General Legislature:
observing that the members of the former would have views & feelings
very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private Citizen
of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the Genl. or
State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His
representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to
which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legisl: with the
eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congs. to the
people at large, had always been better received & produced greater
effect, than those made to the Legislatures.

On the question for postponing in order to take up Mr. Lansings
proposition "to vest the powers of Legislation in Congs."

Masst. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [16]

On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the 2d.
Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the whole was postponed
till tomorrow.

Adjd.

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The words "The first Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "1st. propos."

3. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "to."

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "gentlemen" is used in the singular in the transcript.

7. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

9. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

10. The word "than" is substituted in the transcript for "that."

11. The word "into" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

12. The transcript uses the word "powers" in the singular.

13. The word "or" is stricken out in the transcript.

14. The word "was" is substituted in the transcript for "were."

15. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6; Maryland divided."

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THURSDAY  JUNE 21.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. Jonathan Dayton from N. Jersey took his seat. [*1]

[3] DOCr. JOHNSON. On a comparison of the two plans which had been
proposed from Virginia & N. Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity
which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the
individuality of the States. The plan from Va. did not profess to
destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with such a
tendency. One Gentleman alone (Col. Hamilton) in his animadversions on
the plan of N. Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition
of the State Govts. Mr. Wilson & the gentlemen from Virga. who also were
adversaries of the plan of N. Jersey held a different language. They
wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, tho' a
subordinate jurisdiction. They had not yet however shewn how this cd.
consist with, or be secured agst. the general sovereignty &
jurisdiction, which they proposed to give to the national Government. If
this could be shewn in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the N.
Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be
endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this
could not be shewn their objections would have their full force. He
wished it therefore to be well considered whether in case the States, as
was proposed, shd. retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this
portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate
effectually in the Genl. Govt., without giving them each a distinct and
equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general
Councils.

Mr. WILSON's respect for Docr. Johnson, added to the importance of the
subject led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the
difficulty which had been started. It was asked how the Genl. Govt. and
individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each
other; and how the latter could be secured agst the former? Might it
not, on the other side be asked how the former was to be secured agst.
the latter? It was generally admitted that a jealousy & rivalship would
be felt between the Genl. & particular Govts. As the plan now stood,
tho' indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the Genl. Govt. (the
Senate or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures.
The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the Genl.
Govt. would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a
reciprocal opportunity to be given to the Genl. Govt. of defending
itself by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the
State Govts. If a security be necessary on one side, it wd. seem
reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more
general view, he saw no danger to the States from the Genl. Govt. In
case a combination should be made by the large ones it wd. produce a
general alarm among the rest; and the project wd. be frustrated. But
there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general
a similar interest, in case of any proposition [4] in the National
Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a
general alarm wd. take place in the National Legislature itself, that it
would communicate itself to the State Legislatures, and wd. finally
spread among the people at large. The Genl. Govt. will be as ready to
preserve the rights of the States as the latter are to preserve the
rights of individuals; all the members of the former, having a common
interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave
the State Govts. in possession of what the people wish them to retain.
He could not discover, therefore any danger whatever on the side from
which it had been [5] apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that in
spite of every precaution the general Govt. would be in perpetual danger
of encroachments from the State Govts.

Mr. MADISON was of the opinion [6] that there was 1. less danger of
encroachment from the Genl. Govt. than from the State Govts. 2. [7] that
the mischief from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the
former, than if made by the latter. 1. All the examples of other
confederacies prove the greater tendency in such systems to anarchy than
to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members than to [8] usurpations of
the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this
tendency. -- But it will be said that the proposed change in the
principles & form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the Genl.
Govt. will have real & greater powers, and will be derived in one branch
at least from the people, not from the Govts. of the States. To give
full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that
indefinite power should be given to the Genl. Legislature, and the
States reduced to corporations dependent on the Genl. Legislature; Why
shd. it follow that the Genl. Govt. wd. take from the States any branch
of their power as far as its operation was beneficial, and its
continuance desireable to the people? In some of the States,
particularly in Connecticut, all the Townships are incorporated, and
have a certain limited jurisdiction. Have the Representatives of the
people of the Townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavored
to despoil the Townships of any part of their local authority? As far as
this local authority is convenient to the people they are attached to
it; and their representatives chosen by & amenable to them naturally
respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any
other right or interest. The relation of a General Govt. to State Govts.
is parallel. 2. Guards were more necessary agst. encroachments of the
State Govts. on the Genl. Govt. than of the latter on the former. The
great objection made agst. an abolition of the State Govts. was that the
Genl. Govt. could not extend its care to all the minute objects which
fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as
stated lay not agst. the probable abuse of the general power, but agst.
the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent
of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as as its
operation would be practicable it could not in this view be improper; as
far as it would be impracticable, the conveniency [9] of the Genl. Govt.
itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of
subordinate Governments. Were it practicable for the Genl. Govt. to
extend its care to every requisite object without the cooperation of the
State Govts. the people would not be less free as members of one great
Republic than as members of thirteen small ones. A Citizen of Delaware
was not more free than a Citizen of Virginia: nor would either be more
free than a Citizen of America. Supposing therefore a tendency in the
Genl. Government to absorb the State Govts. no fatal [10] consequence
could result. Taking the reverse of [11] the supposition, that a
tendency should be left in the State Govts. towards an independence on
the General Govt. and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out.
The imagination of them, must have suggested to the States the
experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have
formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous
task. On the question for resolving "that the Legislature ought to
consist of two Branches"

Mass. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. Jersey no Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd.
Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

The third resolution of the Report [13] taken into consideration.

Genl. PINKNEY moved "that the 1st. branch, instead of being elected by
the people, shd. be elected in such manner as the Legislature of each
State should direct." He urged 1. [14] that this liberty would give more
satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accomodate the mode to the
conveniency [15] & opinions of the people. 2. [14] that it would avoid
the undue influence of large Counties which would prevail if the
elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode intended by
the Report of the Committee. 3. [14] that otherwise disputed elections
must be referred to the General Legislature which would be attended with
intolerable expence and trouble to the distant parts of the republic.

Mr. L. MARTIN seconded the Motion.

Col. HAMILTON considered the motion as intended manifestly to transfer
the election from the people to the State Legislatures, which would
essentially vitiate the plan. It would increase that State influence
which could not be too watchfully guarded agst. All too must admit the
possibility, in case the Genl. Govt. shd. maintain itself, that the
State Govts. might gradually dwindle into nothing. The system therefore
shd. not be engrafted on what might possibly fail.

Mr. MASON urged the necessity of retaining the election by the people.
Whatever inconveniency [16] may attend the democratic principle, it must
actuate one part of the Govt. It is the only security for the rights of
the people.

Mr. SHERMAN, would like an election by the Legislatures best, but is
content with [17] plan as it stands.

Mr. RUTLIDGE could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a
mediate & immediate election by the people. It was the same thing to act
by oneself, and to act by another. An election by the Legislature would
be more refined than an election immediately by the people: and would be
more likely to correspond with the sense of the whole community. If this
Convention had been chosen by the people in districts it is not to be
supposed that such proper characters would have been preferred. The
Delegates to Congs. he thought had also been fitter men than would have
been appointed by the people at large.

Mr. WILSON considered the election of the 1st. branch by the people not
only as the corner Stone, but as the foundation of the fabric: and that
the difference between a mediate & immediate election was immense. The
difference was particularly worthy of notice in this respect: that the
Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of the people; but
have an official sentiment opposed to that of the Genl. Govt. and
perhaps to that of the people themselves.

Mr. KING enlarged on the same distinction. He supposed the Legislatures
wd. constantly choose men subservient to their own views as contrasted
to the general interest; and that they might even devise modes of
election that wd. be subversive of the end in view. He remarked several
instances in which the views of a State might be at variance with those
of the Genl. Govt.: and mentioned particularly a competition between the
National & State debts, for the most certain & productive funds.

Genl. PINKNEY was for making the State Govts. a part of the General
System. If they were to be abolished, or lose their agency, S. Carolina
& other States would have but a small share of the benefits of Govt.

On the question for Genl. Pinkney motion to substitute election of [18]
1st. branch in such mode as the Legislatures should appoint, in stead of
its being elected by the people."

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. ay Geo. no. [19]

General PINKNEY then moved that the 1st. branch be elected by the people
in such mode as the Legislatures should direct; but waved it on its
being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in the
detail of the plan.

On the question for ye. election of the 1st. branch by the people."

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay Geo. ay. [20]

[18] Election of the 1st. branch "for the term of three years," [21]
considered

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to strike out, "three years" and insert "two years"
-- he was sensible that annual elections were a source of great
mischiefs in the States, yet it was the want of such checks agst. the
popular intemperence as were now proposed, that rendered them so
mischievous. He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the
extent of the U. S. and the inconveniency [22] which would result from
them to the representatives of the extreme parts of the Empire. The
people were attached to frequency of elections. All the Constitutions of
the States except that of S. Carolina, had established annual elections.

Mr. DICKENSON. The idea of annual elections was borrowed from the
antient usage of England, a country much less extensive than ours. He
supposed biennial would be inconvenient. He preferred triennial: and in
order to prevent the inconveniency [22] of an entire change of the whole
number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an annual election
of one third.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was opposed to three years, supposing that even one year
was preferable to two years. The people were fond of frequent elections
and might be safely indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved
for 1 year.

Mr. STRONG seconded & supported the motion.

Mr. WILSON being for making the 1st. branch an effectual representation
of the people at large, preferred an annual election of it. This
frequency was most familiar & pleasing to the people. It would be not
[23] more inconvenient to them, than triennial elections, as the people
in all the States have annual meetings with which the election of the
National representatives might be made to co-incide. He did not conceive
that it would be necessary for the Natl. Legisl: to sit constantly;
perhaps not half -- perhaps not one fourth of the year.

Mr. MADISON was persuaded that annual elections would be extremely
inconvenient and apprehensive that biennial would be too much so: he did
not mean inconvenient to the electors; but to the representatives. They
would have to travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts
of the Union; and would probably not be allowed even a reimbursement of
their expences. Besides, none of those who wished to be re-elected would
remain at the seat of Governmt.; confiding that their absence would not
affect them. The members of Congs. had done this with few instances of
disappointment. But as the choice was here to be made by the people
themselves who would be much less complaisant to individuals, and much
more susceptible of impressions from the presence of a Rival candidate,
it must be supposed that the members from the most distant States would
travel backwards & forwards at least as often as the elections should be
repeated. Much was to be said also on the time requisite for new members
who would always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge of
the affairs of the States in general without which their trust could not
be usefully discharged.

Mr. SHERMAN preferred annual elections, but would be content with
biennial. He thought the Representatives ought to return home and mix
with the people. By remaining at the seat of Govt. they would acquire
the habits of the place which might differ from those of their
Constituents.

Col. MASON observed that the States being differently situated such a
rule ought to be formed as would put them as nearly as possible on a
level. If elections were annual the middle States would have a great
advantage over the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial; and the
rather as in that case they would coincide with the periodical elections
of S. Carolina as well of the other States.

Col. HAMILTON urged the necessity of 3 years. There ought to be neither
too much nor too little dependence, on the popular sentiments. The
checks in the other branches of Governt. would be but feeble, and would
need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. The British
House of Commons were elected septennially, yet the democratic spirit of
ye. Constitution had not ceased. Frequency of elections tended to make
the people listless to them; and to facilitate the success of little
cabals. This evil was complained of in all the States. In Virga. it had
been lately found necessary to force the attendance & voting of the
people by severe regulations.

On the question for striking out "three years"

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. divd. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [24]

The motion for "two years" was then inserted nem. con.

Adjd.

___________

*1. From June 21 to July 18 inclusive not copied by Mr. Eppes. [2]

2. This footnote is omitted in the transcript. It refers to a copy of
Madison's journal made by John W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law, for
Jefferson's use some time between 1799 and 1810. The Writings of James
Madison, Hunt, Editor, Vol. VI (1906), 329, n; Documentary History of
the Constitution, Vol. V (1905), 294-296.

3. The transcript here inserts the following: "The second Resolution in
the Report from the Committee of the Whole, being under consideration."

4. The transcript uses the word "proposition" in the plural.

5. The word "was" is substituted in the transcript for "had been."

6. The phrase "in the first place" is here inserted in the transcript
and the figure "1" is omitted.

7. The figure "2" is changed to "and in the second place" in the
transcript.

8. The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.

9. The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the transcript.

10. The transcript italicizes the word "fatal."

11. The word "as" is substituted in the transcript for "of".

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 3; Maryland, divided."

13. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "first," "secondly" and
"thirdly" in the transcript.

15. The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the
transcript.

16. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

17. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, South Carolina, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6; Maryland,
divided."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 9; New Jersey, no -- 1; Maryland, divided."

21. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

23. The words "be not" are transposed to read "not be" in the
transcript.

24. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 3; New Jersey, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  JUNE 22.   IN CONVENTION

The clause in Resol. 3. [1] "to receive fixed stipends to be paid out of
the Nationl. Treasury" [2] considered.

Mr. ELSEWORTH, moved to substitute payment by the States out of their
own Treasurys: observing that the manners of different States were very
different in the Stile of living and in the profits accruing from the
exercise of like talents. What would be deemed therefore a reasonable
compensation in some States, in others would be very unpopular, and
might impede the system of which it made a part.

Mr. WILLIAMSON favored the idea. He reminded the House of the prospect
of new States to the Westward. They would be [3] poor -- would pay
little into the common Treasury -- and would have a different interest
from the old States. He did not think therefore that the latter ought to
pay the expences of men who would be employed in thwarting their
measures & interests.

Mr. GHORUM, wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures who
were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of
offices men most capable of executing the functions of them. He thought
also it would be wrong to fix the compensations [4] by the
constitutions, [4] because we could not venture to make it as liberal as
it ought to be without exciting an enmity agst. the whole plan. Let the
Natil. Legisl: provide for their own wages from time to time; as the
State Legislatures do. He had not seen this part of their power abused,
nor did he apprehend an abuse of it.

Mr. RANDOLPH [5] feared we were going too far, in consulting popular
prejudices. Whatever respect might be due to them, in lesser matters, or
in cases where they formed the permanent character of the people, he
thought it neither incumbent on nor honorable for the Convention, to
sacrifice right & justice to that consideration. If the States were to
pay the members of the Natl. Legislature, a dependence would be created
that would vitiate the whole System. The whole nation has an interest in
the attendance & services of the members. The Nationl. Treasury
therefore is the proper fund for supporting them.

Mr. KING, urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States by
leavg. to them the payment of the members of the Natl. Legislature. He
supposed it wd. be best to be explicit as to the compensation to be
allowed. A reserve on that point, or a reference to the Natl.
Legislature of the quantum, would excite greater opposition than any sum
that would be actually necessary or proper.

Mr. SHERMAN contended for referring both the quantum and the payment of
it to the State Legislatures.

Mr. WILSON was agst. fixing the compensation as circumstances would
change and call for a change of the amount. He thought it of great
moment that the members of the Natl. Govt. should be left as independent
as possible of the State Govts. in all respects.

Mr. MADISON concurred in the necessity of preserving the compensations
for the Natl. Govt. independent on the State Govts. but at the same time
approved of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be done by
taking a standard which wd. not vary with circumstances. He disliked
particularly the policy suggested by Mr. Wiliamson of leaving the
members from the poor States beyond the Mountains, to the precarious &
parsimonious support of their constituents. If the Western States
hereafter arising should be admitted into the Union, they ought to be
considered as equals & as brethren. If their representatives were to be
associated in the Common Councils, it was of common concern that such
provisions should be made as would invite the most capable and
respectable characters into the service.

Mr. HAMILTON apprehended inconveniency [6] from fixing the wages. He was
strenuous agst. making the National Council dependent on the Legislative
rewards of the States. Those who pay are the masters of those who are
paid. Payment by the States would be unequal as the distant States would
have to pay for the same term of attendance and more days in travelling
to & from the seat of the [7] Govt. He expatiated emphatically on the
difference between the feelings & views of the people -- & the
Governments of the States arising from the personal interest & official
inducements which must render the latter unfriendly to the Genl. Govt.

Mr. WILSON moved that the Salaries of the 1st. branch "be ascertained by
the National Legislature," [8] and be paid out of the Natl. Treasury.

Mr. MADISON, thought the members of the Legisl. too much interested to
ascertain their own compensation. It wd. be indecent to put their hands
into the public purse for the sake of their own pockets.

On this question [9] Mas. no. Cont. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd. [10]

On the question for striking out "Natl. Treasury" as moved by Mr..
Elseworth.

Mr. HAMILTON renewed his opposition to it. He pressed the distinction
between [11] State Govts. & the people. The former wd. be the rivals of
the Genl. Govt. The State legislatures ought not therefore to be the
paymasters of the latter.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. If we are jealous of the State Govts. they will be so of
us. If on going home I tell them we gave the Gen: Govt. such powers
because we cd. not trust you, will they adopt it, and witht. yr.
approbation it is a nullity.

[12] Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd.; N. J. no Pena. no. Del. no. Md.
no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.divd. [*13, 14]

On a question for substituting "adequate compensation" in place of "fixt
stipends" it was agreed to nem. con. the friends of the latter being
willing that the practicability of fixing the compensation should be
considered hereafter in forming the details.

It was then moved by Mr. BUTLER that a question be taken on both points
jointly; to wit "adequate compensation to be paid out of the Natl.
Treasury." It was objected to as out of order, the parts having been
separately decided on. The Presidt. referd. the question of order to the
House, and it was determined to be in order. Con. N. J. Del. Md. N. C.
S. C. -- ay -- [15] N. Y. Pa. Va. Geo. no -- [15] Mass: divided. The
question on the sentence was then postponed by S. Carolina in right of
the State.

Col. MASON moved to insert "twenty-five years of age as a qualification
for the members of the 1st. branch." He thought it absurd that a man to
day should not be permitted by the law to make a bargain for himself,
and tomorrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great
nation. It was the more extraordinary as every man carried with him in
his own experience a scale for measuring the deficiency of young
politicians; since he would if interrogated be obliged to declare that
his political opinions at the age of 21. were too crude & erroneous to
merit an influence on public measures. It had been said that Congs. had
proved a good school for our young men. It might be so for any thing he
knew but if it were, he chose that they should bear the expence of their
own education.

Mr. WILSON was agst. abridging the rights of election in any shape. It
was the same thing whether this were done by disqualifying the objects
of choice, or the persons chusing. The motion tended to damp the efforts
of genius, and of laudable ambition. There was no more reason for
incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite qualifications were
found. Many instances might be mentioned of signal services rendered in
high stations to the public before the age of 25: The present Mr. Pitt
and Lord Bolingbroke were striking instances. On the question for
inserting "25 years of age"

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [16]

Mr. GHORUM moved to strike out the last member of 3 Resol: [17]
concerning ineligibility of members of the 1st. branch to offices [18]
during the term of their membership & for one year after. He considered
it as [19] unnecessary & injurious. It was true abuses had been
displayed in G. B. but no one cd. say how far they might have
contributed to preserve the due influence of the Govt. nor what might
have ensued in case the contrary theory had been tried.

Mr. BUTLER opposed it. This precaution agst. intrigue was necessary. He
appealed to the example of G. B. where men got [20] into Parlt. that
they might get offices for themselves or their friends. This was the
source of the corruption that ruined their Govt.

Mr. KING, thought we were refining too much. Such a restriction on the
members would discourage merit. It would also give a pretext to the
Executive for bad appointments, as he might always plead this as a bar
to the choice he wished to have made.

Mr. WILSON was agst. fettering elections, and discouraging merit. He
suggested also the fatal consequence in time of war, of rendering
perhaps the best Commanders ineligible: appealing [21] to our situation
during the late war, and indirectly leading to a recollection of the
appointment of the Commander in Chief out of Congress.

Col. MASON was for shutting the door at all events agst. corruption. He
enlarged on the venality and abuses in this particular in G. Britain:
and alluded to the multiplicity of foreign Embassies by Congs. The
disqualification he regarded as a corner stone in the fabric.

Col. HAMILTON. There are inconveniences on both sides. We must take man
as we find him, and if we expect him to serve the public must interest
his passions in doing so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the
source of many of our errors. He thought the remark of Mr. Ghorum a just
one. It was impossible to say what wd be [22] effect in G. B. of such a
reform as had been urged. It was known that one of the ablest
politicians [Mr. Hume,] had pronounced all that influence on the side of
the crown, which went under the name of corruption, [23] an essential
part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution.

On Mr. Ghorum's Motion for striking out "ineligibility," [24]

Masts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. divd. Del. divd. Mard.
no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [25]

Adjd.

___________

1. The words "the third Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol. 3."

2. The word 'being" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "too" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The transcript uses the words "conpensations" and "constitutions" in
the singular.

5. The words "said he" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

7. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

8. The transcript does not italicize the phrase "be ascertained by the
National Legislature."

9. The transcript here inserts the following: "shall the salaries of the
first branch be ascertained by the National Legislature?"

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye --
2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 7; New York, Georgia, divided."

11. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The words "On the question" are here inserted in the transcript.

*13. Note. [It appeared that Massts. concurred, not because they thought
the State Treasy. ought to be substituted; but because they thought
nothing should be said on the subject, in which case it wd. silently
devolve on the Natl. Treasury to support the National Legislature.]

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, [*13] Connecticut,
North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 5; New York, Georgia, divided, so it
passed in the negative."

15. In the transcript the figures "6" and "4" are inserted after "ay"
and "no" respectively.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 7;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no -- 3; New York, divided."

17. The words "the third Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "3 Resol:"

18. The letter "s" is stricken out of the word "offices" in the
transcript.

19. The word "as" is stricken out in the transcript.

20. The word "get" is substituted in the transcript for "got."

21. The word "appealed" is substituted in the transcript for
"appealing."

22. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. The transcript italicizes the word "corruption."

24. The transcript here inserts the following: "it was lost by an equal
division of the votes."

25. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, no -- 4; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  JUNE 23.   IN CONVENTION

The 3. Resol: resumed. [1]

On [2] Question yesterday postponed by S. Carol: for agreeing to the
whole sentence "for allowing an adequate compensation to be paid out of
the Treasury of the U. States"

Masts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pena. ay Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo divided. [3] So the question was lost, & the
sentence not inserted:

Genl. PINKNEY moves to strike out the ineligibility of members of the
1st. branch to offices established "by a particular State." He argued
from the inconveniency [4] to which such a restriction would expose both
the members of the 1st. branch, and the States wishing for their
services; [5] from the smallness of the object to be attained by the
restriction.

It wd. seem from the ideas of some that we are erecting a Kingdom to be
divided agst. itself, he disapproved such a fetter on the Legislature.

Mr. SHERMAN seconds the motion. It wd. seem that we are erecting a
Kingdom at war with itself. The Legislature ought not to [6] fettered in
such a case. on the question

Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [7]

Mr. MADISON renewed his motion yesterday made & waved to render the
members of the 1st. branch "ineligible during their term of service, &
for one year after -- to such offices only as should be established, or
the emoluments thereof, augmented by the Legislature of the U. States
during the time of their being members." He supposed that the
unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of salaries, were the
evils most experienced, & that if the door was shut agst. them: it might
properly be left open for the appointt. of members to other offices as
an encouragemt. to the Legislative service.

Mr. Alex: MARTIN seconded the motion.

Mr. BUTLER. The amendt. does not go far eno' & wd. be easily evaded.

Mr. RUTLIDGE, was for preserving the Legislature as pure as possible, by
shutting the door against appointments of its own members to offices,
[8] which was one source of its corruption.

Mr. MASON. The motion of my colleague is but a partial remedy for the
evil. He appealed to him as a witness of the shameful partiality of the
Legislature of Virginia to its own members. He enlarged on the abuses &
corruption in the British Parliament, connected with the appointment of
its members. He cd. not suppose that a sufficient number of Citizens
could not be found who would be ready, without the inducement of
eligibility to offices, to undertake the Legislative service. Genius &
virtue it may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius, for aught he
knew, might, but that virtue should be encouraged by such a species of
venality, was an idea, that at least had the merit of being new.

Mr. KING remarked that we were refining too much in this business; and
that the idea of preventing intrigue and solicitation of offices was
chimerical. You say that no member shall himself be eligible to any
office. Will this restrain him from from availing himself of the same
means which would gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his
son, his brother, or any other object of his partiality. We were losing
therefore the advantages on one side, without avoiding the evils on the
other.

Mr. WILSON supported the motion. The proper cure he said for corruption
in the Legislature was to take from it the power of appointing to
offices. One branch of corruption would indeed remain, that of creating
unnecessary offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the
amendment would be a proper remedy. He animadverted on the impropriety
of stigmatizing with the name of venality the laudable ambition of
rising into the honorable offices of the Government; an ambition most
likely to be felt in the early & most incorrupt period of life, & which
all wise & free Govts. had deemed it sound policy, to cherish, not to
check. The members of the Legislature have perhaps the hardest & least
profitable task of any who engage in the service of the state. Ought
this merit to be made a disqualification?

Mr. SHERMAN, observed that the motion did not go far enough. It might be
evaded by the creation of a new office, the translation to it of a
person from another office, and the appointment of a member of the
Legislature to the latter. A new Embassy might be established to a new
Court, & an ambassador taken from another, in order to create a vacancy
for a favorite member. He admitted that inconveniencies lay on both
sides. He hoped there wd. be sufficient inducements to the public
service without resorting to the prospect of desireable offices, and on
the whole was rather agst. the motion of Mr. Madison.

Mr. GERRY thought there was great weight in the objection of Mr.
Sherman. He added as another objection agst. admitting the eligibility
of members in any case that it would produce intrigues of ambitious men
for displacing proper officers, in order to create vacancies for
themselves. In answer to Mr. King he observed that although members, if
disqualified themselves might still intrigue & cabal for their sons,
brothers &c, yet as their own interest would be dearer to them, than
those of their nearest connections, it might be expected they would go
greater lengths to promote it.

Mr. MADISON had been led to this motion as a middle ground between an
eligibility in all cases, and an absolute disqualification. He admitted
the probable abuses of an eligibility of the members, to offices,
particularly within the gift of the Legislature He had witnessed the
partiality of such bodies to their own members, as had been remarked of
the Virginia assembly by his colleague [Col. Mason]. He appealed however
to him, in turn to vouch another fact not less notorious in Virginia,
that the backwardness of the best citizens to engage in the Legislative
service gave but too great success to unfit characters. The question was
not to be viewed on one side only. The advantages & disadvantages on
both ought to be fairly compared. The objects to be aimed at were to
fill all offices with the fittest characters, & to draw the wisest &
most worthy citizens into the Legislative service. If on one hand,
public bodies were partial to their own members; on the other they were
as apt to be misled by taking characters on report, or the authority of
patrons and dependents. All who had been concerned in the appointment of
strangers on those recommendations must be sensible of this truth. Nor
wd. the partialities of such Bodies be obviated by disqualifying their
own members. Candidates for office would hover round the seat of Govt.
or be found among the residents there, and practise all the means of
courting the favor of the members. A great proportion of the
appointments made by the States were evidently brought about in this
way. In the general Govt. the evil must be still greater, the characters
of distant states, being much less known throughout the U. States than
those of the distant parts of the same State. The elections by Congress
had generally turned on men living at the seat of the fedl Govt. or in
its neighbourhood. -- As to the next object, the impulse to the
Legislative service, was evinced by experience to be in general too
feeble with those best qualified for it. This inconveniency [9] wd. also
be more felt in the Natl. Govt. than in the State Govts. as the
sacrifices reqd. from the distant members, wd. be much greater, and the
pecuniary provisions, probably, more disproportiate. It wd. therefore be
impolitic to add fresh objections to the Legislative service by an
absolute disqualification of its members. The point in question was
whether this would be an objection with the most capable citizens.
Arguing from experience he concluded that it would. The Legislature of
Virga. would probably have been without many of its best members, if in
that situation, they had been ineligible to Congs. to the Govt. & other
honorable offices of the State.

Mr. BUTLER thought Characters fit for office wd. never be unknown.

Col. MASON. If the members of the Legislature are disqualified, still
the honors of the State will induce those who aspire to them to enter
that service, as the field in which they can best display & improve
their talents, & lay the train for their subsequent advancement.

Mr. JENIFER remarked that in Maryland, the Senators chosen for five
years, cd. hold no other office & that this circumstance gained them the
greatest confidence of the people.

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. Madison.

Massts. divd. Ct. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [10]

Mr. SHERMAN movd. to insert the words "and incapable of holding" after
the words "eligible to offices" [11] wch. was agreed to without
opposition.

The word "established" & the words " [12] Natl. Govt." were struck out
of Resolution 3d.: [13]

Mr. SPAIGHT called for a division of the question, in consequence of
which it was so put, as that it turned in [14] the first member of it,
"on the ineligibility of the [15] members during the term for which they
were elected" -- whereon the States were,

Massts. divd. Ct. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [16]

On the 2d. member of the sentence extending ineligibility of members to
one year after the term for which they were elected.

Col MASON thought this essential to guard agst. evasions by
resignations, and stipulations for office to be fulfilled at the
expiration of the legislative term. Mr. GERRY, had known such a case.
Mr. HAMILTON. Evasions cd. not be prevented -- as by proxies -- by
friends holding for a year, & them [17] opening the way &c. Mr. RUTLIDGE
admitted the possibility of evasions but was for controuling them as
possible. [18, 19] Mass. no. Ct. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del.
ay. Mard. ay Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [20]

Adjd.

___________

1. In the transcript this sentence reads: "The third Resolution being
resumed."

2. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New York,
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 5; Georgia, Divided."

4. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

5. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "be" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 8;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -- 3."

8. The transcript uses the word "offices" in the singular.

9. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, aye --
2; New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8; Massachusetts, divided."

11. The words "ineligible to any office" are substituted in the
transcript for "eligible to offices."

12. The words "under the" are here inserted in the transcript.

13. The words "the third Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resolution 3d".

14. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

15. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
aye -- 8; Pennsylvania, Georgia, no -- 2; Massachusetts, divided."

17. The word "then" is substituted in the transcript for "them."

18. The phrase "contracting them as far as possible" is substituted in
the transcript for "controuling them as possible."

19. The words "On the question" are here inserted in the transcript.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, Delaware, Maryland,
South Carolina, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6; Pennsylvania, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY.  JUNE 25.   IN CONVENTION

Resolution 4. [1] being taken up.

Mr. PINKNEY [2] spoke as follows -- The efficacy of the System will
depend on this article. In order to form a right judgmt. in the case, it
will be proper to examine the situation of this Country more accurately
than it has yet been done. The people of the U. States are perhaps the
most singular of any we are acquainted with. Among them there are fewer
distinctions of fortune & less of rank, than among the inhabitants of
any other nation. Every freeman has a right to the same protection &
security; and a very moderate share of property entitles them to the
possession of all the honors and privileges the public can bestow: hence
arises a greater equality, than is to be found among the people of any
other country, and an equality which is more likely to continue -- I say
this equality is likely to continue, because in a new Country,
possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation
is offered to emigration & where industry must be rewarded with
competency, there will be few poor, and few dependent -- Every member of
the Society almost, will enjoy an equal power of arriving at the supreme
offices & consequently of directing the strength & sentiments of the
whole Community. None will be excluded by birth, & few by fortune, from
voting for proper persons to fill the offices of Government -- the whole
community will enjoy in the fullest sense that kind of political liberty
which consists in the power the members of the State reserve to
themselves, of arriving at the public offices, or at least, of having
votes in the nomination of those who fill them.

If this State of things is true & the prospect of its continuing [3]
probable, it is perhaps not politic to endeavour too close an imitation
of a Government calculated for a people whose situation is, & whose
views ought to be extremely different Much has been said of the
Constitution of G. Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the
best Constitution in existence; but at the same time I am confident it
is one that will not or can not be introduced into this Country, for
many centuries. -- If it were proper to go here into a historical
dissertation on the British Constitution, it might easily be shewn that
the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature of that Governmt.
can not possibly be introduced into our System -- that its balance
between the Crown & the people can not be made a part of our
Constitution. -- that we neither have or can have the members to compose
it, nor the rights, privileges & properties of so distinct a class of
Citizens to guard. -- that the materials for forming this balance or
check do not exist, nor is there a necessity for having so permanent a
part of our Legislative, until the Executive power is so constituted as
to have something fixed & dangerous in its principle -- By this I mean a
sole, hereditary, though limited Executive.

That we cannot have a proper body for forming a Legislative balance
between the inordinate power of the Executive and the people, is evident
from a review of the accidents & circumstances which gave rise to the
peerage of Great Britain -- I believe it is well ascertained that the
parts which compose the British Constitution arose immediately from the
forests of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment of nobility
is by no means clearly defined. Some authors are of opinion that the
dignity denoted by the titles of dux et [4] comes, was derived from the
old Roman to the German Empire; while others are of opinion that they
existed among the Germans long before the Romans were acquainted with
them. The institution however of nobility is immemorial among the
nations who may probably be termed the ancestors of [5] Britain. -- At
the time they were summoned in England to become a part of the National
Council, and [6] the circumstances which have [6] contributed to make
them a constituent part of that constitution, must be well known to all
gentlemen who have had industry & curiosity enough to investigate the
subject -- The nobles with their possessions & and dependents composed a
body permanent in their nature and formidable in point of power. They
had a distinct interest both from the King and the people; an interest
which could only be represented by themselves, and the guardianship [7]
could not be safely intrusted to others. -- At the time they were
originally called to form a part of the National Council, necessity
perhaps as much as other cause, induced the Monarch to look up to them.
It was necessary to demand the aid of his subjects in personal &
pecuniary services. The power and possessions of the Nobility would not
permit taxation from any assembly of which they were not a part: & the
blending [8] the deputies of the Commons with them, & thus forming what
they called their parler-ment [9] was perhaps as much the effect of
chance as of any thing else. The Commons were at that time compleatly
subordinate to the nobles, whose consequence & influence seem to have
been the only reasons for their superiority; a superiority so degrading
to the Commons that in the first Summons we find the peers are called
upon to consult, [10] the commons to consent. [10] From this time the
peers have composed a part of the British Legislature, and
notwithstanding their power and influence have diminished & those of the
Commons have increased, yet still they have always formed an excellent
balance agst. either the encroachments of the Crown or the people.

I have said that such a body cannot exist in this Country for ages, and
that untill the situation of our people is exceedingly changed no
necessity will exist for so permanent a part of the Legislature. To
illustrate this I have remarked that the people of the United States are
more equal in their circumstances than the people of any other Country
-- that they have very few rich men among them, -- by rich men I mean
those whose riches may have a dangerous influence, or such as are
esteemed rich in Europe -- perhaps there are not one hundred such on the
Continent; that it is not probable this number will be greatly
increased: that the genius of the people, their mediocrity of situation
& the prospects which are afforded their industry in a Country which
must be a new one for centuries are unfavorable to the rapid distinction
of ranks. The destruction of the right of primogeniture & the equal
division of the property of Intestates will also have an effect to
preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect the manners of a
people. On the other hand that vast extent of unpeopled territory which
opens to the frugal & industrious a sure road to competency &
independence will effectually prevent for a considerable time the
increase of the poor or discontented, and be the means of preserving
that equality of condition which so eminently distinguishes us.

If equality is as I contend the leading feature of the U. States, where
then are the riches & wealth whose representation & protection is the
peculiar province of this permanent body. Are they in the hands of the
few who may be called rich; in the possession of less than a hundred
citizens? certainly not. They are in the great body of the people, among
whom there are no men of wealth, and very few of real poverty. -- Is it
probable that a change will be created, and that a new order of men will
arise? If under the British Government, for a century no such change was
probable, [11] I think it may be fairly concluded it will not take place
while even the semblance of Republicanism remains. -- How is this change
to be effected? Where are the sources from whence it is to flow? From
the landed interest? No. That is too unproductive & too much divided in
most of the States. From the Monied interest? If such exists at present,
little is to be apprehended from that source. Is it to spring from
commerce? I believe it would be the first instance in which a nobility
sprang from merchants. Besides, Sir, I apprehend that on this point the
policy of the U. States has been much mistaken. We have unwisely
considered ourselves as the inhabitants of an old instead of a new
country. We have adopted the maxims of a State full of people &
manufactures & established in credit. We have deserted our true
interest, and instead of applying closely to those improvements in
domestic policy which would have ensured the future importance of our
commerce, we have rashly & prematurely engaged in schemes as extensive
as they are imprudent. This however is an error which daily corrects
itself & I have no doubt that a few more severe trials will convince us,
that very different commercial principles ought to govern the conduct of
these States.

The people of this country are not only very different from the
inhabitants of any State we are acquainted with in the modern world; but
I assert that their situation is distinct from either the people of
Greece or Rome, or of any State we are acquainted with among the
antients. -- Can the orders introduced by the institution of Solon, can
they be found in the United States? Can the military habits & manners of
Sparta be resembled to our habits & manners? Are the distinctions of
Patrician & Plebeian known among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic
confederacies, or can the unwieldy, unmeaning body called the Germanic
Empire, can they be said to possess either the same or a situation like
ours? I apprehend not. -- They are perfectly different, in their
distinctions of rank, their Constitutions, their manners & their policy.

Our true situation appears to me to be this. -- a new extensive Country
containing within itself the materials for forming a Government capable
of extending to its citizens all the blessings of civil & religious
liberty -- capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end
of Republican Establishments. We mistake the object of our Government,
if we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquest or
superiority among other powers is not or ought not ever to be the object
of republican systems. If they are sufficiently active & energetic to
rescue us from contempt & preserve our domestic happiness & security, it
is all we can expect from them, -- it is more than almost any other
Government ensures to its citizens.

I believe this observation will be found generally true: -- that no two
people are so exactly alike in their situation or circumstances as to
admit the exercise of the same Government with equal benefit: that a
system must be suited to the habits & genius of the people it is to
govern, and must grow out of them.

The people of the U. S. may be divided into three classes --
Professional men who must from their particular pursuits always have a
considerable weight in the Government while it remains popular --
Commercial men, who may or may not have weight as a wise or injudicious
commercial policy is pursued. -- If that commercial policy is pursued
which I conceive to be the true one, the merchants of this Country will
not or ought not for a considerable time to have much weight in the
political scale. -- The third is the landed interest, the owners and
cultivators of the soil, who are and ought ever to be the governing
spring in the system. -- These three classes, however distinct in their
pursuits are individually equal in the political scale, and may be
easily proved to have but one interest. The dependence of each on the
other is mutual. The merchant depends on the planter. Both must in
private as well as public affairs be connected with the professional
men; who in their turn must in some measure depend upon 12 them. Hence
it is clear from this manifest connection, & the equality which I before
stated exists, & must for the reasons then assigned, continue, that
after all there is one, but one great & equal body of citizens composing
the inhabitants of this Country among whom there are no distinctions of
rank, and very few or none of fortune.

For a people thus circumstanced are we then to form a government & the
question is what kind [13] of Government is best suited to them.

Will it be the British Govt.? No. Why? Because G. Britain contains three
orders of people distinct in their situation, their possessions & their
principles. -- These orders combined form the great body of the Nation,
and as in national expences the wealth of the whole community must
contribute, so ought each component part to be properly & duly [14]
represented -- No other combination of power could form this due
representation, but the one that exists. -- Neither the peers or the
people could represent the royalty, nor could the Royalty & the people
form a proper representation for the Peers. -- Each therefore must of
necessity be represented by itself, or the sign of itself; and this
accidental mixture has certainly formed a Government admirably well
balanced.

But the U. States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the
British Nation, -- this is the order of Commons. They will not surely
then attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches, two of
which shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive &
Senate [hereditary] because the King & Lords of England are so. The same
reasons do not exist and therefore the same provisions are not
necessary.

We must as has been observed suit our Governmt. to the people it is to
direct. These are I believe as active, intelligent & susceptible of good
Governmt. as any people in the world. The Confusion which has produced
the present relaxed State is not owing to them. It is owing to the
weakness & [defects] of a Govt. incapable of combining the various
interests it is intended to unite, and destitute of energy. -- All that
we have to do then is to distribute the powers of Govt. in such a
manner, and for such limited periods, as while it gives a proper degree
of permanency to the Magistrate, will reserve to the people, the right
of election they will not or ought not frequently to part with. -- I am
of opinion that this may be easily [15] done; and that with some
amendments the propositions before the Committee will fully answer this
end.

No position appears to me more true than this; that the General Govt.
can not effectually exist without reserving to the States the possession
of their local rights. They are the instruments upon which the Union
must frequently depend for the support & execution of their powers,
however immediately operating upon the people, and not upon the States.

Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing the distinction of
State Governments, & having but one general System. Suffer me for a
moment to examine this question. [*16]

The mode of constituting the 2d. branch being under consideration.

The word "national" was struck out and "United States" inserted.

Mr. GHORUM, inclined to a compromise as to the rule of proportion. He
thought there was some weight in the objections of the small States. If
Va. should have 16. votes & Delre. with several other States together
16. those from Virga. would be more likely to unite than the others, and
would therefore have an undue influence. This remark was applicable not
only to States, but to Counties or other districts of the same State.
Accordingly the Constitution of Massts. had provided that the
representatives of the larger districts should not be in an exact ratio
to their numbers. And experience he thought had shewn the provision to
be expedient.

Mr. READ. The States have heretofore been in a sort of partnership. They
ought to adjust their old affairs before they open [18] a new account.
He brought into view the appropriation of the common interest in the
Western lands, to the use of particular States. Let justice be done on
this head; let the fund be applied fairly & equally to the discharge of
the general debt, and the smaller States who had been injured; would
listen then perhaps to those ideas of just representation which had been
held out.

Mr. GHORUM. did [19] not see how the Convention could interpose in the
case. Errors he allowed had been committed on the subject. But Congs.
were now using their endeavors to rectify them. The best remedy would be
such a Government as would have vigor enough to do justice throughout.
This was certainly the best chance that could be afforded to the smaller
States.

Mr. WILSON. the question is shall the members of the 2d. branch be
chosen by the Legislatures of the States? When he considered the amazing
extent of Country -- the immense population which is to fill it, the
influence which [20] the Govt. we are to form will have, not only on the
present generation of our people & their multiplied posterity, but on
the whole Globe, he was lost in the magnitude of the object. The project
of Henry the 4th. & his Statesmen was but the picture in miniature of
the great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an election by the
State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons it was necessary to
observe the twofold relation in which the people would stand. 1. [21] as
Citizens of the Genl. Govt. 2. [21] as Citizens of their particular
State. The Genl. Govt. was meant for them in the first capacity: the
State Govts. in the second. Both Govts. were derived from the people --
both meant for the people -- both therefore ought to be regulated on the
same principles. The same train of ideas which belonged to the relation
of the Citizens to their State Govts. were applicable to their relation
to the Genl. Govt. and in forming the latter, we ought to proceed, by
abstracting as much as possible from the idea of [22] State Govts. With
respect to the province & objects [23] of the Genl. Govt. they should be
considered as having no existence. The election of the 2d. branch by the
Legislatures, will introduce & cherish local interests & local
prejudices. The Genl. Govt. is not an assemblage of States, but of
individuals for certain political purposes -- it is not meant for the
States, but for the individuals composing them; the individuals
therefore not the States, ought to be represented in it: A proportion in
this representation can be preserved in the 2d. as well as in the 1st.
branch; and the election can be made by electors chosen by the people
for that purpose. He moved an amendment to that effect which was not
seconded.

Mr. ELSEWORTH saw no reason for departing from the mode contained in the
Report. Whoever chooses the member, he will be a Citizen of the State he
is to represent & will feel the same spirit & act the same part whether
he be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every State has its
particular views & prejudices, which will find their way into the
general councils, through whatever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one
of the characteristics which it was in contemplation to give the second
branch. Would not more of it issue from the Legislatures; than from an
immediate election by the people. He urged the necessity of maintaining
the existence & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it
would be impossible to support a Republican Govt. over so great an
extent of Country. An army could scarcely render it practicable. The
largest States are the worst Governed. Virga. is obliged to acknowledge
her incapacity to extend her Govt. to Kentucky. Masts. can not keep the
peace one hundred miles from her capitol and is now forming an army for
its support. How long Pena. may be free from a like situation can not be
foreseen. If the principles & materials of our Govt. are not adequate to
the extent of these single States; how can it be imagined that they can
support a single Govt. throughout the U. States. The only chance of
supporting a Genl. Govt. lies in engrafting [24] it on that [25] of the
individual States.

DOCr. JOHNSON urged the necessity of preserving the State Govts. which
would be at the mercy of the Genl. Govt. on Mr. Wilson's plan.

Mr. MADISON thought it wd. obviate difficulty if the present resol: were
postponed. & the 8th. taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage in
the 2d. branch.

DOCr. [26] WILLIAMSON professed himself a friend to such a system as
would secure the existence of the State Govts. The happiness of the
people depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the
Senate untill he knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain
this, he moved to insert these words [27] after "2d. branch of the Natl.
Legislature" -- [28] "who shall bear such proportion to the no. of the
1st. branch as 1 to _____." He was not seconded.

Mr. MASON. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient Govt. is
necessary that to render it such it ought to have the faculty of
self-defence, that to render its different branches effectual each of
them ought to have the same power of self defence. He did not wonder
that such an agreement should have prevailed in [29] these points. He
only wondered that there should be any disagreement about the necessity
of allowing the State Govts. the same self-defence. If they are to be
preserved as he conceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have
this power, and the only mode left of giving it to them, was by allowing
them to appoint the 2d. branch of the Natl. Legislature.

Mr. BUTLER observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by
the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation wd.
prevail finally in the 2d. branch, moved to postpone the 4th. Resol: &
to proceed to the [30] Resol: on that point. Mr. MADISON seconded him.

On the question Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa.. no. Del.
no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [31]

On a question to postpone the 4 and take up the 7. Resol: ays [32] --
Mard. Va. N. C. S. C. Geo: -- Noes [33] Mas. Ct. N. Y. N. J. Pa. Del:
[33]

On the question to agree "that the members of the 2d. branch be chosen
by the indivl. Legislatures" Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [*34, 35]

On a question on the clause requiring the age of 30 years at least -- "
it was agreed to unanimously: [36]

On a question to strike out -- the words "sufficient to ensure their
independency [37] " after the word "term" it was agreed to.

[38] That the 2d. branch hold their offices for [39] term of seven
years, [40] considered.

Mr. GHORUM suggests a term of "4 years," 1/4 to be elected every year.

Mr. RANDOLPH. supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the wisdom
& stability of the Corps, which might possibly be always sitting, and
aiding the Executive. And moves after "7 years" to add, "to go out in
fixt proportion" which was agreed to.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. suggest "6 years," as more convenient for Rotation than
7 years.

Mr. SHERMAN seconds him.

Mr. REED proposed that they sd. hold their offices "during good"
behaviour. Mr. R. MORRIS seconds him.

Genl. PINKNEY proposed "4 years." A longer term [41] wd. fix them at the
seat of Govt. They wd. acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer their
property & lose sight of the States they represent. Under these
circumstances the distant States wd. labour under great disadvantages.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out "7 years" in order to take questions on
the several propositions.

On the question to strike out "seven"

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del no. Md. divd. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [42]

On the question to insert "6 years, which failed 5 Sts. being ay. 5 no.
& 1 divided

Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del ay. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [43]

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were 5 for 5 agst. it & 1 divided, --
Con. N. J. Pa. Del. Va. -- ay. [44] Massts. N. Y. N. C. S. C. Geo: no.
[44] Maryd. divided.

On the question for "5 years" it was lost.

Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo no. [45]

Adjd.

___________

1. The words "The fourth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resolution 4."

2. Pinckney furnished Madison with a copy of this speech which he
transcribed, but apparently not with the whole of it, as Madison's note
at the end indicates. The original Pinckney draft is among the Madison
papers, and shows Madison's copying to have been accurate.

3. The word "continuance" is substituted in the transcript for
"continuing."

4. The word "and" is substituted in the transcript for "et."

5. The word "Great" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The words "and" and "have" are crossed out in the transcript.

7. The words "of which" are here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "of" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The transcript italicizes the word "parler-ment."

10. The transcript italicizes the words "consult" and "consent."

11. The word "produced" is substituted for the word "probable" in the
transcript.

12. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "upon."

13. The word "sort" is substituted in the transcript for "kind."

14. The words "properly & duly" are transposed in the transcript to read
"duly and properly."

15. The words "be easily" are transposed in the transcript to "easily
be."

*16. The residue of this speech was not furnished like the above by Mr.
Pinckney. [17]

17. "The residue" of Pinckney's speech, according to Robert Yates was as
follows:

"The United States include a territory of about 1500 miles in length,
and in breadth about 400; the whole of which is divided into states and
districts. While we were dependent on the crown of Great Britain, it was
in contemplation to have formed the whole into one -- but it was found
impracticable. No legislature could make good laws for the whole, nor
can it now be done. It would necessarily place the power in the hands of
the few, nearest the seat of government. State governments must
therefore remain, if you mean to prevent confusion. The general negative
powers will support the general government. Upon these considerations I
am led to form the second branch differently from the report. Their
powers are important and the number not too large, upon the principle of
proportion. I have considered the subject with great attention; and I
propose this plan (reads it) and if no better plan is proposed, I will
then move its adoption." Secret Proceedings and Debates of the
Convention Assembled at Philadelphia, in the year 1787, for the purpose
of forming the Constitution of the United States of America, by Robert
Yates (1821), p. 163.

18. The word "opened" is substituted in the transcript for "open."

19. The word "could" is substituted in the transcript for "did."

20. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "which."

21. The figure "1" is changed in the transcript to "first," and the
figure "2" to "and secondly."

22. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. The word "objects" is used in the singular in the transcript.

24. The word "grafting" is substituted in the transcript for
"engrafting."

25. The word "those" is substituted in the transcript for "that."

26. The word "Mr." is substituted in the transcript for "Docr."

27. The words "these words" are omitted in the transcript.

28. The words "the words" are here inserted in the transcript.

29. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

30. The word "eighth" is here inserted in the transcript.

31. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, Virginia, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, no -- 7."

32. The word "ays" is omitted in the transcript.

33. The word "noes" is omitted in the transcript; "aye -- 5" being
inserted after "Georgia" and "no -- 6" after "Delaware."

*34. It must be kept in view that the largest States particularly
Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the 2d. Branch
by the State Legislatures as opposed to a proportional Representation to
which they were attached as a fundamental principle of just Government.
The smaller States who had opposite views, were reinforced by the
members from the large States most anxious to secure the importance of
the State Governments.

35. In the transcript this vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no -- 2."

36. The words "agreed to unanimously" are transposed in the transcript
to read "unanimously agreed to."

37. The word "independency" is changed to "independence" in the
transcript.

38. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

39. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

40. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

41. The word "time" is substituted in the transcript for "term." 42 In
the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no -- 3; Maryland, divided."

43. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5; Maryland, divided."

44. The figure "5" is here inserted in the transcript.

45. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5; Maryland, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY.  JUNE 26.   IN CONVENTION

The duration of the 2d. branch [1] under consideration.

Mr. GHORUM moved to fill the blank with "six years," one third of the
members to go out every second year.

Mr. WILSON 2ded. the motion.

Genl. PINKNEY opposed six years in favor of four years. The States he
said had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina
in particular were different from the Northern. If the Senators should
be appointed for a long term, they wd. settle in the State where they
exercised their functions; and would in a little time be rather the
representatives of that than of the State appointg. them.

Mr. READ movd. that the term be nine years. This wd. admit of a very
convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He wd. still
prefer "during good behaviour," but being little supported in that idea,
he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.

Mr. BROOME 2ded. the motion.

Mr. MADISON. In order to judge of the form to be given to this
institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served
by it. These were first to protect the people agst. their rulers:
secondly to protect the people agst. the transient impressions into
which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate
moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the
plan of Govt. most likely to secure their happiness, would first be
aware, that those chargd. with the public happiness, might betray their
trust. An obvious precaution agst. this danger wd. be to divide the
trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each
other. In this they wd. be governed by the same prudence which has
prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Govt., where all
business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate hands, the one
being a check on the other. It wd. next occur to such a people, that
they themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro' want of
information as to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short
term, & employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might
err from the same cause. This reflection wd. naturally suggest that the
Govt. be so constituted, as that one of its branches might have an oppy.
of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests Another
reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, wd. be that
they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were
liable to err also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence agst.
this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose
limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose agst. impetuous
councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a Govt.
for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the
liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might under sudden
impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all
civilized Countries the people fall into different classes havg a real
or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors & debtors,
farmers, merchts. & manufacturers. There will be particularly the
distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observd. [by Mr.
Pinkney] we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank
which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Govts. as well
as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty
which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded even at
this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that affects a
part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which
we wish to last for ages, we shd. not lose sight of the changes which
ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase
the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life,
& secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These
may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of
indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide
into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in
in this Country, but symtoms, of a leveling spirit, as we have
understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to give
notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded agst. on
republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested
coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded agst.? Among other
means by the establishment of a body in the Govt. sufficiently
respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergences, the
preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale. Such
being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Govt. he thought
a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive
that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but in
pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the
long term allowed to the 2d. branch should not commence till such a
period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to be
re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He
observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan
which in its operation wd. decide for ever the fate of Republican Govt.
we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its
preservation cd. require, but be equally careful to supply the defects
which our own experience had particularly pointed out.

Mr. SHERMAN. Govt. is instituted for those who live under it. It ought
therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their
liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Govt.
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of
rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by
preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election. In
Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability &
uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced from its
original establishmt. to the present time; a period of more than 130
years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness & wisdom in the
system to be adopted; but he thought six or four years would be
sufficient. He shd. be content with either.

Mr. READ wished it to be considered by the small States that it was
their interest that we should become one people as much as possible;
that State attachments shd. be extinguished as much as possible; that
the Senate shd. be so constituted as to have the feelings of Citizens of
the whole.

Mr. HAMILTON. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He
concurred with Mr. Madison in thinking we were now to decide for ever
the fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that
form due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among
ourselves, disgraced & lost to mankind for ever. He acknowledged himself
not to think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his
remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on
them to tone their Government as high as possible. He professed himself
to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and
trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to
the form in which it was most eligible. -- He concurred also in the
general observations of [Mr. Madison] on the subject, which might be
supported by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true: that
nothing like an equality of property existed: that an inequality would
exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result
from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted
the great & fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial
power had levelled the boundary between the patricians & plebeians, what
followed? The distinction between rich & poor was substituted. He meant
not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark
that [Mr. Sherman] seemed not to recollect that one branch of the
proposed Govt. was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians
of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true
causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Cont. Under the
British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers
appertaining to Govt. particularly all those relating to foreign Nations
were not in the hands of the Govt. there. Their internal affairs also
were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were
peculiar to that Country. Of late the Govermt. had entirely given way to
the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions in
order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere. He
asks Mr. S. whether the State at this time, dare impose & collect a tax
on ye. people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections, the
effect, as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.

Mr. GERRY. wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent
Govt. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to the
means. One circumstance He thought should be carefully attended to.
There were not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not agst.
every approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which
seems to make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely
cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be
proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the
quarter it proceeds from as well as from an approbation of the plan
itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent
opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue,
and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He
did not deny the position of Mr. Madison, that the majority will
generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing; But
did not think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our
situation was different from that of G. Britain: and the great body of
lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the
difference. Notwithstanding the symtoms of injustice which had marked
many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to
leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue
for the purpose of Govt. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency
of elections: and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or
five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted
by the people. 

Mr. WILSON did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but wd.
add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested.
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1. [2] to its own
citizens. 2 [2] to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to
anarchy & tyranny within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain
from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depositary of the powers
concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable
in the eyes of foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not
yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no
confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with
a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Govt.
an advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a monarchy much
must always depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the
personal character will be lost in the political. He wd add another
observation. The popular objection agst. appointing any public body for
a long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself
first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It
would be a satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go
out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their
places for unequal terms, [3] and consequently acting under the
influence of different views, and different impulses -- On the question
for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [4]

On the question for 6 years 1/3 to go out biennially

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [5]

[6] "To receive fixt stipends by which they may be compensated for their
services." [7] considered

General PINKNEY proposed "that no Salary should be allowed." As this
[the Senatorial] branch was meant to represent the wealth of the
Country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no
allowance was to be made the wealthy along would undertake the service.
He moved to strike out the clause.

DOCtr. FRANKLIN seconded the motion. He wished the Convention to stand
fair with the people. There were in it a number of young men who would
probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be
recommended we might be chargeable with having carved out places for
ourselves. On the question, Masts. Connecticut [8] Pa. Md. S. Carolina
ay. [10] N. Y. N. J. Del. Virga. N. C. Geo. no. [11]

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to change the expression into these words towit "to
receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public
Service." The motion was seconded by Mr. Elseworth. And was [12] agreed
to by all the States except S. Carola. It seemed to be meant only to get
rid of the word "fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the
provision on this point.

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to strike out "to be paid out of the natil.
Treasury" and insert "to be paid by their respective States." If the
Senate was meant to strengthen the Govt. it ought to have the confidence
of the States. The States will have an interest in keeping up a
representation, and will make such provision for supporting the members
as will ensure their attendance.

Mr. MADISON considered this [13] a departure from a fundamental
principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a
duration of 6 years. They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold
their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State
Legislatures. One great end of the institution was, that being a firm,
wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability to the Genl.
Govt. in its operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among
different States. The motion would make the Senate like Congress, the
mere Agents & Advocates of State interests & views, instead of being the
impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and [14] general Good. Congs.
had lately by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on
the mutual claims be -- between the U. States & the individual States,
fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of
the business referred to them by the Confederation.

Mr. DAYTON considered the payment of the Senate by the States as fatal
to their independence. he was decided for paying them out of the Natl.
Treasury.

On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the States as
moved by Mr. Elseworth. [15]

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [16]

Col. MASON. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea
which seemed to be proper for consideration. One important object in
constituting the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To give
them weight & firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in
office was thought necessary. But a longer term than 6 years, would be
of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He
suggested therefore the propriety of annexing to the office a
qualification of property. He thought this would be very practicable; as
the rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of
wealth possessed by every man.

A question was then taken whether the words "to be paid out of the
public [17] treasury," should stand."

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [18]

Mr. BUTLER moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to State
offices.

Mr. WILLIAMSON seconded the motion.

Mr. WILSON remarked the additional dependence this wd create in the
Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed allotted to the
officer, the more compleat will be the dependance, if it exists at all.

Genl. PINKNEY was for making the States as much as could be conveniently
done, a part of the Genl. Govt.: If the Senate was to be appointed by
the States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be paid by the
States: and the States ought not to be barred from the opportunity of
calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would
also discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved a resolution so penned as to admit of the two
following questions. 1. [19] whether the members of the Senate should be
ineligible to & incapable of holding offices under the U. States 2. [19]
Whether &c. under the particular States.

On the Question to postpone in order to consider [20] Williamson's
Resoln. Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md.
ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [21]

Mr. GERRY & Mr. MADISON -- move to add to Mr. Williamsons 1, [19] Quest:
"and for 1 year thereafter." On this amendt.

Masts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [22]

On Mr. Will-son's 1 Question as amended. vz. inelig: & incapable &c. &c
for 1 year &c. agd. [23] unanimously.

On the 2. [24] question as to ineligibility &c. to State offices. [25]

Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [26]

The 5. [27] Resol: "that each branch have the right of originating acts"
was agreed to nem: con:

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

3. The word "times" is substituted in the transcript for "terms."

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,
aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 7;
New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4."

6. The words "The clause of the fourth Resolution" are here inserted in
the transcript.

7. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. Quer. whether Connecticut should not be -- no, & Delaware, ay. [9]

9. An interrogation mark and the initials "J.M." are here inserted in
the transcript. According to the Journal, Connecticut was "ay" and
Delaware "no."

10. The figure "5" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The figure "6" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "was" is omitted in the transcript.

13. The word "as" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The phrase "it passed in the negative" is here inserted in the
transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 6."

17. The word "public" is changed to "national" in the transcript.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

19. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

20. The word "Mr." is here inserted in the transcript.

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, no -- 3."

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay -- 7;
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no -- 4."

23. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

24. The figure "2" is changed to "second" in the transcript.

25. The transcript italicizes the words "State offices."

26. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, aye -- 3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

27. The figure "5" is changed to "fifth" in the transcript.

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WEDNESDAY  JUNE 27.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to postpone the 6th Resolution, defining the powers
of Congs. in order to take up the 7 & 8 which involved the most
fundamental points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches which was
agreed to nem. con.

A question being proposed on Resol: 7 [1] : declaring that the suffrage
in the first branch sd. be according to an equitable ratio.

Mr. L. MARTIN contended at great length and with great eagerness that
the General Govt. was meant merely to preserve the State Governts.: not
to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within narrow
limits; that if too little power was given to it, more might be added;
but that if too much, it could never be resumed: that individuals as
such have little to do but with their own States; that the Genl. Govt.
has no more to apprehend from the States composing the Union, while it
pursues proper measures, that [2] a Govt. over individuals has to
apprehend from its subjects: that to resort to the Citizens at large for
their sanction to a new Governt. will be throwing them back into a State
of Nature: that the dissolution of the State Govts. is involved in the
nature of the process: that the people have no right to do this without
the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State
purposes: through their tongue only they can speak, through their ears,
only, can hear: that the States have shewn a good disposition to comply
with the Acts, of Congs. weak, contemptibly weak as that body has been;
and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of
the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the
chief causes of this inability: that he did not conceive the instances
mentioned by Mr. Madison of compacts between Va. & Md. between Pa. & N.
J. or of troops raised by Massts. for defence against the Rebels, to be
violations of the articles of confederation -- that an equal vote in
each State was essential to the federal idea, and was founded in justice
& freedom, not merely in policy: that tho' the States may give up this
right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not: that the States
like individuals were in a State of nature equally sovereign & free. In
order to prove that individuals in a State of nature are equally free &
independent he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Summers --
Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with States till they
surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke &
Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the States being equal cannot treat or
confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up
their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of
slavery for 10 States: that as Va. Masts. & Pa. have 42/90 of the votes
they can do as they please without a miraculous Union of the other ten:
that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over one of the ten to
make them compleat masters of the rest: that they can then appoint an
Execute. & Judiciary & legislate [3] for them as they please: that there
was & would continue a natural predilection & partiality in men for
their own States; that the States, particularly the smaller, would never
allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no State in
ratifying the Confederation had objected to the equality of votes; that
the complaints at present run not agst. this equality but the want of
power; that 16 members from Va. would be more likely to act in concert
than a like number formed of members from different States; that instead
of a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a division of
the large States would be more eligible. -- This was the substance of a
speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much
exhausted he said to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he
should tomorrow, resume them.

Adjd.

___________

1. The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol; 7."

2. The word "than" is substituted in the transcript for "that."

3. The word "legislature" is substituted in the transcript for
"legislate."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY.  JUNE 28th.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. L. MARTIN resumed his discourse, contending that the Genl. Govt.
ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if the
States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it
would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by the
Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally
enslaved; that if the large States have the same interest with the
smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal
vote; they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the
large ones on that supposition without injuring themselves and if the
interests, were not the same, the inequality of suffrage wd. be
dangerous to the smaller States: that it will be in vain to propose any
plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the
people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large States
were weak at present in proportion to their extent: & could only be made
formidable to the small ones, by the weight of their votes; that in case
a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would
have nothing to fear from their power; that if in such a case the three
great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do
so too: & that he had rather see partial confederacies take place, than
the plan on the table.

This was the substance of the residue of his discourse which was
delivered with much diffuseness & considerable vehemence.

Mr. LANSING & Mr. DAYTON moved to strike out "not." so that the 7 art:
might read that the rights [1] of suffrage in the 1st. branch ought to
be according to the rule established by the Confederation."

Mr. DAYTON expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put
till tomorrow; Governr. Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and
the representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. thought that if any political truth could be grounded on
mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States were equally
sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that
they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the
smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman
would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if
they had a plurality of votes would have an interest in throwing the
burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged
that the expected addition of new States from the Westward might be kept
in [2] view. They would be small States, they would be poor States, they
would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers; their distance
from market rendering the produce of their labour less valuable; they
would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying
burdens on commerce & consumption which would fall with greatest [3]
weight on the old States.

Mr. MADISON, Sd. he was much disposed to concur in any expedient not
inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the
difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither
be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor [4] necessary for
the safety of the small States agst. the large States. That it was not
just, had been conceded by Mr. Breerly & Mr. Patterson themselves. The
expedient proposed by them was a new partition of the territory of the
U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of
Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding mere
Treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties
were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be
reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an
authority was created paramount to the parties, & making laws for the
government of them. If France, England & Spain were to enter into a
Treaty for the regulation of commerce &c with the Prince of Monacho & 4
or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate
to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal.
Wd. the case be the same, if a Council were to be formed of deputies
from each with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy troops,
determine the value of coin &c? Would 30 or 40. million [5] of people
submit their fortunes into the hands, of a few thousands? If they did it
would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their
superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble
associates. Why are Counties of the same states represented in
proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are
chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the
Nationl. Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake than
the smaller? The case will be the same with the larger & smaller States.
Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons &
properties? The same is the case in some degree as the articles of
confederation stand; the same will be the case in a far greater degree
under the plan proposed to be substituted. In the cases of captures, of
piracies, and of offences in a federal army; the property & persons of
individuals depend on the laws of Congs. By the plan proposed a compleat
power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is proposed to
be vested in the National Govt. Many other powers are added which
assimilate it to the Govt. of individual States. The negative proposed
on the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the State
Legislatures & of course will require that it should be exercised by a
body established on like principles with the other [6] branches of those
Legislatures. -- That it is not necessary to secure the small States
agst. the large ones he conceived to be equally obvious: Was a
combination of the large ones dreaded? this must arise either from some
interest common to Va. Masts. & Pa. & distinguishing them from the other
States or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. Did any such
common interest exist? In point of situation they could not have been
more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous citizen
of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and the other
circumstances which sometimes beget affection between different
communities, they were not more assimilated than the other States. -- In
point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three
other States in the Union. The Staple of Masts. was fish, of Pa. flower,
of Va. Tobo. Was a combination to be apprehended from the mere
circumstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger.
The journals of Congs. did not present any peculiar association of these
States in the votes recorded. It had never been seen that different
Counties in the same State, conformable in extent, but disagreeing in
other circumstances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations.
Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of
superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships were much more
frequent than coalitions. Among independent nations, pre-eminent over
their neighbours, the same remark was verified. Carthage & Rome tore one
another to pieces instead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker
nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria & France were hostile as
long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe. England & France
have succeeded to the pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we
owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers would have
been fatal to us. Among the principal members of antient & Modern
confederacies, we find the same effect from the same cause. The
contintions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens & Thebes, proved fatal
to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions,
not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted & oppressed
the Germanic [7] empire. Were the large States formidable singly to
their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter ought to wish
for such a general Govt. as will operate with equal energy on the former
as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more liberty the larger
will have to avail themselves of their superior force. Here again
Experience was an instructive monitor. What is ye situation of the weak
compared with the strong in those stages of civilization in which the
violence of individuals is least controuled by an efficient Government?
The Heroic period of Antient Greece the feudal licentiousness of the
middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of the American Savages,
answer this question. What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in
the great society of independent nations, in which the more powerful are
under no controul but the nominal authority of the law of Nations? Is
not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their weakness.
But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of the
weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. Plutarch [ [8] life of
Themistocles] will inform us that it happened but too often that the
strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that Judgment went in
favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser
states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly
trampled upon; and that they owe their safety as far as they enjoy it,
partly to their enlisting themselves, under the rival banners of the
pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with neighbouring Princes which
the Constitution of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of
things in the lax system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains
about 1/2 the people, supplies about 1/2 of [9] the money, and by her
influence, silently & indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word;
the two extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect
incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case they would be
independent nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the
last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one
common law. In the first case the smaller States would have every thing
to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear.
The true policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those
principles & that form of Govt. which will most approximate the States
to the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added. If the
Genl. Govt. be feeble, the large States distrusting its continuance, and
foreseeing that their importance & security may depend on their own size
& strength, will never submit to a partition. Give to the Genl. Govt.
sufficient energy & permanency, & you remove the objection. Gradual
partitions of the large, & junctions of the small States will be
facilitated, and time may effect that equalization, which is wished for
by the small States now, but can never be accomplished at once.

Mr. WILSON. The leading argument of those who contend for equality of
votes among the States is that the States as such being equal, and being
represented not as districts of individuals, but in their political &
corporate capacities, are entitled to an equality of suffrage. According
to this mode of reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engld
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the
Constitution, is perfectly right & proper. They are like the States
represented in their corporate capacity like the States therefore they
are entitled to equal voices, old Sarum to as many as London. And
instead of the injury supposed hitherto to be done to London, the true
ground of complaint lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which
is her proper share, sends four representatives to Parliament.

Mr. SHERMAN. The question is not what rights naturally belong to men
[10] ; but how they may be most equally & effectually guarded in
Society. And if some give up more than others in order to attain [11]
this end, there can be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to
require an equal concession from all, if it would create danger to the
rights of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man
who enters into Society along with the poor man, gives up more than the
poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to have
more votes than the poor man in proportion to his superior stake, the
rights of the poor man would immediately cease to be secure. This
consideration prevailed when the articles of Confederation were formed.

The determination of the question from [12] striking out the word "not"
was put off till tomorrow at the request of the Deputies of N. York. See
opposite page & insert the Speech of Doctr. F in this place. [13]

Mr. President The small progress we have made after 4 or five weeks
close attendance & continual reasonings with each other -- our different
sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing as
many noes as ays, is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of
the Human Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of
political wisdom, since we have been running about in search of it. We
have gone back to ancient history for models of Government, and examined
the different forms of those Republics which having been formed with the
seeds of their own dissolution now no longer exist. And we have viewed
Modern States all round Europe, but find none of their Constitutions
suitable to our circumstances.

In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in the dark to
find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented
to us, how has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought
of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our
understandings? In the beginning of the Contest with G. Britain, when we
were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the divine
protection. -- Our prayers, Sir, were heard, & they were graciously
answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed
frequent instances of a superintending providence in our favor. To that
kind providence we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on
the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now
forgotten that powerful friend? or do we imagine that we no longer need
his assistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live,
the more convincing proofs I see of this truth -- that God Governs in
the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without
his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We
have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that "except the Lord
build the House they labour in vain that build it." I firmly believe
this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall
succeed in this political building no better, than the Builders of
Babel: We shall be divided by our little partial local interests; our
projects will be confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach
and bye word down to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may
hereafter from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing
Governments by Human wisdom and leave it to chance, war and conquest.

I therefore beg leave to move -- that henceforth prayers imploring the
assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in
this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one
or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in that
Service -- 

Mr. SHERMAN seconded the motion.

Mr. HAMILTON & several others expressed their apprehensions that however
proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning of the
convention, it might at this late day, I. [14] bring on it some
disagreeable animadversions. & 2. [15] lead the public to believe that
the embarrassments and dissensions within the Convention, had suggested
this measure. It was answered by Docr. F. Mr. SHERMAN & others, that the
past omission of a duty could not justify a further omission -- that the
rejection of such a proposition would expose the Convention to more
unpleasant animadversions than the adoption of it: and that the alarm
out of doors that might be excited for the state of things within, would
at least be as likely to do good as ill.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed that the true cause of the omission could not
be mistaken. The Convention had no funds.

Mr. RANDOLPH proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to ye.
measure, that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention on
[16] 4th of July, the anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward
prayers be used [17] in ye. Convention every morning. Dr. FRANKn. 2ded.
this motion After several unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing
the [18] matter by adjourng. the adjournment was at length carried,
without any vote on the motion.

___________

1. The transcript uses the word "rights" in the singular.

2. The words "taken into" are substituted in the transcript for "kept
in."

3. The word "greater" is substituted in the transcript for "greatest."

4. The words "that it was" are here inserted in the transcript.

5. The transcript uses the word "million" in the plural.

6. The word "other" is omitted in the transcript.

7. The word "German" is substituted in the transcript for "Germanic."

8. The word "see" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.

10. The word "men" is used in the singular in the transcript.

11. The word "obtain" is substituted in the transcript for "attain."

12. The word "from" is changed to "for" in the transcript.

13. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript and the words
"Doctor Franklin" are inserted.

14. The figure "1" is changed to "in the first place" in the transcript.

15. The figure "2" is changed to "in the second place" in the
transcript.

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The words "&c to be read" are substituted in the transcript for "be
used."

18. The word "this" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  JUNE 29th.   IN CONVENTION

DOCtr. JOHNSON. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ
in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the
States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on
the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is
that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Govt. is to be
formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the
individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the
States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of
self-defence. This is the idea of [Col. Mason] who appears to have
looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the Aristocratic and other
interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves, the
States have their interests as such, and are equally entitled to likes
means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are
to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts
of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides,
instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in
one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other the States.

Mr. GHORUM. The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to
refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he
wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to consider
which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He conceived that a
rupture of the Union wd. be an event unhappy for all, but surely the
large States would be least unable to take care of themselves, and to
make connections with one another. The weak therefore were most
interested in establishing some general system for maintaining order. If
among individuals, composed partly of weak, and partly of strong, the
former most need the protection of law & Government, the case is exactly
the same with weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of
Delaware (for these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as
well be done [1] first as last) what wd. be the situation of Delaware in
case of a separation of the States? Would she not lie [2] at the mercy
of Pennsylvania? would not her true interest lie in being consolidated
with her, and ought she not now to wish for such a union with Pa. under
one Govt. as will put it out of the power of Pena. to oppress her?
Nothing can be more ideal than the danger apprehended by the States,
from their being formed into one nation. Massts. was originally three
colonies, viz old Massts. Plymouth -- & the province of Mayne. These
apprehensions existed then. An incorporation took place; all parties
were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. The case
was similar with Connecticut & Newhaven. The dread of union was
reciprocal; the consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. In
like manner N. Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should
a separation of the States take place, the fate of N. Jersey wd. be
worst of all. She has no foreign commerce & can have but little. Pa. &
N. York will continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults
her interest she wd. beg of all things to be annihilated. The
apprehensions of the small States ought to be appeased by another
reflection. Massts. will be divided. The province of Maine is already
considered as approaching the term of its annexation to it; and Pa. will
probably not increase, considering the present state of her population,
& other events that may happen. On the whole he considered a Union of
the States as necessary to their happiness, & a firm Genl. Govt. as
necessary to their Union. He shd. consider it as [3] his duty if his
colleagues viewed the matter in the same light he did to stay here as
long as any other State would remain with them, in order to agree on
some plan that could with propriety be recommended to the people.

Mr. ELSWORTH, did not despair. He still trusted that some good plan of
Govt. wd. be divised & adopted.

Mr. READ. He shd. have no objection to the system if it were truly
national, but it has too much of a federal mixture in it. The little
States he thought had not much to fear. He suspected that the large
States felt their want of energy, & wished for a Genl. Govt. to supply
the defect. Massts. was evidently labouring under her weakness and he
believed Delaware wd. not be in much danger if in her neighbourhood.
Delaware had enjoyed tranquility & he flattered himself wd. continue to
do so. He was not however so selfish as not to wish for a good Genl.
Govt. In order to obtain one the whole States must be incorporated. If
the States remain, the representatives of the large ones will stick
together, and carry every thing before them. The Executive also will be
chosen under the influence of this partiality, and will betray it in his
administration. These jealousies are inseparable from the scheme of
leaving the States in existence. They must be done away. The ungranted
lands also which have been assumed by particular States must also [4] be
given up. He repeated his approbation of the plan of Mr. Hamilton, &
wished it to be substituted in place of [5] that on the table.

Mr. MADISON agreed with Docr. Johnson, that the mixed nature of the
Govt. ought to be kept in view; but thought too much stress was laid on
the rank of the States as political societies. There was a gradation, he
observed from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty. He pointed out the
limitations on the sovereignty of the States, as now confederated their
laws in relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy were analogous
to that of bye laws to the supreme law within a State. Under the
proposed Govt. the powers of the States will be much farther reduced.
According to the views of every member, the Genl. Govt. will have powers
far beyond those exercised by the British Parliament, when the States
were part of the British Empire. It will in particular have the power,
without the consent of the State Legislatures, to levy money directly on
[6] the people themselves; and therefore not to divest such unequal
portions of the people as composed the several States, of an equal
voice, would subject the system to the reproaches & evils which have
resulted from the vicious representation in G. B.

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small States to renounce a
principle wch. was confessedly unjust, which cd. never be admitted, &
[7] if admitted must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we
wished to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the consequences
of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It had been sd. that the
want of energy in the large states wd. be a security to the small. It
was forgotten that this want of energy proceeded from the supposed
security of the States agst. all external danger. Let each state depend
on itself for its security, & let apprehensions arise arise of danger,
from distant powers or from neighbouring States, & the languishing
condition of all the States, large as well as small, wd. soon be
transformed into vigorous & high toned Govts. His great fear was that
their Govts. wd. then have too much energy, that these [8] might not
only be formidable in the large to the small States, but fatal to the
internal liberty of all. The same causes which have rendered the old
world the Theatre of incessant wars, & have banished liberty from the
face of it, wd. soon produce the same effects here. The weakness &
jealousy of the small States wd. quickly introduce some regular military
force agst. sudden danger from their powerful neighbours. The example
wd. be followed by others, and wd. soon become universal. In time of
actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the
Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of war, has the same
tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military
force, with an overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to
liberty. The means of defence agst. foreign danger, have been always the
instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim
to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all
Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved
the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted
system of absolute power in Europe cd. maintain itself, in a situation,
where no alarms of external danger cd. tame the people to the domestic
yoke. The insular situation of G. Britain was the principal cause of her
being an exception to the general fate of Europe. It has rendered less
defence necessary, and admitted a kind of defence wch. cd. not be used
for the purpose of oppression. -- These consequences he conceived ought
to be apprehended whether the States should run into a total separation
from each other, or shd. enter into partial confederacies. Either event
wd. be truly deplorable; & those who might be accessary to either, could
never be forgiven by their Country, nor by themselves.

[*9] Mr. HAMILTON observed that individuals forming political Societies
modify their rights differently, with regard to suffrage. Examples of it
are found in all the States. In all of them some individuals are
deprived of the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification
of property. In some of the States the right of suffrage is allowed in
some cases and refused in others. To vote for a member in one branch, a
certain quantum of property, to vote for a member in another branch of
the Legislature, a higher quantum of property is required. In like
manner States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the larger
exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller share of it. But as States
are a collection of individual men which ought we to respect most, the
rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings
resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more preposterous or
absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been sd. that
if the smaller States renounce their equality, they renounce at the same
time their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not for
liberty. Will the men composing the small States be less free than those
composing the larger. The State of Delaware having 40,000 souls will
lose [11] power, if she has 1/10 only of the votes allowed to Pa. having
400,000: but will the people of Del: be less free, if each citizen has
an equal vote with each citizen of Pa. He admitted that common residence
within the same State would produce a certain degree of attachment; and
that this principle might have a certain influence in [12] public
affairs. He thought however that this might by some precautions be in a
great measure excluded: and that no material inconvenience could result
from it, as there could not be any ground for combination among the
States whose influence was most dreaded. The only considerable
distinction of interests, lay between the carrying & non-carrying
States, which divide [13] instead of uniting the largest States. No
considerable inconvenience had been found from the division of the State
of N. York into different districts of different sizes.

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and the
establishment of partial confederacies, had been pointed out. He would
add another of a most serious nature. Alliances will immediately be
formed with different rival & hostile nations of Europes, who will
foment disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all their
own quarrels. Foreign Nations having American dominions [14] are & must
be jealous of us. Their representatives betray the utmost anxiety for
our fate, & for the result of this meeting, which must have an essential
influence on it. -- It had been said that respectability in the eyes of
foreign Nations was not the object at which we aimed; that the proper
object of republican Government was domestic tranquility & happiness.
This was an ideal distinction. No Governmt. could give us tranquility &
happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient stability and
strength to make us respectable abroad. This was the critical moment for
forming such a Government. We should run every risk in trusting to
future amendments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are weak &
sensible of our weakness. Henceforward the motives will become feebler,
and the difficulties greater. It is a miracle that we were [15] now here
exercising our tranquil & free deliberations on the subject. It would be
madness to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must obstruct a
reproduction of them.

Mr. PIERCE considered the equality of votes under the Confederation as
the great source of the public difficulties. The members of Congs. were
advocates for local advantages. State distinctions must be sacrificed as
far as the general good required, but without destroying the States.
Tho' from a small State he felt himself a Citizen of the U. S.

Mr. GERRY urged that we never were independent States, were not such
now, & never could be even on the principles of the Confederation. The
States & the advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea of their
sovereignty. He was a member of Congress at the time the federal
articles were formed. The injustice of allowing each State an equal vote
was long insisted on. He voted for it, but it was agst. his Judgment,
and under the pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser
States. The present confederation he considered as dissolving. The fate
of the Union will be decided by the Convention. If they do not agree on
something, few delegates will probably be appointed to Congs. If they do
Congs. will probably be kept up till the new System should be adopted.
He lamented that instead of coming here like a band of brothers,
belonging to the same family, we seemed to have brought with us the
spirit of political negociators.

Mr. L. MARTIN. remarked that the language of the States being sovereign
& independent, was once familiar & understood; though it seemed now so
strange & obscure. He read those passages in the articles of
Confederation, which describe them in that language.

On the question as moved by Mr. Lansing. Shall the word "not" be struck
out.

Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [16]

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, "that the rule of
suffrage in the 1st. branch ought not to be according to that
established by the articles of [17] Confederation.

Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [18]

DOCr. JOHNSON & Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to postpone the residue of the
clause, & take up -- ye. 8 -- Resol:

On [17] question.

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved that the rule of suffrage in the 2d. branch be the
same with that established by the articles of confederation." He was not
sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had determined
against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground
of compromise with regard to the 2d. branch. We were partly national;
partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was
conformable to the national principle & would secure the large States
agst. the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal
principle and was necessary to secure the Small States agst. the large.
He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He
did not see that it could on any other. And if no compromise should take
place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To
the Eastward he was sure Massts. was the only State that would listen to
a proposition for excluding the States as equal political Societies,
from an equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every
consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An attempt to deprive
them of it, was at once cutting the body of America in two, and as he
supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large
States he conceived would notwithstanding the equality of votes, have an
influence that would maintain their superiority. Holland, as had been
admitted [by Mr. Madison] had, notwithstanding a like equality in the
Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing influence in the public measures. The
power of self-defence was essential to the small States. Nature had
given it to the smallest insect of the creation. He could never admit
that there was no danger of combinations among the large States. They
will like individuals find out and avail themselves of the advantage to
be gained by it. It was true the danger would be greater, if they were
contiguous and had a more immediate [20] common interest. A defensive
combination of the small States was rendered more difficult by their
greater number. He would mention another consideration of great weight.
The existing confederation was founded on the equality of the States in
the article of suffrage: was it meant to pay no regard to this
antecedent plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary &
Legislative power be created; but Let not too much be attempted; by
which all may be lost. He was not in general a half-way man, yet he
preferred doing half the good we could, rather than do nothing at all.
The other half may be added, when the necessity shall be more fully
experienced.

Mr. BALDWIN could have wished that the powers of the General Legislature
had been defined, before the mode of constituting it had been agitated.
He should vote against the motion of Mr. Elseworth, tho' he did not like
the Resolution as it stood in the Report of the Committee of the whole.
He thought the second branch ought to be the representation of property,
and that in forming it therefore some reference ought to be had to the
relative wealth of their Constituents, and to the principles on which
the Senate of Massts. was constituted. He concurred with those who
thought it wd. be impossible for the Genl. Legislature to extend its
cares to the local matters of the States.

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "at" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "be" is substituted in the transcript for "lie."

3. The word "as" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word "also" is stricken out in the transcript. 

5. The word 'for" is substituted in the transcript for "in place of."

6. The word "from" is substituted in the transcript for "on."

7. The word "which" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "these" is stricken out in the transcript and "this" is
written above it.

*9. From this date he was absent till the _____ of _____ [10]

10. The date, "13th of August," is supplied in the transcript.

11. The transcript does not italicize the word "lose."

12. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

13. The word "divides" is substituted in the transcript for "divide,".

14. The transcript uses the word "dominions" in the singular.

15. The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "were."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6; Maryland, divided."

17. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 4; Maryland,
divided."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Massachusetts, Delaware, no -- 2."

20. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  JUNE 30, 1787. [1]   IN CONVENTION

Mr. BREARLY moved that the Presidt. write to the Executive of N.
Hamshire, informing it that the business depending before the Convention
was of such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the
deputies of that State. In support of his motion he observed that the
difficulties of the subject and the diversity of opinions called for all
the assistance we could possibly obtain. [it was well understood that
the object was to add N. Hamshire to the no. of States opposed to the
doctrine of proportional representation, which it was presumed from her
relative size she must be adverse to].

Mr. PATTERSON seconded the motion

Mr. RUTLIDGE could see neither the necessity nor propriety of such a
measure. They are not unapprized of the meeting, and can attend if they
choose. Rho. Island might as well be urged to appoint & send deputies.
Are we to suspend the business until the deputies arrive? if we proceed
he hoped all the great points would be adjusted before the letter could
produce its effect.

Mr. KING. said he had written more than once as a private correspondent,
& the answers [2] gave him every reason to expect that State would be
represented very shortly, if it shd. be so at all. Circumstances of a
personal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter cd. have no effect.

Mr. WILSON wished to know whether it would be consistent with the rule
or reason of secresy, to communicate to N. Hamshire that the business
was of such a nature as the motion described. It wd. spread a great
alarm. Besides he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State on the
subject; the meeting being merely voluntary -- on the [3] motion of Mr.
Brearly Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. not on ye. floor.
Del. not on floor. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not on
floor. [4]

The motion of Mr. Elseworth [5] resumed for allowing each State an equal
vote in ye 2d. branch.

Mr. WILSON did not expect such a motion after the establishment of ye.
contrary principle in the 1st. branch; and considering the reasons which
would oppose it, even if an equal vote had been allowed in the 1st.
branch. The Gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Elseworth] had pronounced
that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all the States North of
Pena. one only would agree to any Genl. Government. He entertained more
favorable hopes of Connt. and of the other Northern States. He hoped the
alarms exceeded their cause, and that they would not abandon a Country
to which they were bound by so many strong and endearing ties. But
should the deplored event happen, it would neither stagger his
sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America refuse
to coalesce with the majority on just and proper principles, if a
separation must take place, it could never happen on better grounds. The
votes of yesterday agst. the just principle of representation, were as
22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the opinions to be the same on
this point, and he was sure if there was any room for change, it could
not be on the side of the majority, the question will be shall less than
1/4 of the U. States withdraw themselves from the Union; or shall more
than 3/4 . renounce the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights
of men, in favor of the artificial systems of States. If issue must be
joined, it was on this point he would chuse to join it. The gentlemen
from Connecticut in supposing that the prepondenancy [6] secured to the
majority in the 1st. branch had removed the objections to an equality of
votes in the 2d. branch for the security of the minority, narrowed the
case extremely. Such an equality will enable the minority to controul in
all cases whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority.
Seven States will controul six: Seven States, according to the estimates
that had been used, composed 24/90 . of the whole people. It would be in
the power then of less than 1/3 to overrule 2/3 whenever a question
should happen to divide the States in that manner. Can we forget for
whom we are forming a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary
beings called States? Will our honest Constituents be satisfied with
metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought they to be satisfied with
being told that the one third compose the greater number of States? The
rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2d. as
in the 1st. branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it
can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle will be local,
confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion, and grow with
the growth of the U. States. -- Much has been said of an imaginary
combination of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, sometimes
of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No explanation however of the
danger has been vouchsafed. It would be easy to prove both from reason &
history that rivalships would be more probable than coalitions; and that
there are no coinciding interests that could produce the latter. No
answer has yet been given to the observations of [Mr. Madison] on this
subject. Should the Executive Magistrate be taken from one of the large
States would not the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the
other States? Whence then the danger of monarchy? Are the people of the
three large States more aristocratic than those of the small ones?
Whence then the danger of aristocracy from their influence? It is all a
mere illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what they are
composed of. Is a real & fair majority, the natural hot-bed of
aristocracy? It is a part of the definition of this species of Govt. or
rather of tyranny, that the smaller number governs the greater. It is
true that a majority of States in the 2d. branch can not carry a law
agst. a majority of the people in the 1st. But this removes half only of
the objection. Bad Governts. are of two sorts. 1. [7] that which does
too little. 2. [7] that which does too much: that which fails thro'
weakness; and that which destroys thro' oppression. Under which of these
evils do the U. States at present groan? under the weakness and
inefficiency of its Governt. To remedy this weakness we have been sent
to this Convention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave
the U. S. fettered precisely as heretofore; with the additional
mortification of seeing the good purposes of ye. fair represention of
the people in the 1st. branch, defeated in [8] 2d. Twenty four will
still controul sixty six. He lamented that such a disagreement should
prevail on the point of representation, as he did not foresee that it
would happen on the other point most contested, the boundary between the
Genl. & the local authorities. He thought the States necessary &
valuable parts of a good system.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson "that the minority
will rule the majority" is not true. The power is given to the few to
save them from being destroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had
been given to them in both branches, the objection might have had
weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a check on the
many? Is it not the case in the British Constitution the wisdom of which
so many gentlemen have united in applauding? Have not the House of
Lords, who form so small a proportion of the nation a negative on the
laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights agst. the
encroachmts. of the Commons. No instance of a Confederacy has existed in
which an equality of voices has not been exercised by the members of it.
We are running from one extreme to another. We are razing the
foundations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. No
salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority of the States, to
favor it. If security be all that the great States wish for the 1st.
branch secures them. The danger of combinations among them is not
imaginary. Altho' no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the
possibility of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could
easily conceive cases in which they might result from such combinations.
Suppose that in pursuance of some commercial treaty or arrangement,
three or four free ports & no more were to be established would not
combinations be formed in favor of Boston -- Philada. & & some port in
[9] Chesapeak? A like concert might be formed in the appointment of the
great officers. He appealed again to the obligations of the federal pact
which was still in force, and which had been entered into with so much
solemnity; persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to
the plighed faith under which each State small as well as great, held an
equal right of suffrage in the general Councils. His remarks were not
the result of partial or local views. The State he represented
[Connecticut] held a middle rank.

Mr. MADISON did justice to the able & close reasoning of Mr. E. but must
observe that it did not always accord with itself. On another occasion,
the large States were described by him as the Aristocratic States, ready
to oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords requiring a
negative to defend them agst. the more numerous commons. Mr. E. had also
erred in saying that no instance had existed in which confederated
States had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of suffrage.
Passing over the German system in which the K. of Prussia has nine
voices, he reminded Mr. E. of the Lycian confederacy, in which the
component members had votes proportioned to their importance, and which
Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for that form of Government.
Had the fact been as stated by Mr. E. it would have been of little avail
to him, or rather would have strengthened the arguments agst. him; the
History & fate of the several confederacies modern as well as Antient,
demonstrating some radical vice in their structure. In reply to the
appeal of Mr. E. to the faith plighted in the existing federal compact,
he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common
engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all
the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea.
Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which
no State was free, the Legislature of that State had by a pretty recent
vote, positively, refused to pass a law for complying with the
Requisitions of Congs. and had transmitted a copy of the vote to Congs.
It was urged, he said, continually that an equality of votes in the 2d.
branch was not only necessary to secure the small, but would be
perfectly safe to the large ones whose majority in the 1st. branch was
an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this apparent defence, the
majority of States might still injure the majority of [10] people. 1.
[11] they could obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority. 2.
[11] they could extort measures repugnant to the wishes & interest of
the Majority. 3. [11] they could impose measures adverse thereto; as the
2d. branch will probably exercise some great powers, in which the 1st.
will not participate. He admitted that every peculiar interest whether
in any class of citizens, or any description of States, ought to be
secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack there
ought [12] be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended
that the States were divided into different interests not by their
difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of
which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of
their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming
the great division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie between
the large & small States: It lay between the Northern & Southern, and if
any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to
these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with this important
truth that he had been casting about in his mind for some expedient that
would answer the purpose. The one which had occurred was that instead of
proportioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their
respective numbers of inhabitants computing the slaves in the ratio of 5
to 3, they should be represented in one branch according to the number
of free inhabitants only; and in the other according to the whole no.
counting the slaves as if [13] free. By this arrangement the Southern
Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the Northern in the
other. He had been restrained from proposing this expedient by two
considerations: one was his unwillingness to urge any diversity of
interests on an occasion where it is but too apt to arise of itself --
the other was, the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two
branches, and which wd. destroy the equilibrium of interests.

Mr. ELSEWORTH assured the House that whatever might be thought of the
Representatives of Connecticut the State was entirely federal in her
disposition. He appealed to her great exertions during the war, in
supplying both men & money. The muster rolls would show she had more
troops in the field than Virga. If she had been Delinquent, it had been
from inability, and not more so than other States.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Madison has [14] animadverted on the delinquency of the
States, when his object required him to prove that the Constitution of
Congs. was faulty. Congs. is not to blame for the faults of the States.
Their measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has been, a
further power in Congs. to render them effectual.

Mr. DAVY was much embarrassed and wished for explanations. The Report of
the Committee allowing the Legislatures to choose the Senate, and
establishing a proportional representation in it, seemed to be
impracticable. There will according to this rule be ninety members in
the outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. It was
impossible that so numerous a body could possess the activity and other
qualities required in it. Were he to vote on the comparative merits of
the report as it stood, and the amendment, he should be constrained to
prefer the latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors chosen by
the people for that purpose was he conceived liable to an insuperable
difficulty. The larger Counties or districts thrown into a general
district, would certainly prevail over the smaller Counties or
districts, and merit in the latter would be excluded altogether. The
report therefore seemed to be right in referring the appointment to the
Legislatures, whose agency in the general System did not appear to him
objectionable as it did to some others. The fact was that the local
prejudices & interests which could not be denied to exist, would find
their way into the national councils whether the Representatives should
be chosen by the Legislatures or by the people themselves. On the other
hand, if a proportional representation was attended with insuperable
difficulties, the making the Senate the Representative of the States,
looked like bringing us back to Congs. again, and shutting out all the
advantages expected from it. Under this view of the subject he could not
vote for any plan for the Senate yet proposed. He though that in general
there were extremes on both sides. We were partly federal, partly
national in our Union, and he did not see why the Govt. might not in
some respects operate on the States, in others on the people.

Mr. WILSON admitted the question concerning the number of Senators, to
be embarrassing. If the smallest States be allowed one, and the others
in proportion, the Senate will certainly be too numerous. He looked
forward to the time when the smallest States will contain 100,000 souls
at least. Let there be then one Senator in each for every 100,000 souls
and let the States not having that no. of inhabitants be allowed one. He
was willing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the small
States; and threw out the idea as a ground of compromise.

DOCr. FRANKLIN. The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a
proportional representation takes place, the small States contend that
their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put
in its place, the large States say their money will be in danger. When a
broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not fit, the
artist takes a little from both, and makes a good joint. In like manner
here both sides must part with some of their demands, in order that they
may join in some accomodating proposition. He had prepared one which he
would read, that it might lie on the table for consideration.

The proposition was in the words following"

"That the Legislatures of the several States shall choose & send an
equal number of Delegates, namely _____ who are to compose the 2d.
branch of the General Legislature --

"That in all cases or questions wherein the Sovereignty of individual
States may be affected, or whereby their authority over their own
Citizens may be diminished, or the authority of the General Government
within the several States augmented, each State shall have equal
suffrage.

"That in the appointment of all Civil officers of ye. Genl. Govt. in the
election of whom the 2d. branch may by the Constitution have part, each
State shall have equal suffrage.

"That in fixing the Salaries of such officers, and in all allowances for
public services, and generally in all appropriations & dispositions of
money to be drawn out of the General Treasury; and in all laws for
supplying that Treasury, the Delegates of the several States shall have
suffrage in proportion to the Sums which their respective States do
actually contribute to the Treasury." Where a Ship had many owners this
was the rule of deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the
Ministers from this Country to France during the joint war and wd. have
been very glad if allowed a vote in distributing the money to carry it
on.

Mr. KING observed that the simple question was whether each State should
have an equal vote in the 2d. branch; that it must be apparent to those
gentlemen who liked neither the motion for this equality, nor the report
as it stood, that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the
motion; that a reform would be nugatory & nominal only if we should make
another Congress of the proposed Senate: that if the adherence to an
equality of votes was fixed & unalterable, there could not be less
obstinacy on the other side, & that we were in fact cut insunder [15]
already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it: that he was
however filled with astonishment that if we were convinced that every
man in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to
sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty:
that his feelings were more harrowed & his fears more agitated for his
Country than he could express, that he conceived this to be the last
opportunity of providing for its liberty & happiness: that he could not
therefore but repeat his amazement that when a just Governt. founded on
a fair representation of the people of America was within our reach, we
should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom &
importance of States: that should this wonderful illusion continue to
prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than to [16] sit
down under a Govt. founded in [17] a vicious principle of
representation, and which must be as short lived as it would be unjust.
He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had been
hinted by Mr. Wilson: but he never could listen to an equality of votes
as proposed in the motion.

Mr. DAYTON. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted
for argument, he presumed they would have no effect however eloquently
spoken. It should have been shewn that the evils we have experienced
have proceeded from the equality now objected to: and that the seeds of
dissolution for the State Governments are not sown in the Genl.
Government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an
amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be recd. by
the people.

Mr. MARTIN, wd. never confederate if it could not be done on just
principles.

Mr. MADISON would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. Wilson, on
condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The
plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the
States. The Senate therefore is only another edition of Congs. He knew
the faults of that Body & had used a bold language agst. it. Still he
wd. preserve the State rights, as carefully as the trials by jury.

Mr. BEDFORD, contended that there was no middle way between a perfect
consolidation and a mere confederacy of the States. The first is out of
the question, and in the latter they must continue if not perfectly, yet
equally sovereign. If political Societies possess ambition avarice, and
all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought
we not to view them in this light here? Will not the same motives
operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it let him look
at the votes. Have they not been dictated by interest, by ambition? Are
not the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of the small? They think no doubt that they have right on their
side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a
small State at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a
great one. S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest & future
prospects. She hopes too to see the other States cut down to her own
dimensions. N. Carolina has the same motives of present & future
interest. Virga. follows. Maryd. is not on that side of the Question.
Pena. has a direct and future interest. Massts. has a decided and
palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the
small States will act from pure disinterestedness. Look at G. Britain.
Is the Representation there less unequal? But we shall be told again
that that is the rotten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs
however held fast their constitutional rights? and are we to act with
greater purity than the rest of mankind. An exact proportion in the
Representation is not preserved in any one of the States. Will it be
said that an inequality of power will not result from an inequality of
votes. Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The
whole History of mankind proves it. The three large States have a common
interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination as
we suppose, or a competition as others suppose, shall take place among
them, in either case, the smaller [18] States must be ruined. We must
like Solon make such a Governt. as the people will approve. Will the
smaller States ever agree to the proposed degradation of them. It is not
true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present
Congs. The Language of the people has been that Congs. ought to have the
power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the States when [19] it
may be necessary. On the first point they have been explicit &, in a
manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this
& similar measures if they ever mean to discharge their engagements. The
little States are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet
the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been
told with a dictatorial air that this is the last moment for a fair
trial in favor of a good Governmt. It will be the last indeed if the
propositions reported from the Committee go forth to the people. He was
under no apprehensions. The Large States dare not dissolve the
Confederation. If they do the small ones willfind some foreign ally of
more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them
justice. He did not mean by this to intimidate or alarm. It was a
natural consequence; which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal
powers not annihilating the federal system. This is what the people
expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient Govt. and why not
make such an one; as they desire.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. Under a National Govt. he should participate in the
National Security, as remarked by [Mr. King] but that was all. What he
wanted was domestic happiness. The Natl. Govt. could not descend to the
local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a
general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the preservation of his
rights to the State Govts. From these alone he could derive the greatest
happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their
existence, as much as a new born infant on its mother for nourishment.
If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could
be so.

Mr. KING was for preserving the States in a subordinate degree, and as
far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr. Elsewth.
He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a
dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be
devised as he conceived that would give them all the security the nature
of things would admit of. In the establishmt. of Societies the
Constitution was to the Legislature what the laws were to individuals.
As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express
provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not a like security be
provided for the Rights of States in the National Constitution. The
articles of Union between Engld. & Scotland furnish an example of such a
provision in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that Union was in
agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from
the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The
articles however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an
increase of prosperity & happiness. He was aware that this will be
called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to say
that if fundamental articles of compact, are no sufficient defence
against physical power, neither will there be any safety agst. it if
there be no compact. He could not sit down, without taking some notice
of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware [Mr. Bedford].
It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance
had marked the honorabl gentleman himself. It was not he who with a
vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to
turn his hopes from our common Country, and court the protection of some
foreign hand. This too was the language of the Honbl member himself. He
was grieved that such a thought had entered into [20] his heart. He was
more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The
gentleman cd. only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For
himself whatever might be his distress, he wd. never court relief from a
foreign power.

Adjourned.

___________

1. The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The transcript uses the word "answers" in the singular.

3. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, aye -- 2;
Massachusetts Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no
-- 5; Maryland, divided: Pennsylvania, Delaware, Georgia, not on the
floor."

5. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "prepondenancy" is changed to "preponderance" in the
transcript.

7. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The words "of the" are substituted in the transcript for "in."

10. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "In the first place,"
"Secondly" and "Thirdly."

12. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. The word "if" is omitted in the transcript.

14. The word "has" is omitted in the transcript.

15. The word "asunder" is substituted in the transcript for "insunder.."

16. The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.

17. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

18. The word "small" is substituted in the transcript for "smaller."

19. The word "where" is substituted in the transcript for "when."

20. The word "into" is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  JULY 2nd.   IN CONVENTION

On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as
moved by Mr. Elseworth, [1] Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Mr. Jenifer being not present Mr. Martin alone
voted Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd. Mr. Houston no. Mr. Baldwin
ay.

Mr. PINKNEY thought an equality of votes in the 2d. branch inadmissible.
At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the large States would
feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them a preference, in
appointments: that they might also find some common points in their
commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a
real distinction [3] the Northern & Southn. interests. N. Carola. S.
Carol: & Geo. in their Rice & Indigo had a peculiar interest which might
be sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented from
administering the Genl. Govt. as they please, without being themselves
unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some but
not a full proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be
done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment.
Congs. have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the
federal System. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the
appointmt. of this Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the
consequences of such an event He read his motion, to form the States
into classes, with an apportionment of Senators among them, [see art. 4,
of his plan].

General PINKNEY. was willing the motion might be considered. He did not
entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Docr. Franklin [which
see Saturday June 30]. Some compromise seemed to be necessary: the
States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in
the 2d. branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from
each State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.

Mr. L. MARTIN had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications
whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminution of
their equal Sovereignty.

Mr. SHARMAN. We are now at a full stop, and nobody he supposed meant
that we shd. break up without doing something. A committee he thought
most likely to hit on some expedient.

[4] Mr. Govr. MORRIS. thought a Come. adviseable as the Convention had
been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of
appointing the 2d. branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it.
What is this object? to check the precipitation, changeableness, and
excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the
democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation -- in
Congress changeableness, in every department excesses agst. personal
liberty private property & personal safety. What qualities are necessary
to constitute a check in this case? Abilities and virtue, are equally
necessary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted. 1. [6]
the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other
branch, one interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices as they
exist, must be turned agst. each other. 2. [7] It must have great
personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to
lord it thro' pride, pride is indeed the great principle that actuates
both the poor & the rich. It is this principle which in the former
resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3. [8] It should be
independent. In Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That
it is otherwise in political affairs, the late debates here are an
unhappy proof. The aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm
as the democratic. If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on
the democratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the
guards contrived by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches
of the Legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If
the 2d. branch is to be dependent we are better without it. To make it
independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be
said. He believed so: He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish
their dominion & enslave the rest. They always did. They always will.
The proper security agst them is to form them into a separate interest.
The two forces will then controul each other. Let the rich mix with the
poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an oligarchy. Take
away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the
world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men: and
we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor.
By thus combining & setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the
popular interest will be combined agst. it. There will be a mutual check
and mutual security. 4. [9] An independence for life, involves the
necessary permanency. If we change our measures no body will trust us:
and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of men. Ask
any man if he confides in Congs. if he confides in the State of Pena. if
he will lend his money or enter into contract? He will tell you no. He
sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were to explain
her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed. --
He disliked the exclusion of the 2d. branch from holding offices. It is
dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the military officers
during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of
the principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended from the
Executive what a lift-handed way is this of obviating it? If the son,
the brother or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be even
increased, as the disqualified father &c. can then boast of a
disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides shall the best, the
most able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices?
Who then are to hold them? He was also agst. paying the Senators. They
will pay themselves if they can. If they can not they will be rich and
can do without it. Of such the 2d. branch ought to consist; and none but
such can compose it if they are not to be paid -- He contended that the
Executive should appoint the Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid
of the difficulty in the present question. You may begin with any ratio
you please; it will come to the same thing. The members being independt.
& for life, may be taken as well from one place as from another. -- It
should be considered too how the scheme could be carried through the
States. He hoped there was strength of mind eno' in this House to look
truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to say that loaves &
fishes must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher
offices under the general than the State Govts. A Senate for life will
be a noble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders
will oppose & defeat the plan. He perceived that the 1st. branch was to
be chosen by the people of the States: the 2d. by those chosen by the
people. Is not here a Govt. by the States. A Governt. by Compact between
Virga. in the 1st. & 2d. branch; Masts. in the 1st. & 2d. branch &c.
This is going back to mere treaty. It is no Govt. at all. It is
altogether dependent on the States, and will act over again the part
which Congs. has acted. A firm Governt. alone can protect our liberties.
He fears the influence of the rich. They will have the same effect here
as elsewhere if we do not by such a Govt. keep them within their proper
sphere. [10] We should remember that the people never act from reason
alone. The Rich will take [11] advantage of their passions & make these
the instruments for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a
violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the
Rich will be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such
distant parts can not communicate & act in concert. They will be the
dupes of those who have more knowledge & intercourse. The only security
agst. encroachments will be a select & sagacious body of men, instituted
to watch agst. them on all sides. He meant only to hint these
observations, without grounding any motion on them.

Mr. RANDOLPH favored the commitment though he did not expect much
benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm & rash language
of Mr. Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small States that if the large
States should combine some danger of which he did not deny there would
be a check in the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated that
in order to render this still more effectual, he would agree that in the
choice of the [12] Executive each State should have an equal vote. He
was persuaded that two such opposite bodies as Mr. Morris had planned,
could never long co-exist. Dissentions would arise as has been seen even
between the Senate and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be
made to the people; and in a little time, commotions would be the result
-- He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of themselves
any more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole in ruin,
and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of Government as would
secure us agst. such a calamity.

Mr. STRONG was for the Commitment; and hoped the mode of constituting
both branches would be referred. If they should be established on
different principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never
be a concurrence in necessary measures. DOCr. WILLIAMSON. If we do not
concede on both sides, our business must soon be at an end. He approved
of the Commitment, supposing that as the Come. wd. be a smaller body, a
compromise would be pursued with more coolness.

Mr. WILSON objected to the Committee, because it would decide according
to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side. Experience in
Congs. had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members
from each State.

Mr. LANSING wd. not oppose the commitment, though expecting little
advantage from it.

Mr. MADISON opposed the Commitment. He had rarely seen any other effect
than delay from such Committees in Congs. Any scheme of compromise that
could be proposed in the Committee might as easily be proposed in the
House; and the report of the Committee when [13] it contained merely the
opinion of the Come. would neither shorten the discussion, nor influence
the decision of the House.

Mr. GERRY was for the Commitmt. Something must be done, or we shall
disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a
consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the failure of
the Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide controversies and
must be at the mercy of events. What too is to become of our treaties --
what of our foreign debts, what of our domestic? We must make
concessions on both sides. Without these the Constitutions of the
several States would never have been formed.

On the question "for committing," generally:

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [14]

On the question for committing [15] "to a member from each State."

Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [16]

The Committee elected by ballot, were Mr. Gerry, Mr. Elseworth, Mr.
Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason,
Mr. Davy, Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.

That time might be given to the Committee, and to such as chose to
attend to the celebrations on the anniversary of Independence, the
Convention adjourned till Thursday.

___________

1. The phrase "it was lost by an equal division of votes," is here
inserted in the transcript and the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, [2] aye -- 5; Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 5;
Georgia, divided [Mr. Baldwin, aye, Mr. Houston, No]." The footnote
referring to Maryland reads: "Mr. Jenifer not being present, Mr. Martin
alone voted."

2. Transfer hither the marginal note. [5]

3. The word "between" is here inserted in the transcript. See Appendix
to Debates, IV, No. 3, p. 600.

4. He had just returned from N.Y. havg. left ye. Convention a few days
after it commenced business.

5. Madison's direction concerning the footnote is omitted in the
transcript.

6. The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.

7. The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.

8. The figure "3" is changed to "In the third place" in the transcript.

9. The figure "4" is changed to "In the fourth place" in the transcript.

10. The transcript uses the word "sphere" in the plural.

11. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "an" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

13. The word "where" is substituted in the transcript for "when."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 9; New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 2."

15. The word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Delaware Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; Pennsylvania, no -- 1."

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THURSDAY  JULY 5th.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. GERRY delivered in from the Committee appointed on Monday last the
following Report.

"The Committee to whom was referred the 8th. Resol. of the Report from
the Committee of the whole House, and so much of the 7th. as has not
been decided on, submit the following Report: That the subsequent
propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both
shall be generally adopted. 1. That in the 1st. branch of the
Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed 1
member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description reported in the
7th. Resolution of the Come. of the whole House: that each State not
containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for
raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the Salaries of the
officers of the Governt. of the U. States shall originate in the 1st.
branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the
2d. branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury.
but in pursuance of appropriations to be orginated in the 1st. branch"
II. That in the 2d. branch each State shall have an equal vote." [*1]

Mr. GHORUM observed that as the report consisted of propositions
mutually conditional he wished to hear some explanations touching the
grounds on which the conditions were estimated.

Mr. GERRY. The Committee were of different opinions as well as the
Deputations from which the Come. were taken, and agreed to the Report
merely in order that some ground of accomodation might be proposed.
Those opposed to the equality of votes have only assented conditionally;
and if the other side do not generally agree will not be under any
obligation to support the Report.

Mr. WILSON thought the Committee had exceeded their powers.

Mr. MARTIN was for taking the question on the whole report.

Mr. WILSON was for a division of the question: otherwise it wd. be a
leap in the dark.

Mr. MADISON. could not regard the exclusive [3] privilege of originating
money bills as any concession on the side of the small States.
Experience proved that it had no effect. If seven States in the upper
branch wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some
member from some of the same States in the lower branch who would
originate it. The restriction as to amendments was of as little
consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate to
members in the other house. Bills could be negatived that they might be
sent up in the desired shape. If the Senate should yield to the
obstinacy of the 1st. branch the use of that body as a check would be
lost. If the 1st. branch should yield to that of the Senate, the
privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shewn both in G. B. and
the States having a similar regulation that it was a source of frequent
& obstinate altercations. These considerations had produced a rejection
of a like motion on a former occasion when judged by its own merits. It
could not therefore be deemed any concession on the present, and left in
force all the objections which had prevailed agst. allowing each State
an equal voice. He conceived that the Convention was reduced to the
alternative of either departing from justice in order to conciliate the
smaller States, and the minority of the people of the U. S. or of
displeasing these by justly gratifying the larger States and the
majority of the people. He could not himself hesitate as to the option
he ought to make. The Convention with justice & the majority of the
people on their side, had nothing to fear. With injustice and the
minority on their side they had every thing to fear. It was in vain to
purchase concord in the Convention on terms which would perpetuate
discord among their Constituents. The Convention ought to pursue a plan
which would bear the test of examination, which would be espoused &
supported by the enlightened and impartial part of America, & which they
could themselves vindicate and urge. It should be considered that altho'
at first many may judge of the system recommended, by their opinion of
the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Convention by the
System. The merits of the System alone can finally & effectually obtain
the public suffrage. He was not apprehensive that the people of the
small States would obstinately refuse to accede to a Govt. founded on
just principles, and promising them substantial protection. He could not
suspect that Delaware would brave the consequences of seeking her
fortunes apart from the other States, rather than submit to such a Govt.
much less could he suspect that she would pursue the rash policy of
courting foreign support, which the warmth of one of her representatives
[Mr. Bedford] had suggested, or if she shd. that any foreign nation wd.
be so rash as to hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect
that the people of N. Jersey notwithstanding the decided tone of the
gentlemen from that State, would choose rather to stand on their own
legs, and bid defiance to events, than to acquiesce under an
establishment founded on principles the justice of which they could not
dispute, and absolutely necessary to redeem them from the exactions
levied on them by the commerce of the neighbouring States. A review of
other States would prove that there was as little reason to apprehend an
inflexible opposition elsewhere. Harmony in the Convention was no doubt
much to be desired. Satisfaction to all the States, in the first
instance still more so. But if the principal States comprehending a
majority of the people of the U. S. should concur in a just & judicious
plan, he had the firmest hopes, that all the other States would by
degrees accede to it.

Mr. BUTLER said he could not let down his idea of the people, of America
so far as to believe they would from mere respect to the Convention
adopt a plan evidently unjust. He did not consider the privilege
concerning money bills as of any consequence. He urged that the 2d.
branch ought to represent the States according to their property.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. thought the form as well as the matter of the Report
objectionable. It seemed in the first place to render amendments
impracticable. In the next place, it seemed to involve a pledge to agree
to the 2d. part if the 1st. shd. be agreed to. He conceived the whole
aspect of it to be wrong. He came here as a Representative of America;
he flattered himself he came here in some degree as a Representative of
the whole human race; for the whole human race will be affected by the
proceedings of this Convention. He wished gentlemen to extend their
views beyond the present moment of time; beyond the narrow limits of
place from which they derive their political origin. If he were to
believe some things which he had heard, he should suppose that we were
assembled to truck and bargain for our particular States. He can-not
descend to think that any gentlemen are really actuated by these views.
We must look forward to the effects of what we do. These alone ought to
guide us. Much has been said of the sentiments of the people. They were
unknown. They could not be known. All that we can infer is that if the
plan we recommend be reasonable & right; all who have reasonable minds
and sound intentions will embrace it, notwithstanding what had been said
by some gentlemen. Let us suppose that the larger States shall agree;
and that the smaller refuse: and let us trace the consequences. The
opponents of the system in the smaller States will no doubt make a
party, and a noise for a time, but the ties of interest, of kindred & of
common habits which connect them with the other States will be too
strong to be easily broken. In N. Jersey particularly he was sure a
great many would follow the sentiments of Pena. & N. York. This Country
must be united. If persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. He
begged that [4] this consideration might have its due weight. The scenes
of horror attending civil commotion can not be described, and the
conclusion of them will be worse than the term of their continuance. The
stronger party will then make traytors of the weaker; and the Gallows &
Halter will finish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would
be ready to take part in the confusions he would not say. Threats that
they will be invited have it seems been thrown out. He drew the
melancholy picture of foreign intrusions as exhibited in the History of
Germany, & urged it as a standing lesson to other nations. He trusted
that the Gentlemen who may have hazarded such expressions, did not
entertain them till they reached their own lips. But returning to the
Report he could not think it in any respect calculated for the public
good. As the 2d. branch is now constituted, there will be constant
disputes & appeals to the States which will undermine the Genl.
Government & controul & annihilate the 1st. branch. Suppose that the
delegates from Massts. & Rho 1. in the Upper House disagree, and that
the former are outvoted. What Results? they will immediately declare
that their State will not abide by the decision, and make such
representations as will produce that effect. The same may happen as to
Virga. & other States. Of what avail then will be what is on paper.
State attachments, and State importance have been the bane of this
Country. We can not annihilate; but we may perhaps take out the teeth of
the serpents. He wished our ideas to be enlarged to the true interest of
man, instead of being circumscribed within the narrow compass of a
particular Spot. And after all how little can be the motive yielded by
selfishness for such a policy. Who can say whether he himself, much less
whether his children, will the next year be an inhabitant of this or
that State.

Mr. BEDFORD. He found that what he had said as to the small States being
taken by the hand, had been misunderstood; and he rose to explain. He
did not mean that the small States would court the aid & interposition
of foreign powers. He meant that they would not consider the federal
compact as dissolved untill it should be so by the Acts of the large
States. In this case The consequence of the breach of faith on their
part, and the readiness of the small States to fulfill their
engagements, would be that foreign Nations having demands on this
Country would find it their interest to take the small States by the
hand, in order to do themselves justice. This was what he meant. But no
man can foresee to what extremities the small States may be driven by
oppression. He observed also in apology that some allowance ought to be
made for the habits of his profession in which warmth was natural &
sometimes necessary. But is there not an apology in what was said by
[Mr. Govr. Morris] that the sword is to unite: by Mr. Ghorum that
Delaware must be annexed to Penna. and N. Jersey divided between Pena.
and N. York. To hear such language without emotion, would be to renounce
the feelings of a man and the duty of a Citizen -- As to the
propositions of the Committee, the lesser States have thought it
necessary to have a security somewhere. This has been thought necessary
for the Executive Magistrate of the proposed Govt. who has a sort of
negative on the laws; and is it not of more importance that the States
should be protected, than that the Executive branch of the Govt. shd. be
protected. In order to obtain this, the smaller States have conceded as
to the constitution of the first branch, and as to money bills. If they
be not gratified by correspondent concessions as to the 2d. branch is it
to be supposed they will ever accede to the plan; and what will be the
consequence if nothing should be done! The condition of the U. States
requires that something should be immediately done. It will be better
that a defective plan should be adopted, than that none should be
recommended. He saw no reason why defects might not be supplied by
meetings 10, 15, or 20 years hence.

Mr. ELSEWORTH said he had not attended the proceedings of the Committee,
but was ready to accede to the compromise they had reported. Some
compromise was necessary; and he saw none more convenient or reasonable.

Mr. WILLIAMSON hoped that the expressions of individuals would not be
taken for the sense of their colleagues, much less of their States which
was not & could not be known. He hoped also that the meaning of those
expressions would not be misconstrued or exaggerated. He did not
conceive that [Mr. Govr. Morris] meant that the sword ought to be drawn
agst. the smaller States. He only pointed out the probable consequences
of anarchy in the U. S. A similar exposition ought to be given of the
expressions [of Mr. Ghorum]. He was ready to hear the Report discussed;
but thought the propositions contained in it, the most objectionable of
any he had yet heard.

Mr. PATTERSON said that he had when the Report was agreed to in the
Come. reserved to himself the right of freely discussing it. He
acknowledged that the warmth complained of was improper; but he thought
the Sword & the Gallows as [5] little calculated to produce conviction.
He complained of the manner in which Mr. M -- & Mr. Govr. Morris had
treated the small States.

Mr. GERRY. Tho' he had assented to the Report in the Committee, he had
very material objections to it. We were however in a peculiar situation.
We were neither the same Nation nor different Nations. We ought not
therefore to pursue the one or the other of these ideas too closely. If
no compromise should take place what will be the consequence. A
secession he foresaw would take place; for some gentlemen seem decided
on it; two different plans will be proposed; and the result no man could
foresee. If we do not come to some agreement among ourselves some
foreign sword will probably do the work for us.

Mr. MASON. The Report was meant not as specific propositions to be
adopted; but merely as a general ground of accomodation. There must be
some accomodation on this point, or we shall make little further
progress in the work. Accomodation was the object of the House in the
appointment of the Committee; and of the Committee in the Report they
had made. And however liable the Report might be to objections, he
thought it preferable to an appeal to the world by the different sides,
as had been talked of by some Gentlemen. It could not be more
inconvenient to any gentleman to remain absent from his private affairs,
than it was for him: but he would bury his bones in this City rather
than expose his Country to the Consequences of a dissolution of the
Convention without any thing being done.

The 1st. proposition in the report for fixing the representation in the
1st. branch, one member for every 40,000 inhabitants, being taken up.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS objected to that scale of apportionment. He thought
property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the number of
inhabitants. Life & liberty were generally said to be of more value,
than property. An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove
that property was the main object of Society. The savage State was more
favorable to liberty than the Civilized; and sufficiently so to life. It
was preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for property; it
was only renounced for the sake of property which could only be secured
by the restraints of regular Government. These ideas might appear to
some new, but they were nevertheless just. If property then was the main
object of Govt. certainly it ought to be one measure of the influence
due to those who were to be affected by the Governmt. He looked forward
also to that range of New States which wd. soon be formed in the West.
He thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to secure
to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils. The new
States will know less of the public interest than these, will have an
interest in many respects different, in particular will be little
scrupulous of involving the Community in wars the burdens & operations
of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. Provision ought
therefore to be made to prevent the maritime States from being hereafter
outvoted by them. He thought this might be easily done by irrevocably
fixing the number of representatives which the Atlantic States should
respectively have, and the number which each new State will have. This
wd. not be unjust, as the Western settlers wd. previously know the
conditions on which they were to possess their lands. It would be
politic as it would recommend the plan to the present as well as future
interest of the States which must decide the fate of it.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. The gentleman last up had spoken some of his sentiments
precisely. Property was certainly the principal object of Society. If
numbers should be made the rule of representation, the Atlantic States
will [6] be subjected to the Western. He moved that the first
proposition in the report be postponed in order to take up the following
viz "that the suffrages of the several States be regulated and
proportioned according to the sums to be paid towards the general
revenue by the inhabitants of each State respectively. that an
apportionment of suffrages, according to the ratio aforesaid shall be
made and regulated at the end of _____ years from the 1st. meeting of
the Legislature of the U. S. and at the end of every _____ years but
that for the present, and until the period above mentioned, the
suffrages shall be for N. Hampshire _____ [7] Massachts. _____ &c.- 

Col. MASON said the case of new States was not unnoticed in the
Committee; but it was thought and he was himself decidedly of opinion
that if they made a part of the Union, they ought to be subject to no
unfavorable discriminations. Obvious considerations required it.

Mr. RANDOLPH concurred with Col. [8] Mason.

On [9] Question on Mr. Rutlidges motion.

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Maryd. no. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. not on floor. [10]

Adjd

___________

*1. This report was founded on a motion in the Committee made by Dr
Franklin. It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the State
opposed to an equality of votes in the 2d branch and was evidently
considered by the members on the other side, as a gaining of their
point. A motion was made by Mr Sherman [he [2] acted in place of Mr
Elseworth who was kept away by indisposition.] In the Committee to the
following effect "that each State should have an equal vote in the 2d
branch; provided that no decision therein should prevail unless the
majority of States concurring should also comprize a majority of the
inhabitants of the U. States." This motion was not much deliberated on
nor approved in the Committee. A similar proviso had been proposed in
the debates on the articles of Confederation in 1777, to the articles
giving certain powers to "nine States." See Journals of Congs for 1777,
p. 462.

2. The word "who" is substituted in the transcript for "he."

3. The word "exclusive" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.

5. The word "as" is crossed out in the transcript.

6. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "will."

7. The word "for" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "Mr." is substituted in the transcript for "Col."

9. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "South Carolina, aye -- 1;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 9; Georgia not on
the floor."

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FRIDAY  JULY 6th.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to commit so much of the Report as relates to "I
member for every 40,000 inhabitants" His view was that they might
absolutely fix the number for each State in the first instance; leaving
the Legislature at liberty to provide for changes in the relative
importance of the States, and for the case of new States.

Mr. WILSON 2ded. the motion; but with a view of leaving the Committee
under no implied shackles.

Mr. GHORUM apprehended great inconveniency [1] from fixing directly the
number of Representatives to be allowed to each State. He thought the
number of Inhabitants the true guide; tho' perhaps some departure might
be expedient from the full proportion. The States also would vary in
their relative extent by separations of parts of the largest States. A
part of Virga. is now on the point of a separation. In the province of
Mayne a Convention is at this time deliberating on a separation from
Masts. In such events the number of representatives ought certainly to
be reduced. He hoped to see all the States made small by proper
divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as was apprehended, to
the Small States. He conceived that let the Genl. [2] Government be
modified as it might, there would be a constant tendency in the State
Governmts. to encroach upon it: it was of importance therefore that the
extent of the States shd. be reduced as much & as fast as possible. The
stronger the Govt. shall be made in the first instance the more easily
will these divisions be effected; as it will be of less consequence in
the opinion of the States whether they be of great or small extent. 

Mr. GERRY did not think with his Colleague that the large States ought
to be cut up. This policy has been inculcated by the middling and
smaller States, ungenerously & contrary to the spirit of the
Confederation. Ambitious men will be apt to solicit needless divisions,
till the States be reduced to the size of Counties. If this policy
should still actuate the small States, the large ones cou'd not
confederate safely with them; but would be obliged to consult their
safety by confederating only with one another. He favored the Commitment
and thought that Representation ought to be in the Combined ratio of
numbers of Inhabitants and of wealth, and not of either singly.

Mr. KING wished the clause to be committed chiefly in order to detach it
from the Report with which it had no connection. He thought also that
the Ratio of Representation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in
a century & a half our computed increase of population would carry the
number of representatives to an enormous excess; that ye. number of
inhabitants was not the proper index of ability & wealth; that property
was the primary object of Society; and that in fixing a ratio this ought
not to [3] be excluded from the estimate. With regard to new States, he
observed that there was something peculiar in the business which had not
been noticed. The U. S. were now admitted to be proprietors of the
Country N. West of the Ohio. Congs. by one of their ordinances have
impoliticly laid it out into ten States, and have made it a fundamental
article of compact with those who may become settlers, that as soon as
the number in any one State shall equal that of the smallest of the 13
original States, it may claim admission into the union. Delaware does
not contain it is computed more than 35,000 souls, and for obvious
reasons will not increase much for a considerable time. It is possible
then that if this plan be persisted in by Congs. 10 new votes may be
added, without a greater addition of inhabitants than are represented by
the single vote of Pena. The plan as it respects one of the new States
is already irrevocable, the sale of the lands having commenced, and the
purchasers & settlers will immediately become entitled to all the
privileges of the compact.

Mr. BUTLER agreed to the Commitment if the Committee were to be left at
liberty. He was persuaded that the more the subject was examined, the
less it would appear that the number of inhabitants would be a proper
rule of proportion. If there were no other objection the changeableness
of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred with those who thought
some balance was necessary between the old & new States. He contended
strenuously that property was the only just measure of representation.
This was the great object of Governt: the great cause of war; the great
means of carrying it on.

Mr. PINKNEY saw no good reason for committing. The value of land had
been found on full investigation to be an impracticable rule. The
contributions of revenue including imports & exports, must be too
changeable in their amount; too difficult to be adjusted; and too
injurious to the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants
appeared to him the only just & practicable rule. He thought the blacks
ought to stand on an equality with [4] whites: But wd. agree to the
ratio settled by Congs. He contended that Congs. had no right under the
articles of Confederation to authorize the admission of new States; no
such case having been provided for.

Mr. DAVY, was for committing the clause in order to get at the merits of
the question arising on the Report. He seemed to think that wealth or
property ought to be represented in the 2d. branch; and numbers in the
1st. branch.

On the Motion for committing as made by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [5]

The members appd. by Ballot were Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr.
Randolph, Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. King.

Mr. WILSON signified that his view in agreeing to the commitmt. was that
the Come. might consider the propriety of adopting a scale similar to
that established by the Constitution of Masts. which wd. give an
advantage to ye. small States without substantially departing from a [6]
rule of proportion.

Mr. WILSON & Mr. MASON moved to postpone the clause relating to money
bills in order to take up the clause relating to an equality of votes in
the second branch.

On the question [7] Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

The clause relating to equality of votes being under consideration,

DOCr. FRANKLIN observed that this question could not be properly put by
itself, the Committee having reported several propositions as mutual
conditions of each other. He could not vote for it if separately taken,
but should vote for the whole together.

Col. MASON perceived the difficulty & suggested a reference of the rest
of the Report to ye Committee just appointed, that the whole might be
brought into one view.

Mr. RANDOLPH disliked ye. reference to that Committee, as it consisted
of members from States opposed to the wishes of the smaller States, and
could not therefore be acceptable to the latter.

Mr. MARTIN & Mr. JENIFER moved to postpone the clause till the Come.
last appointed should report. 

Mr. MADISON observed that if the uncommitted part of the Report was
connected with the part just committed, it ought also to be committed;
if not connected, it need not be postponed till report should be made.

On the question for postponing moved by Mr. Martin & Mr. Jennifer

    Cont. N. J. Del. Md. Va. Geo.,                        ay [8]
    Pa. N. C. S. C....................................... no [9]
    Mas. N. Y............................................ divided

The 1st. clause relating to the originating of money bills was then
resumed.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS was opposed to a restriction of this right in either
branch, considered merely in itself and as unconnected with the point of
representation in the 2d. branch. It will disable the 2d. branch from
proposing its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of
judging by comparison of the merits of those proposed by the 1st.
branch.

Mr. WILSON could see nothing like a concession here on the part of the
smaller States. If both branches were to say yes [10] or no, [10] it was
of little consequence which should say yes [10] or no [10] first, which
last. If either was indiscriminately to have the right of originating,
the reverse of the Report, would he thought be most proper; since it was
a maxim that the least numerous body was the fittest for deliberation;
the most numerous for decision. He observed that this discrimination had
been transcribed from the British into several American constitutions.
But he was persuaded that on examination of the American experiments it
would be found to be a trifle light as air. Nor could he ever discover
the advantage of it in the Parliamentary history of G. Britain. He hoped
if there was any advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed
out.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought that if the privilege were not common to both
branches it ought rather to be confined to the 2d. as the bills in that
case would be more narrowly watched, than if they originated with the
branch having most of the popular confidence.

Mr. MASON. The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that
the 1st. branch would be the immediate representatives of the people,
the 2d. would not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the
people's money, they might soon forget the source from whence they
received it. We might soon have an aristocracy. He had been much
concerned at the principles which had been advanced by some gentlemen,
but had the satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was
a friend to proportional representation in both branches; but supposed
that some points must be yielded for the sake of accomodation.

Mr. WILSON. If he had proposed that the 2d. branch should have an
independent disposal of public money, the observations of [Col Mason]
would have been a satisfactory answer. But nothing could be farther from
what he had said. His question was how is the power of the 1st. branch
increased or that of the 2d. diminished by giving the proposed privilege
to the former? Where is the difference, in which branch it begins if
both must concur, in the end?

Mr. GERRY would not say that the concession was a sufficient one on the
part of the small States. But he could not but regard it in the light of
a concession. It wd. make it a constitutional principle that the 2d.
branch were not possessed of the Confidence of the people in money
matters, which wd. lessen their weight & influence. In the next place if
the 2d. branch were dispossessed of the privilege, they wd. be deprived
of the opportunity which their continuance in office 3 times as long as
the 1st. branch would give them of makig three successive essays in
favor of a particular point.

Mr. PINKNEY thought it evident that the Concession was wholly on one
side, that of the large States, the privilege of originating money bills
being of no account.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS had waited to hear the good effects of the restriction.
As to the alarm sounded, of an aristocracy, his creed was that there
never was, nor ever will be a civilized Society without an aristocracy.
His endeavor was to keep it as much as possible from doing mischief. The
restriction if it has any real operation will deprive us of the services
of the 2d. branch in digesting & proposing money bills of which it will
be more capable than the 1st. branch. It will take away the
responsibility of the 2d. branch, the great security for good behavior.
It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious money bill that it was
disliked, but could not be constitutionally amended; nor safely
rejected. It will be a dangerous source of disputes between the two
Houses. We should either take the British Constitution altogether or
make one for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two Houses as
the only cure for such disputes. Will our Executive be able to apply
such a remedy? Every law directly or indirectly takes money out of the
pockets of the people. Again What use may be made of such a privilege in
case of great emergency? Suppose an Enemy at the door, and money
instantly & absolutely necessary for repelling him, may not the popular
branch avail itself of this duress, to extort concessions from the
Senate destructive of the Constitution itself. He illustrated this
danger by the example of the Long Parliament's expedts. for subverting
the H. of Lords; concluding on the whole that the restriction would be
either useless or pernicious.

DOCr. FRANKLIN did not mean to go into a justification of the Report;
but as it had been asked what would be the use of restraining the 2d.
branch from medling with money bills, he could not but remark that it
was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of
their money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those
who feel, can best judge. This end would, he thought, be best attained,
if money affairs were to be confined to the immediate representatives of
the people. This was his inducement to concur in the report. As to the
danger or difficulty that might arise from a negative in the 2d. [11]
where the people wd. not be proportionally represented, it might easily
be got over by declaring that there should be no such Negative: or if
that will not do, by declaring that there shall be no such branch at
all.

Mr. MARTIN said that it was understood in the Committee that the
difficulties and disputes which had been apprehended, should be guarded
agst. in the detailing of the plan.

Mr. WILSON. The difficulties & disputes will increase with the attempts
to define & obviate them. Queen Anne was obliged to dissolve her
Parliamt. in order to terminate one of these obstinate disputes between
the two Houses. Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one
can say what the result would have been. The point is still sub judice
in England. He approved of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble
President [12] [Doctr. Franklin] his Colleague, as to the expediency of
keeping the people informed of their money affairs. But thought they
would know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in the
other.

Genl. PINKNEY was astonished that this point should have been considered
as a concession. He remarked that the restriction [13] to money bills
had been rejected on the merits singly considered, by 8 States agst. 3.
and that the very States which now called it a concession, were then
agst. it as nugatory or improper in itself.

On the Question whether the clause relating to money bills in the Report
of the Come. consisting of a member from each State, shd. stand as part
of the Report -- 

Massts. dividd. Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay.
Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divd. [14]

A Question was then raised whether the question was carried in the
affirmative: there being but 5 ays out of 11 States present. The words
of the rule are [15] (see May 28). [16]

On The [17] question:

    Mas. Cont. N. J. Pa. Del. Md. N. C. S. C. Geo    ay [18]
    N. Y. Va......................                   no [19]


[In several preceding instances like votes had sub silentio been entered
as decided in the affirmative.]

Adjourned

___________

1. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

2. The word "Genl." is omitted in the transcript.

3. The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New York, Jersey, Delaware, no -- 3; Maryland, divided."

6. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for the word "a."

7. The words "of postponement" are here inserted in the transcript and
the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 8; Massachusetts, Connecticut,
North Carolina, no -- 3."

8. The figure "6" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The figure "3" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The transcript italicizes the words "yes" and "no."

11. The word "branch" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. In the transcript after the word "President" reference is made to a
footnote which reads: "He was at that time President of the State of
Pennsylvania."

13. The word "as" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Pennsylvania, Virginia,
South Carolina, no -- 3; Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided."

15. The phrase "For the words of the Rule" is substituted in the
transcript for "The words of the rule are."

16. A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less
than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater
number of these which shall be fully represented: but a less number than
seven may adjourn from day to day.

17. The word "this" is substituted in the transcript for "the".

18. The figure "9" is here added in the transcript.

19. The figure "2" is here added in the transcript.

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SATURDAY  JULY 7.   IN CONVENTION

[1] "Shall the clause allowing each State one vote in the 2d. branch,
stand as part of the Report"? being taken up

Mr. GERRY. This is the critical question. He had rather agree to it than
have no accomodation. A Governt. short of a proper national plan, if
generally acceptable, would be preferable to a proper one which if it
could be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. He
thought it would be best to suspend the [2] question till the Comme.
yesterday appointed, [3] should make report.

Mr. SHERMAN Supposed that it was the wish of every one that some Genl.
Govt. should be established. An equal vote in the 2d. branch would, he
thought, be most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States
have more vigor in their Govts. than the large ones, the more influence
therefore the large ones have, the weaker will be the Govt. In the large
States it will be most difficult to collect the real & fair sense of the
people. Fallacy & undue influence will be practiced with most success:
and improper men will most easily get into office. If they vote by
States in the 2d. branch, and each State has an equal vote, there must
be always a majority of States as well as a majority of the people on
the side of public measures, & the Govt. will have decision and
efficacy. If this be not the case in the 2d. branch there may be a
majority of the [4] States agst. public measures, and the difficulty of
compelling them to abide by the public determination, will render the
Government feebler than it has ever yet been.

Mr. WILSON was not deficient in a conciliating temper, but firmness was
sometimes a duty of higher obligation. Conciliation was also misapplied
in this instance. It was pursued here rather among the Representatives,
than among the Constituents; and it wd. be of little consequence, if not
established among the latter; and there could be little hope of its
being established among them if the foundation should not be laid in
justice and right.

On [5] Question shall the words stand as part of the Report?

Massts. divd. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divd. [6] [Note. Several votes were given
here in the affirmative or were divd. because another final question was
to be taken on the whole report.]

Mr. GERRY thought it would be proper to proceed to enumerate & define
the powers to be vested in the Genl. Govt. before a question on the
report should be taken, as to the rule of representation in the 2d.
branch.

Mr. MADISON, observed that it wd. be impossible to say what powers could
be safely & properly vested in the Govt. before it was known, in what
manner the States were to be represented in it. He was apprehensive that
if a just representation were not the basis of the Govt. it would
happen, as it did when the Articles of Confederation were depending,
that every effectual prerogative would be withdrawn or withheld, and the
New Govt. wd. be rendered as impotent and as shortlived as the old.

Mr. PATTERSON would not decide whether the privilege concerning money
bills were a valuable consideration or not: But he considered the mode &
rule of representation in the 1st. branch as fully so. and that after
the establishment of that point, the small States would never be able to
defend themselves without an equality of votes in the 2d. branch. There
was no other ground of accomodation. His resolution was fixt. He would
meet the large States on that Ground and no other. For himself he should
vote agst. the Report, because it yielded too much.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. He had no resolution unalterably fixed except to do
what should finally appear to him right. He was agst. the Report because
it maintained the improper Constitution of the 2d. branch. It made it
another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. It had been sd. [by Mr. Gerry]
that the new Governt. would be partly national, partly federal; that it
ought in the first quality to protect individuals; in the second, the
States. But in what quality was it to protect the aggregate interest of
the whole. Among the many provisions which had been urged, he had seen
none for supporting the dignity and splendor of the American Empire. It
had been one of our greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the
nation had been sacrificed constantly to local views; in like manner as
the general interests of States had been sacrificed to those of the
Counties. What is to be the check in the Senate? none; unless it be to
keep the majority of the people from injuring particular States. But
particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a majority of the
people, in case their conduct should deserve it. Suppose they should
insist on claims evidently unjust, and pursue them in a manner
detrimental to the whole body. Suppose they should give themselves up to
foreign influence. Ought they to be protected in such cases. They were
originally nothing more than colonial corporations. On the declaration
of Independence, a Governmt. was to be formed. The small States aware of
the necessity of preventing anarchy, and taking advantage of the moment,
extorted from the large ones an equality of votes. Standing now on that
ground, they demand under the new system greater rights as men, than
their fellow Citizens of the large States. The proper answer to them is
that the same necessity of which they formerly took advantage, does not
now exist, and that the large States are at liberty now to consider what
is right, rather than what may be expedient. We must have an efficient
Govt. and if there be an efficiency in the local Govts. the former is
impossible. Germany alone proves it. Notwithstanding their common diet,
notwithstanding the great prerogatives of the Emperor as head of the
Empire, and his vast resources, as sovereign of his particular
dominions, no union is maintained: foreign influence disturbs every
internal operation, & there is no energy whatever in the general
Governmt. Whence does this proceed? From the energy of the local
authorities; from its being considered of more consequence to support
the Prince of Hesse, than the Happiness of the people of Germany. Do
Gentlemen wish this to be ye case here. Good God, Sir, is it possible
they can so delude themselves. What if all the Charters & Constitutions
of the States were thrown into the fire, and all their demagogues into
the ocean. What would it be to the happiness of America. And will not
this be the case here if we pursue the train in wch. the business lies.
We shall establish an Aulic Council without an Emperor to execute its
decrees. The same circumstances which unite the people here, unite them
in Germany. They have there a common language, a common law, common
usages and manners, and a common interest in being united; yet their
local jurisdictions destroy every tie. The case was the same in the
Grecian States. The United Netherlands are at this time torn in
factions. With these examples before our eyes shall we form
establishments which must necessarily produce the same effects. It is of
no consequence from what districts the 2d. branch shall be drawn, if it
be so constituted as to yield an asylum agst. these evils. As it is now
constituted he must be agst. its being drawn from the States in equal
portions. But shall he was [7] ready to join in devising such an
amendment of the plan, as will be most likely to secure our liberty &
happiness.

Mr. SHERMAN & Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to postpone the Question on the Report
from the Committee of a member from each State, in order to wait for the
Report from the Come. of 5 last appointed.

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. Maryland ay. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [8]

Adjd.

___________

1. The words "The question" are here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "this" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

3. The words "yesterday appointed" are transposed to read "appointed
yesterday" in the transcript.

4. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye -- 6; Pennsylvania, Virginia,
South Carolina, no -- 3; Massachusetts, Georgia, divided."

7. The words "shall be" are substituted in the transcript for "shall he
was."

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, aye -- 6; New York, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5."

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MONDAY  JULY 9th.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. Daniel Carroll from Maryland took his Seat.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS delivered a report from the Come. of 5 members to whom
was committed the clause in the Report of the Come. consisting of a
member from each State, stating the proper ratio of Representatives in
the 1st. branch, to be as 1 to every 40,000 inhabitants, as follows viz

"The Committee to whom was referred the 1st. clause of the 1st.
proposition reported from the grand Committee, beg leave to report

I. [1] that in the 1st. meeting of the Legislature the 1st. branch
thereof consist of 56. members of which Number, N. Hamshire shall have
2. Massts. 7. R. Id. 1. Cont 4. N. Y. 5. N. J. 3. Pa. 8. Del. 1. Md. 4.
Va. 9. N. C. 5. S. C. 5. Geo. 2. -- 

II. [1] But as the present situation of the States may probably alter as
well in point of wealth as in the number of their inhabitants, that the
Legislature be authorized from time to time to augment ye. number of
Representatives. And in case any of the States shall hereafter be
divided, or any two or more States united, or any new States created
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall possess
authority to regulate the number of Representatives in any of the
foregoing cases, upon the principles of their wealth and number of
inhabitants."

Mr. SHERMAN wished to know on what principles or calculations the Report
was founded. It did not appear to correspond with any rule of numbers,
or of any requisition hitherto adopted by Congs.

Mr. GORHAM. Some provision of this sort was necessary in the outset. The
number of blacks & whites with some regard to supposed wealth was the
general guide Fractions could not be observed. The Legislre. is to make
alterations from time to time as justice & propriety may require. Two
objections prevailed agst. the rate [2] of 1 member for every 40,000.
inhts. The 1st. was that the Representation would soon be too numerous:
the 2d. that the Westn. States who may have a different interest, might
if admitted on that principle by degrees, outvote the Atlantic. Both
these objections are removed. The number will be small in the first
instance and may be continued so; and the Atlantic States having ye.
Govt. in their own hands, may take care of their own interest, by
dealing out the right of Representation in safe proportions to the
Western States. These were the views of the Committee.

Mr. L MARTIN wished to know whether the Come. were guided in the ratio,
by the wealth or number of inhabitants, of the States, or by [3] both;
noting its variations from former apportionments by Congs.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to postpone the 1st. paragraph
relating to the number of members to be allowed each State in the first
instance, and to take up the 2d. paragraph authorizing the Legislre. to
alter the number from time to time according to wealth & inhabitants.
The motion was agreed to nem. con.

On [4] Question on the 2d. paragh. taken without any debate

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. SHERMAN moved to refer the 1st. part apportioning the
Representatives, to a Comme. of a member from each State.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS seconded the motion; observing that this was the only
case in which such Committees were useful.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. thought it would be necessary to return to the rule of
numbers, but that the Western States stood on different footing. If
their property shall [6] be rated as high as that of the Atlantic
States, then their representation ought to hold a like proportion.
Otherwise if their property was not to be equally rated.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The Report is little more than a guess. Wealth was not
altogether disregarded by the Come. Where it was apparently in favor of
one State, whose nos. were superior to the numbers of another, by a
fraction only, a member extraordinary was allowed to the former: and so
vice versa. The Committee meant little more than to bring the matter to
a point for the consideration of the House.

Mr. REED asked why Georgia was allowed 2 members, when her number of
inhabitants had stood below that of Delaware.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Such is the rapidity of the population of that State,
that before the plan takes effect, it will probably be entitled to 2
Representatives.

Mr. RANDOLPH. disliked the report of the Come. but had been unwilling to
object to it. He was apprehensive that as the number was not to be
changed till the Natl. Legislature should please, a pretext would never
be wanting to postpone alterations, and keep the power in the hands of
those possessed of it. He was in favor of the commitmt. to a member from
each State.

Mr. PATTERSON considered the proposed estimate for the future according
to the Combined rule [7] of numbers and wealth, as too vague. For this
reason N. Jersey was agst. it. He could regard negroes [8] slaves in no
light but as property. They are no free agents, have no personal
liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary are
themselves property, & like other property entirely at the will of the
Master. Has a man in Virga. a number of votes in proportion to the
number of his slaves? And if Negroes are not represented in the States
to which they belong, why should they be represented in the Genl. Govt.
What is the true principle of Representation? It is an expedient by
which an assembly of certain individls. chosen by the people is
substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people
themselves. If such a meeting of the people was actually to take place,
would the slaves vote? They would not. Why then shd. they be
represented. He was also agst. such an indirect encouragemt. of the
slave trade; observing that Congs. in their act relating to the change
of the 8 art: of Confedn. had been ashamed to use the term "slaves" &
had substituted a description.

Mr. MADISON, reminded Mr. Patterson that his doctrine of Representation
which was in its principle the genuine one, must for ever silence the
pretensions of the small States to an equality of votes with the large
ones. They ought to vote in the same proportion in which their citizens
would do, if the people of all the States were collectively met. He
suggested as a proper ground of compromise, that in the first branch the
States should be represented according to their number of free
inhabitants; and in the 2d. which had for one of its primary objects the
guardianship of property, according to the whole number, including
slaves.

Mr. BUTLER urged warmly the justice & necessity of regarding wealth in
the apportionment of Representation.

Mr. KING had always expected that as the Southern States are the
richest, they would not league themselves with the Northn. unless some
respect were paid to their superior wealth. If the latter expect those
preferential distinctions in Commerce & other advantages which they will
derive from the connection they must not expect to receive them without
allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of 13 of the States had
agreed to consider Slaves in the apportionment of taxation; and taxation
and Representation ought to go together.

On the question for committing the first paragraph of the Report to a
member from each State.

Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [9]

The Come. appointed were Mr. King. Mr. Sherman, Mr. Yates, Mr. Brearly,
Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Reed, Mr. Carrol, Mr. Madison, Mr. Williamson, Mr.
Rutledge, Mr. Houston.

Adjd.

___________

1. The Roman numerals "I" and "II" are omitted in the transcript.

2. The word "rule" is substituted in the transcript for "rate."

3. The word "by" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; New York, New Jersey, no -- 2."

6. The word "should" is substituted in the transcript for "shall."

7. The transcript uses the word "rule" in the plural.

8. The transcript uses the word "negroes" in the singular.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 9; New York, South Carolina, no -- 2."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TEUSDAY.  JULY 10.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. KING reported from the Come. yesterday appointed that the States at
the 1st. meeting of the General Legislature, should be represented by 65
members in the following proportions, to wit.

N. Hamshire by 3. Masts. 8. R. 1st. 1. Cont. 5. N. Y. 6. N. J. 4. Pa. 8.
Del. 1. Md. 6. Va. 10. N. C. 5. S. C. 5. Georgia 3.

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved that N. Hampshire be reduced from 3 to 2. members.
Her numbers did not entitle her to 3 and it was a poor State.

Genl. PINKNEY seconds the motion.

Mr. KING. N. Hamshire has probably more than 120,000 Inhabts. and has an
extensive Country of tolerable fertility. Its inhabts therefore may [1]
be expected to increase fast. He remarked that the four Eastern States
having 800,000 souls, have 1/3 fewer representatives than the four
Southern States, having not more than 700,000 souls rating the blacks,
as 5 for 3. The Eastern people will advert to these circumstances, and
be dissatisfied. He believed them to be very desirous of uniting with
their Southern brethren, but did not think it prudent to rely so far on
that disposition as to subject them to any gross inequality. He was
fully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests
did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great &
small States; but between the Southern & Eastern. For this reason he had
been ready to yield something in the proportion of representatives for
the security of the Southern. No principle would justify the giving them
a majority. They were brought as near an equality as was possible. He
was not averse to giving them a still greater security, but did not see
how it could be done.

Genl. PINKNEY. The Report before it was committed was more favorable to
the S. States than as it now stands. If they are to form so considerable
a minority, and the regulation of trade is to be given to the Genl.
Government, they will be nothing more than overseers for the Northern
States. He did not expect the S. States to be raised to a majority of
representatives, but wished them to have something like an equality. At
present by the alterations of the Come. in favor of the N. States they
are removed farther from it than they were before. One member had indeed
[2] been added to Virga. which he was glad of as he considered her as a
Southern State. He was glad also that the members of Georgia were
increased.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was not for reducing N. Hamshire from 3 to 2. but for
reducing some others. The Southn. Interest must be extremely endangered
by the present arrangement. The Northn. States are to have a majority in
the first instance and the means of perpetuating it.

Mr. DAYTON observed that the line between the [3] Northn. & Southern
interest had been improperly drawn: that Pa. was the dividing State,
there being six on each side of her. Genl. PINKNEY urged the reduction,
dwelt on the superior wealth of the Southern States, and insisted on its
having its due weight in the Government.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS regretted the turn of the debate. The States he found
had many Representatives on the floor. Few he fears [4] were to be
deemed the Representatives of America. He thought the Southern States
have by the report more than their share of representation. Property
ought to have its weight, but not all the weight. If the Southn. States
are to supply money. The Northn. States are to spill their blood.
Besides, the probable Revenue to be expected from the S. States has been
greatly overrated. He was agst. reducing N. Hamshire.

Mr. RANDOLPH was opposed to a reduction of N. Hamshire, not because she
had a full title to three members: but because it was in his
contemplation 1. [5] to make it the duty instead of leaving it in [6]
the discretion of the Legislature to regulate the representation by a
periodical census. 2. [5] to require more than a bare majority of votes
in the Legislature in certain cases, & particularly in commercial cases.

On the question for reducing N. Hamshire from 3 to 2 Represents. it
passed in the negative

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
ay. [*7] S. C. ay. Geo. no. [*7, 8]

Genl. PINKNEY and Mr. ALEXr. MARTIN moved that 6 Reps. instead of 5 be
allowed to N. Carolina

On the Question, it passed in the negative.

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [9]

Genl. PINKNEY & Mr. BUTLER made the same motion in favor of S. Carolina.

On the Question it passed in the negative

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [10]

Genl. PINKNEY & Mr. HOUSTON moved that Georgia be allowed 4 instead of 3
Reps. urging the unexampled celerity of its population. On the Question,
it passed in the Negative

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [11]

Mr. MADISON, moved that the number allowed to each State be doubled. A
majority of a Quorum of 65 members, was too small a number to to
represent the whole inhabitants of the U. States; They would not possess
enough of the confidence of the people, and wd. be too sparsely taken
from the people, to bring with them all the local information which
would be frequently wanted. Double the number will not be too great,
even with the future additions from New States. The additional expence
was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so important a case. And as far
as the augmentation might be unpopular on that score, the objection was
overbalanced by its effect on the hopes of a greater number of the
popular Candidates.

Mr. ELSEWORTH urged the objection of expence, & that the greater the
number, the more slowly would the business proceed; and the less
probably be decided as it ought, at last. He thought the number of
Representatives too great in most of the State Legislatures: and that a
large number was less necessary in the Genl. Legislature than in those
of the States, -- as its business would relate to a few great, national
Objects only.

Mr. SHERMAN would have preferred 50 to 65. The great distance they will
have to travel will render their attendance precarious and will make it
difficult to prevail on a sufficient number of fit men to undertake the
service. He observed that the expected increase from New States also
deserved consideration.

Mr. GERRY was for increasing the number beyond 65. The larger the
number, the less the danger of their being corrupted. The people are
accustomed to & fond of a numerous representation, and will consider
their rights as better secured by it. The danger of excess in the number
may be guarded agst. by fixing a point within which the number shall
always be kept.

Col. MASON admitted that the objection drawn from the consideration of
expence, had weight both in itself, and as the people might be affected
by it. But he thought it outweighed by the objections agst. the
smallness of the number. 38, will he supposes, as being a majority of
65, form a quorum. 20 will be a majority of 38. This was certainly too
small a number to make laws for America. They would neither bring with
them all the necessary information relative to various local interests,
nor possess the necessary confidence of the people. After doubling the
number, the laws might still be made by so few as almost to be
objectionable on that account.

Mr. READ was in favor of the Motion. Two of the States [Del. & R. I.]
would have but a single member if the aggregate number should remain at
65. and in case of accident to either of these one State wd. have no
representative present to give explanations or informations of its
interests or wishes. The people would not place their confidence in so
small a number. He hoped the objects of the Genl. Govt. would be much
more numerous than seemed to be expected by some gentlemen, and that
they would become more & more so. As to [12] New States the highest
number of Reps. for the whole might be limited, and all danger of excess
thereby prevented.

Mr. RUTLIDGE opposed the motion. The Representatives were too numerous
in all the States. The full number allotted to the States may be
expected to attend & the lowest possible quorum shd. not therefore be
considered. The interests of their Constituents will urge their
attendance too strongly for it to be omitted: and he supposed the Genl.
Legislature would not sit more than 6 or 8 weeks in the year.

On the Question for doubling the number, it passed in the negative.

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [13]

On the question for agreeing to the apportionment of Reps. as amended by
the last committee, it passed in the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [14]

Mr. BROOM gave notice to the House that he had concurred with a reserve
to himself of an intention to claim for his State an equal voice in the
2d. branch: which he thought could not be denied after this concession
of the small States as to the first branch.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved as an amendment to the report of the Comme. of five
"that in order to ascertain the alterations in the population & wealth
of the several States the Legislature should be required to cause a
census, and estimate to be taken within one year after its first
meeting; and every _____ years thereafter -- and that the Legislre.
arrange the Representation accordingly."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed it as fettering the Legislature too much.
Advantage may be taken of it in time of war or the apprehension of it,
by new States to extort particular favors. If the mode was to be fixed
for taking a census, it might certainly be extremely inconvenient: if
unfixt the Legislature may use such a mode as will defeat the object:
and perpetuate the inequality. He was always agst. such Shackles on the
Legislre. They had been found very pernicious in most of the State
Constitutions. He dwelt much on the danger of throwing such a
preponderancy [15] into the Western Scale, suggesting that in time the
Western people wd. outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished therefore to
put it in the power of the latter to keep a majority of votes in their
own hands. It was objected he said that if the Legislre. are left at
liberty, they will never readjust the Representation. He admitted that
this was possible; but he did not think it probable unless the reasons
agst. a revision of it were very urgent & in this case, it ought not to
be done.

It was moved to postpone the proposition of Mr. Randolph in order to
take up the following, viz. "that the Committee of Eleven, to whom was
referred the report of the Committee of five on the subject of
Representation, be requested to furnish the Convention with the
principles on which they grounded the Report," which was disagreed to:
S. C. only [16] voting in the affirmative.

___________

1. The words "therefore may" are transposed to read "may therefore" in
the transcript.

2. The words "had indeed" are transposed to read "indeed had" in the
transcript.

3. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word "feared" is substituted in the transcript for "fears."

5. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

*7. In the printed Journal N. C. no. Georgia ay

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, [7] South
Carolina, aye -- ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, [7] no -- 8."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 7."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4: Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 7."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye --
4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
no -- 7."

12. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, aye -- 9; South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 2."

15. The word "preponderancy" is changed to "preponderance" in the
transcript.

16. The word "alone" is substituted in the transcript for "only."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY.  JULY 11.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. RANDOLPH's motion requiring the Legislre. to take a periodical
census for the purpose of redressing inequalities in the Representation,
was resumed.

Mr. SHERMAN was agst. shackling the Legislature too much. We ought to
choose wise & good men, and then confide in them.

Mr. MASON. The greater the difficulty we find in fixing a proper rule of
Representation, the more unwilling ought we to be, to throw the task
from ourselves, on the Genl. Legislre. He did not object to the
conjectural ratio which was to prevail in the outset; but considered a
Revision from time to time according to some permanent & precise
standard as essential to ye. fair representation required in the 1st.
branch. According to the present population of America, the Northn. part
of it had a right to preponderate, and he could not deny it. But he
wished it not to preponderate hereafter when the reason no longer
continued. From the nature of man we may be sure, that those who have
power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it. On
the contrary we know they will always when they can rather increase it.
If the S. States therefore should have 3/4 of the people of America
within their limits, the Northern will hold fast the majority of
Representatives. 1/4 will govern the 3/4 . The S. States will complain:
but they may complain from generation to generation without redress.
Unless some principle therefore which will do justice to them hereafter
shall be inserted in the Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration
was to him, he must declare he could neither vote for the system here,
nor support it, in his State. Strong objections had been drawn from the
danger to the Atlantic interests from new Western States. Ought we to
sacrifice what we know to be right in itself, lest it should prove
favorable to States which are not yet in existence. If the Western
States are to be admitted into the Union, as they arise, they must, he
wd. repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading
discriminations. They will have the same pride & other passions which we
have, and will either not unite with or will speedily revolt from the
Union, if they are not in all respects placed on an equal footing with
their brethren. It has been said they will be poor, and unable to make
equal contributions to the general Treasury. He did not know but that in
time they would be both more numerous & more wealthy than their Atlantic
brethren. The extent & fertility of their soil, made this probable; and
though Spain might for a time deprive them of the natural outlet for
their productions, yet she will, because she must, finally yield to
their demands. He urged that numbers of inhabitants; though not always a
precise standard of wealth was sufficiently so for every substantial
purpose.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for making it the duty of the Legislature to do what
was right & not leaving it at liberty to do or not [1] do it. He moved
that Mr. Randolph's proposition be postpond. in order to consider the
following "that in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen in
the population & wealth of the several States, a census shall be taken
of the free white inhabitants and 3/5 ths. of those of other
descriptions on the 1st. year after this Government shall have been
adopted and every year thereafter; and that the Representation be
regulated accordingly."

Mr. RANDOLPH agreed that Mr. Williamson's proposition should stand in
the place of his. He observed that the ratio fixt for the 1st. meeting
was a mere conjecture, that it placed the power in the hands of that
part of America, which could not always be entitled to it, that this
power would not be voluntarily renounced; and that it was consequently
the duty of the Convention to secure its renunciation when justice might
so require; by some constitutional provisions. If equality between great
& small States be inadmissible, because in that case unequal numbers of
Constituents wd. be represented by equal number [2] of votes; was it not
equally inadmissible that a larger & more populous district of America
should hereafter have less representation, than a smaller & less
populous district. If a fair representation of the people be not
secured, the injustice of the Govt. will shake it to its foundations.
What relates to suffrage is justly stated by the celebrated Montesquieu,
as a fundamental article in Republican Govts. If the danger suggested by
Mr. Govr. Morris be real, of advantage being taken of the Legislature in
pressing moments, it was an additional reason, for tying their hands in
such a manner that they could not sacrifice their trust to momentary
considerations. Congs. have pledged the public faith to New States, that
they shall be admitted on equal terms. They never would nor ought to
accede on any other. The census must be taken under the direction of the
General Legislature. The States will be too much interested to take an
impartial one for themselves.

Mr. BUTLER & Genl. PINKNEY insisted that blacks be included in the rule
of Representation, equally with the Whites: and for that purpose moved
that the words "three fifths" be struck out.

Mr. GERRY thought that 3/5 of them was to say the least the full
proportion that could be admitted.

Mr. GHORUM. This ratio was fixed by Congs. as a rule of taxation. Then
it was urged by the Delegates representing the States having slaves that
the blacks were still more inferior to freemen. At present when the
ratio of representation is to be established, we are assured that they
are equal to freemen. The arguments on ye. former occasion had convinced
him that 3/5 was pretty near the just proportion and he should vote
according to the same opinion now.

Mr. BUTLER insisted that the labour of a slave in S. Carola. was as
productive & valuable as that of a freeman in Massts., that as wealth
was the great means of defence and utility to the Nation they were
equally valuable to it with freemen; and that consequently an equal
representation ought to be allowed for them in a Government which was
instituted principally for the protection of property, and was itself to
be supported by property. 

Mr. MASON, could not agree to the motion, notwithstand it was favorable
to Virga. because he thought it unjust. It was certain that the slaves
were valuable, as they raised the value of land, increased the exports &
imports, and of course the revenue, would supply the means of feeding &
supporting an army, and might in cases of emergency become themselves
soldiers. As in these important respects they were useful to the
community at large, they ought not to be excluded from the estimate of
Representation. He could not however regard them as equal to freemen and
could not vote for them as such. He added as worthy of remark, that the
Southern States have this peculiar species of property, over & above the
other species of property common to all the States.

Mr. WILLIAMSON reminded Mr. Ghorum that if the Southn. States contended
for the inferiority of blacks to whites when taxation was in view, the
Eastern States on the same occasion contended for their equality. He did
not however either then or now, concur in either extreme, but approved
of the ratio of 3/5.

On Mr. Butlers motion for considering blacks as equal to Whites in the
apportionmt. of Representation.

Massts. no. Cont. no. [N. Y. not on floor.] N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. no. Va. no N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [3]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said he had several objections to the proposition of
Mr. Williamson. 1. [4] It fettered the Legislature too much. 2. [5] it
would exclude some States altogether who would not have a sufficient
number to entitle them to a single Representative. 3. [6] it will not
consist with the Resolution passed on Saturday last authorising the
Legislature to adjust the Representation from time to time on the
principles or population & wealth or [7] with the principles of equity.
If slaves were to be considered as inhabitants, not as wealth, then the
sd.. Resolution would not be pursued. If as wealth, then why is no other
wealth but slaves included? These objections may perhaps be removed by
amendments. His great objection was that the number of inhabitants was
not a proper standard of wealth. The amazing difference between the
comparative numbers & wealth of different Countries, rendered all
reasoning superfluous on the subject. Numbers might with greater
propriety be deemed a measure of stregth, than of wealth, yet the late
defence made by G. Britain, agst. her numerous enemies proved in the
clearest manner, that it is entirely fallacious even in this respect.

Mr. KING thought there was great force in the objections of Mr. Govr.
Morris: he would however accede to the proposition for the sake of doing
something.

Mr. RUTLIDGE contended for the admission of wealth in the estimate by
which Representation should be regulated. The Western States will not be
able to contribute in proportion to their numbers; they shd. not
therefore be represented in that proportion. The Atlantic States will
not concur in such a plan. He moved that "at the end of years after the
1st. meeting of the Legislature, and of every years thereafter, the
Legislature shall proportion the Representation according to the
principles of wealth & population"

Mr. SHERMAN thought the number of people alone the best rule for
measuring wealth as well as representation; and that if the Legislature
were to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged to estimate it by
numbers. He was at first for leaving the matter wholly to the discretion
of the Legislature; but he had been convinced by the observations of
[Mr. Randolph & Mr. Mason,] that the periods & the rule, of revising the
Representation ought to be fixt by the Constitution.

Mr. REID thought the Legislature ought not to be too much shackled. It
would make the Constitution like Religious Creeds, embarrassing to those
bound to conform to them & more likely to produce dissatisfaction and
scism, than harmony and union.

Mr. MASON objected to Mr. Rutlidge motion, as requiring of the
Legislature something too indefinite & impracticable, and leaving them a
pretext for doing nothing.

Mr. WILSON had himself no objection to leaving the Legislature entirely
at liberty. But considered wealth as an impracticable rule.

Mr. GHORUM. If the Convention who are comparatively so little biassed by
local views are so much perplexed, How can it be expected that the
Legislature hereafter under the full biass of those views, will be able
to settle a standard. He was convinced by the arguments of others & his
own reflections, that the Convention ought to fix some standard or
other.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The argts. of others & his own reflections had led him
to a very different conclusion. If we can't agree on a rule that will be
just at this time, how can we expect to find one that will be just in
all times to come. Surely those who come after us will judge better of
things present, than we can of things future. He could not persuade
himself that numbers would be a just rule at any time. The remarks of
[Mr. Mason] relative to the Western Country had not changed his opinion
on that head. Among other objections it must be apparent they would not
be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to share in the
administration of our common interests. The Busy haunts of men not the
remote wilderness, was the proper school of political Talents. If the
Western people get the power into their hands they will ruin the
Atlantic interests. The Back members are always most averse to the best
measures. He mentioned the case of Pena. formerly. The lower part of the
State had ye. power in the first instance. They kept it in yr. own hands
& the Country was ye. better for it. Another objection with him agst.
admitting the blacks into the census, was that the people of Pena would
revolt at the idea of being put on a footing with slaves. They would
reject any plan that was to have such an effect. Two objections had been
raised agst. leaving the adjustment of the Representation from time, to
time, to the discretion of the Legislature. The 1. [8] was they would be
unwilling to revise it at all. The 2. [8] that by referring to wealth
they would be bound by a rule which if willing, they would be unable to
execute. The 1st. objn. distrusts their fidelity. But if their duty,
their honor & their oaths will not bind them, let us not put into their
hands our liberty, and all our other great interests: let us have no
Govt. at all. 2 [9] If these ties will bind them, we need not distrust
the practicability of the rule. It was followed in part by the Come. in
the apportionment of Representatives yesterday reported to the House.
The best course that could be taken would be to leave the interests of
the people to the Representatives of the people.

Mr. MADISON, was not a little surprised to hear this implicit confidence
urged by a member who on all occasions, had inculcated so strongly, the
political depravity of men, and the necessity of checking one vice and
interest by opposing to them another vice & interest. If the
Representatives of the people would be bound by the ties he had
mentioned, what need was there of a Senate? What of a Revisionary power?
But his reasoning was not only inconsistent with his former reasoning,
but with itself. At the same time that he recommended this implicit
confidence to the Southern States in the Northern Majority, he was still
more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy of [10] Western Majority. To
reconcile the gentln. with himself, it it must be imagined that he
determined the human character by the points of the compass. The truth
was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain
degree. The case of Pena. had been mentioned where it was admitted that
those who were possessed of the power in the original settlement, never
admitted the new settlemts. to a due share of it. England was a still
more striking example. The power there had long been in the hands of the
boroughs, of the minority; who had opposed & defeated every reform which
had been attempted. Virga. was in a lesser [11] degree another example.
With regard to the Western States, he was clear & firm in opinion, that
no unfavorable distinctions were admissible either in point of justice
or policy. He thought also that the hope of contributions to the Treasy.
from them had been much underrated. Future contributions it seemed to be
understood on all hands would be principally levied on imports &
exports. The extent and and fertility of the Western Soil would for a
long time give to agriculture a preference over manufactures. Trials
would be repeated till some articles could be raised from it that would
bear a transportation to places where they could be exchanged for
imported manufactures. Whenever the Mississpi should be opened to them,
which would of necessity be ye. case, as soon as their population would
subject them to any considerable share of the public burdin, imposts on
their trade could be collected with less expence & greater certainty,
than on that of the Atlantic States. In the mean time, as their supplies
must pass thro' the Atlantic States, their contributions would be levied
in the same manner with those of the Atlantic States. -- He could not
agree that any substantial objection lay agst. fixig numbers for the
perpetual standard of Representation. It was said that Representation &
taxation were to go together; that taxation and wealth ought to go
together, that population & wealth were not measures of each other. He
admitted that in different climates, under different forms of Govt. and
in different stages of civilization the inference was perfectly just. He
would admit that in no situation, numbers of inhabitants were an
accurate measure of wealth. He contended however that in the U. States
it was sufficiently so for the object in contemplation. Altho' their
climate varied considerably, yet as the Govts. the laws, and the manners
of all were nearly the same, and the intercourse between different parts
perfectly free, population, industry, arts, and the value of labour,
would constantly tend to equalize themselves. The value of labour, might
be considered as the principal criterion of wealth and ability to
support taxes; and this would find its level in different places where
the intercourse should be easy & free, with as much certainty as the
value of money or any other thing. Wherever labour would yield most,
people would resort, till the competition should destroy the inequality.
Hence it is that the people are constantly swarming from the more to the
less populous places -- from Europe to Ama. from the Northn. & Middle
parts of the U. S. to the Southern & Western. They go where land is
cheaper, because there labour is dearer. If it be true that the same
quantity of produce raised on the banks of the Ohio is of less value,
than on the Delaware, it is also true that the same labor will raise
twice or thrice, the quantity in the former, that it will raise in the
latter situation.

Col. MASON. Agreed with Mr. Govr. Morris that we ought to leave the
interests of the people to the Representatives of the people: but the
objection was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives
of the people. It would continue so no longer than the States now
containing a majority of the people should retain that majority. As soon
as the Southern & Western population should predominate, which must
happen in a few years, the power wd. be in the hands of the minority,
and would never be yielded to the majority, unless provided for by the
Constitution

On the Question for postponing Mr. Williamson's motion, in order to
consider that of Mr. Rutlidge it passed in the negative.

Massts. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

On the question on the first clause of Mr. Williamson's motion as to
taking a census of the free inhabitants; it passed in the affirmative
Masts. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [13] the next clause as to 3/5 of the negroes
[14] considered.

Mr. KING. being much opposed to fixing numbers as the rule of
representation, was particularly so on account of the blacks. He thought
the admission of them along with Whites at all, would excite great
discontents among the States having no slaves. He had never said as to
any particular point that he would in no event acquiesce in & support
it; but he wd. say that if in any case such a declaration was to be made
by him, it would be in this. He remarked that in the temporary allotment
of Representatives made by the Committee, the Southern States had
received more than the number of their white & three fifths of their
black inhabitants entitled them to.

Mr. SHERMAN. S. Carola. had not more beyond her proportion than N. York
& N. Hampshire, nor either of them more than was necessary in order to
avoid fractions or reducing them below their proportion. Georgia had
more; but the rapid growth of that State seemed to justify it. In
general the allotment might not be just, but considering all
circumstances, he was satisfied with it.

Mr. GHORUM. supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the rule.
He said that in Massts. estimates had been taken in the different towns,
and that persons had been curious enough to compare these estimates with
the respective numbers of people; and it had been found even including
Boston, that the most exact proportion prevailed between numbers &
property. He was aware that there might be some weight in what had
fallen from his colleague, as to the umbrage which might be taken by the
people of the Eastern States. But he recollected that when the
proposition of Congs. for changing the 8th. art: of Confedn. was before
the Legislature of Massts. the only difficulty then was to satisfy them
that the negroes ought not to have been counted equally with [15] whites
instead of being counted in the ratio of three fifths only. [*16]

Mr. WILSON did not well see on what principle the admission of blacks in
the proportion of three fifths could be explained. Are they admitted as
Citizens? then why are they not admitted on an equality with White
Citizens? are they admitted as property? then why is not other property
admitted into the computation? These were difficulties however which he
thought must be overruled by the necessity of compromise. He had some
apprehensions also from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with
the whites, to give disgust to the people of Pena. as had been intimated
by his Colleague [Mr. Govr. Morris]. But he differed from him in
thinking numbers of inhabts. so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had
seen the Western settlemts. of Pa. and on a comparison of them with the
City of Philada. could discover little other difference, than that
property was more unequally divided among individuals [17] here than
there. Taking the same number in the aggregate in the two situations he
believed there would be little difference in their wealth and ability to
contribute to the public wants.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was compelled to declare himself reduced to the dilemma
of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature, and he
must therefore do it to the former. For he could never agree to give
such encouragement to the slave trade as would be given by allowing them
a representation for their negroes, and he did not believe those States
would ever confederate on terms that would deprive them of that trade.

On [18] Question for agreeing to include 3/5 of the blacks Massts. no.
Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Mard. [*19] no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. no. Geo. ay [21].

On the question as to taking [18] census "the first year after [18]
meeting of the Legislature"

Masts. ay. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. ay. Geo. no [22]

On filling the blank for the periodical census, with 15 years," Agreed
to nem. con.

Mr. MADISON moved to add after "15 years," the words "at least" that the
Legislature might anticipate when circumstances were likely to render a
particular year inconvenient.

On this motion for adding "at least," it passed in the negative the
States being equally divided.

Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [23]

A Change of [24] the phraseology of the other clause so as to read; "and
the Legislature shall alter or augment the representation accordingly"
was agreed to nem. con.

On the question on the whole resolution of Mr. Williamson as amended. 

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C.
no. Geo. no. [25, 26]

___________

1. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The transcript uses the word "number" in the plural.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 7; New York not on the floor."

4. The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.

5. The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.

6. The figure "3" is changed to "In the third place" in the transcript.

7. The word "or" is changed to "nor" in the transcript.

8. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "second" in the
transcript.

9. The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.

10. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "lesser" is changed to "less" in the transcript.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 5."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 6; Delaware,
Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4."

14. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

*16. They were then to have been a rule of taxation only.

17. The words "among individuals" are omitted in the transcript.

18. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

*19. [Mr Carrol Sd.. in explanation of the vote of Md. that he wished the
phraseology [20] to be so altered as to obviate if possible the danger
which had been expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern & Middle
States.]

20. The transcript italicizes the word "phraseology."

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, [19] South Carolina, no -- 6."

22. In the transcript the note reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye --
7; Connecticut, Maryland, Georgia, no -- 3."

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 5."

24. The word "in" is substituted in the transcript for "of."

25. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no -- 9; so it was rejected unanimously."

26. The word "Adjourned" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY.  JULY 12.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to add to the clause empowering the Legislature
to vary the Representation according to the principles of wealth &
number [1] of inhabts. a "proviso that taxation shall be in proportion
to Representation."

Mr. BUTLER contended again that Representation Sd.. be according to the
full number of inhabts. including all the blacks; admitting the justice
of Mr. Govr. Morris's motion.

Mr. MASON also admitted the justice of the principle, but was afraid
embarrassments might be occasioned to the Legislature by it. It might
drive the Legislature to the plan of Requisitions.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, admitted that some objections lay agst. his motion,
but supposed they would be removed by restraining the rule to direct
taxation. With regard to indirect taxes on exports & imports & on
consumption, the rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had
been said to the contrary he was persuaded that the imports &
consumption were pretty nearly equal throughout the Union.

General PINKNEY liked the idea. He thought it so just that it could not
be objected to. But foresaw that if the revision of the census was left
to the discretion of the Legislature, it would never be carried into
execution. The rule must be fixed, and the execution of it enforced by
the Constitution. He was alarmed at what was said yesterday, [*2]
concerning the negroes. He was now again alarmed at what had been thrown
out concerning the taxing of exports. S. Carola. has in one year
exported to the amount of ?00,000 Sterling all which was the fruit of
the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in proportion to this
amount? She will not. Neither ought she then to be subject to a tax on
it. He hoped a clause would be inserted in the system, restraining the
Legislature from a [3] taxing Exports.

Mr. WILSON approved the principle, but could not see how it could be
carried into execution; unless restrained to direct taxation.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS having so varied his Motion by inserting the word
"direct." It passd. nem. con. as follows -- "provided the always that
direct taxation ought to be proportioned to representation."

Mr. DAVIE, said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that it was
meant by some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of
Representation for their blacks. He was sure that N. Carola. would never
confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least as 3/5 . If the
Eastern States meant therefore to exclude them altogether the business
was at an end.

Dr. JOHNSON, thought that wealth and population were the true, equitable
rule [4] of representation; but he conceived that these two principles
resolved themselves into one; population being the best measure of
wealth. He concluded therefore that ye. number of people ought to be
established as the rule, and that all descriptions including blacks
equally with the whites, ought to fall within the computation. As
various opinions had been expressed on the subject, he would move that a
Committee might be appointed to take them into consideration and report
thereon.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. It has [5] been said that it is high time to speak
out, as one member, he would candidly do so. He came here to form a
compact for the good of America. He was ready to do so with all the
States. He hoped & believed that all would enter into such a Compact. If
they would not he was ready to join with any States that would. But as
the Compact was to be voluntary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to
insist on what the Southn. States will never agree to. It is equally
vain for the latter to require what the other States can never admit;
and he verily believed the people of Pena. will never agree to a
representation of Negroes. What can be desired by these States more than
has been already proposed; that the Legislature shall from time to time
regulate Representation according to population & wealth.

Genl. PINKNEY desired that the rule of wealth should be ascertained and
not left to the pleasure of the Legislature; and that property in slaves
should not be exposed to danger under a Govr. instituted for the
protection of property.

The first clause in the Report of the first Grand Committee was
postponed.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. In order to carry into effect the principle established,
moved to add to the last clause adopted by the House the words following
"and that the rule of contribution by direct taxation for the support of
the Government of the U. States shall be the number of white
inhabitants, and three fifths of every other description in the several
States, until some other rule that shall more accurately ascertain the
wealth of the several States can be devised and adopted by the
Legislature."

Mr. BUTLER seconded the motion in order that it might be committed.

Mr. RANDOLPH was not satisfied with the motion. The danger will be
revived that the ingenuity of the Legislature may evade or pervert the
rule so as to perpetuate the power where it shall be lodged in the first
instance. He proposed in lieu of Mr. Elseworth's motion, "that in order
to ascertain the alterations in Representation that may be required from
time to time by changes in the relative circumstances of the States, a
census shall be taken within two years from the 1st. meeting of the
Genl. Legislature of the U.S., and once within the term of every year
afterwards, of all the inhabitants in the manner & according to the
ratio recommended by Congress in their resolution of the 18th day of
Apl. 1783; [rating the blacks at 3/5 of their number] and, that the
Legislature of the U.S. shall arrange the Representation accordingly."
-- He urged strenuously that express security ought to be provided for
including slaves in the ratio of Representation. He lamented that such a
species of property existed. But as it did exist the holders of it would
require this security. It was perceived that the design was entertained
by some of excluding slaves altogether; the Legislature therefore ought
not to be left at liberty.

Mr. ELSEWORTH withdraws his motion & seconds that of Mr. Randolph.

Mr. WILSON observed that less umbrage would perhaps be taken agst. an
admission of the slaves into the Rule of representation, if it should be
so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient in the rule,
by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation: and as
representation was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally
attained. He accordingly moved & was 2ded. so to alter the last clause
adopted by the House, that together with the amendment proposed the
whole should read as follows -- provided always that the representation
ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation, and in order to
ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation which may be required
from time to time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the
States. Resolved that a census be taken within two years from the first
meeting of the Legislature of the U. States, and once within the term of
every years afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U.S. in the manner
and according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution
of April 18. [6] 1783; and that the Legislature of the U. S. shall
proportion the direct taxation accordingly."

Mr. KING. Altho' this amendment varies the aspect somewhat, he had still
two powerful objections agst. tying down the Legislature to the rule of
numbers. 1. [7] they were at this time an uncertain index of the
relative wealth of the States. 2. [7] if they were a just index at this
time it can not be supposed always to continue so. He was far from
wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever in one part of the
Republic. If justice was not the basis of the connection it could not be
of long duration. He must be shortsighted indeed who does not foresee
that whenever the Southern States shall be more numerous than the
Northern, they can & will hold a language that will awe them into
justice. If they threaten to separate now in case injury shall be done
them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual, when force shall
back their demands. Even in the intervening period, there will [8] no
point of time at which they will not be able to say, do us justice or we
will separate. He urged the necessity of placing confidence to a certain
degree in every Govt. and did not conceive that the proposed confidence
as to a periodical readjustment, of the representation exceeded that
degree.

Mr. PINKNEY moved to amend Mr. Randolph's motion so as to make "blacks
equal to the whites in the ratio of representation." This he urged was
nothing more than justice. The blacks are the labourers, the peasants of
the Southern States: they are as productive of pecuniary resources as
those of the Northern States. They add equally to the wealth, and
considering money as the sinew of war, to the strength of the nation. It
will also be politic with regard to the Northern States, as taxation is
to keep pace with Representation.

Genl. PINKNEY moves to insert 6 years instead of two, as the period
computing from [9] 1st. meeting of ye. Legis -- within which the first
census should be taken. On this question for inserting six [10] instead
of "two" in the proposition of Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirmative

Masts. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. Divd. Mayd. ay. Va. no. N.C.
no. S.C. ay. Geo. no. [11]

On a [12] question for filling the blank for ye. periodical census with
20 years, it it passed in the negative.

Masts. no. Ct.ay. N.J.ay. P.ay. Del.no. Md.no. Va.no. N.C.no. S.C.no.
Geo.no. [13]

On a [12] question for 10 years, it passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont.no. N.J.no. P.ay. Del.ay. Md.ay. Va. ay. N.C.ay. S.C.ay.
Geo.ay. [14]

On Mr. Pinkney's motion for rating blacks as equal to Whites instead of
as 3/5 -- 

Mas.no. Cont.no. [Dr Johnson ay] N.J.no. Pa.no. [3 agst. 2.] Del.no.
Md.no. Va.no. N.C.no. S.C.ay. Geo -- ay. [15]

Mr. RANDOLPH's proposition as varied by Mr. Wilson being read for [16]
question on the whole.

Mr. GERRY, urged that the principle of it could not be carried into
execution as the States were not to be taxed as States. With regard to
taxes in [17] imports, he conceived they would be more productive. Where
there were no slaves than where there were; the consumption being
greater -- 

Mr. ELSEWORTH. In case of a poll tax there wd. be no difficulty. But
there wd. probably be none. The sum allotted to a State may be levied
without difficulty according to the plan used by the State in raising
its own supplies. On the question on ye. whole proposition; as
proportioning representation to direct taxation & both to the white &
3/5 of [18] black inhabitants, & requiring a Census within six years --
& within every ten years afterwards. 

Mas.divd. Cont.ay. N.J.no. Pa.ay. Del.no. Md.ay. Va.ay. N.C.ay.
S.C.divd. Geo.ay. [19, 20]

___________

1. The transcript uses the word "number" in the plural.

*2. By Mr. Govr. Morris.

3. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The transcript uses the word "rule" in the plural.

5. The word "had" is substituted in the transcript for "has."

6. The date "April 18" is changed to "the eighteenth day of April" in
the transcript.

7. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

8. The word "be" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The word "years" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, aye -- 5; Massachusetts,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4; Delaware, divided."

12. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a".

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; Connecticut, New Jersey, no -- 2."

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, [Doctor Johnson, aye], New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, [3 against 2] Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, no -- 8."

16. The words "taking the" are here inserted in the transcript.

17. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

18. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; New Jersey,
Delaware, no -- 2; Massachusetts, South Carolina, divided."

20. The word "Adjourned" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  JULY 13.   IN CONVENTION

It being moved to postpone the clause in the Report of the Committee of
Eleven as to the originating of money bills in the [1] first branch, in
order to take up the following "that in the 2d. branch each State shall
have an equal voice."

Mr. GERRY, moved to add as an amendment to the last clause agreed to by
the House, "that from the first meeting of the Legislature of the U. S.
till a census shall be taken all monies to be raised for supplying the
public Treasury by direct taxation, shall be assessed on the inhabitants
of the several States according to the number of their Representatives
respectively in the 1st. branch." He said this would be as just before
as after the Census: according to the general principle that taxation &
Representation ought to go together.

Mr. WILLIAMSON feared that N. Hamshire will have reason to complain. 3
members were allotted to her as a liberal allowance, for this reason
among others, that she might not suppose any advantage to have been
taken of her absence. As she was still absent, and had no opportunity of
deciding whether she would chuse to retain the number on the condition,
of her being taxed in proportion to it, he thought the number ought to
be reduced from three to two, before the question [2] on Mr. G's motion.

Mr. READ could not approve of the proposition. He had observed he said
in the Committee a backwardness in some of the members from the large
States, to take their full proportion of Representatives. He did not
then see the motive. He now suspects it was to avoid their due share of
taxation. He had no objection to a just & accurate adjustment of
Representation & taxation to each other.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. MADISON answered that the charge itself involved
an acquittal, since notwithstanding the augmentation of the number of
members allotted to Masts. & Va. the motion for proportioning the
burdens thereto was made by a member from the former State & was
approved by Mr-M from the latter who was on the Come. Mr. Govr. Morris
said that he thought Pa. had her due share in 8 members; and he could
not in candor ask for more. Mr. M. said that having always conceived
that the difference of interest in the U, States lay not between the
large & small, but the N. & Southn. States, and finding that the number
of members allotted to the N. States was greatly superior, he should
have preferred, an addition of two members to the S. States, to wit one
to N. & 1 to S. Carla. rather than of one member to Virga. He liked the
present motion, because it tended to moderate the views both of the
opponents & advocates for rating very high, the negroes.

Mr. ELSEWORTH hoped the proposition would be withdrawn. It entered too
much into detail. The general principle was already sufficiently
settled. As fractions can not be regarded in apportioning the No. of
representatives, the rule will be unjust, until an actual census shall
be made. After that taxation may be precisely proportioned according to
the principle established, to the number of inhabitants.

Mr. WILSON hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. If it shd. it will
be made from another quarter. The rule will be as reasonable & just
before, as after a Census. As to fractional numbers, the Census will not
distroy, but ascertain them. And they will have the same effect after as
before the Census: for as he understands the rule, it is to be adjusted
not to the number of inhabitants, but of Representatives.

Mr. SHERMAN opposed the motion. He thought the Legislature ought to be
left at liberty: in which case they would probably conform to the
principles observed by Congs.

Mr. MASON did not know that Virga. would be a loser by the proposed
regulation, but had some scruple as to the justice of it. He doubted
much whether the conjectural rule which was to precede the Census, would
be as just, as it would be rendered by an actual census.

Mr. ELSEWORTH & Mr. SHERMAN moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Gerry,
on ye. question, it passed in the negative. Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.no. N.C.no. S.C.no. Geo.no. [3]

[4] Question on Mr. Gerry's motion; it passed in the negative, the
States being equally divided. 

Mas.ay. Cont.no. N. J. no. Pa.ay. Del.no. Md.no. Va. no. N.C.ay. S.C.ay.
Geo.ay. [5]

Mr. GERRY finding that the loss of the question had proceeded from an
objection with some, to the proposed assessment of direct taxes on the
inhabitants of the States, which might restrain the Legislature to a
poll tax, moved his proposition again, but so varied as to authorise the
assessment on the States, which wd. leave [6] the mode to the
Legislature, at this caret insert the words interlined [7] viz "that
from the 1st. meeting of the Legislature of the U. S. untill a census
shall be taken, all monies for supplying the public Treasury by direct
taxation shall be raised from the said several States according to the
number of their representatives respectively in the 1st. branch."

On this varied question, it passed in the affirmative

Mas.ay. Cont.no. N.J.no. Pa.divd. Del.no. Md.no. va.ay. N.C.ay. S.C.ay.
Geo.ay. [8]

On the motion of Mr. Randolph, the vote of Saturday [9] last authorising
the Legislre. to adjust from time to time, the representation upon the
principles of wealth & numbers of inhabitants was reconsidered by common
consent in order to strike out "Wealth" [10] and adjust the resolution
to that requiring periodical revisions according to the number of whites
& three fifths of the blacks: the motion was in the words following --
"But as the present situation of the States may probably alter in the
number of their inhabitants, that the Legislature of the U. S. be
authorized from time to time to apportion the number of representatives:
and in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided or any two or
more States united or new States created within the limits of the U. S.
the Legislature of [11] U. S. shall possess authority to regulate the
number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, upon the
principle of their number of inhabitants; according to the provisions
hereafter mentioned."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed the alteration as leaving still an incoherence.
If Negroes were to be viewed as inhabitants, and the revision was to
proceed on the principle of numbers of inhabts. they ought to be added
in their entire number, and not in the proportion of 3/5 . If as
property, the word wealth was right, and striking it out, would produce
the very inconsistency which it was meant to get rid of. -- The train of
business & the late turn which it had taken, had led him he said, into
deep meditation on it, and He wd. candidly state the result. A
distinction had been set up & urged, between the Nn. & Southn. States.
He had hitherto considered this doctrine as heretical. He still thought
the distinction groundless. He sees however that it is persisted in, and
that the Southn. Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way
open to their gaining a majority in the public Councils. The consequence
of such a transfer of power from the maritime to the interior & landed
interest will he foresees be such an oppression of [12] commerce, that
he shall be obliged to vote for ye. vicious principle of equality in the
2d. branch in order to provide some defence for the N. States agst. it.
But to come more to the point; either this distinction is fictitious or
real; if fictitious let it be dismissed & let us proceed with due
confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible
things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other. There can be
no end of demands for security if every particular interest is to be
entitled to it. The Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and
for other objects, as the Southn. States claim it for their peculiar
objects. In this struggle between the two ends of the Union, what part
ought the middle States in point of policy to take: to join their
Eastern brethren according to his ideas. If the Southn. States get the
power into their hands, and be joined as they will be with the interior
Country, they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the
Mississippi. This language is already held. the interior Country having
no property nor interest exposed on the sea, will be little affected by
such a war. He wished to know what security the Northn. & middle States
will have agst. this danger. It has been said that N. C. S. C., and
Georgia only will in a little time have a majority of the people of
America. They must in that case include the great interior Country, and
every thing was to be apprehended from their getting the power into
their hands.

Mr. BUTLER. The security the Southn. States want is that their negroes
may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or without
doors, have a very good mind to do. It was not supposed that N. C. S. C.
& Geo. would have more people than all the other States, but many more
relatively to the other States than they now have. The people & strength
of America are evidently bearing Southwardly & S. westwdly.

Mr. WILSON. If a general declaration would satisfy any gentleman he had
no indisposition to declare his sentiments. Conceiving that all men
wherever placed have equal rights and are equally entitled to
confidence, he viewed without apprehension the period when a few States
should contain the superior number of people. The majority of people
wherever found ought in all questions to govern the minority. If the
interior Country should acquire this majority, it will not only have the
right, but will avail themselves [13] of it whether we will or no. This
jealousy misled the policy of G. Britain with regard to America. The
fatal maxims espoused by her were that the Colonies were growing too
fast, and that their growth must be stinted in time. What were the
consequences? first. enmity on our part, then actual separation. Like
consequences will result on the part of the interior settlements, if
like jealousy & policy be pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not a
proper rule, why is not some better rule pointed out. No one has yet
ventured to attempt it. Congs. have never been able to discover a
better. No State as far as he had heard, has suggested any other. In
1783, after elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth all were
satisfied then as they are now that the rule of numbers, does not differ
much from the combined rule of numbers & wealth. Again he could not
agree that property was the sole or the [14] primary object of Governt.
& society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most
noble object. With respect to this object, as well as to other personal
rights, numbers were surely the natural & precise measure of
Representation. And with respect to property, they could not vary much
from the precise measure. In no point of view however could the
establishmt. of numbers as the rule of representation in the 1st. branch
vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious principle
into the 2d. branch. -- On the Question to strike out wealth, & to make
the change as moved by Mr. Randolph, it passed in the affirmative -- 

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. divd. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [15]

Mr. REED moved to insert after the word -- "divided," "or enlarged by
addition of territory" which was agreed to nem. con. [his object
probably was to provide for such cases as an enlargemt. of Delaware by
annexing to it the Peninsula on the East side of [16] Chesapeak]

Adjourned

___________

1. The word "the" is not italicized in the transcript.

2. The words "was taken" are here inserted in the transcript.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

4. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, South Carolina. Georgia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 5."

6. The word "leaves" is substituted in the transcript for "wd. leave."

7. Madison's direction concerning the interlined words is omitted in the
transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, no -- 4; Pennsylvania, divided."

9. The word "Saturday" is changed to "Monday" in the transcript.

10. The transcript italicizes the word "Wealth."

11. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "of."

13. The word "itself" is substituted in the transcript for "themselves."

14. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Delaware, divided."

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript; and the sentence
in brackets is a footnote.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY.  JULY 14.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. L. MARTIN called for the question on the whole report, including the
parts relating to the origination of money bills, and the equality of
votes in the 2d. branch.

Mr. GERRY. wished before the question should be put, that the attention
of the House might be turned to the dangers apprehended from Western
States. He was for admitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting
ourselves into their hands. They will if they acquire power like all
men, abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our wealth into the
Western Country. To guard agst. these consequences, he thought it
necessary to limit the number of new States to be admitted into the
Union, in such a manner, that they should never be able to outnumber the
Atlantic States. He accordingly moved "that in order to secure the
liberties of the States already confederated, the number of
Representatives in the 1st. branch, of the States which shall hereafter
be established, shall never exceed in number, the Representatives from
such of the States as shall accede to this confederation.

Mr. KING. seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN, thought there was no probability that the number of future
States would exceed that of the Existing States. If the event should
ever happen, it was too remote to be taken into consideration at this
time. Besides We are providing for our posterity, for our children & our
grand Children, who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western
States, as of the old States. On this consideration alone, we ought to
make no such discrimination as was proposed by the motion.

Mr. GERRY. If some of our children should remove, others will stay
behind, and he thought it incumbent on us to provide for their
interests. There was a rage for emigration from the Eastern States to
the Western Country, and he did not wish those remaining behind to be at
the mercy of the Emigrants. Besides foreigners are resorting to that
country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take there. -- On the
question for agreeing to the Motion of Mr. Gerry, it passed in the
negative.

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N.J. no. Pa. divd. Del: ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C. no.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [1]

Mr. RUTLIDGE proposed to reconsider the two propositions touching the
originating of money bills in the first & the equality of votes in the
second branch.

Mr. SHERMAN was for the question on the whole at once. It was he said a
conciliatory plan, it had been considered in all its parts, a great deal
of time had been spent on [2] it, and if any part should now be altered,
it would be necessary to go over the whole ground again.

Mr. L. MARTIN urged the question on the whole. He did not like many
parts of it. He did not like having two branches, nor the inequality of
votes in the 1st. branch. He was willing however to make trial of the
plan, rather than do nothing.

Mr. WILSON traced the progress of the report through its several stages,
remarking yt. when on the question concerning an equality of votes, the
House was divided, our Constituents had they voted as their
representatives did, would have stood as 2/3 agst. the equality, and 1/3
only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be known, and it will [3]
appear that this fundamental point has been carried by 1/3 agst. 2/3 .
What hopes will our Constituents entertain when they find that the
essential principles of justice have been violated in the outset of the
Governmt. As to the privilege of originating money bills, it was not
considered by any as of much moment, and by many as improper in itself.
He hoped both clauses wd. be reconsidered. The equality of votes was a
point of such critical importance, that every opportunity ought to be
allowed, for discussing and collecting the mind of the Convention on [4]
it.

Mr. L. MARTIN denies that there were 2/3 agst. the equality of votes.
The States that please to call themselves large, are the weekest in the
Union. Look at Masts. Look at Virga. Are they efficient States? He was
for letting a separation take place if they desired it. He had rather
there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any other
principle than an equality of votes in the 2d. branch at least.

Mr. WILSON was not surprised that those who say that a minority is [5]
more than the [6] majority should say that 7 the minority is stronger
than the majority. He supposed the next assertion will be that they are
richer also; though he hardly expected it would be persisted in when the
States shall be called on for taxes & troops -- 

Mr. GERRY. also animadverted on Mr. L. Martins remarks on the weakness
of Masts. He favored the reconsideration with a view not of destroying
the equality of votes; but of providing that the States should vote per
capita, which he said would prevent the delays & inconveniences that had
been experienced in Congs. and would give a national aspect & Spirit to
the management of business. He did not approve of a reconsideration of
the clause relating to money bills. It was of great consequence. It was
the corner stone of the accomodation. If any member of the Convention
had the exclusive privilege of making propositions, would any one say
that it would give him no advantage over other members. The Report was
not altogether to his mind. But he would agree to it as it stood rather
than throw it out altogether.

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to.

Mr. PINKNEY moved that instead of an equality of votes, the States
should be represented in the 2d. branch as follows: N. H. by. 2.
members. Mas. 4. R. I. 1. Cont. 3. N.Y. 3. N.J. 2. Pa. 4. Del I. Md. 3.
Virga.5. N.C.3. S.C.3. Geo. 2.making in the whole 36.

Mr. WILSON seconds the motion

Mr. DAYTON. The smaller States can never give up their equality. For
himself he would in no event yield that security for their rights.

Mr. SHERMAN urged the equality of votes not so much as a security for
the small States; as for the State Govts. which could not be preserved
unless they were represented & had a negative in the Genl. Government.
He had no objection to the members in the 2d. b. voting per capita, as
had been suggested by [Mr. Gerry]

Mr. MADISON concurred in this motion of Mr. Pinkney as a reasonable
compromise.

Mr. GERRY said he should like the motion, but could see no hope of
success. An accomodation must take place, and it was apparent from what
had been seen that it could not do so on the ground of the motion. He
was utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States to
accede or not accede; as had been intimated.

Mr. KING said it was always with regret that he differed from his
colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from [Mr. Gerry] on this
occasion. He considered the proposed Government as substantially and
formally, a General and National Government over the people of America.
There never will be a case in which it will act as a federal Government
on the States and not on the individual Citizens. And is it not a clear
principle that in a free Govt. those who are to be the objects of a
Govt. ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can be
assigned why the same rule of representation sd. not prevail in the 2d.
branch [8] as in the 1st.? He could conceive none. On the contrary,
every view of the subject that presented itself, seemed to require it.
Two objections had been raised agst. it: drawn 1. [9] from the terms of
the existing compact 2. [9] from a supposed danger to the smaller
States. -- As to the first objection he thought it inapplicable.
According to the existing confederation, the rule by which the public
burdens is to be apportioned is fixed, and must be pursued. In the
proposed Govermt. it can not be fixed, because indirect taxation is to
be substituted. The Legislature therefore will have full discretion to
impose taxes in such modes & proportions as they may judge expedient. As
to the 2d. objection, he thought it of as little weight. The Genl.
Governt. can never wish to intrude on the State Governts. There could be
no temptation. None had been pointed out. In order to prevent the
interference of measures which seemed most likely to happen, he would
have no objection to throwing all the State debts into the federal debt,
making one aggregate debt of about 70,000,000 of dollars, and leaving it
to be discharged by the Genl. Govt. -- According to the idea of securing
the State Govts. there ought to be three distinct legislative branches.
The 2d. was admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant, to check
the 1st. branch, to give more wisdom, system, & stability to the Govt.
and ought clearly as it was to operate on the people to be proportioned
to them. For the third purpose of securing the States, there ought then
to be a 3d. branch, representing the States as such, and guarding by
equal votes their rights & dignities. He would not pretend to be as
thoroughly acquainted with his immediate Constituents as his colleagues,
but it was his firm belief that Masts. would never be prevailed on to
yield to an equality of votes. In N. York (he was sorry to be obliged to
say any thing relative to that State in the absence of its
representatives, but the occasion required, it), in N. York he had seen
that the most powerful argument used by the considerate opponents to the
grant of the Impost to Congress, was pointed agst. the viccious
constitution of Congs. with regard to representation & suffrage. He was
sure that no Govt. could [10] last that was not founded on just
principles. He prefer'd the doing of nothing, to an allowance of an
equal vote to all the States. It would be better he thought to submit to
a little more confusion & convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. It
was difficult to say what the views of different Gentlemen might be.
Perhaps there might be some who thought no Governmt. co-extensive with
the U. States could be established with a hope of its answering the
purpose. Perhaps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with
the object we were [11] pursuing. If there were, he thought it but
candid that Gentlemen would [12] speak out that we might understand one
another.

Mr. STRONG. The Convention had been much divided in opinion. In order to
avoid the consequences of it, an accomodation had been proposed. A
committee had been appointed: and though some of the members of it were
averse to an equality of votes, a Report has [13] been made in favor of
it. It is agreed on all hands that Congress are nearly at an end. If no
Accomodation takes place, the Union itself must soon be dissolved. It
has been suggested that if we can not come to any general agreement, the
principal States may form & recommend a scheme of Government. But will
the small States in that case ever accede [14] it. Is it probable that
the large States themselves will under such circumstances embrace and
ratify it. He thought the small States had made a considerable
concession in the article of money bills; and that they might naturally
expect some concessions on the other side. From this view of the matter
he was compelled to give his vote for the Report taken all together.

Mr. MADISON expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of
Govenmt -- was destroyed, by substituting an equality in place of a
proportional Representation, no proper superstructure would be raised.
If the small States really wish for a Government armed with the powers
necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the
larger members as well as on [15] themselves he could not help thinking
them extremely mistaken in their [16] means. He reminded them of the
consequences of laying the existing confederation [17] on improper
principles. All the principal parties to its compilation, joined
immediately in mutilating & fettering the Governmt. in such a manner
that it has disappointed every hope placed on it. He appealed to the
doctrine & arguments used by themselves on a former occasion. It had
been very properly observed by [Mr. Patterson] that Representation was
an expedient by which the meeting of the people themselves was rendered
unnecessary; and that the representatives ought therefore to bear a
proportion to the votes which their constituents if convened, would
respectively have. Was not this remark as applicable to one branch of
the Representation as to the other? But it had been said that the
Governt. would in its operation be partly federal, partly national; that
altho' in the latter respect the Representatives of the people ought to
be in proportion to the people: yet in the former it ought to be
according to the number of States. If there was any solidity in this
distinction he was ready to abide by it, if there was none it ought to
be abandoned. In all cases where the Genl. Government. is to act on the
people, let the people be represented and the votes be proportional. In
all cases where the Governt. is to act on the States as such, in like
manner as Congs. now act on them, let the States be represented & the
votes be equal. This was the true ground of compromise if there was any
ground at all. But he denied that there was any ground. He called for a
single instance in which the Genl. Govt. was not to operate on the
people individually. The practicability of making laws, with coercive
sanctions, for the States as Political bodies, had been exploded on all
hands. He observed that the people of the large States would in some way
or other secure to themselves a weight proportioned to the importance
accruing from their superior numbers. If they could not effect it by a
proportional representation in the Govt. they would probably accede to
no Govt. which did not in [18] great measure depend for its efficacy on
their voluntary cooperation; in which case they would indirectly secure
their object. The existing confederacy proved that where the Acts of the
Genl. Govt. were to be executed by the particular Govts. the latter had
a weight in proportion to their importance. No one would say that either
in Congs. or out of Congs. Delaware had equal weight with Pensylva. If
the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the former, and no
compulsion could be used, it was of ten times more importance, that she
should voluntarily furnish the supply. In the Dutch confederacy the
votes of the Provinces were equal. But Holland which supplies about half
the money, governs [19] the whole republic. He enumerated the objections
agst. an equality of votes in the 2d. branch, notwithstanding the
proportional representation in the first. 1. the minority could negative
the will of the majority of the people. 2. they could extort measures by
making them a condition of their assent to other necessary measures. 3.
they could obtrude measures on the majority by virtue of the peculiar
powers which would be vested in the Senate. 4. the evil instead of being
cured by time, would increase with every new State that should be
admitted, as they must all be admitted on the principle of equality. 5.
the perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northn. agst.
the Southn. Scale was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be
pretty well understood that the real difference of interests lay, not
between the large & small but between the N. & Southn States. The
institution of slavery & its consequences formed the line of
discrimination. There were 5 States on the South, [20] 8 on the Northn.
side of this line. Should a proportl. representation take place it was
true, the N. side [21] would still outnumber the other; but not in the
same degree, at this time; and every day would tend towards an
equilibrium.

Mr. WILSON would add a few words only. If equality in the 2d. branch was
an error that time would correct, he should be less anxious to exclude
it being sensible that perfection was unattainable in any plan; but
being a fundamental and a perpetual error, it ought by all means to be
avoided. A vice in the Representation, like an error in the first
concoction, must be followed by disease, convulsions, and finally death
itself. The justice of the general principle of proportional
representation has not in argument at least been yet contradicted. But
it is said that a departure from it so far as to give the States an
equal vote in one branch of the Legislature is essential to their
preservation. He had considered this position maturely, but could not
see its application. That the States ought to be preserved he admitted.
But does it follow that an equality of votes is necessary for the
purpose? Is there any reason to suppose that if their preservation
should depend more on the large than on the small States the security of
the States agst. the Genl. Government would be diminished? Are the large
States less attached to their existence, more likely to commit suicide,
than the small? An equal vote then is not necessary as far as he can
conceive: and is liable among other objections to this insuperable one:
The great fault of the existing confederacy is its inactivity. It has
never been a complaint agst. Congs. that they governed overmuch. The
complaint has been that they have governed too little. To remedy this
defect we were sent here. Shall we effect the cure by establishing an
equality of votes as is proposed? no: this very equality carries us
directly to Congress: to the system which it is our duty to rectify. The
small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equality, but they may
controul the Govt. as they have done in Congs. This very measure is here
prosecuted by a minority of the people of America. Is then the object of
the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way? Will not our
Constituents say? we sent you to form an efficient Govt. and you have
given us one more complex indeed, but having all the weakness of the
former Governt. He was anxious for uniting all the States under one
Governt. He knew there were some respectable men who preferred three
confederacies, united by offensive & defensive alliances. Many things
may be plausibly said, some things may be justly said, in favor of such
a project. He could not however concur in it himself; but he thought
nothing so pernicious as bad first principles.

Mr. ELSEWORTH asked two questions one of Mr. Wilson, whether he had ever
seen a good measure fail in Congs. for want of a majority of States in
its favor? He had himself never known such an instance: the other of Mr.
Madison whether a negative lodged with the majority of the States even
the smallest, could be more dangerous than the qualified negative
proposed to be lodged in a single Executive Magistrate, who must be
taken from some one State?

Mr. SHERMAN, signified that his expectation was that the Genl.
Legislature would in some cases act on the federal principle, of
requiring quotas. But he thought it ought to be empowered to carry their
own plans into execution, if the States should fail to supply their
respective quotas.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinkney's motion for allowing N. H.
2. Mas. 4. &c -- it passed in the negative Mas. no. Mr. King ay. Mr.
Ghorum absent. cont. no. N.J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
no. S. C. ay Geo. no. [22]

Adjourned

___________

1. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, aye -- 4; New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5; Pennsylvania, divided."

2. The word "upon" is substituted in the transcript for "on."

3. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "will."

4. The word "upon" is substituted in the transcript for "on."

5. The word "does" is substituted in the transcript for "is."

6. The word "a" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

7. The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.

8. In the transcript the word "branch" is transposed, making the phrase
read: "second, as in the first, branch."

9. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "Secondly" in the
transcript.

10. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "could."

11. The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "were."

12. The word "should" is substituted in the transcript for "would."

13. The word "had" is substituted in the transcript for "has."

14. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The word "on" is omitted in the transcript.

16. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "their."

17. The transcript italicizes the words "existing confederation."

18. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. The word "governed" is substituted in the transcript for "governs."

20. The word "Southern" is substituted in the transcript for "South."

21. The word "side" is omitted in the transcript.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, [Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham,
absent], Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no
-- 6."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY.  JULY 16.   IN CONVENTION

On the question for agreeing to the whole Report as amended & including
the equality of votes in the 2d. branch. it passed in the Affirmative.

Mas. divided Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, ay. Mr. King Mr. Ghorum no. Cont.
ay. N.J. ay. Pena. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C. ay. Mr. Spaight no.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [1] [Here enter the whole in the words entered in the
Journal July 16] [2]

The whole, thus passed is in the words following viz

"Resolved that in the original formation of the Legislature of the U. S.
the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty five members, of which
number N. Hampshire shall send 3. Massts. 8. Rh. I. 1. Connt. 5. N. Y.
6. N. J. 4. Pena. 8. Del. 1. Maryd. 6. Virga. 10. N. C. 5. S. C. 5. Geo.
3. -- But as the present situation of the States may probably alter in
the number of their inhabitants, the Legislature of the U. S. shall be
authorized from time to time to apportion the number of Reps.; and in
case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged by,
addition of territory, or any two or more States united, or any new
States created with [3] the limits of the U. S. the Legislature of the
U. S. shall possess authority to regulate the number of Reps. in any of
the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabitants,
according to the provisions hereafter mentioned, namely [4] -- provided
always that representation ought to be proportioned according to direct
taxation; and in order to ascertain the alteration in the direct
taxation, which may be required from time to time by the changes in the
relative circumstances of the States -- 

Resolved, that a Census be taken within six years from the 1st. meeting
of the Legislature of the U. S. and once within the term of every 10
years afterwards of all the inhabitants of the U. S. in the manner and
according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of
April 18. [5] 1783, and that the Legislature of the U. S. shall
proportion the direct taxation accordingly -- 

"Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for
fixing the salaries of officers of the Govt. of the U. S. shall
originate in the first branch of the Legislature of the U. S. and shall
not be altered or amended in the 2d. branch: and that no money shall be
drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be
originated in the 1st. branch.

"Resolvd. that in the 2d. branch of the Legislature of the U. S. each
State shall have an equal vote."

The 6th. Resol: in the Report from the Come. of the whole House, which
had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8th. Resolns.: was now
resumed. see the Resoln.

The 1st. member [6] "That the Natl. Legislature ought to possess the
Legislative Rights vested in Congs. by the Confederation." was agreed to
nem. Con.

The next, [7] "And moreover to legislate in all cases to which the
separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U. S.
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation," being
read for a question

Mr. BUTLER calls for some explanation of the extent of this power:
particularly of the word incompetent. The vagueness of the terms
rendered it impossible for any precise judgment to be formed.

Mr. GHORUM. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the propriety of
them. We are now establishing general principles, to be extended
hereafter into details which will be precise & explicit.

Mr. RUTLIDGE, urged the objection started by Mr. Butler and moved that
the clause should be committed to the end that a specification of the
powers comprised in the general terms, might be reported.

On the question for a [8] commitment, the States [9] were equally
divided.

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay: [10] So it was lost.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The vote of this morning [involving an equality of
suffrage in 2d. branch] had embarrassed the business extremely. All the
powers given in the Report from the Come. of the whole, were founded on
the supposition that a Proportional representation was to prevail in
both branches of the Legislature. When he came here this morning his
purpose was to have offered some propositions that might if possible
have united a great majority of votes, and particularly might provide
agst. the danger suspected on the part of the smaller States, by
enumerating the cases in which it might lie, and allowing an equality of
votes in such cases. [*11] But finding from the preceding vote that they
persist in demanding an equal vote in all cases, that they have
succeeded in obtaining it, and that N. York if present would probably be
on the same side, he could not but think we were unprepared to discuss
this subject further. It will probably be in vain to come to any final
decision with a bare majority on either side. For these reasons he
wished the Convention might [14] adjourn, that the large States might
consider the steps proper to be taken in the present solemn crisis of
the business, and that the small States might also deliberate on the
means of conciliation.

Mr. PATTERSON, thought with Mr. R. that it was high time for the
Convention to adjourn that the rule of secrecy ought to be rescinded,
and that our Constituents should be consulted. No conciliation could be
admissible on the part of the smaller States on any other ground than
that of an equality of votes in the 2d. branch. If Mr. Randolph would
reduce to form his motion for an adjournment sine die, he would second
it with all his heart.

Genl. PINKNEY wished to know of Mr. R. whether he meant an adjournment
sine die, or only an adjournment for the day. If the former was meant,
it differed much from his idea. He could not think of going to S.
Carolina and returning again to this place. Besides it was chimerical to
suppose that the States if consulted would ever accord separately, and
beforehand.

Mr. RANDOLPH, had never entertained an idea of an adjournment sine die;
& was sorry that his meaning had been so readily & strangely
misinterpreted. He had in view merely an adjournment till tomorrow, in
order that some conciliatory experiment might if possible be devised,
and that in case the smaller States should continue to hold back, the
larger might then take such measures, he would not say what, as might be
necessary.

Mr. PATTERSON seconded the adjournment till tomorrow, as an opportunity
seemed to be wished by the larger States to deliberate further on
conciliatory expedients. On the question for adjourning till tomorrow,
the States were equally divided.

Mas. no. Cont. no. N.J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C. ay.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [15] So it was lost.

Mr. BROOME thought it his duty to declare his opinion agst. an
adjournment sine die, as had been urged by Mr. Patterson. Such a measure
he thought would be fatal. Something must be done by the Convention,
tho' it should be by a bare majority.

Mr. GERRY observed that Masts. was opposed to an adjournment, because
they saw no new ground of compromise. But as it seemed to be the opinion
of so many States that a trial shd -- be made, the State would now
concur in the adjournmt.

Mr. RUTLIDGE could see no need of an adjournt. because he could see no
chance of a compromise. The little States were fixt. They had repeatedly
& solemnly declared themselves to be so. All that the large States then
had to do, was to decide whether they would yield or not. For his part
he conceived that altho' we could not do what we thought best, in
itself, we ought to do something. Had we not better keep the Govt. up a
little longer, hoping that another Convention will supply our omissions,
than abandon every thing to hazard. Our Constituents will be very little
satisfied with us if we take the latter course.

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. KING renewed the motion to adjourn till tomorrow.

On the question. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay.
Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. divd. [16]

Adjourned

On the morning following before the hour of the convention a number of
the members from the larger States by common agreement met for the
purpose of consulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of
the vote in favor of an equal Representation in the 2d. branch, and the
apparent inflexibility of the smaller States on that point. Several
members from the latter States also attended. The time was wasted in
vague conversation on the subject, without any specific proposition or
agreement. It appeared indeed that the opinions of the members who
disliked the equality of votes differed so [17] much as to the
importance of that point, and as to the policy of risking a failure of
any general act of the Convention, by inflexibly opposing it. Several of
them supposing that no good Governnt. could or would be built on that
foundation, and that as a division of the Convention into two opinions
was unavoidable; it would be better that the side comprising the
principal States, and a majority of the people of America, should
propose a scheme of Govt. to the States, than that a scheme should be
proposed on the other side, would have concurred in a firm opposition to
the smaller States, and in a separate recommendation, if eventually
necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the smaller States, and to
concur in such an act however imperfect & exceptionable, as might be
agreed on by the Convention as a body, tho' decided by a bare majority
of States and by a minority of the people of the U. States. It is
probable that the result of this consultation satisfied the smaller
States that they had nothing to apprehend from a union of the larger, in
any plan whatever agst. the equality of votes in the 2d. branch.

___________

1. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina [Mr. Spaight, no], aye -- 5; Pennsylvania,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4; Massachusetts, divided, [Mr.
Gerry, Mr. Strong, aye; Mr. King, Mr. Gorham, no.]"

2. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

3. The word "within" is substituted in the transcript for the word
"with."

4. The word "namely" is omitted in the transcript.

5. The date "April 18" is changed to "the eighteenth of April" in the
transcript.

6.. The words "The 1st. member" are omitted in the transcript.

7 The words "The next" are omitted in the transcript.

8. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.

9. The word "votes" is substituted in the transcript for "States."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, no -- 5."

*11 See the paper in [12] appendix communicated by Mr. R. to J.M. July
10. [13]

12. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. The transcript here inserts "No. -- "

14. The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "might."

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye --
7; Connecticut, Delaware, no -- 2; Georgia, divided."

17. The word "so" is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  JULY 17.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS. moved to reconsider the whole Resolution agreed to
yesterday concerning the constitution of the 2 branches of the
Legislature. His object was to bring the House to a consideration in the
abstract of the powers necessary to be vested in the general Government.
It had been said, Let us know how the Govt. is to be modelled, and then
we can determine what powers can be properly given to it. He thought the
most eligible course was, first to determine on the necessary powers,
and then so to modify the Governt. as that it might be justly & properly
enabled to administer them. He feared if we proceeded to a consideration
of the powers, whilst the vote of yesterday including an equality of the
States in the 2d. branch, remained in force, a reference to it, either
mental or expressed, would mix itself with the merits of every question
concerning the powers. -- this motion was not seconded. [It was probably
approved by several members, who either despaired of success, or were
apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the jealousies of the
smaller States.]

The 6th. Resoln. in the Report of the Como. of the Whole relating to the
powers, which had been postponed in order to consider the 7 & 8th.
relating to the constitution of the Natl. Legislature, was now resumed.

Mr. SHERMAN observed that it would be difficult to draw the line between
the powers of the Genl. Legislatures, and those to be left with the
States; that he did not like the definition contained in the Resolution,
and proposed in [1] place of [2] the words "of [3] individual
Legislation" line 4. [4] inclusive, to insert "to make laws binding on
the people of the United States in all cases which may concern the
common interests of the Union; but not to interfere with the Government
of the individual States in any matters of internal police which respect
the Govt. of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the U.
States is not concerned."

Mr. WILSON 2ded. the amendment as better expressing the general
principle.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed it. The internal police, as it would be called
& understood by the States ought to be infringed in many cases, as in
the case of paper money & other tricks by which Citizens of other States
may be affected.

Mr. SHERMAN, in explanation of his idea read an enumeration of powers,
including the power of levying taxes on trade, but not the power of
direct taxation.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS remarked the omission, and inferred that for the
deficiencies of taxes on consumption, it must have been the meaning of
Mr. Sherman, that the Genl. Govt. should recur to quotas & requisitions,
which are subversive of the idea of Govt.

Mr. SHERMAN acknowledged that his enumeration did not include direct
taxation. Some provision he supposed must be made for supplying the
deficiency of other taxation, but he had not formed any.

On [5] Question of Mr. Sherman's motion, it passed in the negative

Mas. no. Cont. ay. N.J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C. no.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [6]

Mr. BEDFORD moved that the 2d. member of Resolution 6. [7] be so altered
as to read "and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are
separately [8] incompetent," or in which the harmony of the U. States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ds. the motion

Mr. RANDOLPH. This is a formidable idea indeed. It involves the power of
violating all the laws and constitutions of the States, and of
intermeddling with their police. The last member of the sentence is also
superfluous, being included in the first.

Mr. BEDFORD. It is not more extensive or formidable than the clause as
it stands: no State being separately competent to legislate for the
general interest of the Union.

On [9] question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's motion, it passed in the
affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. no. N.J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C. ay.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [10]

On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C.2y.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [11]

The next. [12] "To negative all laws passed by the several States
contravening in the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of
Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of ye. Union" [13]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed this power as likely to be terrible to the
States, and not necessary, if sufficient Legislative authority should be
given to the Genl. Government.

Mr. SHERMAN thought it unnecessary, as the Courts of the States would
not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority of the Union,
and which the legislature would wish to be negatived.

Mr. L. MARTIN considered the power as improper & inadmissible. Shall all
the laws of the States be sent up to the Genl. Legislature before they
shall be permitted to operate?

Mr. MADISON, considered the negative on the laws of the States as
essential to the efficacy & security of the Genl. Govt. The necessity of
a general Govt. proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue
their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. This
propensity will continue to disturb the system, unless effectually
controuled. Nothing short of a negative on their laws will controul it.
They can [14] pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects
before they can be repealed by the Genl. Legislre. or be [15] set aside
by the National Tribunals. Confidence can not be put in the State
Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests. In all
the States these are more or less dependt. on the Legislatures. In
Georgia they are appointed annually by the Legislature. In R. Island the
Judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were displaced,
and others substituted, by the Legislature who would be [16] willing
instruments of the wicked & arbitrary plans of their masters. A power of
negativing the improper laws of the States is at once the most mild &
certain means of preserving the harmony of the system. Its utility is
sufficiently displayed in the British System. Nothing could maintain the
harmony & subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the
prerogative by which the Crown, stifles in the birth every Act of every
part tending to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is
sometimes misapplied thro' ignorance or a partiality to one particular
part of ye. empire; but we have not the same reason to fear such
misapplications in our System. As to the sending all laws up to the
Natl. Legisl: that might be rendered unnecessary by some emanation of
the power into the States, so far at least, as to give a temporary
effect to laws of immediate necessity.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was more & more opposed to the negative. The proposal
of it would disgust all the States. A law that ought to be negatived
will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should
fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law.

Mr. SHERMAN. Such a power involves a wrong principle, to wit, that a law
of a State contrary to the articles of the Union, would if not
negatived, be valid & operative.

Mr. PINKNEY urged the necessity of the Negative. On the question for
agreeing to the power of negativing laws of States &c" it passed in the
negative.

Mas. ay. Ct. no. N.J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no.
Geo. no. [17]

Mr. LUTHER MARTIN moved the following resolution "that the Legislative
acts of the U.S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the articles of Union,
and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. S. shall
be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those acts or
treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and
inhabitants -- & that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of
the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding" which was agreed
to nem: con:

9th Resol: "that Natl. Executive consist of a single person." Agd. to
nem. con. [18]

[19] "To be chosen by the National Legisl:" [20]

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS was pointedly agst. his being so chosen. He will be
the mere creature of the Legisl: if appointed & impeachable by that
body. He ought to be elected by the people at large, by the freeholders
of the Country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they
have been found superable in N. Y. & in Cont. and would he believed be
found so, in the case of an Executive for the U. States. If the people
should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished
character, or services; some man, if he might so speak, of continental
reputation. -- If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of
intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a
pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to
the appointment. He moved to strike out "National Legislature" & insert
"citizens of [21] U.S."

Mr. SHERMAN thought that the sense of the Nation would be better
expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large. The latter
will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will
never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote
for some man in their own State, and the largest State will have the
best chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the Legislre.
A majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an election.

Mr. WILSON. two arguments have been urged agnt. an election of the
Executive Magistrate by the people. 1 [22] the example of Poland where
an Election of the supreme Magistrate is attended with the most
dangerous commotions. The cases he observed were totally dissimilar. The
Polish nobles have resources & dependents which enable them to appear in
force, and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next
place the electors all assemble in [23] one place: which would not be
the case with us. The 2d. argt. is that a majority [24] of the people
would never concur. It might be answered that the concurrence of a
majority of [25] people is not a necessary principle of election, nor
required as such in any of the States. But allowing the objection all
its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in Masts. where the
Legislature by [26] majority of voices, decide in case a majority of
people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would
restrain the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent in a
great degree intrigue & cabal. A particular objection with him agst. an
absolute election by the Legislre. was that the Exec: in that case would
be too dependent to stand the mediator between the intrigues & sinister
views of the Representatives and the general liberties & interests of
the people.

Mr. PINKNEY did not expect this question would again have been brought
forward; An Election by the people being liable to the most obvious &
striking objections. They will be led by a few active & designing men.
The most populous States by combining in favor of the same individual
will be able to carry their points. The Natl. Legislature being most
immediately interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most
attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into
execution.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. It is said that in case of an election by the people
the populous States will combine & elect whom they please. Just the
reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If their be any
combination it must be among their representatives in the Legislature.
It is said the people will be led by a few designing men. This might
happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the
continent. In the election of a Govr. of N. York, it sometimes is the
case in particular spots, that the activity & intrigues of little
partizans are successful, but the general voice of the State is never
influenced by such artifices. It is said the multitude will be
uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what passed in the
Legislative Conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they
will not be uninformed of those great & illustrious characters which
have merited their esteem & confidence. If the Executive be chosen by
the Natl. Legislature, he will not be independent on [27] it; and if not
independent, usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be
the consequence. This was the case in England in the last Century. It
has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all
power. It has been the case every where. He was surprised that an
election by the people at large should ever have been likened to the
polish election of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature
will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The
great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption & cabal
wch. are known to characterise the one would soon find their way into
the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies, are always worse than
those made by single responsible individuals, or by the people at large.

Col. MASON. It is curious to remark the different language held at
different times. At one moment we are told that the Legislature is
entitled to thorough confidence, and to indifinite power. At another,
that it will be governed by intrigue & corruption, and cannot be trusted
at all. But not to dwell on this inconsistency he would observe that a
Government which is to last ought at least to be practicable. Would this
be the case if the proposed election should be left to the people at
large. He conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a
proper character for chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to
refer a trial of colours to a blind man. The extent of the Country
renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to
judge of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.

Mr. WILSON. could not see the contrariety stated [by Col. Mason] The
Legislre. might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in
others. In acts which were to affect them & yr. Constituents precisely
alike confidence was due. In others jealousy was warranted. The
appointment to great offices, where the Legislre. might feel many
motives, not common to the public confidence was surely misplaced. This
branch of business it was notorious was [28] most corruptly managed of
any that had been committed to legislative bodies.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, conceived that there was the same difference between an
election in this case, by the people and by the legislature, as between
an appt. by lot, and by choice. There are at present distinguished
characters, who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not
always be the case. The people will be sure to vote for some man in
their own State, and the largest State will be sure to succeed. This
will not be Virga. however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As the
Salary of the Executive will be fixed, and he will not be eligible a 2d.
time, there will not be such a dependence on the Legislature as has been
imagined.

[29] Question on an election by the people instead of the Legislature;
which [30] passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C. no.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [31]

Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the Executive be chosen by Electors appointed
by the several Legislatures of the individual States.

Mr. BROOME 2ds. On the Question, it passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.C. no.
S.C. no. Geo. no. [32]

On the question on the words "to be chosen by the Nationl. Legislature"
it passed unanimously in the affirmative.

"For the term of seven years" -- postponed nem. con. on motion of Mr.
Houston & [33] Gov. Morris

"to carry into execution the nationl. laws" -- agreed to nem. con.

"to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for." -- agreed to
nem.con.

"to be ineligible a second time" -- Mr. HOUSTON moved to strike out this
clause.

Mr. SHERMAN 2ds. the motion.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS espoused the motion. The ineligibility proposed by the
clause as it stood tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior,
the hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment. It was saying to him,
make hay while the sun shines.

On the question for striking out as moved by Mr. Houston, it passed in
the affirmative

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no.
S.C. no. Geo. ay. [34]

[35] "For the term of 7 years" [36] resumed

Mr. BROOM was for a shorter term since the Executive Magistrate was now
to be re-eligible. Had he remained ineligible a 2d. time, he should have
preferred a longer term.

DOCr. Mc.CLURG moved [*37] to strike out 7 years, and insert "during good
behavior." By striking out the words declaring him not re-eligible, he
was put into a situation that would keep him dependent for ever on the
Legislature; and he conceived the independence of the Executive to be
equally essential with that of the Judiciary department.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion. He expressed great pleasure in
hearing it. This was the way to get a good Government. His fear that so
valuable an ingredient would not be attained had led him to take the
part he had done. He was indifferent how the Executive should be chosen,
provided he held his place by this tenure.

Mr. BROOME highly approved the motion. It obviated all his difficulties.

Mr. SHERMAN considered such a tenure as by no means safe or admissible.
As the Executive Magistrate is now re-eligible, he will be on good
behavior as far as will be necessary. If he behaves well he will be
continued; if otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election.

Mr. MADISON [*38] If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that
the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each
other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislure, if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a reappointment. Why was it
determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a
tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by
an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual
expositor, as well [39] the maker of the laws. In like manner a
dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the
Executor as well as the maker of laws; & then according to the
observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be
executed in a tyrannical manner. There was an analogy between the
Executive & Judiciary departments in several respects. The latter
executed the laws in certain cases as the former did in others. The
former expounded & applied them for certain purposes, as the latter did
for others. The difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two
circumstances -- 1. [40] the collective interest & security were much
more in the power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary
department. 2. [40] in the administration of the former much greater
latitude is left to opinion and discretion than in the administration of
the latter. But if the 2d. consideration proves that it will be more
difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise for trying the
Execut: than the Judges, & forms an objection to the same tenure of
office, both considerations prove that it might be more dangerous to
suffer a union between the Executive & Legisl: powers, than between the
Judiciary & Legislative powers. He conceived it to be absolutely
necessary to a well constituted Republic that the two first shd. be kept
distinct & independent of each other. Whether the plan proposed by the
motion was a proper one was another question, as it depended on the
practicability of instituting a tribunal for impeachmts. as certain & as
adequate in the one case as in the other. On the other hand, respect for
the mover entitled his proposition to a fair hearing & discussion, until
a less objectionable expedient should be applied for guarding agst. a
dangerous union of the Legislative & Executive departments.

Col. MASON. This motion was made some time ago, & negatived by a very
large majority. He trusted that it wd.. be again negatived. It Wd.. be
impossible to define the misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it
to a proper trial; and perhaps still more impossible to compel so high
an offender holding his office by such a tenure to submit to a trial. He
considered an Executive during good behavior as a softer name only for
an Executive for life. And that the next would be an easy step to
hereditary Monarchy. If the motion should finally succeed, he might
himself live to see such a Revolution. If he did not it was probable his
children or grand children would. He trusted there were few men in that
House who wished for it. No state he was sure had so far revolted from
Republican principles as to have the least bias in its favor.

Mr. MADISON, was not apprehensive of being thought to favor any step
towards monarchy. The real object with him was to prevent its
introduction. Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to
throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the
States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures
omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the
instability & encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or
other would be inevitable. The preservation of Republican Govt.
therefore required some expedient for the purpose, but required
evidently at the same time that in devising it, the genuine principles
of that form should be kept in view.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was as little a friend to monarchy as any gentleman. He
concurred in the opinion that the way to keep out monarchical Govt. was
to establish such a Repub. Govt. as Wd.. make the people happy and
prevent a desire of change.

Docr. Mc. CLURG was not so much afraid of the shadow of monarchy as to
be unwilling to approach it; nor so wedded to Republican Govt. as not to
be sensible of the tyrannies that had been & may be exercised under that
form. It was an essential object with him to make the Executive
independent of the Legislature; and the only mode left for effecting it,
after the vote destroying his ineligibility a second time, was to
appoint him during good behavior.

On the question for inserting "during good behavior" in place of 7 years
[with a re-eligibility] it passed in the negative.

Mas. no. Ct. no. N.J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.C. no. S.C.
no. Geo. no. [*42, 41]

On the motion for inserting "to strike out seven years" it passed in the
negative.

Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. AY. S.
C. no. Geo. no. [*42, 46]

It was now unanimously agreed that the vote which had struck out the
words "to be ineligible a second time" should be reconsidered to-morrow.

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "its" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "of" is crossed out in the transcript and "to" is written
above it.

3. The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word and figure "line 4" are crossed out in the transcript.

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, aye -- 2;
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

7. The words "the sixth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resolution 6."

8. The word "severally" is substituted in the transcript for "separately."

9. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye -- 6; Connecticut,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye
-- 8; South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 2."

12. The word "clause" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. The phrase "was then taken up" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The word "will" is substituted in the transcript for "can."

15. The word "be" is omitted in the transcript.

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, North
Carolina, aye -- 3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

18. In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: "The ninth
Resolution being taken up, the first clause, 'That a National Executive
be instituted, to consist of a single person,' was agreed to, nem. con."

19. The words "The next clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

20. The words "being considered" are here inserted in the transcript.

21. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. The figure "1" is changed to "The first is" in the transcript.

23. The word "at" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

24. The transcript does not italicize the word "majority."

25. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

26. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

27. In the transcript the word "on" is crossed out and "of" is written
above it.

28. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

29. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

30. The word "which" is crossed out and "it" is written above it in the
transcript.

31. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye -- 1;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9."

32. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, Maryland, aye -- 2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

33. The word "Mr." is here inserted in the transcript.

34. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Georgia, aye -- 6; Delaware, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 4."

35. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

36. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

*37. The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the
argument against the re-eligibility of the Executive Magistrate, by
holding out a tenure during good behaviour as the alternative for
keeping him independent of the Legislature.

*38. The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the
animadversions likely to fall on the motion of Dr. McClurg, for whom
J.M. had a particular regard. The Doctr. though possessing talents of
the highest order, was modest & unaccustomed to exert them in public
debate.

39. The word "as" is here inserted in the transcript.

40. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

41. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6 [*42]"

*42. Transfer the above notes hither. [43]

[ [*42] This vote is not [44] be considered as any certain index of
opinion, as a number in the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view
to alarm those attached to a dependence of the Executive on the
Legislature, & thereby facilitate some final arrangement of a contrary
tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive, "during good behaviour"
were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they would finally
[45] have adhered to such a tenure. An independence of the three great
departments of each other, as far as possible, and the responsibility of
all to the will of the community seemed to be generally admitted as the
true basis of a well constructed government.]

43. Madison's direction concerning the footnotes is omitted in the
transcript.

44. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

45. The word "finally" is omitted in the transcript.

[ [*42] There was no debate on this motion the apparent object of many
in the affirmative was to secure the re-eligibility by shortening the
term and of many in the negative to embarrass the plan of referring the
appointment & dependence of the Executive to the Legislature.]

46. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, North Carolina, aye--4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no--6. [*42] "

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  JULY 18.   IN CONVENTION

On motion of Mr. L. Martin to fix tomorrow for reconsidering the vote
concerning "eligibility of Exective. [1] a 2d. time" it passed in the
affirmative.

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. absent. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. absent. [2]

The residue of Resol. 9 [3] concerning the Executive was postpd. till
tomorrow.

Resol. 10. [4] that Executive shl. have a right to negative legislative
acts not afterwards passed by 2/3 of each branch. [5] Agreed to nem.
con.

Resol. 11 [6] "that a Natl. Judiciary [7] be estabd. to consist of one
supreme tribunal." agd. to nem. con. [8] "The Judges of which to be
appointd. by the 2d. branch of the Natl. Legislature."

Mr. GHORUM, Wd. prefer an appointment by the 2d. branch to an appointmt.
by the whole Legislature; but he thought even that branch too numerous,
and too little personally responsible, to ensure a good choice. He
suggested that the Judges be appointed by the Execuve. with the advice &
consent of the 2d. branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution of
Masts. This mode had been long practised in that country, & was found to
answer perfectly well.

Mr. WILSON, still wd. [9] prefer an appointmt. by the Executive; but if
that could not be attained, wd. prefer in the next place, the mode
suggested by Mr. Ghorum. He thought it his duty however to move in the
first instance "that the Judges be appointed by the Executive." Mr.
GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion.

Mr. L. MARTIN was strenuous for an appt. by the 2d. branch. Being taken
from all the States it wd. be best informed of characters & most capable
of making a fit choice.

Mr. SHERMAN concurred in the observations of Mr. Martin, adding that the
Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to be attended
to by the 2d. branch, than by the Executive.

Mr. MASON. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in some degree
on the mode of trying impeachments of the Executive. If the Judges were
to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be
appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable objections besides
agst. referring the appointment to the Executive. He mentioned as one,
that as the Seat of Govt. must be in some one State, and [10] the
Executive would remain in office for a considerable time, for 4, 5, or 6
years at least, he would insensibly form local & personal attachments
within the particular State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere, of
an equal chance of promotion.

Mr. GHORUM. As the Executive will be responsible in point of character
at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will
be careful to look through all the States for proper characters. The
Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the seat of
Govt. where they reside, as the Executive. If they can not get the man
of the particular State to which they may respectively belong, they will
be indifferent to the rest. Public bodies feel no personal
responsibility, and give full play to intrigue & cabal. Rh. Island is a
full illustration of the insensibility to character, produced by a
participation of numbers, in dishonorable measures, and of the length to
which a public body may carry wickedness & cabal.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS supposed it would be improper for an impeachmt. of the
Executive to be tried before the Judges. The latter would in such case
be drawn into intrigues with the Legislature and an impartial trial
would be frustrated. As they wd. be much about the Seat of Govt. they
might even be previously consulted & arrangements might be made for a
prosecution of the Executive. He thought therefore that no argument
could be drawn from the probability of such a plan of impeachments agst.
the motion before the House.

Mr. MADISON, suggested that the Judges might be appointed by the
Executive with the concurrence of 1/3 at least, of the 2d. branch. This
would unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive with the
security afforded in the 2d. branch agst. any incautious or corrupt
nomination by the Executive.

Mr. SHERMAN, was clearly for an election by the Senate. It would be
composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of course have
on the whole more wisdom. They would bring into their deliberations a
more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for
candidates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magistrate.
For these reasons he thought there would be a better security for a
proper choice in the Senate than in the Executive.

Mr. RANDOLPH. It is true that when the appt. of the Judges was vested in
the 2d. branch an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had
rather leave the appointmt. there than give it to the Executive. He
thought the advantage of personal responsibility might be gained in the
Senate by requiring the respective votes of the members to be entered on
the Journal. He thought too that the hope of receiving appts. would be
more diffusive if they depended on the Senate, the members of which wd.
be diffusively known, than if they depended on a single man who could
not be personally known to a very great extent; and consequently that
opposition to the System, would be so far weakened.

Mr. BEDFORD thought there were solid reasons agst. leaving the
appointment to the Executive. He must trust more to information than the
Senate. It would put it in his power to gain over the larger States, by
gratifying them with a preference of their Citizens. The responsibility
of the Executive so much talked of was chimerical. He could not be
punished for mistakes.

Mr. GHORUM remarked that the Senate could have no better information
than the Executive. They must like him, trust to information from the
members belonging to the particular State where the Candidates resided.
The Executive would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment,
as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone. He did not mean
that he would be answerable under any other penalty than that of public
censure, which with honorable minds was a sufficient one.

On the question for referring the appointment of the Judges to the
Executive, instead of the 2d. branch

Mas. ay. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
-- Geo. absent. [11]

Mr. GHORUM moved "that the Judges be nominated and appointed by the
Executive by & with the advice & consent of the 2d. branch & every such
nomination shall be made at least days prior to such appointment." This
mode he said had been ratified by the experience of 140 years in
Massachussts. If the appt. should be left to either branch of the
Legislature, it will be a mere piece of jobbing.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. & supported the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN thought it less objectionable than an absolute appointment
by the Executive; but disliked it as too much fettering the Senate.

[12] Question on Mr. Ghorum's motion

Mas. ay. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. absent. [13]

Mr. MADISON moved that the Judges should be nominated by the Executive,
& such nomination should become an appointment if not disagreed to
within days by 2/3 of the 2d. branch Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion.
By common consent the consideration of it was postponed till tomorrow.

"To hold their offices during good behavior" & "to receive fixed
salaries" agreed to nem: con:

"In which [salaries of Judges] no increase or diminution shall be made
so as to affect the persons at the time in office." [14]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "or increase." He thought the
Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circumstances
might require, and that this would not create any improper dependence in
the Judges.

DOCr. FRANKLIN was in favor of the motion. Money may not only become
plentier, but the business of the department may increase as the Country
becomes more populous.

Mr. MADISON. The dependence will be less if the increase alone should be
permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a dependence
Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in
the legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be felt towards
the latter. If at such a crisis there should be in Court suits, to which
leading members of the Legislature may be parties, the Judges will be in
a situation which ought not to [15] suffered, if it can be prevented.
The variations in the value of money, may be guarded agst. by taking for
a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent value. The increase of
business will be provided for by an increase of the number who are to do
it. An increase of salaries may be easily so contrived as not to affect
persons in office.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The value of money may not only alter but the State of
Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of wheat, the same
value would not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must
always be regulated by the manners & the style of living in a Country.
The increase of business can not, be provided for in the supreme
tribunal in the way that has been mentioned. All the business of a
certain description whether more or less must be done in that single
tribunal. Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for
additional business. Additional compensation therefore ought not to be
prohibited.

On the question for striking out "or increase"

Mas. ay. Cont. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. absent. [16]

The whole clause as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

12. Resol: [17] "that [18] Natl. Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior tribunals" [19]

Mr. BUTLER could see no necessity for such tribunals. The State
Tribunals might do the business.

Mr. L. MARTIN concurred. They will create jealousies & oppositions in
the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.

Mr. GHORUM. There are in the States already federal Courts with
jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c. committed on the Seas. No
complaints have been made by the States or the Courts of the States.
Inferior tribunals are essential to render the authority of the Natl.
Legislature effectual

Mr. RANDOLPH observed that the Courts of the States can not be trusted
with the administration of the National laws. The objects of
jurisdiction are such as will often place the General & local policy at
variance.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS urged also the necessity of such a provision

Mr. SHERMAN was willing to give the power to the Legislature but wished
them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be done, with
safety to the general interest.

Col. MASON thought many circumstances might arise not now to be
foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.

On [20] question for agreeing to 12. Resol: [21] empowering the National
Legislature to appoint "inferior tribunals." [22] Agd. to nem. con.

[23] 13. Resol: "Impeachments of national officers" were struck out" on
motion for the purpose. "The jurisdiction of Natl. Judiciary." Several
criticisms having been made on the definition; it was proposed by Mr.
Madison so to alter [24] as to read thus -- "that the jurisdiction shall
extend to all cases arising under the Natl. laws: And to such other
questions as may involve the Natl. peace & harmony," which was agreed to
nem. con.

Resol. 14. [25] providing for the admission of new States [26] Agreed to
nem. con.

Resol. 15. [27] that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congs. &c. & for the completion of their engagements. [28]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought the assumption of their engagements might as
well be omitted; and that Congs. ought not to be continued till all the
States should adopt the reform; since it may become expedient to give
effect to it whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it.

Mr. MADISON the clause can mean nothing more than that provision ought
to be made for preventing an interregnum; which must exist in the
interval between the adoption of the New Govt. and the commencement of
its operation, if the old Govt. should cease on the first of these
events.

Mr. WILSON did not entirely approve of the manner in which the clause
relating to the engagements of Congs. was expressed; but he thought some
provision on the subject would be proper in order to prevent any
suspicion that the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved
along with the Governt. under which they were contracted.

On the question on the 1st. part -- relating to [29] continuance of
Congs."

Mas. no. Cont. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.C. ay. S. C. [*30]
ay. Geo. no. [31]

The 2d. part as to [29] completion of their engagements, [32] disagd.
to. nem. con.

Resol. 16. [33] "That a Republican Constitution & its. existing laws
ought to be guarantied to each State by the U. States." [34]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS -- thought the Resol: very objectionable. He should be
very unwilling that such laws as exist in R. Island should be
guaranteid.

Mr. WILSON. The object is merely to secure the States agst. dangerous
commotions, insurrections and rebellions.

Col. MASON. If the Genl. Govt. should have no right to suppress
rebellions agst. particular States, it will be in a bad situation
indeed. As Rebellions agst. itself originate in & agst. individual
States, it must remain a passive Spectator of its own subversion.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The Resoln. has 2. objects. 1. [35] to secure Republican
Government. 2. [35] to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the
necessity of both these provisions.

Mr MADISON moved to substitute "that the Constitutional authority of the
States shall be guarantied to them respectively agst. domestic as well
as foreign violence."

DOCr. Mc.CLURG seconded the motion.

Mr. HOUSTON was afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the
States. That of Georgia was a very bad one, and he hoped would be
revised & amended. It may also be difficult for the Genl. Govt. to
decide between contending parties each of which claim the sanction of
the Constitution.

Mr. L. MARTIN was for leaving the States to suppress Rebellions
themselves.

Mr. GHORUM thought it strange that a Rebellion should be known to exist
in the Empire, and the Genl. Govt. shd. be restrained from interposing
to subdue it. At this rate an enterprising Citizen might erect the
standard of Monarchy in a particular State, might gather together
partizans from all quarters, might extend his views from State to State,
and threaten to establish a tyranny over the whole & the Genl. Govt. be
compelled to remain an inactive witness of its own destruction. With
regard to different parties in a State; as long as they confine their
disputes to words, they will be harmless to the Genl. Govt. & to each
other. If they appeal to the sword, it will then be necessary for the
Genl. Govt., however difficult it may be to decide on the merits of
their contest, to interpose & put an end to it.

Mr. CARROL. Some such provision is essential. Every State ought to wish
for it. It has been doubted whether it is a casus federis at present.
And no room ought to be left for such a doubt hereafter.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to add as [36] amendt. to the motion; "and that no
State be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Govt.

Mr. MADISON seconded the motion

Mr. RUTLIDGE thought it unnecessary to insert any guarantee. No doubt
could be entertained but that Congs. had the authority if they had the
means to co-operate with any State in subduing a rebellion. It was &
would be involved in the nature of the thing.

Mr. WILSON moved as a better expression of the idea, "that a Republican
form of Governmt. shall be guarantied to each State & that each State
shall be protected agst. foreign & domestic violence.

This seeming to be well received, Mr. MADISON & Mr. RANDOLPH withdrew
their propositions & on the Question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's
motion, it passed nem. con.

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "eligibility of Executive" are changed to "the ineligibility
of the Executive" in the transcript.

2. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye -- 8; New Jersey, Georgia, absent."

3. The words "the ninth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol. 9."

4. The words "The tenth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol. 10."

5. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The words "The Eleventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol. 11."

7. The word "shall" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The words "On the clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

9. The words "still wd." are transposed to read "would still" in the
transcript.

10. The word "as" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, aye
-- 2; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, no -- 6; Georgia, absent."

12. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 4; Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina,
South Carolina, no -- 4; Georgia, absent."

14. The phrase "actually in office at the time" is substituted in the
transcript for "at the time in office."

15. The word "be" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye -- 6; Virginia,
North Carolina, no -- 2; Georgia, absent."

17. The words "The twelfth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "12, Resol."

18. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. The words "being taken up" are here inserted in the transcript.

20. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

21. The words "the twelfth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "12. Resol."

22. The words "it was" are here inserted in the transcript.

23. This paragraph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: "The
clause of 'Impeachments of national officers,' was struck out, on motion
for the purpose. The thirteenth Resolution, 'The jurisdiction of the
National Judiciary, &c.' being then taken up, several ..."

24. The word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.

25. The words "The fourteenth Resolution" are substituted in transcript
for "Resol. 14."

26. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

27. The words "The fifteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resol. 15."

28. The words "being considered" are here inserted in the transcript.

29. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

*30. In the printed Journal, S. Carolina no.

31. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, [30] aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no -- 6."

32. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

33. The words "The sixteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resol. 16."

34. The words "being considered" are here added in the transcript.

35. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

36. The word "an" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY.  JULY 19.   IN CONVENTION

On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible a 2d.
time, Mr. MARTIN moved to reinstate the words, "to be ineligible a 2d.
time."

Mr. GOVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into one view all that
relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of
which must depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present
and future States. It has been a maxim in Political Science that
Republican Government is not adapted to a large extent of Country,
because the energy of the Executive Magistracy can not reach the extreme
parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one. We must either then
renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with
sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so
much importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it.
One great object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The
Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves;
and will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or
convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive
Magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower
classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who
in the course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative body.
Wealth tends to corrupt the mind & [1] to nourish its love of power, and
to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of
the opulent. The check provided in the 2d. branch was not meant as a
check on Legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful
powers, on the propensity in [2] the 1st. branch to legislate too much
to run into projects of paper money & similar expedients. It is no check
on Legislative tyranny. On the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1st.
branch can be seduced may find the means of success. The Executive
therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the
Mass of the people. -- It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the
officers & to command the forces of the Republic: to appoint 1. [3]
ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs. 2. [3]
officers for the dispensation of Justice. Who will be the best Judges
whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who will
know, will see, will feel the effects of them. Again who can judge so
well of the discharge of military duties for the protection & security
of the people, as the people themselves who are to be protected &
secured? -- He finds too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible.
What effect will this have?

1. [4] it will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem by
taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. It may give
a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the human breast.
The love of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions.
Shut the Civil road to Glory & he may be compelled to seek it by the
sword.

2. [5] It will tempt him to make the most of the short space of time
allotted him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends.

3. [6] It will produce violations of the very constitution it is meant
to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and
established character of a favorite Magistrate will prevail over respect
for the forms of the Constitution. The Executive is also to be
impeachable. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It will hold him in
such dependence that he will be no check on the Legislature, will not be
a firm guardian of the people and of the public interest. He will be the
tool of a faction, of some leading demagogue in the Legislature. These
then are the faults of the Executive establishment as now proposed. Can
no better establishmt. be devised? If he is to be the Guardian of the
people let him be appointed by the people? If he is to be a check on the
Legislature let him not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration,
that he may with propriety be re-eligible. It has been said that the
candidates for this office will not be known to the people. If they be
known to the Legislature, they must have such a notoriety and eminence
of Character, that they can not possibly be unknown to the people at
large. It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently
distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his
character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. As to the danger
from an unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it as formidable.
There must be certain great officers of State; a minister of finance, of
war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes will exercise their
functions in subordination to the Executive, and will be amenable by
impeachment to the public Justice. Without these ministers the Executive
can do nothing of consequence. He suggested a biennial election of the
Executive at the time of electing the 1st. branch, and the Executive to
hold over, so as to prevent any interregnum in the administration. An
election by the people at large throughout so great an extent of country
could not be influenced, by those little combinations and those
momentary lies which often decide popular elections within a narrow
sphere. It will probably, be objected that the election will be
influenced by the members of the Legislature; particularly of the 1st.
branch, and that it will be nearly the same thing with an election by
the Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such an influence
would exist. But it might be answered that as the Legislature or the
candidates for it would be divided, the enmity of one part would
counteract the friendship of another: that if the administration of the
Executive were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his reelection, if
bad it ought to be opposed & a reappointmt. prevented; and lastly that
in every view this indirect dependence on the favor of the Legislature
could not be so mischievous as a direct dependence for his appointment.
He saw no alternative for making the Executive independent of the
Legislature but either to give him his office for life, or make him
eligible by the people -- Again, it might be objected that two years
would be too short a duration. But he believes that as long as he should
behave himself well, he would be continued in his place. The extent of
the Country would secure his re-election agst. the factions &
discontents of particular States. It deserved consideration also that
such an ingredient in the plan would render it extremely palatable to
the people. These were the general ideas which occurred to him on the
subject, and which led him to wish & move that the whole constitution of
the Executive might undergo reconsideration.

Mr. RANDOLPH urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin for restoring the words
making the Executive ineligible a 2d. time. If he ought to be
independent, he should not be left under a temptation to court a
re-appointment. If he should be re-appointable by the Legislature, he
will be no check on it. His revisionary power will be of no avail. He
had always thought & contended as he still did that the danger
apprehended by the little States was chimerical; but those who thought
otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious for the motion. If the
Executive be appointed, as has been determined, by the Legislature, he
will probably be appointed either by joint ballot of both houses, or be
nominated by the 1st. and appointed by the 2d. branch. In either case
the large States will preponderate. If he is to court the same influence
for his re-appointment, will he not make his revisionary power, and all
the other functions of his administration subservient to the views of
the large States. Besides, is there not great reason to apprehend that
in case he should be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the
Legislature might lead them to continue an unfit man in office in
preference to a fit one. It has been said that a constitutional bar to
reappointment will inspire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate
himself. It may be answered that his endeavours can have no effect
unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render all
precautions hopeless: to which may be added that this argument supposes
him to be more powerful & dangerous, than other arguments which have
been used, admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on his
authority. He thought an election by the Legislature with an incapacity
to be elected a second time would be more acceptable to the people that
[7] the plan suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Mr. KING. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there was great
force in the remark [8] of Mr. Sherman, that he who has proved himself
to be [9] most fit for an Office, ought not to be excluded by the
constitution from holding it. He would therefore prefer any other
reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was much disposed to think
that in such cases the people at large would chuse wisely. There was
indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of a general
concurrence of the people in favor of any one man. On the whole he was
of opinion that an appointment by electors chosen by the people for the
purpose, would be liable to fewest objections.

Mr. PATTERSON's ideas nearly coincided he said with those of Mr. King.
He proposed that the Executive should be appointed by Electors to be
chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector to the
smallest and three to the largest States. Mr. WILSON. It seems to be the
unanimous sense that the Executive should not be appointed by the
Legislature, unless he be rendered in-eligible a 2d. time: he perceived
with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately
or immediately by the people.

Mr. MADISON. If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should be separately
exercised, it is equally so that they be independently exercised. There
is the same & perhaps greater reason why the Executive shd. be
independent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should: A
coalition of the two former powers would be more immediately & certainly
dangerous to public liberty. It is essential then that the appointment
of the Executive should either be drawn from some source, or held by
some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the
Legislature. This could not be if he was to be appointable from time to
time by the Legislature. It was not clear that an appointment in the
1st. instance even with an eligibility afterwards would not establish an
improper connection between the two departments. Certain it was that the
appointment would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought
not to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed for these reasons to
refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large was in
his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any that
could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished
Character. The people generally could only know & vote for some Citizen
whose merits had rendered him an object of general attention & esteem.
There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an
immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could
have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes. The
substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the
whole to be liable to fewest objections.

Mr. GERRY. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature he
certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make him absolutely
dependent. He was agst. a popular election. The people are uninformed,
and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of
an appointment of the Executive by Electors to be chosen by the State
Executives. The people of the States will then choose the 1st. branch:
The legislatures of the States the 2d. branch of the National
Legislature, and the Executives of the States, the National Executive.
This he thought would form a strong attachnt. in the States to the
National System. The popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would
certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so elected & should do
his duty, he will be turned out for it like Govr. Bowdoin in Massts. &
President Sullivan in N. Hamshire.

On the question on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider generally the
constitution of the Executive. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay & all the
others ay. [10]

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to strike out the appointmt. by the Natl.
Legislature, and [11] insert "to be chosen by electors appointed, by the
Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; towit -- one for each
State not exceeding 200,000 inhabts. two for each above yt. number & not
exceeding 300,000. and three for each State exceeding 300,000.

Mr. BROOME 2ded. the motion

Mr. RUTLIDGE was opposed to all the modes except the appointmt. by the
Natl. Legislature. He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not
re-eligible.

Mr. GERRY preferred the motion of Mr. Elseworth to an appointmt. by the
Natl. Legislature, or by the people; tho' not to an appt. by the State
Executives. He moved that the electors proposed by Mr. E. should be 25
in number, and allotted in the following proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas.
3. to R. I. 1. to Cont. 2. to N. Y. 2. [12] N. J. 2. [12] Pa. 3. [12]
Del. 1. [12] Md. 2. [12] Va. 3. [12] N. C. 2. [12] S. C. 2. [12] Geo. 1.

The question as moved by Mr. Elseworth being divided, on the 1st. part
shall ye. Natl. Executive be appointed by Electors? Mas. divd. Cont. ay.
N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[13]

On [14] 2d. part shall the Electors be chosen by [14] State
Legislatures? Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [15]

The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd. chuse electors
was postponed nem. con.

Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the Executive be ineligible a 2d. time.

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ds. the motion. He had no great confidence in the
Electors to be chosen for the special purpose. They would not be the
most respectable citizens; but persons not occupied in the high offices
of Govt. They would be liable to undue influence, which might the more
readily be practised as some of them will probably be in appointment 6
or 8 months before the object of it comes on.

Mr. ELSEWORTH supposed any persons might be appointed Electors,
excepting [16] solely, members of the Natl. Legislature.

On the question shall he be ineligible a 2d. time? Mas. no. Ct. no. N.
J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[17]

On the question Shall the Executive continue for 7 years? It passed in
the negative Mas. divd. Cont. ay. [*18] N. J. no. [*18] Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. KING was afraid we shd. shorten the term too much.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was for a short term, in order to avoid impeachts.
which wd.. be otherwise necessary.

Mr. BUTLER was agst. a [20] frequency of the elections. Geo. & S. C.
were too distant to send electors often.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was for 6. years. If the elections be too frequent, the
Executive will not be firm eno'. There must be duties which will make
him unpopular for the moment. There will be outs as well as ins. His
administration therefore will be attacked and misrepresented.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for 6 years. The expence will be considerable & ought
not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the Elections are too frequent, the
best men will not undertake the service and those of an inferior
character will be liable to be corrupted.

On [21] question for 6 years? Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del.
no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [22] 

Adjourned

___________

1. The word "and" is crossed out in the transcript.

2. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

3. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

4. The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.

5. The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.

6. The figure "3" is changed to "In the third place" in the transcript.

7. The word "that" is changed to "than" in the transcript.

8. The word "remark" is used in the plural in the transcript.

9. The words "to be" are omitted in the transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, and all the others, aye."

11. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 6; North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 3; Massachusetts, divided."

14. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 2."

16. The word "except" is substituted in the transcript for "excepting."

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, South Carolina,
aye -- 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 8."

*18. In the printed Journal Cont., no: N. Jersey ay

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, [18] South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; New Jersey, [18] Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, no -- 5; Massachusetts, North Carolina, divided."

20. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a."

21. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Delaware, no."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  JULY 20.   IN CONVENTION

The postponed [1] Ratio of Electors for appointing the Executive; to wit
1 for each State whose inhabitants do not exceed 100,000, [2] &c. being
taken up.

Mr. MADISON observed that this would make in time all or nearly all the
States equal. Since there were few that would not in time contain the
number of inhabitants intitling them to 3 Electors: that this ratio
ought either to be made temporary, or so varied as that it would adjust
itself to the growing population of the States.

Mr. GERRY moved that in the 1st. instance the Electors should be
allotted to the States in the following ratio: to N. H. 1. Mas. 3. R. I.
1. Cont. 2. N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C. 2. S.
C. 2. Geo. 1.

On the question to postpone in order to take up this motion of Mr.
Gerry. It passed in the affirmative. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa.
ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [3]

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved that 2 Electors be allotted to N. H. Some rule ought
to be pursued; and N. H. has more than 100,000 inhabitants. He thought
it would be proper also to allot 2. to Georgia

Mr. BROOM & Mr. MARTIN moved to postpone Mr. Gerry's allotment of
Electors, leaving a fit ratio to be reported by the Committee to be
appointed for detailing the Resolutions.

On this motion. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [4]

Mr. HOUSTON 2ded. the motion of Mr. Elseworth to add another Elector to
N. H. & Georgia. On the Question: Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved as an amendment to Mr. Gerry's allotment of
Electors in the 1st. instance that in future elections of the Natl.
Executive, the number of Electors to be appointed by the several States
shall be regulated by their respective numbers of Representatives in the
1st. branch pursuing as nearly as may be the present proportions.

On question on Mr. Gerry's ratio of Electors Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no.
Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [6, 7] "to
be removeable on impeachment and conviction for mal practice or neglect
of duty." see Resol: 9. [8]

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. Govr. MORRIS moved to strike out this part of the
Resolution. Mr. P. observd. he ought not to be impeachable whilst in
office

Mr. DAVIE. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no
efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He considered this
as an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.

Mr. WILSON concurred in the necessity of making the Executive
impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. He can do no criminal act without Coadjutors who may
be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be [9]
sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides who is to impeach? Is the
impeachment to suspend his functions. If it is not the mischief will go
on. If it is the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a
displacement, and will render the Executive dependent on those who are
to impeach

Col. MASON. No point is of more importance than that the right of
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above Justice? Above
all shall that man be above it, who can commit the most extensive
injustice? When great crimes were committed he was for punishing the
principal as well as the Coadjutors. There had been much debate &
difficulty as to the mode of chusing the Executive. He approved of that
which had been adopted at first, namely of referring the appointment to
the Natl. Legislature. One objection agst. Electors was the danger of
their being corrupted by the Candidates; & this furnished a peculiar
reason in favor of impeachments whilst in office. Shall the man who has
practised corruption & by that means procured his appointment in the
first instance, be suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his
guilt?

DOCr. FRANKLIN was for retaining the clause as favorable to the
Executive. History furnishes one example only of a first Magistrate
being formally brought to public Justice. Every body cried out agst.
this as unconstitutional. What was the practice before this in cases
where the chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was
had to assassination in wch. he was not only deprived of his life but of
the opportunity of vindicating his character. It wd.. be the best way
therefore to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of
the Executive where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his
honorable acquittal when [10] he should be unjustly accused.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS admits corruption & some few other offences to be such
as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated
& defined:

Mr. MADISON thought it indispensable that some provision should be made
for defending the Community agst. the incapacity, negligence or perfidy
of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service,
was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of
peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers.
The case of the Executive Magistracy was very distinguishable, from that
of the Legislature or of any other public body, holding offices of
limited duration. It could not be presumed that all or even a majority
of the members of an Assembly would either lose their capacity for
discharging, or be bribed to betray, their trust. Besides the restraints
of their personal integrity & honor, the difficulty of acting in concert
for purposes of corruption was a security to the public. And if one or a
few members only should be seduced, the soundness of the remaining
members, would maintain the integrity and fidelity of the body. In the
case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a
single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass
of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic.

Mr. PINKNEY did not see the necessity of impeachments. He was sure they
ought not to issue from the Legislature who would in that case hold them
as a rod over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his
independence. His revisionary power in particular would be rendered
altogether insignificant.

Mr. GERRY urged the necessity of impeachments. A good magistrate will
not fear them. A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. He hoped the
maxim would never be adopted here that the chief magistrate could do no
wrong.

Mr. KING expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor of
liberty might enervate the Government we were forming. He wished the
House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three great departments
of Govts. should be separate & independent: that the Executive &
Judiciary should be so as well as the Legislative: that the Executive
should be so equally with the Judiciary. Would this be the case, if the
Executive should be impeachable? It had been said that the Judiciary
would be impeachable. But it should have been remembered at the same
time that the Judiciary hold their places not for a limited time, but
during good behaviour. It is necessary therefore that a forum should be
established for trying misbehaviour. Was the Executive to hold his place
during good behaviour? The Executive was to hold his place for a limited
term like the members of the Legislature: Like them particularly the
Senate whose members would continue in appointmt the same term of 6
years he would periodically be tried for his behaviour by his electors,
who would continue or discontinue him in trust according to the manner
in which he had discharged it. Like them therefore, he ought to be
subject to no intermediate trial, by impeachment. He ought not to be
impeachable unless he held his office during good behaviour, a tenure
which would be most agreeable to him; provided an independent and
effectual forum could be devised. But under no circumstances ought he to
be impeachable by the Legislature. This would be destructive of his
independence and of the principles of the Constitution. He relied on the
vigor of the Executive as a great security for the public liberties.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle
with him. Guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The Executive will
have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of
war when the military force, and in some respects the public money will
be in his hands. Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be
irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrections. He is aware of the
necessity of proceeding with a cautious hand, and of excluding as much
as possible the influence of the Legislature from the business. He
suggested for consideration an idea which had fallen [from Col Hamilton]
of composing a forum out of the Judges belonging to the States: and even
of requiring some preliminary inquest whether just grounds [11] of
impeachment existed.

DOCtr. FRANKLIN mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange during the
late war. An agreement was made between France & Holland; by which their
two fleets were to unite at a certain time & place. The Dutch fleet did
not appear. Every body began to wonder at it. At length it was suspected
that the Statholder was at the bottom of the matter. This suspicion
prevailed more & more. Yet as he could not be impeached and no regular
examination took place, he remained in his office, and strengthening his
own party, as the party opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth
to the most violent animosities & contentions. Had he been impeachable,
a regular & peaceable enquiry would have taken place and he would if
guilty have been duly punished, if innocent restored to the confidence
of the public.

Mr. KING remarked that the case of the Statholder was not applicable. He
held his place for life, and was not periodically elected. In the former
case impeachments are proper to secure good behaviour. In the latter
they are unnecessary; the periodical responsibility to the electors
being an equivalent security.

Mr. WILSON observed that if the idea were to be pursued, the Senators
who are to hold their places during the same term with the Executive,
ought to be subject to impeachment & removal.

Mr. PINKNEY apprehended that some gentlemen reasoned on a supposition
that the Executive was to have powers which would not be committed to
him: He presumed that his powers would be so circumscribed as to render
impeachments unnecessary.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS's opinion had been changed by the arguments used in the
discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the
Executive was to continue for any [12] time in office. Our Executive was
not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having
an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater
interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to
expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in forign
pay, without being able to guard agst. it by displacing him. One would
think the King of England well secured agst. bribery. He has as it were
a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis
XIV. The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery;
Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other causes of
impeachment. For the latter he should be punished not as a man, but as
an officer, and punished only by degradation from his office. This
Magistrate is not the King but the prime-Minister. The people are the
King. When we make him amenable to Justice however we should take care
to provide some mode that will not make him dependent on the
Legislature.

It was moved & 2ded. to postpone the question of impeachments which was
negatived. Mas. & S. Carolina only being ay. On ye. Question, Shall the
Executive be removeable on impeachments &c.? Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay.
Pa. ay. Del ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [13]

" [14] Executive to receive fixed compensation." Agreed to nem. con. "to
be paid out of the National Treasury" agreed to, N. Jersey only in the
negative.

Mr. GERRY & [15] GOVr. MORRIS moved "that the Electors of the Executive
shall not be members of the Natl. Legislature, nor officers of the U.
States, nor shall the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme
magistracy." Agreed to nem. con.

DOCr. Mc.CLURG asked whether it would not be necessary, before a
Committee for detailing the Constitution should be appointed, to
determine on the means by which the Executive is to carry the laws into
effect, and to resist combinations agst. them. Is he to have a military
force for the purpose, or to have the command of the Militia, the only
existing force that can be applied to that use? As the Resolutions now
stand the Committee will have no determinate directions on this great
point.

Mr. WILSON thought that some additional directions to the Committee wd..
be necessary.

Mr. KING. The Committee are to provide for the end. Their discretionary
power to provide for the means is involved according to an established
axiom.

Adjourned

___________

1. The word "proposed" is substituted in the transcript for "postponed."

2. In the figure "100,000" the "1" is crossed out and a figure "2" is
written above it in the transcript

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 4."

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 7."

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 6; New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no -- 4."

7. The words "On the clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

8. The words "the ninth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript
for "Resol: 9."

9. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The word "where" is substituted in the transcript for "when."

11. The transcript uses the word "grounds" in the singular.

12. The words "length of" are here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Massachusetts, South Carolina, No -- 2."

14. The word "The" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The word "Mr." is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  JULY 21   IN CONVENTION

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved that the Electors of the Executive should be paid
out of the National Treasury for the Service to be performed by them."
Justice required this: as it was a national service they were to render.
The motion was agreed to Nem. Con.

Mr. WILSON moved as an amendment to Resoln. 10. [1] that the supreme
Natl. Judiciary should be associated with the Executive in the
Revisionary power." This proposition had been before made and failed:
but he was so confirmed by reflection in the opinion of its utility,
that he thought it incumbent on him to make another effort: The
Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating agst. projected
encroachments on the people as well as on themselves. It had been said
that the Judges, as expositors of the Laws would have an opportunity of
defending their constitutional rights. There was weight in this
observation; but this power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and
yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing
to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power, and
they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these [2] characters
of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the
improper views of the Legislature. -- 

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion

Mr. GHORUM did not see the advantage of employing the Judges in this
way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar
knowledge of the mere policy of public measures. Nor can it be necessary
as a security for their constitutional rights. The Judges in England
have no such additional provision for their defence, yet their
jurisdiction is not invaded. He thought it would be best to let the
Executive alone be responsible, and at most to authorize him to call on
[3] Judges for their opinions.

Mr. ELSEWORTH approved heartily of the motion. The aid of the Judges
will give more wisdom & firmness to the Executive. They will possess a
systematic and accurate knowledge of the Laws, which the Executive can
not be expected always to possess. The law of Nations also will
frequently come into question. Of this the Judges alone will have
competent information.

Mr. MADISON considered the object of the motion as of great importance
to the meditated Constitution. It would be useful to the Judiciary
departmt. by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself
agst. Legislative encroachments; It would be useful to the Executive, by
inspiring additional confidence & firmness in exerting the revisionary
power: It would be useful to the Legislature by the valuable assistance
it would give in preserving a consistency, conciseness, perspicuity &
technical propriety in the laws, qualities peculiarly necessary; & yet
shamefully wanting in our republican Codes. It would moreover be useful
to the Community at large as an additional check agst. a pursuit of
those unwise & unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of
our calamities. If any solid objection could be urged agst. the motion,
it must be on the supposition that it tended to give too much strength
either to the Executive or Judiciary. He did not think there was the
least ground for this apprehension. It was much more to be apprehended
that notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments, the
Legislature would still be an overmatch for them. Experience in all the
States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all
power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the
American Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving every
defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with
republican principles.

Mr. MASON said he had always been a friend to this provision. It would
give a confidence to the Executive, which he would not otherwise have,
and without which the Revisionary power would be of little avail.

Mr. GERRY did not expect to see this point which had undergone full
discussion, again revived. The object he conceived of the Revisionary
power was merely to secure the Executive department agst. legislative
encroachment. The Executive therefore who will best know and be ready to
defend his rights ought alone to have the defence of them. The motion
was liable to strong objections. It was combining & mixing together the
Legislative & the other departments. It was establishing an improper
coalition between the Executive & Judiciary departments. It was making
Statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as the guardians of the
Rights of the people. He relied for his part on the Representatives of
the people as the guardians of their Rights & interests. It was making
the Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be
done. A better expedient for correcting the laws, would be to appoint as
had been done in Pena. a person or persons of proper skill, to draw
bills for the Legislature.

Mr. STRONG thought with Mr. Gerry that the power of making ought to be
kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was better
established. The Judges in exercising the function of expositors might
be influenced by the part they had taken, in framing [4] the laws.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Some check being necessary on the Legislature, the
question is in what hands it should be lodged. On one side it was
contended that the Executive alone ought to exercise it. He did not
think that an Executive appointed for 6 years, and impeachable whilst in
office wd. be a very effectual check. On the other side it was urged
that he ought to be reinforced by the Judiciary department. Agst. this
it was objected that Expositors of laws ought to have no hand in making
them, and arguments in favor of this had been drawn from England. What
weight was due to them might be easily determined by an attention to
facts. The truth was that the Judges in England had a great share in ye.
Legislation. They are consulted in difficult & doubtful cases. They may
be & some of them are members of the Legislature. They are or may be
members of the privy Council, and can there advise the Executive as they
will do with us if the motion succeeds. The influence the English Judges
may have in the latter capacity in strengthening the Executive check can
not be ascertained, as the King by his influence in a manner dictates
the laws. There is one difference in the two Cases however which
disconcerts all reasoning from the British to our proposed Constitution.
The British Executive has so great an interest in his prerogatives and
such powerful means of defending them that he will never yield any part
of them. The interest of our Executive is so inconsiderable & so
transitory, and his means of defending it so feeble, that there is the
justest ground to fear his want of firmness in resisting incroachments.
He was extremely apprehensive that the auxiliary firmness & weight of
the Judiciary would not supply the deficiency. He concurred in thinking
the public liberty in greater danger from Legislative usurpations than
from any other source. It had been said that the Legislature ought to be
relied on as the proper Guardians of liberty. The answer was short and
conclusive. Either bad laws will be pushed or not. On the latter
supposition no check will be wanted. On the former a strong check will
be necessary: And this is the proper supposition. Emissions of paper
money, largesses to the people -- a remission of debts and similar
measures, will at some times be popular, and will be pushed for that
reason At other times such measures will coincide with the interests of
the Legislature themselves, & that will be a reason not less cogent for
pushing them. It may be thought that the people will not be deluded and
misled in the latter case. But experience teaches another lesson. The
press is indeed a great means of diminishing the evil, yet it is found
to be unable to prevent it altogether.

Mr. L. MARTIN. Considered the association of the Judges with the
Executive as a dangerous innovation; as well as one which [5] could not
produce the particular advantage expected from it. A knowledge of
Mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a
higher deger degree to the Judges than to the Legislature. And as to the
Constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in
their proper [6] official character. In this character they have a
negative on the laws. Join them with the Executive in the Revision and
they will have a double negative. It is necessary that the Supreme
Judiciary should have the confidence of the people. This will soon be
lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating agst. popular
measures of the Legislature. Besides in what mode & proportion are they
to vote in the Council of Revision?

Mr. MADISON could not discover in the proposed association of the Judges
with the Executive in the Revisionary check on the Legislature any
violation of the maxim which requires the great departments of power to
be kept separate & distinct. On the contrary he thought it an auxiliary
precaution in favor of the maxim If a Constitutional discrimination of
the departments on paper were a sufficient security to each agst.
encroachments of the others, all further provisions would indeed be
superfluous. But experience had taught us a distrust of that security;
and that it is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and
interests, as will guarantee the provisions on paper. Instead therefore
of contenting ourselves with laying down the Theory in the Constitution
that each department ought to be separate & distinct, it was proposed to
add a defensive power to each which should maintain the Theory in
practice. In so doing we did not blend the departments together. We
erected effectual barriers for keeping them separate. The most regular
example of this theory was in the British Constitution. Yet it was not
only the practice there to admit the Judges to a seat in the
legislature, and in the Executive Councils, and to submit to their
previous examination all laws of a certain description, but it was a
part of their Constitution that the Executive might negative any law
whatever; a part of their Constitution which had been universally
regarded as calculated for the preservation of the whole. The objection
agst. a union of the Judiciary & Executive branches in the revision of
the laws, had either no foundation or was not carried far enough. If
such a Union was an improper mixture of powers, or such a Judiciary
check on the laws, was inconsistent with the Theory of a free
Constitution, it was equally so to admit the Executive to any
participation in the making of laws; and the revisionary plan ought to
be discarded altogether.

Col. MASON Observed that the defence of the Executive was not the sole
object of the Revisionary power. He expected even greater advantages
from it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the Constitution of
the Legislature, it would still so much resemble that of the individual
States, that it must be expected frequently to pass unjust and
pernicious laws. This restraining power was therefore essentially
necessary. It would have the effect not only of hindering the final
passage of such laws; but would discourage demagogues from attempting to
get them passed. It had been said [by Mr. L. Martin] that if the Judges
were joined in this check on the laws, they would have a double
negative, since in their expository capacity of Judges they would have
one negative. He would reply that in this capacity they could impede in
one case only, the operation of laws. They could declare an
unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law however unjust
oppressive or pernicious, which [7] did not come plainly under this
description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a
free course. He wished the further use to be made of the Judges, of
giving aid in preventing every improper law. Their aid will be the more
valuable as they are in the habit and practice of considering laws in
their true principles, and in all their consequences.

Mr. WILSON. The separation of the departments does not require that they
should have separate objects but that they should act separately tho' on
the same objects. It is necessary that the two branches of the
Legislature should be separate and distinct, yet they are both to act
precisely on the same object.

Mr. GERRY had rather give the Executive an absolute negative for its own
defence than thus to blend together the Judiciary & Executive
departments. It will bind them together in an offensive and defensive
alliance agst. the Legislature, and render the latter unwilling to enter
into a contest with them.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was surprised that any defensive provision for securing
the effectual separation of the departments should be considered as an
improper mixture of them. Suppose that the three powers, were to be
vested in three persons, by compact among themselves; that one was to
have the power of making, another of executing, and a third of judging,
the laws. Would it not be very natural for the two latter after having
settled the partition on paper, to observe, and would not candor oblige
the former to admit, that as a security agst. legislative acts of the
former which might easily be so framed as to undermine the powers of the
two others, the two others ought to be armed with a veto for their own
defence, or at least to have an opportunity of stating their objections
agst. acts of encroachment? And would any one pretend that such a right
tended to blend & confound powers that ought to be separately exercised?
As well might it be said that If three neighbours had three distinct
farms, a right in each to defend his farm agst. his neighbours, tended
to blend the farms together.

Mr. GHORUM. All agree that a check on the Legislature is necessary. But
there are two objections agst. admitting the Judges to share in it which
no observations on the other side seem to obviate. the 1st. is that the
Judges ought to carry into the exposition of the laws no prepossessions
with regard to them. [8] 2d. that as the Judges will outnumber the
Executive, the revisionary check would be thrown entirely out of the
Executive hands, and instead of enabling him to defend himself, would
enable the Judges to sacrifice him.

Mr. WILSON. The proposition is certainly not liable to all the
objections which have been urged agst. it. According [to Mr. Gerry] it
will unite the Executive & Judiciary in an offensive & defensive
alliance agst. the Legislature. According to Mr. Ghorum it will lead to
a subversion of the Executive by the Judiciary influence. To the first
gentleman the answer was obvious; that the joint weight of the two
departments was necessary to balance the single weight of the
Legislature. To the 1st. objection stated by the other Gentleman it
might be answered that supposing the prepossion to mix itself with the
exposition, the evil would be overbalanced by the advantages promised by
the expedient. To the 2d. objection, that such a rule of voting might be
provided in the detail as would guard agst. it.

Mr. RUTLIDGE thought the Judges of all men the most unfit to be
concerned in the revisionary Council. The Judges ought never to give
their opinion on a law till it comes before them. He thought it equally
unnecessary. The Executive could advise with the officers of State, as
of war, finance &c. and avail himself of their information & opinions.

On [8] Question on Mr. Wilson's motion for joining the Judiciary in the
Revision of laws it passed in the negative -- Mas. no. Cont. ay. N. J.
not present. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo.
divd. [9] Resol. 10, giving the Ex. a qualified veto, without the
amendt. was then agd. to nem. con. [10]

The motion made by Mr. Madison July 18.

[11] & then postponed, 'that the Judges shd. be nominated by the
Executive & such nominations become appointments unless disagreed to by
2/3 of the 2d. branch of the Legislature," was now resumed.

Mr. MADISON stated as his reasons for the motion. 1. [12] that it
secured the responsibility of the Executive who would in general be more
capable & likely to select fit characters than the Legislature, or even
the 2d. b. of it, who might hide their selfish motives under the number
concerned in the appointment. -- 2. [12] that in case of any flagrant
partiality or error, in the nomination it might be fairly presumed that
2/3 of the 2d. branch would join in putting a negative on it. 3. [12]
that as the 2d. b. was very differently constituted when the appointment
of the Judges was formerly referred to it, and was now to be composed of
equal votes from all the States, the principle of compromise which had
prevailed in other instances required in this that their shd. be a
concurrence of two authorities, in one of which the people, in the other
the States, should be represented. The Executive Magistrate wd. be
considered as a national officer, acting for and equally sympathising
with every part of the U. States. If the 2d. branch alone should have
this power, the Judges might be appointed by a minority of the people,
tho' by a majority, of the States, which could not be justified on any
principle as their proceedings were to relate to the people, rather than
to the States: and as it would moreover throw the appointments entirely
into the hands of ye. Northern States, a perpetual ground of jealousy &
discontent would be furnished to the Southern States.

Mr. PINKNEY was for placing the appointmt. in the 2d. b. exclusively.
The Executive will possess neither the requisite knowledge of
characters, nor confidence of the people for so high a trust.

Mr. RANDOLPH wd. have preferred the mode of appointmt. proposed formerly
by Mr. Ghorum, as adopted in the Constitution of Massts. but thought the
motion depending so great an improvement of the clause as it stands,
that he anxiously wished it success. He laid great stress on the
responsibility of the Executive as a security for fit appointments.
Appointments by the Legislatures have generally resulted from cabal,
from personal regard, or some other consideration than a title derived
from the proper qualifications. The same inconveniencies will
proportionally prevail, if the appointments be be referred to either
branch of the Legislature or to any other authority administered by a
number of individuals.

Mr. ELSEWORTH would prefer a negative in the Executive on a nomination
by the 2d. branch, the negative to be overruled by a concurrence of 2/3
of the 2d. b. to the mode proposed by the motion; but preferred an
absolute appointment by the 2d. branch to either. The Executive will be
regarded by the people with a jealous eye. Every power for augmenting
unnecessarily his influence will be disliked. As he will be stationary
it was not to be supposed he could have a better knowledge of
characters. He will be more open to caresses & intrigues than the
Senate. The right to supersede his nomination will be ideal only. A
nomination under such circumstances will be equivalent to an
appointment.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS supported the motion. 1. [13] The States in their
corporate capacity will frequently have an interest staked on the
determination of the Judges. As in the Senate the States are to vote the
Judges ought not to be appointed by the Senate. Next to the impropriety
of being Judge in one's own cause, is the appointment of the Judge. 2.
[13] It had been said the Executive would be uninformed of characters.
The reverse was ye. truth. The Senate will be so. They must take the
character of candidates from the flattering pictures drawn by their
friends. The Executive in the necessary intercourse with every part of
the U. S. required by the nature of his administration, will or may have
the best possible information. 3. [13] It had been said that a jealousy
would be entertained of the Executive. If the Executive can be safely
trusted with the command of the army, there cannot surely be any
reasonable ground of Jealousy in the present case. He added that if the
objections agst. an appointment of the Executive by the Legislature, had
the weight that had been allowed there must be some weight in the
objection to an appointment of the Judges by the Legislature or by any
part of it.

Mr. GERRY. The appointment of the Judges like every other part of the
Constitution shd. be so modelled as to give satisfaction both to the
people and to the States. The mode under consideration will give
satisfaction to neither. He could not conceive that the Executive could
be as well informed of characters throughout the Union, as the Senate.
It appeared to him also a strong objection that 2/3 of the Senate were
required to reject a nomination of the Executive. The Senate would be
constituted in the same manner as Congress. And the appointments of
Congress have been generally good.

Mr. MADISON, observed that he was not anxious that 2/3 should be
necessary to disagree to a nomination. He had given this form to his
motion chiefly to vary it the more clearly from one which had just been
rejected. He was content to obviate the objection last made, and
accordingly so varied the motion as to let a majority reject.

Col. MASON found it his duty to differ from his colleagues in their
opinions & reasonings on this subject. Notwithstanding the form of the
proposition by which the appointment seemed to be divided between the
Executive & Senate, the appointment was substantially vested in the
former alone. The false complaisance which usually prevails in such
cases will prevent a disagreement to the first nominations. He
considered the appointment by the Executive as a dangerous prerogative.
It might even give him an influence over the Judiciary department
itself. He did not think the difference of interest between the Northern
and Southern States could be properly brought into this argument. It
would operate & require some precautions in the case of regulating
navigation, commerce & imposts; but he could not see that it had any
connection with the Judiciary department.

On the question, the motion now being [14] that the executive should
nominate, & such nominations should become appointments unless disagreed
to by the Senate" Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [15]

On [16] question for agreeing to the clause as it stands by which the
Judges are to be appointed by [16] 2d. branch Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [17]

Adjourned

___________

1. The words "the tenth Resolution" are substituted for "Resoln. 10."

2. The word "those" is substituted in the transcript for "these."

3. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "passing" is substituted in the transcript for "framing."

5. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "which."

6. The word "proper" is omitted in the transcript.

7. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "which."

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no --
4; Pennsylvania, Georgia, divided; New Jersey, not present."

10. This sentence has been changed in the transcript to read as follows:
"The tenth Resolution, giving the Executive a qualified veto, requiring
two -- thirds of each branch of the Legislature to overrule it was then
agreed to nem. con."

11. The date "July 18" is changed in the transcript to "on the
eighteenth of July."

12. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "first," "Secondly" and
"Thirdly" in the transcript.

13. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "First," "Secondly" and
"Thirdly" in the transcript.

14. The words "now being" are transposed to read "being now" in the
transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, aye -- 3; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, no -- 3; so it passed in the affirmative."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY.  JULY 23.  IN CONVENTION

Mr. John Langdon & Mr. Nicholas Gilman from N. Hampshire, took
their seats.

Resoln.: 17. [1] that provision ought to be made for future amendments
of the articles of Union, [2] agreed to, nem. con.

Resoln. 18. [3] "requiring the Legis: Execut: & Judy. of the States to
be bound by oath to support the articles of Union," [2] taken into
consideration.

Mr. WILLIAMSON suggests that a reciprocal oath should be required from
the National officers, to support the Governments of the States.

Mr. GERRY moved to insert as an amendmt. that the oath of the officers
of the National Government also should extend to the support of the
Natl. Govt. which was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. WILSON said he was never fond of oaths, considering them as a left
handed security only. A good Govt. did not need them, and a bad one
could not or ought not to be supported. He was afraid they might too
much trammel the members of the Existing Govt -- in case future
alterations should be necessary; and prove an obstacle to Resol: 17. [1]
just agd. to.

Mr. GHORUM did not know that oaths would be of much use; but could see
no inconsistency between them and the 17. Resol: or any regular amendt.
of the Constitution. The oath could only require fidelity to the
existing Constitution. A constitutional alteration of the Constitution,
could never be regarded as a breach of the Constitution, or of any oath
to support it.

Mr. GERRY thought with Mr. Ghorum there could be no shadow of
inconsistency in the case. Nor could he see any other harm that could
result from the Resolution. On the other side he thought one good effect
would be produced by it. Hitherto the officers of the two Governments
had considered them as distinct from, [4] not as parts of the General
System, & had in all cases of interference given a preference to the
State Govts. The proposed oaths will cure that error.

The Resoln. [18 [5]] was agreed to nem. con. -- 

Resol: 19. [6] "referring the new Constitution to Assemblies to be
chosen by the people for the express purpose of ratifying it" was next
taken into consideration.

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved that it be referred to the Legislatures of the
States for ratification. Mr. PATTERSON 2ded. the motion.

Col. MASON considered a reference of the plan to the authority of the
people as one of the most important and essential of the Resolutions.
The Legislatures have no power to ratify it. They are the mere creatures
of the State Constitutions, and can not be greater than their creators.
And he knew of no power in any of the Constitutions, he knew there was
no power in some of them, that could be competent to this object.
Whither then must we resort? To the people with whom all power remains
that has not been given up in the Constitutions derived from them. It
was of great moment he observed that this doctrine should be cherished
as the basis of free Government. Another strong reason was that
admitting the Legislatures to have a competent authority, it would be
wrong to refer the plan to them, because succeeding Legislatures having
equal authority could undo the acts of their predecessors; and the
National Govt. would stand in each State on the weak and tottering
foundation of an Act of Assembly. There was a remaining consideration of
some weight. In some of the States the Govts. were not derived from the
clear & undisputed authority of the people. This was the case in
Virginia Some of the best & wisest citizens considered the Constitution
as established by an assumed authority. A National Constitution derived
from such a source would be exposed to the severest criticisms.

Mr. RANDOLPH. One idea has pervaded all our proceedings, to wit, that
opposition as well from the States as from individuals, will be made to
the System to be proposed. Will it not then be highly imprudent, to
furnish any unnecessary pretext by the mode of ratifying it. Added to
other objections agst. a ratification by Legislative authority only, it
may be remarked that there have been instances in which the authority of
the Common law has been set up in particular States agst. that of the
Confederation which has had no higher sanction than Legislative
ratification. Whose opposition will be most likely to be excited agst.
the System? That of the local demagogues who will be degraded by it from
the importance they now hold. These will spare no efforts to impede that
progress in the popular mind which will be necessary to the adoption of
the plan, and which every member will find to have taken place in his
own, if he will compare his present opinions with those brought with him
into the Convention. It is of great importance therefore that the
consideration of this subject should be transferred from the
Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to a
field in which their efforts can be less mischeivous. It is moreover
worthy of consideration that some of the States are averse to any change
in their Constitution, and will not take the requisite steps, unless
expressly called upon to refer the question to the people.

Mr. GERRY. The arguments of Col. Mason & Mr. Randolph prove too much.
they prove an unconstitutionality in the present federal system even in
some of the State Govts. Inferences drawn from such a source must be
inadmissible. Both the State Govts. & the federal Govt. have been too
long acquiesced in, to be now shaken. He considered the Confederation to
be paramount to any State Constitution. The last article of it
authorizing alterations must consequently be so as well as the others,
and every thing done in pursuance of the article must have the same high
authority with the article. -- Great confusion he was confident would
result from a recurrence to the people. They would never agree on any
thing. He could not see any ground to suppose that the people will do
what their rulers will not. The rulers will either conform to, or
influence the sense of the people.

Mr. GHORUM was agst. referring the plan to the Legislatures. 1. Men
chosen by the people for the particular purpose, will discuss the
subject more candidly than members of the Legislature who are to lose
the power which is to be given up to the Genl. Govt. 2. Some of the
Legislatures are composed of several branches. It will consequently be
more difficult in these cases to get the plan through the Legislatures,
than thro' a Convention. 3. in the States many of the ablest men are
excluded from the Legislatures, but may be elected into a Convention.
Among these may be ranked many of the Clergy who are generally friends
to good Government. Their services were found to be valuable in the
formation & establishment of the Constitution of Massachts. 4. the
Legislatures will be interrupted with a variety of little business, by
artfully pressing which, designing men will find means to delay from
year to year, if not to frustrate altogether, the national system. 5. If
the last art: of the Confederation is to be pursued the unanimous
concurrence of the States will be necessary. But will any one say, that
all the States are to suffer themselves to be ruined, if Rho. Island
should persist in her opposition to general measures. Some other States
might also tread in her steps. The present advantage which N. York seems
to be so much attached to, of taxing her neighbours by the regulation of
her trade, makes it very probable, that she will be of the number. It
would therefore deserve serious consideration whether provision ought
not to be made for giving effect to the System without waiting for the
unanimous concurrence of the States.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. If there be any Legislatures who should find themselves
incompetent to the ratification, he should be content to let them advise
with their constituents and pursue such a mode as wd. be competent. He
thought more was to be expected from the Legislatures than from the
people. The prevailing wish of the people in the Eastern States is to
get rid of the public debt; and the idea of strengthening the Natl.
Govt. carries with it that of strengthening the public debt. It was said
by Col. Mason 1. [7] that the Legislatures have no authority in this
case. 2. [8] that their successors having equal authority could rescind
their acts. As to the 2d. point he could not admit it to be well
founded. An Act to which the States by their Legislatures, make
themselves parties, becomes a compact from which no one of the parties
can recede of itself. As to the 1st. point, he observed that a new sett
of ideas seemed to have crept in since the articles of Confederation
were established. Conventions of the people, or with power derived
expressly from the people, were not then thought of. The Legislatures
were considered as competent. Their ratification has been acquiesced in
without complaint. To whom have Congs. applied on subsequent occasions
for further powers? To the Legislatures; not to the people. The fact is
that we exist at present, and we need not enquire how, as a federal
Society, united by a charter one article of which is that alterations
therein may be made by the Legislative authority of the States. It has
been said that if the confederation is to be observed, the States must
unanimously concur in the proposed innovations. He would answer that if
such were the urgency & necessity of our situation as to warrant a new
compact among a part of the States, founded on the consent of the
people; the same pleas would be equally valid in favor of a partial
compact, founded on the consent of the Legislatures.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought the Resoln.: [19 [9]] so expressed as that it
might be submitted either to the Legislatures or to Conventions
recommended by the Legislatures. He observed that some Legislatures were
evidently unauthorized to ratify the system. He thought too that
Conventions were to be preferred as more likely to be composed of the
ablest men in the States.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS considered the inference of Mr. Elseworth from the plea
of necessity as applied to the establishment of a new System on ye.
consent of the people of a part of the States, in favor of a like
establishment. on the consent of a part of the Legislatures as a non
sequitur. If the Confederation is to be pursued no alteration can be
made without the unanimous consent of the Legislatures: Legislative
alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not be
valid. The Judges would consider them as null & void. Whereas in case of
an appeal to the people of the U. S., the supreme authority, the federal
compact may be altered by a majority of them; in like manner as the
Constitution of a particular State may be altered by a majority of the
people of the State. The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth erroneously
supposes that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. This
Convention is unknown to the Confederation.

Mr. KING thought with Mr. Elseworth that the Legislatures had a
competent authority, the acquiescence of the people of America in the
Confederation, being equivalent to a formal ratification by the people.
He thought with Mr. E -- also that the plea of necessity was as valid in
the one case as in [10] the other. At the same time he preferred a
reference to the authority of the people expressly delegated to
Conventions, as the most certain means of obviating all disputes &
doubts concerning the legitimacy of the new Constitution; as well as the
most likely means of drawing forth the best men in the States to decide
on it. He remarked that among other objections made in the State of N.
York to granting powers to Congs. one had been that such powers as would
operate within the State, [11] could not be reconciled to the
Constitution; and therefore were not grantible by the Legislative
authority. He considered it as of some consequence also to get rid of
the scruples which some members of the State Legislatures might derive
from their oaths to support & maintain the existing Constitutions.

Mr. MADISON thought it clear that the Legislatures were incompetent to
the proposed changes. These changes would make essential inroads on the
State Constitutions, and it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a
Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its
existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions within the Union,
which had given a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of
the federal Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in
the case of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the
people. He considered the difference between a system founded on the
Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the true
difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution. The former in
point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the latter. In point
of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor
of the latter. 1. [12] A law violating a treaty ratified by a
pre-existing law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an
unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a constitution established by
the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.
2. [12] The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of
treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties,
frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a union
of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been
understood to exclude such an interpretation. Comparing the two modes in
point of expediency he thought all the considerations which recommended
this Convention in preference to Congress for proposing the reform were
in favor of State Conventions in preference to the Legislatures for
examining and adopting it.

On [13] question on Mr. Elseworth's motion to refer the plan to the
Legislatures of the States

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. no. [14] Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [15]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved that the reference of the plan be made to one
general Convention, chosen & authorized by the people to consider,
amend, & establish the same. -- Not seconded . On [13] question for
agreeing to Resolution 19. [16] touching the mode of Ratification as
reported from the Committee of the Whole; viz, to refer the Constn.
after the approbation of Congs. to assemblies chosen by the people:

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [17]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. KING moved that the representation in the second
branch consist of _____ members from each State, who shall vote per
capita.

Mr. ELSEWORTH said he had always approved of voting in that mode.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to fill the blank [18] with three. He wished the
Senate to be a pretty numerous body. If two members only should be
allowed to each State, and a majority be made a quorum, the power would
be lodged in 14 members, which was too small a number for such a trust.

Mr. GHORUM preferred two to three members for the blank. A small number
was most convenient for deciding on peace & war &c. which he expected
would be vested in the 2d. branch. The number of States will also
increase. Kentucky, Vermont, the Province of Mayne & Franklin will
probably soon be added to the present number. He presumed also that some
of the largest States would be divided. The strength of the General
Govt. will lie not in the largeness, but in the smallness of the States.

Col. MASON thought 3 from each State including new States would make the
2d. branch too numerous. Besides other objections, the additional
expense ought always to form one, where it was not absolutely necessary:

Mr. WILLIAMSON. If the number be too great, the distant States will not
be on an equal footing with the nearer States. The latter can more
easily send & support their ablest Citizens. He approved of the voting
per capita.

On the question for filling the blank with "three."

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C.
no. Geo. no. [19]

On [20] question for filling it with "two." Agreed to nem. con.

Mr. L MARTIN was opposed to voting per Capita, as departing from the
idea of the States being represented in the 2d. branch.

Mr. Carrol, was not struck with any particular objection agst. the mode;
but he did not wish so hastily to make so material an innovation.

On the question on the whole motion viz. the 2d. b. to consist of 2
members from each State and to vote per capita."

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [21]

Mr. HOUSTON & Mr. SPAIGHT moved "that the appointment of the Executive
by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the States, be reconsidered."
Mr. Houston urged the extreme inconveniency & the considerable expense,
of drawing together men from all the States for the single purpose of
electing the Chief Magistrate.

On the question which was put without any [22] debate.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Virga. no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [23]

Ordered that tomorrow be assigned for the reconsideration. Cont. & Pena.
no -- all the rest ay.

Mr. GERRY moved that the proceedings of the Convention for the
establishment of a Natl. Govt. (except the part relating to the
Executive), be referred to a Committee to prepare & report a
Constitution conformable thereto.

GENl. PINKNEY reminded the Convention that if the Committee should fail
to insert some security to the Southern States agst. an emancipation of
slaves, and taxes on exports, he shd. be bound by duty to his State to
vote agst. their Report -- The appt. of a Come. as moved by Mr. Gerry.
[24] Agd. to nem. con.

[25] Shall the Come. consist of 10 members one from each State prest.?
All the States were no, except Delaware ay.

Shall it consist of 7. members.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S.
C. ay. Geo. no. [26] The question being lost by an equal division of
Votes.

It was agreed nem -- con -- that the Comttee [27] consist of 5 members,
to be appointed tomorrow.

Adjourned

___________

1. The words "The seventeenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resoln. 17."

2. The Word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The words "The eighteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resoln. 18."

4. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The words "the eighteenth" are substituted in the transcript for
"18."

6. The words "The nineteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resol: 19."

7. The figure "1" is changed to "in the first place" in the transcript.

8. The figure "2" is changed to "and in the second" in the transcript.

9. The words "the nineteenth" are substituted in the transcript for "19."

10. The word "in" is omitted in the transcript.

11. The transcript uses the word "State" in the plural.

12. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the
transcript.

13. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The entry in the notes was originally "N.J. no." Madison struck out
"N.J." but inadvertently let "no" remain.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

16. The words "the nineteenth Resolution" are substituted in the
transcript for "Resolution 19."

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Delaware, no -- 1."

18. The transcript does not italicise the word "blank."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

20. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 9; Maryland, no -- 1."

22. The word "any" is omitted in the transcript.

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 3."

24. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

25. The words "On the question" are here inserted in the transcript.

26. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, aye -- 5; Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5."

27. The word "should" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  JULY 24.    IN CONVENTION

The appointment of the Executive by Electors [1] reconsidered.

Mr. HOUSTON moved that he be appointed by the "Natl. Legislature,"
instead of "Electors appointed by the State Legislatures" according to
the last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly on the improbability,
that capable men would undertake the service of Electors from the more
distant States.

Mr. SPAIGHT seconded the motion.

Mr. GERRY opposed it. He thought there was no ground to apprehend the
danger urged by Mr. Houston. The election of the Executive Magistrate
will be considered as of vast importance and will excite [2] great
earnestness. The best men, the Governours of the States will not hold it
derogatory from their character to be the electors. If the motion should
be agreed to, it will be necessary to make the Executive ineligible a
2d. time, in order to render him independent of the Legislature; which
was an idea extremely repugnant to his way of thinking.

Mr. STRONG supposed that there would be no necessity, if the Executive
should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d.
time; as new elections of the Legislature will have intervened; and he
will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the same sett of men as [3]
his first was recd. from. It had been suggested that gratitude for his
past appointment wd. produce the same effect as dependence for his
future appointment. He thought very differently. Besides this objection
would lie agst. the Electors who would be objects of gratitude as well
as the Legislature. It was of great importance not to make the Govt. too
complex which would be the case if a new sett of men like the Electors
should be introduced into it. He thought also that the first characters
in the States would not feel sufficient motives to undertake the office
of Electors.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for going back to the original ground; to elect the
Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible a 2d. time. The proposed
Electors would certainly not be men of the 1st. nor even of the 2d.
grade in the States. These would all prefer a seat either [4] in the
Senate or the other branch of the Legislature. He did not like the Unity
in the Executive. He had wished the Executive power to be lodged in
three men taken from three districts into which the States should be
divided. As the Executive is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and
there is an essential difference of interests between the N. & S.
States, particularly in the carrying trade, the power will be dangerous,
if the Executive is to be taken from part of the Union, to the part from
which he is not taken. The case is different here from what it is in
England; where there is a sameness of interests throughout the Kingdom.
Another objection agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an
elective King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains
to keep himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the
succession of his children. It was pretty certain he thought that we
should at some time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to
be omitted that might postpone the event as long as possible. --
Ineligibility a 2d. time appeared to him to be the best precaution. With
this precaution he had no objection to a longer term than 7 years. He
would go as far as 10 or 12 years.

Mr. GERRY moved that the Legislatures of the States should vote by
ballot for the Executive in the same proportions as it had been proposed
they should chuse electors; and that in case a majority of the votes
should not center on the same person, the 1st. branch of the Natl.
Legislature should chuse two out of the 4 candidates having most votes,
and out of these two, the 2d. branch should chuse the Executive.

Mr. KING seconded the motion -- and on the Question to postpone in order
to take it into consideration. The noes were so predominant, that the
States were not counted.

[5] Question on Mr. Houston's motion that the Executive be appd. by [6]
Nal. Legislature

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [7]

Mr. L. MARTIN & Mr. GERRY moved to re-instate the ineligibility of the
Executive a 2d. time.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. With many this appears a natural consequence of his being
elected by the Legislature. It was not the case with him. The Executive
he thought should be reelected if his conduct proved him worthy of it.
And he will be more likely to render himself, worthy of it if he be
rewardable with it. The most eminent characters also will be more
willing to accept the trust under this condition, than if they foresee a
necessary degradation at a fixt period.

Mr. GERRY. That the Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature is
a clear point. The longer the duration of his appointment the more will
his dependence be diminished. It will be better then for him to continue
10, 15, or even 20, years and be ineligible afterwards.

Mr. KING was for making him re-eligible. This is too great an advantage
to be given up for the small effect it will have on his dependence, if
impeachments are to lie. He considered these as rendering the tenure
during pleasure.

Mr. L. MARTIN, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility, moved
"that the appointmt. of the Executive shall continue for Eleven years.

Mr. GERRY suggested fifteen years.

Mr. KING twenty years. This is the medium life of princes. [8]

Mr. DAVIE Eight years

Mr. WILSON. The difficulties & perplexities into which the House is
thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature which he was sorry
had been reinstated. The inconveniency [10] of this mode was such that
he would agree to almost any length of time in order to get rid of the
dependence which must result from it. He was persuaded that the longest
term would not be equivalent to a proper mode of election; unless indeed
it should be during good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a
certain advance in life, a continuance in office would cease to be
agreeable to the officer, as well as desirable to the public. Experience
had shewn in a variety of instances that both a capacity & inclination
for public service existed -- in very advanced stages. He mentioned the
instance of a Doge of Venice who was elected after he was 80 years of
age. The popes have generally been elected at very advanced periods, and
yet in no case had a more steady or a better concerted policy been
pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Executive should come into
office at 35. years of age, which he presumes may happen & his
continuance should be fixt at 15 years. at the age of 50. in the very
prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must be cast aside
like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would the British
Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50. been fixt there as the
ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve the public. The great
luminary [Ld. Mansfield] held his seat for thirty years after his
arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had been done he could not but
hope that a better mode of election would yet be adopted; and one that
would be more agreeable to the general sense of the House. That time
might be given for further deliberation he wd. move that the present
question be postponed till tomorrow.

Mr. BROOM seconded the motion to postpone.

Mr. GERRY. We seem to be entirely at a loss on this head. He would
suggest whether it would not be adviseable to refer the clause relating
to the Executive to the Committee of detail to be appointed. Perhaps
they will be able to hit on something that may unite the various
opinions which have been thrown out.

Mr. WILSON. As the great difficulty seems to spring from the mode of
election, he wd. suggest a mode which had not been mentioned. It was
that the Executive be elected for 6 years by a small number, not more
than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be drawn from it, not by ballot,
but by lot and who should retire immediately and make the election
without separating. By this mode intrigue would be avoided in the first
instance, and the dependence would be diminished. This was not he said a
digested idea and might be liable to strong objections.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Of all possible modes of appointment that by the
Legislature is the worst. If the Legislature is to appoint, and to
impeach or to influence the impeachment, the Executive will be the mere
creature of it. He had been opposed to the impeachment but was now
convinced that impeachments must be provided for, if the appt. was to be
of any duration. No man wd. say, that an Executive known to be in the
pay of an Enemy, should not be removeable in some way or other. He had
been charged heretofore [by Col. Mason] with inconsistency in pleading
for confidence in the Legislature on some occasions, & urging a distrust
on others. The charge was not well founded. The Legislature is worthy of
unbounded confidence in some respects, and liable to equal distrust in
others. When their interest coincides precisely with that of their
Constituents, as happens in many of their Acts, no abuse of trust is to
be apprehended. When a strong personal interest happens to be opposed to
the general interest, the Legislature can not be too much distrusted. In
all public bodies there are two parties. The Executive will necessarily
be more connected with one than with the other. There will be a personal
interest therefore in one of the parties to oppose as well as in the
other to support him. Much had been said of the intrigues that will be
practised by the Executive to get into office. Nothing had been said on
the other side of the intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of
[11] party will always covet his seat, will perplex his administration,
will cabal with the Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting him.
This was the way in which the King of England was got out, he meant the
real King, the Minister. This was the way in which Pitt [Ld. Chatham]
forced himself into place. Fox was for pushing the matter still farther.
If he carried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he would
have made the Minister, the King in form almost as well as in substance.
Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about to make him
appointable by the Legislature. Something had been said of the danger of
Monarchy. If a good government should not now be formed, if a good
organization of the Execuve should not be provided, he doubted whether
we should not have something worse than a limited Monarchy. In order to
get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, the
expedient of making him ineligible a 2d. time had been devised. This was
as much as to say we shd. give him the benefit of experience, and then
deprive ourselves of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 2d. time
-- and prolong his duration even to 15 -- years, will he by any
wonderful interposition of providence at that period cease to be a man?
No he will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the road to his object
thro' the Constitution will be shut; he will be in possession of the
sword, a civil war will ensue, and the Commander of the victorious army
on which ever side, will be the despot of America. This consideration
renders him particularly anxious that the Executive should be properly
constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other parts of the
system be curable. It is the most difficult of all rightly to balance
the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will usurp his powers:
Make him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature. He preferred a
short period, a re-eligibility, but a different mode of election. A long
period would prevent an adoption of the plan: it ought to do so. He shd.
himself be afraid to trust it. He was not prepared to decide on Mr.
Wilson's mode of election just hinted by him. He thought it deserved
consideration It would be better that chance sd. decide than intrigue.

On a [12] question to postpone the consideration of the Resolution on
the subject of the Executive

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. divd. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [13]

Mr. WILSON then moved that the Executive be chosen every ______ years by
______ Electors to be taken by lot from the Natl Legislature who shall
proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive and not separate
until it be made."

Mr. CARROL 2ds. the motion 

Mr. GERRY. this is committing too much to chance. If the lot should fall
on a sett of unworthy men, an unworthy Executive must be saddled on the
Country. He thought it had been demonstrated that no possible mode of
electing by the Legislature could be a good one.

Mr. KING. The lot might fall on a majority from the same State which wd.
ensure the election of a man from that State. We ought to be governed by
reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed to be satisfied, he wished the
matter to be postponed.

Mr. WILSON did not move this as the best mode. His opinion remained
unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for the election. He
seconded the postponement.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS observed that the chances were almost infinite agst. a
majority of electors from the same State.

On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was determined in
the affirmative; 7. ays. 4 noes.

On the question of postponent. it was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. CARROL took occasion to observe that he considered the clause
declaring that direct taxation on the States should be in proportion to
representation, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very
objectionable, and that he reserved to himself the right of opposing it,
if the Report of the Committee of detail should leave it in the plan. 

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS hoped the Committee would strike out the whole of the
clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only
meant it as a [14] bridge to assist us over a certain gulph; having
passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He thought the principle
laid down with so much strictness, liable to strong objections.

On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution conformable to the
Resolutions passed by the Convention, the members chosen were Mr.
Rutlidge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Elseworth, Mr. Wilson -- 

On motion to discharge the Come. of the whole from the propositions
submitted to the Convention by Mr. C. Pinkney as the basis of a
constitution, and to refer them to the Committee of detail just
appointed, it was agd. to nem: con.

A like motion was then made & agreed to nem: con: with respect to the
propositions of Mr. Patterson.

Adjourned.

___________

1. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "create" is substituted in the transcript for "excite."

3. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "as."

4. The word "either" is omitted in the transcript.

5. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 4."

8. This might possibly be meant as a carricature of the previous motions
in order to defeat the object of them. Transfer hither. [9]

9. Madison's direction concerning the footnote is omitted in the transcript.

10. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

11. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

14. The object was to lessen the eagerness on one side, [16] & the
opposition on the other, to the share of representation claimed by the
S. Southern States on account of the Negroes.

15. The N.B. to be transferred hither without the N.B. [17]

16. The word "for" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. Madison's direction concerning the footnote is ommitted in the
transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  JULY 25.   IN CONVENTION

[1] Clause relating to the Executive [2] again under consideration.

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved "that the Executive be appointed by the
Legislature," except when the magistrate last chosen shall have
continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, & be
reeligible, in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed by
the Legislatures of the States for that purpose." By this means a
deserving magistrate may be reelected without making him dependent on
the Legislature. [3]

Mr. GERRY repeated his remark that an election at all by the Natl.
Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved that the
Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents of the States,
with advice of their Councils, and where there are no Councils by
Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to vote in the
following proportions: viz --

Mr. MADISON. There are objections agst. every mode that has been, or
perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made either by some
existing authority under the Natil. or State Constitutions -- or by some
special authority derived from the people -- or by the people
themselves. -- The two Existing authorities under the Natl. Constitution
wd. be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he presumed was out of
the question. The former was in his Judgment liable to insuperable
objections. Besides the general influence of that mode on the
independence of the Executive, 1. [4] the election of the Chief
Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so much that the
public interest would materially suffer by it. Public bodies are always
apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more violent ones by such
occasions than by any others. 2. [5] the candidate would intrigue with
the Legislature, would derive his appointment from the predominant
faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its
views. 3. [6] The Ministers of foreign powers would have and [7] make
use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues & influence with the
Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an
object of great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have
American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt. a man
attached to their respective politics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps
expense, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an appointmt.
favorable to their wishes. Germany & Poland are witnesses of this
danger. In the former, the election of the Head of the Empire, till it
became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much
influenced by foreign interference. In the latter, altho' the elective
Magistrate has very little real power, his election has at all times
produced the most eager interference of forign princes, and has in fact
at length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in
the States are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment
of the Natl. Executive by the first, was objectionable in many points of
view, some of which had been already mentioned. He would mention one
which of itself would decide his opinion. The Legislatures of the States
had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures.
One object of the Natl. Legislre. was to controul this propensity. One
object of the Natl. Executive, so far as it would have a negative on the
laws, was to controul the Natl. Legislature, so far as it might be
infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt. of the Natl.
Executive to the State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be
defeated. The Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular
plan, and will promote the appointmt. of a man who will not oppose
himself to a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at
the time of election have the same object, or different objects of the
same kind, The Natl. Executive would be rendered subservient to them. --
An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other
objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they
could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their
partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The State Judiciarys
had not [8] & he presumed wd. not be proposed as a proper source of
appointment. The option before us then lay between an appointment by
Electors chosen by the people -- and an immediate appointment by the
people. He thought the former mode free from many of the objections
which had been urged agst. it, and greatly preferable to an appointment
by the Natl. Legislature. As the electors would be chosen for the
occasion, would meet at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment,
there would be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a
farther precaution, it might be required that they should meet at some
place, distinct from the seat of Govt. and even that no person within a
certain distance of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This Mode
however had been rejected so recently & by so great a majority that it
probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining mode was an election
by the people or rather by the qualified part of them, at large: With
all its imperfections he liked this best. He would not repeat either the
general argumts. for or the objections agst. this mode. He would only
take notice of two difficulties which he admitted to have weight. The
first arose from the disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of
their own State, and the disadvantage this wd. throw on the smaller
States. Great as this objection might be he did not think it equal to
such as lay agst. every other mode which had been proposed. He thought
too that some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The
second difficulty arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in
the N. & S. States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on
the latter. The answer to this objection was 1. [9] that this
disproportion would be continually decreasing under the influence of the
Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase
of their population. 2. [10] That local considerations must give way to
the general interest. As an individual from the S. States he was willing
to make the sacrifice.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. The objection drawn from the different sizes of the
States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest States would
invariably prefer the Candidate within the State; and the largest States
wd. invariably have the man.

[11] Question on Mr. Elseworth's motion as above.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [12]

Mr. PINKNEY moved that the election by the Legislature be qualified with
a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 6 years in any twelve
years. He thought this would have all the advantage & at the same time
avoid in some degree the inconveniency, [13] of an absolute
ineligibility a 2d. time.

Col. MASON approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the
instance of Congs. and some of the Executives of the States. It rendered
the Executive as effectually independent, as an ineligibility after his
first election, and opened the way at the same time for the advantage of
his future services. He preferred on the whole the election by the Nati.
Legislature: Tho' Candor obliged him to admit, that there was great
danger of foreign influence, as had been suggested. This was the most
serious objection with him that had been urged.

Mr. BUTLER. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at home, &
influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either if the
Election be made by the Natl. Legislature. On the other hand: The Govt.
should not be made so complex & unwieldy as to disgust the States. This
would be the case, if the election shd. be referred to the people. He
liked best an election by Electors chosen by the Legislatures of the
States. He was agst. are -- eligibility at all events. He was also agst.
a ratio of votes in the States. An equality should prevail in this case.
The reasons for departing from it do not hold in the case of the
Executive as in that of the Legislature.

Mr. GERRY approved of Mr. Pinkney's motion as lessening the evil.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was agst. a rotation in every case. It formed a
political School, in wch we were always governed by the scholars, and
not by the Masters. The evils to be guarded agst. in this case are 1.
[14] the undue influence of the Legislature. 2. [14] instability of
Councils. 3. [14] misconduct in office. To guard agst. the first, we run
into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of
Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of men is ever
followed by a change of measures. We see this fully exemplified in the
vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the State of Pena. The
self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to tread in the paths of
their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate Soloman. 2. [15] the
Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the
Legislature. The man in office will look forward to the period at which
he will become re-eligible. The distance of the period, the
improbability of such a protraction of his life will be no obstacle.
Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent author no doubt for
wise ends, that altho' he knows his existence to be limited to a span,
he takes his measures as if he were to live for ever. But taking another
supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If the
magistrate does not look forward to his re-election to the Executive, he
will be pretty sure to keep in view the opportunity of his going into
the Legislature itself. He will have little objection then to an
extension of power on a theatre where he expects to act a distinguished
part; and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his
popularity with the Legislature, on his influence over which the figure
he is to make will depend. 3. [16] To avoid the third evil, impeachments
will be essential, and hence an additional reason agst. an election by
the Legislature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by
the Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could
not but favor the idea of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture of lot.
It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal & dependence.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was sensible that strong objections lay agst. an election
of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it opened a door for
foreign influence. The principal objection agst. an election by the
people seemed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the
smaller States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that each
man should vote for 3 candidates, One of these [17] he observed would be
probably of his own State, the other 2. of some other States; and as
probably of a small as a large one.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that each
man should vote for two persons one of whom at least should not be of
his own State.

Mr. MADISON also thought something valuable might be made of the
suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The second best man in
this case would probably be the first, in fact. The only objection which
occurred was that each Citizen after havg. given his vote for his
favorite fellow Citizen, wd. throw away his second on some obscure
Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first
choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the Citizens of many States
would be so sanguine of having their favorite elected, as not to give
their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice. It
might moreover be provided in favor of the smaller States that the
Executive should not be eligible more than times in years from the same
State.

Mr. GERRY. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The
ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men
dispersed through the Union & acting in Concert to delude them into any
appointment. He observed that such a Society of men existed in the Order
of the Cincinnati. They are respectable, United, and influencial. They
will in fact elect the chief Magistrate in every instance, if the
election be referred to the people. His respect for the characters
composing this Society could not blind him to the danger & impropriety
of throwing such a power into their hands.

Mr. DICKENSON. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had
taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay agst. an
election of the Executive by the Natl. Legislature; as also by the
Legislatures or Executives of the States. He had long leaned towards an
election by the people which he regarded as the best & purest source.
Objections he was aware lay agst. this mode, but not so great he thought
as agst. the other modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the
House seemed to arise from the partiality of the States to their
respective Citizens. But, might not this very partiality be turned to a
useful purpose. Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The
people will know the most eminent characters of their own States, and
the people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those
of which [18] they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the
thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen
either by the Natl. Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.

On a Question which was moved for postponing Mr. Pinkney's motion; in
order to make way for some such proposition as had been hinted by Mr.
Williamson & others: it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [19]

On Mr. Pinkney's motion that no person shall serve in the Executive more
than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [20]

On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with copies
of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the
negative.

It was then moved that the members of the House might take copies of the
Resolions which had been agreed to; which passed in the negative. N. H.
no. Mas. no. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Maryd. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [21]

Mr. GERRY & Mr. BUTLER moved to refer the resolution relating to the
Executive (except the clause making it consist of a single person) to
the Committee of detail.

Mr. WILSON hoped that so important a branch of the System wd. not be
committed untill a general principle shd. be fixed by a vote of the
House.

Mr. LANGDON, was for the Commitment -- Adjd.

___________

1. The word "The" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The transcript italicizes the phrase "making him dependent on the
Legislature."

4. The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.

5. The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.

6. The figure "3" is changed to "In the third place" in the transcript.

7. The word "would" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "been" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The figure "1" is changed to "in the first place" in the transcript.

10. The figure "2" is changed to "in the second place" in the transcript.

11. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye -- 4: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

13. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

14. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "first," "secondly" and
"thirdly" in the transcript.

15. The figure "2" is changed to "Secondly" in the transcript.

16. The figure "3" is changed to "Finally" in the transcript.

17. The word "them" is substituted in the transcript for "these."

18. The word "whom" is substituted in the transcript for "which."

19 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, no -- 6."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 6."

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no --
6."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  JULY 26.   IN CONVENTION

Col. [1] MASON. In every Stage of the Question relative to the
Executive, the difficulty of the subject and the diversity of the
opinions concerning it have appeared. Nor have any of the modes of
constituting that department been satisfactory. 1. [2] It has been
proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that
is that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most of
Eminent characters, & qualifications, should be performed by those who
know least. 2. [2] that the election should be made by the Legislatures
of the States. 3. [2] by the Executives of the States. Agst. these modes
also strong objections have been urged. 4. [2] It has been proposed that
the election should be made by Electors chosen by the people for that
purpose. This was at first agreed to: But on further consideration has
been rejected. 5. [2] Since which, the mode of Mr. Williamson, requiring
each freeholder to vote for several candidates has been proposed. This
seemed like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on
closer inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election in
any form, as Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into
the hands of the Cincinnati, a Society for the members of which he had a
great respect; but which he never wished to have a preponderating
influence in the Govt. 6. [3] Another expedient was proposed by Mr.
Dickenson, which is liable to so palpable & material an inconvenience
that he had little doubt of its being by this time rejected by himself.
It would exclude every man who happened not to be popular within his own
State; tho' the causes of his local unpopularity might be of such a
nature as to recommend him to the States at large. 7. 3 Among other
expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the tickets do not
appear to be in much demand, it will probably, not be carried on, and
nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all
these various modes, he was led to conclude, that an election by the
Natl. Legislature as originally proposed, was the best. If it was liable
to objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived at
the same time that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited.
Having for his primary object, for the pole [4] -- star of his political
conduct, the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an
essential point, as the very palladium of Civil liberty, that the great
officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed
periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in
order that they may feel & respect those rights & interests, which are
again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving that
the constitution of the Executive as reported by the Come. of the whole
be re-instated, viz. "that the Executive be appointed for seven years, &
be ineligible a 2d. time"

Mr. DAVIE seconded the motion

DOCr. FRANKLIN. It seems to have been imagined by some that the
returning to the mass of the people was degrading the magistrate. This
he thought was contrary to republican principles. In free Governments
the rulers are the servants, and the people their superiors &
sovereigns. For the former therefore to return among the latter was not
to degrade but to promote them. And it would be imposing an unreasonable
burden on them, to keep them always in a State of servitude, and not
allow them to become again one of the Masters.

[5] Question on Col. Masons motion as above; which 6 passed in the
affirmative

N. H. ay. Masts. not on floor. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md.
ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [7]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was now agst. the whole paragraph. In answer to Col.
Mason's position that a periodical return of the great officers of the
State into the mass of the people, was the palladium of Civil liberty he
wd. observe that on the same principle the Judiciary ought to be
periodically degraded; certain it was that the Legislature ought on
every principle, yet no one had proposed, or conceived that the members
of it should not be re-eligible. In answer to Docr. Franklin, that a
return into the mass of the people would be a promotion, instead of a
degradation, he had no doubt that our Executive like most others would
have too much patriotism to shrink from the burden of his office, and
too much modesty not to be willing to decline the promotion.

On the question on the whole resolution as amended in the words
following -- "that a National Executive be instituted -- to consist of a
single person -- to be chosen by the Natl. legislature -- for the term
of seven years -- to be ineligible a 2d. time -- with power to carry
into execution the natl. laws -- to appoint to offices in cases not
otherwise provided for -- to be removable on impeachment & conviction of
malpractice or neglect of duty -- to receive a fixt compensation for the
devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the Natl.
treasury" -- it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas. not on floor. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no.
Va. divd. Mr. Blair & Col. Mason ay. Genl. Washington & Mr. Madison no.
Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo.
ay. [8]

Mr. MASON moved "that the Committee of detail be instructed to receive a
clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property & citizenship
of the U. States in members of the [9] Legislature, and disqualifying
persons having unsettled Accts. with or being indebted to the U. S. from
being members of the Natl. Legislature" -- He observed that persons of
the latter descriptions had frequently got into the State Legislatures,
in order to promote laws that might shelter their delinquencies; and
that this evil had crept into Congs. if Report was to be regarded.

Mr. PINCKNEY seconded the motion

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. If qualifications are proper, he wd. prefer them in
the electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S. they
are but few. As to persons having unsettled accounts he believed them to
pretty many. He thought however that such a discrimination would be both
odious & useless, and in many instances unjust & cruel. The delay of
settlemt. had been more the fault of the public than of the individuals.
What will be done with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or
services or property to their Country, without having been yet able to
obtain a liquidation of their claims? Are they to be excluded?

Mr. GHORUM was for leaving to the Legislature, the providing agst. such
abuses as had been mentioned.

Col. MASON mentioned the parliamentary qualifications adopted in the
Reign of Queen Anne, which he said had met with universal approbation.

Mr. MADISON had witnessed the zeal of men having accts. with the public,
to get into the Legislatures for sinister purposes. He thought however
that if any precaution were to be [10] taken for excluding them, the one
proposed, by Col. Mason ought to be new [11] modelled. It might be well
to limit the exclusion to persons who had recd. money from the public,
and had not accounted for it.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. It was a precept of great antiquity as well as [12]
high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we
ought to be equally on our guard agst. being wise over much. The
proposed regulation would enable the Govent. to exclude particular
persons from office as long as they pleased He mentioned the case of the
Commander in Chief's presenting his account for secret services, which
he said was so moderate that every one was astonished at it; and so
simple that no doubt could arise on it. Yet had the Auditor been
disposed to delay the settlement, how easily might he [13] have effected
it, & how cruel wd. it be in such a case to keep a distinguished &
meritorious Citizen under a temporary disability & disfranchisement. He
mentioned this case merely to illustrate the objectionable nature of the
proposition. He was opposed to such minutious regulations in a
Constitution. The parliamentary qualifications quoted by Col. Mason, had
been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the landed agst.
the monied interest.

Mr. PINCKNEY & GENl. PINCKNEY moved to insert by way of amendmt. the
words Judiciary & Executive so as to extend the qualifications to those
departments which was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. GERRY thought the inconveniency [14] of excluding a few worthy
individuals who might be public debtors or have unsettled accts. ought
not to be put in the scale agst. the public advantages of the
regulation, and that the motion did not go far enough.

Mr. KING observed that there might be great danger in requiring landed
property as a qualification since it would [15] exclude the monied
interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the
public safety. Mr. DICKENSON, was agst. any recital of qualifications in
the Constitution. It was impossible to make a compleat one, and a
partial one wd. by implication tie up the hands of the Legislature from
supplying the omissions, The best defence lay in the freeholders who
were to elect the Legislature. Whilst this Source [16] should remain
pure, the public interest would be safe. If it ever should be corrupt,
no little expedients would repel the danger. He doubted the policy of
interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth. He
had always understood that a veneration for poverty & virtue, were the
objects of republican encouragement. It seemed improper that any man of
merit should be subjected to disabilities in a Republic where merit was
understood to form the great title to public trust, honors & rewards.

Mr. GERRY if property be one object of Government. provisions for securing
[17] it cannot be improper.

Mr. MADISON moved to strike out the word landed, before the word
"qualifications." If the proposition sd. be agreed to he wished the
Committee to be at liberty to report the best criterion they could
devise. Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many
enjoyed them to a great extent who were more in debt than they were
worth. The unjust laws of the States had proceeded more from this class
of men, than any others. It had often happened that men who had acquired
landed property on credit, got into the Legislatures with a view of
promoting an unjust protection agst. their Creditors. In the next place,
if a small quantity of land should be made the standard, it would be no
security; if a large one, it would exclude the proper representatives of
those classes of Citizens who were not landholders. It was politic as
well as just that the interests & rights of every class should be duly
represented & understood in the public Councils. It was a provision
every where established that the Country should be divided into
districts & representatives taken from each, in order that the
Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathise, with the
rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less
proper that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of making
their rights be felt & understood in the public Councils. The three
principal classes into which our citizens were divisible, were the
landed the commercial, & the manufacturing. The 2d. & 3d. class, bear as
yet a small proportion to the first. The proportion however will daily
increase. We see in the populous Countries in [18] Europe now, what we
shall be hereafter. These classes understand much less of each others
interests & affairs, than men of the same class inhabiting different
districts. It is particularly requisite therefore that the interests of
one or two of them should not be left entirely to the care, or the [19]
impartiality of the third. This must be the case if landed
qualifications should be required; few of the mercantile, & scarcely any
of the manufacturing class, chusing whilst they continue in business to
turn any part of their Stock into landed property. For these reasons he
wished if it were possible that some other criterion than the mere
possession of land should be devised. He concurred with Mr. GOVr. MORRIS
in thinking that qualifications in the Electors would be much more
effectual than in the elected. The former would discriminate between
real & ostensible property in the latter; But he was aware of the
difficulty of forming any uniform standard that would suit the different
circumstances & opinions prevailing in the different States.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion.

On the Question for striking out "landed"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [20]

On [21] Question on [21] 1st. part of Col. Masons proposition as to
qualification of property & citizenship," as so amended

N. H. ay. Masts. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [22]

"The 2d. part, for disqualifying debtors, and persons having unsettled
accounts," being under consideration 

Mr. CARROL moved to strike out "having unsettled accounts"

Mr. GHORUM seconded the motion; observing that it would put the
commercial & manufacturing part of the people on a worse footing than
others as they would be most likely to have dealings with the public.

Mr. L. MARTIN. if these words should be struck out, and the remaining
words concerning debtors retained, it will be the interest of the latter
class to keep their accounts unsettled as long as possible.

Mr. WILSON was for striking them out. They put too much power in the
hands of the Auditors, who might combine with rivals in delaying
settlements in order to prolong the disqualifications of particular men.
We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for future
generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the
moment. The time has been, and will again be, when the public safety may
depend on the voluntary aids of individuals which will necessarily open
accts. with the public, and when such accts. will be a characteristic of
patriotism. Besides a partial enumeration of cases will disable the
Legislature from disqualifying odious & dangerous characters. Mr.
LANGDON was for striking out the whole clause for the reasons given by
Mr. Wilson. So many exclusions he thought too would render the system
unacceptable to the people. Mr. GERRY. If the argumts. used to day were
to prevail, we might have a Legislature composed of public debtors,
pensioners, placemen & contractors. He thought the proposed
qualifications would be pleasing to the people. They will be considered
as a security agst. unnecessary or undue burdens being imposed on them.
He moved to add "pensioners" to the disqualified characters which was
negatived.

N. H. no Mas. ay. Con. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. no.
N. C. divided. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [23]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The last clause, relating to public debtors will
exclude every importing merchant. Revenue will be drawn it is foreseen
as much as possible, from trade. Duties of course will be bonded, and
the Merchts. will remain debtors to the public. He repeated that it had
not been so much the fault of individuals as of the public that
transactions between them had not been more generally liquidated &
adjusted. At all events to draw from our short & scanty experience rules
that are to operate through succeeding ages, does not savour much of
real wisdom.

On [24] question for striking out, "persons having unsettled accounts
with the U. States."

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [25]

Mr. ELSEWORTH was for disagreeing to the remainder of the clause
disqualifying public debtors; and for leaving to the wisdom of the
Legislature and the virtue of the Citizens, the task of providing agst.
such evils. Is the smallest as well [26] largest debtor to be excluded?
Then every arrear of taxes will disqualify. Besides how is it to be
known to the people when they elect who are or are not public debtors.
The exclusion of pensioners & placemen in Engld. is founded on a
consideration not existing here. As persons of that sort are dependent
on the Crown, they tend to increase its influence.

Mr. PINKNEY sd. he was at first a friend to the proposition, for the
sake of the clause relating to qualifications of property; but he
disliked the exclusion of public debtors; it went too far. It wd.
exclude persons who had purchased confiscated property or should
purchase Western territory of the public, and might be some obstacle to
the sale of the latter.

On the question for agreeing to the clause disqualifying public debtors

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [27]

Col. MASON. observed that it would be proper, as he thought, that some
provision should be made in the Constitution agst. choosing for the seat
of the Genl. Govt. the City or place at which the seat of any State
Govt. might be fixt. There were 2 objections agst. having them at the
same place, which without mentioning others, required some precaution on
the subject. The 1st. was that it tended to produce disputes concerning
jurisdiction. The 2d. & principal one was that the intermixture of the
two Legislatures tended to give a provincial tincture to ye. Natl.
deliberations. He moved that the Come. be instructed to receive a clause
to prevent the seat of the Natl. Govt. being in the same City or town
with the Seat of the Govt. of any State longer than until the necessary
public buildings could be erected.

Mr. ALEX. MARTIN 2ded. the motion.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS did not dislike the idea, but was apprehensive that
such a clause might make enemies of Philda. & N. York which had
expectations of becoming the Seat of the Genl. Govt.

Mr. LANGDON approved the idea also: but suggisted the case of a State
moving its seat of Govt. to the natl. seat after the erection of the
public buildings.

Mr. GHORUM. The precaution may be evaded by the Natl. Legislre. by
delaying to erect the public buildings.

Mr. GERRY conceived it to be the genel. sense of America, that neither
the Seat of a State Govt. nor any large commercial City should be the
seat of the Genl. Govt.

Mr. WILLIAMSON liked the idea, but knowing how much the passions of men
were agitated by this matter, was apprehensive of turning them agst. the
System. He apprehended also that an evasion might be practiced in the
way hinted by Mr. Ghorum.

Mr. PINKNEY thought the seat of a State Govt. ought to be avoided; but
that a large town or its vicinity would be proper for the Seat of the
Genl. Govt.

Col. MASON did not mean to press the motion at this time, nor to excite
any hostile passions agst. the system. He was content to withdraw the
motion for the present.

Mr. BUTLER was for fixing by the Constitution the place, & a central
one, for the seat of the Natl. Govt.

The proceedings since Monday last were referred unanimously [28] to the
Come. of detail, and the Convention then unanimously Adjourned till
Monday, Augst. 6. that the Come. of detail might have time to prepare &
report the Constitution. The whole proceedings [29] as referred are as
follow: "[here copy them from the Journal p. 207 [30]

[June 20. [31]
             I. RESOLVED,  That the Government of the United States
                           ought to consist of a supreme legislative,
                           judiciary, and executive.
June 21.    II. RESOLVED,  That the legislature consist of two branches.
June 22.
June 23.   III. RESOLVED,  That the members of the first branch of the
                           legislature ought to be elected by the people
                           of the several states for the term of two years;
                           to be paid out of the publick treasury; to
                           receive an adequate compensation for their
                           services; to be of the age of twenty-five years
                           at least; to be ineligible [32] and incapable of
                           holding any office under the authority of the
                           United States (except those peculiarly
                           belonging to the functions of the first branch)
                           during the term of service of the first branch.
 
June 25.    IV. RESOLVED,  That the members of the second branch of
June 26.                   the legislature of the United States ought to be
                           chosen by the individual legislatures; to be of
                           the age of thirty years at least; to hold their
                           offices for six years, one third to go out
                           biennally; to receive a compensation for the
                           devotion of their time to the publick service;
                           to be ineligible to and incapable of holding any
                           office, under the authority of the United
                           States (except those peculiarly belonging to
                           the functions of the second branch) during the
                           term for which they are elected, and for one
                           year thereafter.
             V. RESOLVED,  That each branch ought to possess the right of
                           originating acts.
Postponed   VI. RESOLVED,  That the national legislature ought to possess
27.                        the legislative rights vested in Congress by the
July 16.                   confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all
July 17.                   cases for the general interests of the union,
                           and also in those to which the states are
                           separately incompetent, or in which the
                           harmony of the United States may be
                           interrupted by the exercise of individual
                           legislation.
           VII. RESOLVED,  That the legislative acts of the United States,
                           made by virtue and in pursuance of the
                           articles of union, and all treaties made and
                           ratified under the authority of the United
                           States, shall be the supreme law of the
                           respective states, as far as those acts or
                           treaties shall relate to the said states, or their
                           citizens and inhabitants; and that the
                           judiciaries of the several states shall be bound
                           thereby in their decisions, any thing in the
                           respective laws of the individual states to the
                           contrary, notwithstanding.
16.       VIII. RESOLVED,  That in the original formation of the
                           legislature of the United States, the first
                           branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five
                           members; of which number

                                 New Hampshire shall send three,
                                 Massachusetts ......     eight,
                                 Rhode Island .......     one,
                                 Connecticut ........     five,
                                 New York ...........     six,
                                 New Jersey .........     four,
                                 Pennsylvania .......     eight,
                                 Delaware ...........     one,
                                 Maryland ...........     six,
                                 Virginia ...........     ten,
                                 North Carolina .....     five,
                                 South Carolina .....     five,
                                 Georgia ............     three.


                           But as the present situation of the states may
                           probably alter in the number of their
                           inhabitants, the legislature of the United States
                           shall be authorized, from time to time, to
                           apportion the number of representatives; and
                           in case any of the states shall hereafter be
                           divided, or enlarged by addition of territory,
                           or any two or more states united, or any new
                           states created within the limits of the United
                           States, the legislature of the United States
                           shall possess authority to regulate the number
                           of representatives, in any of the foregoing
                           cases, upon the principle of their number of
                           inhabitants according to the provisions
                           hereafter mentioned, namely -- Provided
                           always, that representation ought to be
                           proportioned according [33] to direct taxation.
                           And in order to ascertain the alteration in the
                           direct taxation, which may be required from
                           time to time by the changes in the relative
                           circumstances of the states -- 

            IX. RESOLVED,  That a census be taken within six years from
                           the first meeting of the legislature of the
                           United States, and once within the term of
                           every ten years afterwards, of all the
                           inhabitants of the United States, in the
                           manner and according to the ratio
                           recommended by Congress in their resolution
                           of April 18, 1783; and that the legislature of
                           the United States shall proportion the direct
                           taxation accordingly.
             X. RESOLVED,  That all bills for raising or appropriating
                           money, and for fixing the salaries of the
                           officers of the government of the United
                           States, shall originate in the first branch of the
                           legislature of the United States, and shall not
                           be altered or amended by the second branch;
                           and that no money shall be drawn from the
                           publick treasury, but in pursuance of
                           appropriations to be originated by the first
                           branch.
            XI. RESOLVED,  That in the second branch of the legislature of
                           the United States, each state shall have an
                           equal vote.
July 26.   XII. RESOLVED,  That a national executive be instituted, to
                           consist of a single person; to be chosen by the
                           national legislature, for the term of seven
                           years; to be ineligible a second time; with
                           power to carry into execution the national
                           laws; to appoint to offices in cases not
                           otherwise provided for; to be removable on
                           impeachment, and conviction of malpractice
                           or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed
                           compensation for the devotion of his time to
                           [34] publick service; to be paid out of the
                           publick treasury.
July 21.  XIII. RESOLVED,  That the national executive shall have a right
                           to negative any legislative act, which shall not
                           be afterwards passed, unless by two third
                           parts of each branch of the national
                           legislature.
18.        XIV. RESOLVED,  That a national judiciary be established, to
July 21.                   consist of one supreme tribunal, the judges of
18.                        which shall be appointed by the second
                           branch of the national legislature; to hold their
                           offices during good behaviour; to receive
                           punctually, at stated times, a fixed
                           compensation for their services, in which no
                           diminution shall be made, so as to affect the
                           persons actually in office at the time of such
                           diminution.
            XV. RESOLVED,  That the national legislature be empowered to
                           appoint inferior tribunals.
           XVI. RESOLVED,  That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary
                           shall extend to cases arising under laws passed
                           by the general legislature; and to such other
                           questions as involve the national peace and
                           harmony.
          XVII. RESOLVED,  That provision ought to be made for the
                           admission of states lawfully arising within the
                           limits of the United States, whether from a
                           voluntary junction of government and
                           territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a
                           number of voices in the national legislature
                           less than the whole.
         XVIII. RESOLVED,  That a republican form of government shall
                           be guarantied to each state; and that each
                           state shall be protected against foreign and
                           domestick violence.
23.        XIX. RESOLVED,  That provision ought to be made for the
                           amendment of the articles of union,
                           whensoever it shall seem necessary.
            XX. RESOLVED,  That the legislative executive, and judiciary
                           powers, within the several states, and of the
                           national government, ought to be bound, by
                           oath, to support the articles of union.
           XXI. RESOLVED,  That the amendments which shall be offered
                           to the confederation by the convention ought,
                           at a proper time or times after the approbation
                           of Congress, to be submitted to an assembly
                           or assemblies of representatives,
                           recommended by the several legislatures, to
                           be expressly chosen by the people to consider
                           and decide thereon.
          XXII. RESOLVED,  That the representation in the second branch
                           of the legislature of the United States [35]
                           consist of two members from each state, who
                           shall vote per capita.
26.      XXIII. RESOLVED,  That it be an instruction to the committee, to
                           whom were referred the proceedings of the
                           convention for the establishment of a national
                           government, to receive a clause or clauses,
                           requiring certain qualifications of property and
                           citizenship, in the United States, for the
                           executive, the judiciary, and the members of
                           both branches of the legislature of the United
                           States.]


With the above resolutions were referred the propositions offered by Mr.
C. Pinckney on the 29th. of May, & by Mr. Patterson on the 15th. of
June. [36]

___________

1. The word "Mr." is substituted in the transcript for "Col."

2. The figures "1." "2," "3," "4" and "5" are changed to "First,"
"Secondly," "Thirdly" etc. in the transcript.

3. The figures "6" and "7" are changed to "Sixthly" and "Seventhly" in
the transcript.

4. The word "polar" is substituted in the transcript for the word "pole."

5. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "which" is crossed out in the transcript and "it" is written
above it.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina. South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -- 3; Massachusetts not on the
floor."

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, no -- 3; Massachusetts not on the floor; Virginia,
divided [Mr. Blair and Col. Mason, aye. General Washington and Mr.
Madison no, Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.]"

9. The word "National" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The words "to be" are omitted in the transcript.

11. The word "new" is crossed out and the syllable "re" is written above
it.

12. The word "of" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. The words "might he" are transposed to read "he might" in the
transcript.

14. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

15. The word "might" is substituted in the transcript for the word
"would."

16. The word "resource" is erroneously substituted in the transcript for
the word "source."

17. The words "to secure" are substituted for "for securing," in the
transcript.

18. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

19. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; Maryland, no."

21. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8: Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -- 3."

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 7; North Carolina, divided."

24. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

25. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, aye -- 9; New Jersey, Georgia, no -- 2."

26. The words "as the" are here inserted in the transcript.

27. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, Georgia, aye --
2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 9."

28. The words "referred unanimously" are transposed to read "unanimously
referred" in the transcript.

29. The word "proceedings" is crossed out in the transcript and
"Resolutions" is written above it.

30. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

31. The printed Journal says, page 11, that these 23 Resolutions are
"collected from the proceedings of the convention, as they are spread
over the journal from June 16th to July 26th." The dates in the margin
show when the respective Resolutious were adopted. They are omitted in
the transcript.

32. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

33. The word "according" is omitted in the transcript.

34. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

35. The word "shall" is here inserted in the transcript.

36. The word "Adjourned" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  AUGUST 6th   IN CONVENTION

Mr. John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.

Mr. RUTLIDGE delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail as
follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member:
[1]

"We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachussetts,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina,
South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the
following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our
Posterity.

                              ARTICLE I

The stile of the Government shall be, "The United States of America"

                               [2] II

The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive; and
judicial powers.

                               [2] III

The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two
separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives and a
Senate; each of which shall in all cases have a negative on the other.
The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in December [3] every
year.

                                 IV

Sect. 1. The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen
every second year, by the people of the several States comprehended
within this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall be the same,
from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of
the most numerous branch of their own legislatures. 

Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the
age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen in the
United States for at least three years before his election; and shall
be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he
shall be chosen.

Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first formation, and
until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken in the
manner herein after described, consist of sixty five Members, of whom
three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in
New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware,
six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five in
South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.

Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will alter
from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be divided; as
others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more States
may be united; as new States will be erected within the limits of the
United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, regulate
the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to
the provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every forty
thousand.

Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing
the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in the House
of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate.
No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of
appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.

Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied by
writs of election from the executive authority of the State in the
representation from which it [4] shall happen.

                                [2] V

Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the
Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two
members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the next
meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one vote.

Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but immediately
after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into three
classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The seats of
the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the
second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year,
of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that a third
part of the members may be chosen every second year.

Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years
at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least
four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his
election, a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.

Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other officers.

                               [2] VI

Sect. 1. The times and places and manner of holding the elections of the
members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each
State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time be altered
by the Legislature of the United States.

Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to
establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with
regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.

Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall constitute a
quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day.

Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its own members.

Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be
impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the Legislature;
and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except treason felony
and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from it.

Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings; may
punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel a member.

Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it shall be
acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their
proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas
and nays of the members of each House, on any question, shall at the
desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on the
journal.

Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at which the
two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to the
Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the ______
article.

Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and incapable
of holding any office under the authority of the United States, during
the time for which they shall respectively be elected: and the members
of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any such
office for one year afterwards.

Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation for
their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they
shall be chosen.

[5] Sect. 11. The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall
be. "Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in Congress
assembled."

Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating bills,
except in the cases beforementioned.

Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become [6] a law, be
presented to the President of the United States for his revision: if,
upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation
by signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him
improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with
his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and
proceed to reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration, two
thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the
President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his objections, be
sent to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and
if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it shall become a
law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined
by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for or against the
bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any
bill shall not be returned by the President within seven days after it
shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the
legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it
shall not be a law.

                               [2] VII

Sect. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States;
To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United
States;
To coin money;
To regulate the value of foreign coin;
To fix the standard of weights and measures;
To establish Post-offices;
To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United States;
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To make rules concerning captures on land and water;
To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United
States, and of offenses against the law of nations;
To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature;
To make war;
To raise armies;
To build and equip fleets;
To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the
Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this
Constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department
or officer [7] thereof;

Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying
war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the
enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of the
United States shall have power to declare the punishment of treason. No
person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two
witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, nor
forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by the
whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every
age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of
years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the
foregoing description, (except Indians not paying taxes) which number
shall, within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and
within the term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such [8]
manner as the said Legislature shall direct.

Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on articles
exported from any State; nor on the migration or importation of such
persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall
such migration or importation be prohibited.

Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the
Census hereinbefore directed to be taken.

Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two
thirds of the members present in the each House.

Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility.

                              [2] VIII

The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of
this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the
United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of
their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States
shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the
Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary
notwithstanding.

                               [2] IX

Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to make
treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.

Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that may
hereafter subsist between two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or
territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers. Whenever the
Legislature, or the Executive authority, or lawful agent of any State,
in controversy with another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the
matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice of such memorial and
application shall be given by order of the Senate, to the Legislature or
the Executive authority of the other State in Controversy. The Senate
shall also assign a day for the appearance of the parties, by their
agents, before the [9] House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint,
by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a Court for
hearing and determining the matter in question. But if the Agents cannot
agree, the Senate shall name three persons out of each of the several
States; and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately
strike out one, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from
that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as the Senate
shall direct, shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the
persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be
commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the controversy;
provided a majority of the Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in
the determination. If either party shall neglect to attend at the day
assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not attending, or being
present shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate
three persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate shall
strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of the parties
shall refuse to submit to the authority of such Court; or shall not
appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the Court shall
nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall be final
and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted to the President of
the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public records, for the
security of the parties concerned. Every Commissioner shall, before he
sit in judgment, take an oath, to be administred by one of the Judges of
the Supreme or Superior Court of the State where the cause shall be
tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question
according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope
of reward."

Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under different
grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they respect such
lands shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent [10] to such
grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the Senate, be finally
determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before
prescribed for deciding controversies between different States.

                                [2] X

Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a
single person. His stile shall be, "The President of the United States
of America;" and his title shall be, "His Excellency." He shall be
elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during
the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time.

Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the
Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient:
he may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case of disagreement
between the two Houses, with regard to the time of adjournment, he may
adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper: he shall take care that
the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed: he shall
commission all the officers of the United States; and shall appoint
officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution.
He shall receive Ambassadors, and may correspond with the supreme
Executives of the several States. He shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an
impeachment. He shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the Militia of the several States. He shall, at
stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall
neither be increased nor diminished during his continuance in office.
Before he shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation, "I _____ solemnly swear, (or affirm) that
that [11] I will faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States of America." He shall be removed from his office on
impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the
supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his
removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall
exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United
States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.

                                2 XI

Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary,
from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United
States.

Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts,
shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated
times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office.

Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases
arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to
all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to
the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States; to all cases
of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or
more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction)
between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of
different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof and
foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases
affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In
all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The
Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned
(except the trial of the President of the United States) in the manner,
and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior
Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.

Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of
impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and
shall be by Jury.

Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the
party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment,
trial, judgment and punishment according to law.

                               [2] XII

No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal; nor
enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title
of Nobility.

                              [2] XIII

No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States,
shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in
payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor keep troops
or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or
compact with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any
war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of
invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay, until the Legislature
of the United States can be consulted.

                              [2] XIV

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States.

                               [2] XV

Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in any
State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other
State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State from which
he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of
the offence.

                              [2] XVI

Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures,
and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and
magistrates of every other State.

                              [2] XVII

New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of the
United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this Government;
but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present
in each House shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the
limits of any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures of
such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If the admission
be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with
the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the
new States, concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting.

                             [2] XVIII

The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form of
Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and,
on the application of its Legislature, against domestic violence.

                              [2] XIX

On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in
the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the
United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.

                               [2] XX

The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial officers
of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath
to support this Constitution.

                              [2] XXI

The ratifications of the Conventions of ______ States shall be
sufficient for organizing this Constitution.

                              [2] XXII

This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Congress
assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this
Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention
chosen, [12] under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to
receive the ratification of such Convention.

                              [2] XXIII

To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention, that
each assenting Convention should notify its assent and ratification to
the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after receiving
the assent and ratification of the Conventions of ______ States, should
appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place for
commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that after such
publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect members
of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the House of
Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature should meet at
the time and place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be,
after their meeting, choose the President of the United States, and
proceed to execute this Constitution."

A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give leisure to
examine the Report; which passed in the negative -- N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. Pa. ay. Md. ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. [13]

The House then adjourned till to morrow [14] II OC.

___________

1. Madison's printed copy is marked: "As Reported by Com. of Detail viz
of five. Aug. 6. 1787." It is a large folio of seven pages. In the
enumeration of the Articles by a misprint VI. was repeated, and the
alterations in Article VII, and succeeding articles were made by
Madison. In Sec. 11 of Article VI., as it was printed, it appeared: "The
enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. 'Be it
enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the House of Representatives, and
by the Senate of the United States, in Congress assembled."' which
Madison altered to read: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United
States shall be. 'Be it enacted by the Senate & representatives in
Congress assembled."' The printed copy among the Madison papers is a
duplicate of the copy filed by General Washington with the papers of the
Constitution, and Sec. 11 is there given as actually printed. Madison
accurately transcribed the report for his notes and it is this copy
which is used in the text.

2. The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "in" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "it" is crossed out and the word "they" is written above it
in the transcript.

5. Section 11 is copied in the transcript as originally printed. See
footnote 14 on p. 471.

6. The word "becomes" is substituted in the transcript for "become."

7. The letter "r" is stricken from the word "officer" in the transcript.

8. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The word "the" is changed to "that" in the transcript.

10. The syllable "ly" is added in the transcript to the word
"subsequent."

11. The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.

12. The phrase "in each State" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina,
South Carolina, no -- 5."

14. The word "at" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TEUSDAY  AUGUST 7th.   IN CONVENTION

The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,

Mr. PINKNEY moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This
was strongly opposed by Mr. GHORUM & several others, as likely to
produce unnecessary delay; and was negatived. Delaware Maryd & Virga
only being in the affirmative.

The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were Art: I & II.
[1]

Art: III. [2, 3] considered. Col. MASON doubted the propriety of giving
each branch a negative on the other "in all cases." There were some
cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the
case of balloting for appointments.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to insert "legislative acts" instead of "all
cases"

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ds. him.

Mr. SHERMAN. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It
will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots,
which he hoped would take place.

Mr. GHORUM contended that elections ought to be made by joint ballot. If
separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches
should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention &
confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Masts. in
the election of officers of little importance compared with the
Executive of the U. States. The only objection agst. a joint ballot is
that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought not
to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility & welfare.

Mr. WILSON was for a joint ballot in several cases at least;
particularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for the
amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & concerng. the
vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.

Col. MASON thought the amendment of Mr. Govr. Morris extended too far.
Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will be
therefore [4] subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be made as
proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual negative
should be restrained to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two
Houses.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought this but a repetition of the same thing; the
mutual negative and distinct assent, being equavalent expressions.
Treaties he thought were not laws.

Mr. MADISON moved to strike out the words "each of which shall in all
cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently
expressed in the preceding member of the article; vesting the
"legislative power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the respective
powers and mode of exercising them were fully delineated in a subsequent
article.

Genl. PINKNEY 2ded. the motion

On [5] question for inserting legislative Acts as moved by Mr. Govr.
Morris. [6]

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S.
C. no. Geo. no. [7]

On [5] question for agreeing to Mr. M's motion to strike out &c. -- N.
H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C.
ay. Geo. ay. [8]

Mr. MADISON wished to know the reasons of the Come. for fixing by ye.
Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested,
that it be required only that one meeting at least should be held every
year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out the sentence. It was improper to
tie down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to require a
meeting every year. The public business might not require it.

Mr. PINKNEY concurred with Mr. Madison.

Mr. GHORUM. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, disputes will
arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss to adjust
thereto, the times of their elections. In the N. England States the
annual time of meeting had been long fixed by their Charters &
Constitutions, and no inconveniency [9] had resulted. He thought it
necessary that there should be one meeting at least every year as a
check on the Executive department.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was agst. striking out the words. The Legislature will not
know till they are met whether the public interest required their
meeting or not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the
Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.

Mr. WILSON thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.

Mr. KING could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every
year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The
most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the
Natl. Legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce &
revenue. When these should be once settled, alterations would be rarely
necessary & easily made.

Mr. MADISON thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a law it
wd. be sufficiently fixed & there would be no difficulty then as had
been suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elections
to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate strongly agst.
fixing a time by the Constitution. It might happen that the Legislature
might be called together by the public exigencies & finish their Session
but a short time before the annual period. In this case it would be
extremely inconvenient to reassemble so quickly & without the least
necessity. He thought one annual meeting ought to be required; but did
not wish to make two unavoidable.

Col. MASON thought the objections against fixing the time insuperable:
but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essential to the
preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will supply
business. And if it should not, the Legislature, besides legislative, is
to have inquisitorial powers, which can not safely be long kept in a
state of suspension.

Mr. SHERMAN was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent
meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will arise
between the two Houses, & between both & the States, if the time be
changeable -- frequent meetings of Parliament were required at the
Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty. So also are
annual meetings in most of the American charters & constitutions. There
will be business eno' to require it. The Western Country, and the great
extent and varying state of our affairs in general will supply objects.

Mr. RANDOLPH was agst. fixing any day irrevocably; but as there was no
provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating the periods
of meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill the Legislature
shall make provision, he could not agree to strike out the words
altogether. Instead of which he moved to add the words following -- "
unless a different day shall be appointed by law." 

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion, & on the question N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct.
no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [10]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out Decr. & insert May. It might
frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in
Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which
intelligence would arrive in the Spring.

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion, he preferred May to Decr. because the
latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Govt. in the
most inconvenient seasons of the year.

Mr. WILSON. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. The summer will interfere too much with private business,
that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or
less connected with agriculture.

Mr. RANDOLPH. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature can
vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the States, he found that
the times of their elections with which the election [11] of the Natl.
Representatives would no doubt be made to co-incide, would suit better
with Decr. than May. And it was adviseable to render our innovations as
little incommodious as possible.

On [12] question for "May" instead of "Decr."

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C no. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [13]

Mr. READ moved to insert after the word "Senate" the words, "subject to
the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an
absolute negative to the Executive -- He considered this as so essential
to the Constitution, to the preservation of liberty, & to the public
welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the motion.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. him. And on the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no. [14]

Mr. RUTLIDGE. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of
the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be
freed from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at
least in every year," were inserted, nem. con.

Art. III with the foregoing alterations was agd. to nem. con. and is as
follows "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist
of 2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Reps. & a Senate The
Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting
shall be on the 1st. monday in Decr. unless a different day shall be
appointed by law."

"Art IV. Sect. 1. [15, 16] taken up."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out the last member of the section
beginning with the words "qualifications" of Electors," in order that
some other provision might be substituted which wd. restrain the right
of suffrage to freeholders.

Mr. FITZIMMONS 2ded. the motion

Mr. WILLIAMSON was opposed to it.

Mr. WILSON. This part of the Report was well considered by the
Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It
was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the
States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It
would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time,
to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded
from a vote for those in the Natl. Legislature.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The
people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of
the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of
the Govr. & [17] Representatives; In others for different Houses of the
Legislature. Another objection agst. the clause as it stands is that it
makes the qualifications of the Natl. Legislature depend on the will of
the States, which he thought not proper.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the
most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and
strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not
readily subscribe to the Natl. Constitution if it should subject them to
be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances &
temper of their own people.

Col. MASON. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those
gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States
have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders, what will
the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter
the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the
Legislature.

Mr. BUTLER. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than
that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in
Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the
Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.

Mr. DICKINSON. had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the
right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them
as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to
them as a necessary defence agst. the dangerous influence of those
multitudes without property & without principle with which our Country
like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the
innovation it was in his opinion chemirical. The great mass of our
Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased
with it.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man
who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose
of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear
a full share of the public burdens be not allowed a voice in the
imposition of them -- taxation & representation ought to go together.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The
sound of Aristocracy therefore had no effect on [18] him. It was the
thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal
objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that it
threatens this [19] Country with an Aristocracy. The aristocracy will
grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who
have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able
to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment.
The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics &
manufacturers [20] who will receive their bread from their employers.
Will such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they
be the impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy? -- He was as little duped
by the association of the words "taxation & Representation." The man who
does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who
dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want
prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the
dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not
conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable.
Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people
are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it.
As to Merchts. &c. if they have wealth & value the right they can
acquire it. If not they don't deserve it.

Col. MASON. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices,
and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the
qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only proper
one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of
attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to
share in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained
to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a
common interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property mark a
permanent attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of
a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own
Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be
trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens

Mr. MADISON. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental
articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be
regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has
been the mode in which Aristocracies have been built on the ruins of
popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a
freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a
change would meet with in [21] States where the right was now exercised
by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was
now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the
freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of
Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will
not only be without landed, but any other sort of, property. These will
either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which
case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in
their hands: or which [22] is more probable, they will become the tools
of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on
another side. The example of England had been misconceived [by Col
Mason]. A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen
by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs,
in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it in any of
the U. S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties,
that bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections
was most dangerously exerted. [23]

DOCr. FRANKLIN. It is of great consequence that we shd. not depress the
virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a
great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the
favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American
seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during
the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by
entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting
their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British
seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of
the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made
out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different
manner in which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain.
He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow
the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British
Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that
pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a
certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another
under the succeeding Parliamt. subjecting the people who had no votes to
peculiar labors & hardships. He was persuaded also that such a
restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous
States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves
freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are
a great many persons of the description.

Mr. MERCER. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in
none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the
qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the
people. The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates.
The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate
in Virga. as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their
votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over the
people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes
among a variety of candidates.

Mr. RUTLIDGE thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to
the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the
people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

On the question for striking out as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris, from the
word "qualifications" to the end of the III article. N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not
prest. [24]

Adjourned

___________

1. See ante.

2. See ante.

3. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The words "be therefore" are changed in the transcript to "therefore
be."

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The phrase "it passed in the negative, the votes being equally
divided," is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5"

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, no -- 3."

9. The word "inconveniency" is changed in the transcript to
"inconvenience."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; New Hampshire, Connecticut, no -- 2."

11. The word "election" is used in the plural in the transcript.

12. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: aye -- 1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9."

15. See ante.

16. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

17. The words "of the" are here inserted in the transcript.

18. The word "upon" is substituted in the transcript for "on."

19. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "this."

20. The word "manufacturers" is substituted in the transcript for
"manufactures."

21. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. The word "which" is crossed out in the transcript and "what" is
written above it.

23. In the transcript the following footnote is here added: "See
Appendix No. -- for a note of Mr. Madison to this speech."

24. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 7; Maryland, divided; Georgia, not
present"

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  AUGst 8.   IN CONVENTION

Art: IV. Sect. I. [1, 2] -- Mr. MERCER expressed his dislike of the
whole plan, and his opinion that it never could succeed.

Mr. GHORUM. he had never seen any inconveniency [3] from allowing such
as were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The
elections in Phila. N. York & Boston where the Merchants, & Mechanics
vote are at least as good as those made by freeholders only. The case in
England was not accurately stated yesterday [by Mr. Madison] The Cities
& large towns are not the seat of Crown influence & corruption. These
prevail in the Boroughs, and not on account of the right which those who
are not freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of the number who
vote. The people have been long accustomed to this right in various
parts of America, and will never allow it to be abridged. We must
consult their rooted prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our
propositions.

Mr. MERCER did not object so much to an election by the people at large
including such as were not freeholders, as to their being left to make
their choice without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates ought to be
nominated by the State Legislatures.

On [4] question for agreeing to Art: IV -- Sect. 1 it passd. nem. con.

Art IV. Sect. 2 1, 5 taken up.

Col. MASON was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse
to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us.
Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local
knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was
the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also
happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send
over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for
insidious purposes. He moved that "seven" years instead of "three," be
inserted.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. the Motion, & on the question, all the States
agreed to it except Connecticut.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out the word "resident" and insert
"inhabitant," as less liable to miscontruction.

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion, both were vague, but the latter least so
in common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent occasionally
for a considerable time on public or private business. Great disputes
had been raised in Virga. concerning the meaning of residence as a
qualification of Representatives which were determined more according to
the affection or dislike to the man in question, than to any fixt
interpretation of the word.

Mr. WILSON preferred "inhabitant."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, was opposed to both and for requiring nothing more
than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occasioned by these
terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority. Such a
regulation is not necessary. People rarely chuse a nonresident -- It is
improper as in the 1st. branch, the people at large, not the States, are
represented.

Mr. RUTLIDGE urged & moved that a residence of 7 years shd. be required
in the State Wherein the Member shd. be elected. An emigrant from N.
England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could
not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.

Mr. READ reminded him that we were now forming a Natil. Govt. and such a
regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one
people.

Mr. WILSON. enforced the same consideration.

Mr. MADISON suggested the case of new States in the West, which could
have perhaps no representation on that plan.

Mr. MERCER. Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among
the States [6] than existed under the old federal system. It would
interweave local prejudices & State distinctions in the very
Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned instances of
violent disputes raised in Maryland concerning the term "residence"

Mr. ELSEWORTH thought seven years of residence was by far too long a
term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be proper. He
thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no objection to
three years.

Mr. DICKENSON proposed that it should read "inhabitant actually resident
for ______ year. [7] This would render the meaning less indeterminate.

Mr. WILSON. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict
an expression might be construed to exclude the members of the
Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in their
States whilst at the Seat of the Genl. Government.

Mr. MERCER. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been
inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their
original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge could not in
such case [8] be presumed.

Mr. MASON thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to part with
the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it a defect in the
plan that the Representatives would be too few to bring with them all
the local knowledge necessary. If residence be not required, Rich men of
neighbouring States, may employ with success the means of corruption in
some particular district and thereby get into the public Councils after
having failed in their own State. [9] This is the practice in the
boroughs of England. 

On the question for postponing in order to consider Mr. Dickensons
motion.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [10]

On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in place of "resident" --
agd. to nem. con.

Mr. ELSEWORTH & Col. MASON move to insert "one year" for previous
inhabitancy

Mr. WILLIAMSON liked the Report as it stood. He thought "resident" a
good eno' term. He was agst. requiring any period of previous residence.
New residents if elected will be most zealous to Conform to the will of
their constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous
eye.

Mr. BUTLER & Mr. RUTLIDGE moved "three years" instead of "one year" for
previous inhabitancy

On the question for 3 years -- 

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [11]

On the question for "1 year"

N. H. no -- Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. divd. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

Art. IV. Sect. 2. As amended in manner preceding, was agreed to nem.
con.

Art: IV. Sect. 3." [13, 14] taken up.

Genl. PINKNEY & Mr. PINKNEY moved that the number of representatives
allotted to S. Carola. be "six" on the question, N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct.
no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware ay Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay. [15]

The 3. Sect. of Art: IV was then agreed to.

Art: IV. Sect. 4 [13, 14] taken up.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out "according to the provisions
hereinafter after made" and to insert the words "according "to the rule
hereafter to be provided for direct taxation" -- See Art. VII. sect. 3.
[16]

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Williamson's amendment

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [17]

Mr. KING wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant
[18] have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning the admission
of slaves into the rule of Representation. He could not reconcile his
mind to the article if it was to prevent objections to the latter part.
The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, &
he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had
not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped
that this concession would have produced a readiness which had not been
manifested, to strengthen the Genl. Govt. and to mark a full confidence
in it. The Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end
to all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the Legislature
were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be prohibited
-- exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are the great
objects of the Genl. System? 1. [19] defence agst. foreign invasion. 2.
[19] agst. internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound to
defend each; & shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which
will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the U. S. be bound
to defend another part, and that other part be at liberty not only to
increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation for the
burden? If slaves are to be imported shall not the exports produced by
their labor, supply a revenue the better to enable the Genl. Govt. to
defend their masters? -- There was so much inequality & unreasonableness
in all this, that the people of the Northern States could never be
reconciled to it. No candid man could undertake to justify it to them.
He had hoped that some accomodation wd. have taken place on this
subject; that at least a time wd. have been limited for the importation
of slaves. He never could agree to let them be imported without
limitation & then be represented in the Natl. Legislature. Indeed he
could so little persuade himself of the rectitude of such a practice,
that he was not sure he could assent to it under any circumstances. At
all events, either slaves should not be represented, or exports should
be taxable.

Mr. SHERMAN regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of
representation having been settled after much difficulty & deliberation,
he did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the
present article as amended did not preclude any arrangement whatever on
that point in another place of the Report.

Mr. MADISON objected to 1 for every 40,000, inhabitants as a perpetual
rule. The future increase of population if the Union shd. be permanent,
will render the number of Representatives excessive.

Mr. GHORUM. It is not to be supposed that the Govt. will last so long as
to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country
including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?

Mr. ELSEWORTH. If the Govt. should continue so long, alterations may be
made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subsequent article.

Mr. SHERMAN & Mr. MADISON moved to insert the words "not exceeding"
before the words "1 for every 40,000, which was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to insert "free" before the word inhabitants.
Much he said would depend on this point. He never would concur in
upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the
curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free
regions of the Middle States, where a rich & noble cultivation marks the
prosperity & happiness of the people, with the misery & poverty which
overspread the barren wastes of Va. Maryd. & the other States having
slaves. Travel thro' ye. whole Continent & you behold the prospect
continually varying with the appearance & disappearance of slavery. The
moment you leave ye. E. Sts. & enter N. York, the effects of the
institution become visible, passing thro' the Jerseys & entering Pa.
every criterion of superior improvement witnesses the change. Proceed
south wdly & every step you take thro' ye. great region of slaves
presents a desert increasing, with ye. increasing proportion of these
wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be
computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens
and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property
included? The Houses in this city [Philada.] are worth more than all the
wretched slaves which cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The
admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes
to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast
of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears
away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to
the most cruel bondages, [20] shall have more votes in a Govt.
instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of
Pa. or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a
practice. He would add that Domestic slavery is the most prominent
feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution.
The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite offspring of
Aristocracy. And What is the proposed compensation to the Northern
States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of
humanity. They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the
defence of the S. States; for their defence agst. those very slaves of
whom they complain. They must supply vessels & seamen in case of foreign
Attack. The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by
excises, and duties on imports: both of which will fall heavier on them
than on the Southern inhabitants; for the bohea tea used by a Northern
freeman, will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable
slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and
the rag that covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern States
are not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched
Africans, at once to increase the danger of attack, and the difficulty
of defence; nay they are to be encouraged to it by an assurance of
having their votes in the Natl. Govt. increased in proportion, and are
at the same time to have their exports & their slaves exempt from all
contributions for the public service. Let it not be said that direct
taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose
that the Genl. Govt. can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of
the people scattered over so vast a Country. They can only do it through
the medium of exports imports & excises. For what then are all these
sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a tax for
paying for all the negroes in the U. States, than saddle posterity with
such a Constitution.

Mr. DAYTON 2ded. the motion. He did it he said that his sentiments on
the subject might appear whatever might be the fate of the amendment.

Mr. SHERMAN. did not regard the admission of the Negroes into the ratio
of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the
freemen of the Southn. States who were in fact to be represented
according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only included
in the Estimate of the taxes. This was his idea of the matter.

Mr. PINKNEY, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more
burdensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could be
demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.

Mr. WILSON. thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause
would be no bar to the object of it.

[21] Question On [22] motion to insert "free" before "inhabitants."

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [23]

On the suggestion of Mr. DICKENSON the words, "provided that each State
shall have one representative at least." -- were added nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. as amended was agreed to nem. con.

Art. IV. Sect. 5. [24, 25] taken up

Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving no peculiar advantage
to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Govt. If the Senate
can be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be
trusted with that of originating money bills. 

Mr. GHORUM. was agst. allowing the Senate to originate; but [26] only to
amend.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. It is particularly proper that the Senate shd. have
the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will
consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with
due correctness; and so as to prevent delay of business in the other
House.

Col. MASON was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out
the section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part. The
duration of the Senate made it improper. He does not object to that
duration. On the Contrary he approved of it. But joined with the
smallness of the number, it was an argument against adding this to the
other great powers vested in that body. His idea of an Aristocracy was
that it was the governt. of the few over the many. An aristocratic body,
like the screw in mechanics, workig. its way by slow degrees, and
holding fast whatever it gains, should ever be suspected of an
encroaching tendency. The purse strings should never be put into its
hands.

Mr. MERCER. considered the exclusive power of originating Money bills as
so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes in the Senate
ideal & of no consequence.

Mr. BUTLER was for adhering to the principle which had been settled.

Mr. WILSON was opposed to it on its merits without regard to the
compromise

Mr. ELSEWORTH did not think the clause of any consequence, but as it was
thought of consequence by some members from the larger States, he was
willing it should stand.

Mr. MADISON was for striking it out: considering it as of no advantage
to the large States as fettering the Govt. and as a source of injurious
altercations between the two Houses.

On the question for striking out "Sect. 5. Art. IV" N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay. [27]

___________

1. See ante.

2. The words "being under consideration" are here inserted in the
transcript.

3. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. The phrase "among the States" is omitted in the transcript.

7. The transcript uses the word "year" in the plural.

8. The transcript uses the word "case" in the plural.

9. The transcript uses the word "State" in the plural.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
2; New Hampshire, MAssachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 9."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: New Jersey, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no -- 6; Maryland, divided."

13. See ante.

14. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: Delaware, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
new Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 7."

16. See ante.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 2."

18. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the
transcript.

20. The transcript uses the word "bondages" in the singular.

21. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

22. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. In the transcript the vote reads: New Jersey, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

24. See ante.

25. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

26. The words "was for allowing it" are here inserted in the transcript.

27. In the transcript the vote reads: New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no -- 4."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY  AUGst 9.   IN CONVENTION

Art: IV. Sect. 6. [1, 2] Mr. RANDOLPH expressed his dissatisfaction at
the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as
endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in
itself; and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration of the
vote.

Mr. WILLIAMSON said he had formed a like intention.

Mr. WILSON, gave notice that he shd. move to reconsider the vote,
requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification
of candidates for the House of Representatives.

Art. IV. Sect. 6 & 7. [1, 3] Agreed to nem. con.

Art. V. Sect I. [4, 5] taken up.

Mr. WILSON objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the
Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will
meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people;
the Executives in most of the States being elected by the Legislatures.
As he had always thought the appointment of the Executives 6 by the
Legislative department wrong: so it was still more so that the Executive
should elect into the Legislative department.

Mr. RANDOLPH thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient
chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet but once a
year. As the Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller number
than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The
Executives might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for
so short a time.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. It is only said that the Executive may supply the [7]
vacancies. When the Legislative meeting happens to be near, the power
will not be exerted. As there will be but two members from a State
vacancies may be of great moment.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is
therefore absolutely necessary.

On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by [8]
Executives

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no. [9]

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the
Executives," the following [10] words "unless other provision shall be
made by the Legislature" [of the State].

Mr. ELSEWORTH. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the Executive
of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer
appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased.

[11] Question on Mr. Williamson's motion N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N.
J. no. Pa. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

Mr. MADISON in order to prevent doubts whether resignations, could be
made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to
strike out the words after "vacancies," & insert the words "happening by
refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise may be supplied by the
Legislature of the State in the representation of which such vacancies
shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until the next meeting of the
Legislature"

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as members
chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to any
office by Sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature
by appointing a man a Senator agst. his consent to deprive the U. S. of
his services.

The motion of Mr. Madison was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. RANDOLPH called for division of the Section, so as to leave a
distinct question on the last words "each member shall have one vote."
He wished this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration
should have taken place on Sect. 5. Art. IV. concerning money bills. If
that section should not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the
representation in the Senate.

Mr. STRONG concurred in Mr. Randolphs ideas on this point.

Mr. READ did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage
to the larger States and had voted for striking it out as being viewed
in the same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as
of any value, and as a condition of the equality of votes in the Senate,
he had no objection to its being re-instated.

Mr. WILSON -- Mr. ELSEWORTH & Mr. MADISON urged that it was of no
advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous source
of contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the
Natl. Legislature had some relation to money.

DOCr. FRANKLIN, considered the two clauses, the originating of money
bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as essentially connected
by the compromise which had been agreed to.

Col. MASON said this was not the time for discussing this point. When
the originating of money bills shall be reconsidered, he thought it
could be demonstrated that it was of essential importance to restrain
the right to the House of Representatives the immediate choice of the
people.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. The State of N. C. had agreed to an equality in the
Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to
the other House: and he was surprised to see the Smaller States
forsaking the condition on which they had received their equality.

[13] Question on the Section I. [14] down to the last sentence

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no [15] Del. ay. Md. ay. Virga
ay N. C. no. S. C. divd. Geo. ay. [16]

Mr. RANDOLPH moved that the last sentence "each member shall have one
vote." be postponed

It was observed that this could not be necessary; as in case the section
as to originating [17] bills should not be reinstated, and a revision of
the Constitution should ensue, it wd. still be proper that the members
should vote per Capita. A postponement of the preceding sentence
allowing to each State 2 members wd. have been more proper

Mr. MASON, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of voting per
capita in any event. But as there might be other modes proposed, he saw
no impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State may have two
members, and yet may have unequal votes. He said that unless the
exclusive [18] orginating of money bills should be restored to the House
of Representatives, he should, not from obstinacy, but duty and
conscience, oppose throughout the equality of Representation in the
Senate.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed to the
smaller States in order to alarm them for their equality in the Senate,
and induce them agst. their judgments, to concur in restoring the
section concerning money bills. He would declare in his turn that as he
saw no prospect of amending the Constitution of the Senate & considered
the section relating to money bills as intrinsically bad, he would
adhere to the section establishing the equality at all events.

Mr. WILSON. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section
concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The fact was
that two of those States [Pa. & Va.] had uniformly voted agst. it
without reference to any other part of the system.

Mr. RANDOLPH, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence under
consideration was connected with that relating to Money bills, and might
possibly be affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering the
latter. That the postponement was therefore not improper.

[19] Question for postponing "each member shall have one vote."

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [20]

The words were then agreed to as part of the section.

Mr. RANDOLPH then gave notice that he should move to reconsider this
whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected with the 5. Sect. art. IV. as to
which he had already given such notice.

Art. V. Sect. 2d. [21, 22] taken up.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to insert after the words "immediately after,"
the following "they shall be assembled in consequence of -- " which was
agreed to nem. con. as was then the whole Sect. 2. [23]

Art: V. Sect. 3. [21, 24] taken up.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a
qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting strangers
into our public Councils. Mr. PINKNEY 2 ds him

Mr. ELSEWORTH. was opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious
aliens from emigrating to this Country.

Mr. PINKNEY. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties &
managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety
in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the
jealousy of the Athenians on this subject who made it death for any
stranger to intrude his voice into their Legislative proceedings.

Col. MASON highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that
many not natives of this Country had acquired great merit [25] during
the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the
Senate, to natives.

Mr. MADISON, was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but
could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction
however in the Constitution unnecessary, and improper. unnecessary;
because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the right of regulating
naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of
residence as conditions of enjoying different privileges of Citizenship:
Improper; because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the
Constitution: because it will put it out of the power of the Nat1
Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to confer the full
rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers & because it will discourage
the most desireable class of people from emigrating to the U. S. Should
the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving stability &
reputation to our Govts. great numbers of respectable Europeans: men who
love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to
transfer their fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of
being marked with suspicious incapacitations though they sd. not covet
the public honors He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of
strangers would be appointed by the State Legislatures, if they were
left at liberty to do so: nor that foreign powers would made use of
strangers as instruments for their purposes. Their bribes would be
expended on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite
jealousy & watchfulness in the public.

Mr. BUTLER was decidely opposed to the admission of foreigners without a
long residence in the Country. They bring with them, not only
attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours
that in every point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if
he himself had been called into public life within a short time after
his coming to America, his foreign habits opinions & attachments would
have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the
great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject.

DOCr. FRANKLIN was not agst. a reasonable time, but should be very sorry
to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. The
people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the Country with
which we have been lately at war, we have now & had during the war, a
great many friends not only among the people at large but in both houses
of Parliament. In every other Country in Europe all the people are our
friends. We found in the course of the Revolution that many strangers
served us faithfully -- and that many natives took part agst. their
Country. When foreigners after looking about for some other Country in
which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours it is a
proof of attachment which ought to excite our confidence & affection.

Mr. RANDOLPH did not know but it might be problematical whether
emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful or not: but be
could never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to
participate in the public honours. He reminded the Convention of the
language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles
laid down in all our American Constitutions. Many foreigners may have
fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of these invitations. All
persons under this description, with all others who would be affected by
such a regulation, would enlist themselves under the banners of
hostility to the proposed System. He would go as far as seven years, but
no farther.

Mr. WILSON said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar;
mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the
possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his
being incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution,
which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal
complexion which the motion would give to the System, & the effect which
a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us,
and the discouragement & mortification they must feel from the degrading
discrimination, now proposed. He had himself experienced this
mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found himself, from
defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities which never ceased
to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire & would not have
accepted the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place
may be matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed, is a
circumstance grating and mortifying.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed
as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible. What
is the language of Reason on this subject? That we should not be polite
at the expence of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is
said that some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality so far as to
offer to strangers their wives & daughters. Was this a proper model for
us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them to his table,
would provide for them confortable lodgings; but would not carry the
complaisance so far as, to bed them with his wife. He would let them
worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make Priests of them.
He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though
they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices
of Government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to
foreigners in any part of the world; and that as every Society from a
great nation down to a club had the right of declaring the conditions on
which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for
complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the
World as they call themselves, He owned he did not wish to see any of
them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The men who can
shake off their attachments to their own Country can never love any
other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all
Governments, Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to
increase the commerce of France: an Englishman, [26] he will feel an
equal biass in favor of that of England. It has been said that The
Legislatures will not chuse foreigners, at least improper ones. There
was no knowing what Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by
them, proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals
practised on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who
left this State in disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from
another to Congress.

[27] Question on the motion of Mr. GOVr. MORRIS to insert 14 in place of
4 years

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [28]

On 13 years, moved Mr. Govr. Morris [29]

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

On 10 years moved by Genl. PINKNEY [30]

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay.

Geo. ay.

Dr. FRANKLIN reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an
omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution that the persons
in question wd. be actually chosen into the Legislature.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of
Representatives. Surely a longer term is requisite for the Senate, which
will have more power.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case
than the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily practised in
the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures
composed of a few men, than of the House of Represents. who will be
chosen by the people.

Mr. RANDOLPH will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be
reduced to seven if Mr. Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7
years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of
that period.

On a [31] question for 9 years.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [32]

The term "Resident" was struck out, & "inhabitant" inserted nem. con.

Art. V Sect. 3, as amended [33] agreed to nem. con.

Sect. 4. [34] agreed to nem. con. [35]

Art. VI. sect. I. [34, 36] taken up.

Mr. MADISON & Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "each House" & to
insert "the House of Representatives"; the right of the Legislatures to
regulate the times & places &c in the election of Senators being
involved in the right of appointing them, which was disagreed to.

[37] Division of the question being called, [38] it was taken on the
first part down to "but their provisions concerning &c"

The first part was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out the remaining part viz
but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the
Legislature of the United States." The States they contended could &
must be relied on in such cases.

Mr. GHORUM. It would be as improper [39] take this power from the Natl
Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the
circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties
themselves -- 

Mr. MADISON. The necessity of a Genl. govt. supposes that the State
Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common
interest at the expence of their local conveniency [40] or prejudices.
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives
to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that
the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the
question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not
to have the uncontrouled right of regulating the times places & manner
of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was
impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the
discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva
voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided
into districts or all meet at one place, shd. all vote for all the
representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the
district; these & many other points would depend on the Legislatures,
and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State
Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to
mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to
succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the
Legislatures of particular States, would produce a like inequality in
their representation in the Natl. Legislature, as it was presumable that
the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to
themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a
controuling power to the Natl. Legislature? Of whom was it to consist?
1. [41] of a Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the
latter therefore could be trusted, their representatives could not be
dangerous. 2. [41] of Representatives elected by the same people who
elect the State Legislatures; surely then if confidence is due to the
latter, it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in
principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to
the State Legislatures this great authority over the election of the
Representatives of the people in the Genl. Legislature, as it would be
to give to the latter a like power over the election of their
Representatives in the State Legislatures.

Mr. KING. If this power be not given to the Natl. Legislature, their
right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No
probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Altho this
scheme of erecting the Genl. Govt. on the authority of the State
Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem
as if many gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS -- observed that the States might make false returns
and then make no provisions for new elections Mr. SHERMAN did not know
but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself
sufficient confidence in the State Legislatures. The motion of Mr. P.
and Mr. R. did not prevail -- The word "respectively" was inserted after
the word "State" On the motion of Mr. Read the word "their" was struck
out, & "regulations in such cases" inserted in place of "provisions
concerning them." the clause then reading -- " but regulations in each
of the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or altered by the
Legislature of the U.S" This was meant to give the Natl. Legislature a
power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make
regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

Art. VI. Sect. 1. as thus amended was agreed to nem. con.

Adjourned.

___________

1. See ante.

2. The words "was taken up" are here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "were" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. See ante.

5. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "Executives" is in the singular in the transcript.

7. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8; Maryland, divided."

10. The word "following" is omitted in the transcript.

11. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no -- 6."

13. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

14. The words "first section" are substituted for "Section 1" in the
transcript.

15. In the printed Journal Pensylvania. ay.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 7; Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, [15] North Carolina, no -- 3; South Carolina, divided."

17. The word "money" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The words "right of" are here inserted in the transcript.

19. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: Virginia, North Carolina, aye --
2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8; New Hampshire, divided."

21. See p. -- .

22. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

23. The figure "2" is omitted in the transcript.

24. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

25. The word "credit" is substituted in the transcript for "merit."

26. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

27. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

28. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 7."

29. In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: "On the question
for thirteen years, moved by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, it was negatived, as
above." The vote by States is omitted.

30. The phrase "the votes were the same," is here inserted in the
transcript, and the vote by States is omitted.

31. In the transcript the word "a" is stricken out and "the" is written
above it.

32. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no -- 4; North Carolina, devided."

33. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript

34. See ante.

35. In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: "Article 5, Sect.
4 was agreed to nem. con."

36. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

37. The words "A" is here inserted in the transcript.

38. The word "for" is here inserted in the transcript.

39. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

40. The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the transcript.

41. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the
transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  AUGst 10.   IN CONVENTION

Art. VI. Sect. 2. [1, 2] taken up.

Mr. PINKNEY. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to report
the proper qualifications of property for the members of the Natl.
Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the Natl.
Legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first
Legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property:
and if it should happen to consist of rich men they might fix such such
qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an
opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment
of an undue aristocratic influence in the Constitution but he thought it
essential that the members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the
Judges, should be possessed of competent property to make them
independent & respectable. It was prudent when such great powers were to
be trusted to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in
securing a faithful administration. The Legislature would have the fate
of the Nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very
great influence on it. The Judges would have not only [3] important
causes between Citizen & Citizen but also, where foreigners are
concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the U. States and
individual States as well as between one State & another. Were he to fix
the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of
less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that
sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of
the Natl. Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion
was that the President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of the
Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively
possessed of a cleared [4] unincumbered Estate to the amount of _____ in
the case of the President &c &c.

Mr. RUTLIDGE seconded the motion; observing that the Committee had
reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among
themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing
the people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them
nugatory by making them low.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. The different circumstances of different parts of the U.
S. and the probable difference between the present and future
circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either uniform or
fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S.
States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the
latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner
what may be accomodated to the existing State of things among us, may be
very inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought for these
reasons that it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative
discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution.
DOCtr. FRANKLIN expressed his dislike of [5] every thing that tended to
debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the
companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation,
it was not less true that the possession of property increased the
desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever
acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember the
character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should be
men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and
attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to the
rich, will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and
enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing
into [6] this Country.

The Motion of Mr. Pinkney was rejected by so general a no, that the
States were not called. 

Mr. MADISON was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper &
dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and
elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be
fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of
either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the
number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect. In
all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal
interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same
reason for being jealous of them, as there was for relying on them with
full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the
former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own
wages, or their own privileges. It was a power also which might be made
subservient to the views of one faction agst. another. Qualifications
founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in
order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.

Mr. ELSEWORTH, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he
could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors
would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order
to leave the Legislature entirely at large.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. This could [7] surely never be admitted. Should a
majority of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of
men, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the
future elections might be secured to their own body. Mr. MADISON
observed that the British Parliamt. possessed the power of regulating
the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse
they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made
the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the
views of political or Religious parties.

[8] Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. [9] Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [10]

Mr. RUTLIDGE was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature. He
proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of
the State Legislatures.

Mr. WILSON thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go
out. A uniform rule would probably be never [11] fixed by the
Legislature, and this particular power would constructively exclude
every other power of regulating qualifications.

On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2d. -- N. H. ay. Mas. ay.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[12]

On Motion of Mr. Wilson to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 2; so as to restore
3 in place of seven years of citizenship as a qualification for being
elected into the House of Represents. 

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [13]

Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration: all the States
being ay. except Massts. & Georgia

Art: VI. Sect. 3. [14, 15] taken up.

Mr. GHORUM contended that less than a Majority in each House should be
made of [16] Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in business, and
great inconvenience from the future increase of numbers.

Mr. MERCER was also for less than a majority. So great a number will put
it in the power of a few by seceding at a critical moment to introduce
convulsions, and endanger the Governmt. Examples of secession have
already happened in some of the States. He was for leaving it to the
Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite
number is small & no inconveniency [17] has been experienced.

Col. MASON. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan. In this
extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would
be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of
the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always take care
to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or
wearying their patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures
as they pleased. He admitted that inconveniences might spring from the
secession of a small number: But he had also known good produced by an
apprehension, of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that
cause in Virginia. He thought the Constitution as now moulded was
founded on sound principles, and was disposed to put into it extensive
powers. At the same time he wished to guard agst. abuses as much as
possible. If the Legislature should be able to reduce the number at all,
it might reduce it as low as it pleased & the U. States might be
governed by a Juncto -- A majority of the number which had been agreed
on, was so few that he feared it would be made an objection agst. the
plan.

Mr. KING admitted there might be some danger of giving an advantage to
the Central States; but was of opinion that the public inconveniency
[17] on the other side was more to be dreaded.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to fix the quorum at 33 members in the H. of
Reps. & 14 in the Senate. This is a majority of the present number, and
will be a bar to the Legislature: fix the number low and they will
generally attend knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence.
the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a
quorum. Such events in the States may have been of little consequence.
In the national Councils, they may be fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if
a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular
part of the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by
threatening a secession, some unjust & selfish measure.

Mr. MERCER 2ded. the motion

Mr. KING said he had just prepared a motion which instead of fixing the
numbers proposed by Mr. Govr. Morris as Quorums, made those the lowest
numbers, leaving the Legislature at liberty to increase them or not. He
thought the future increase of members would render a majority of the
whole extremely cumbersome.

Mr. MERCER agreed to substitute Mr. Kings motion in place of Mr.
Morris's.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground of
confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them,
by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution proposed to
give such a discretion with regard to the number of Representatives that
a very incovenient number was not to be apprehended. The inconveniency
[18] of secessions may be guarded agst. by giving to each House an
authority to require the attendance of absent members.

Mr. WILSON concurred in the sentiments of Mr. Elseworth.

Mr. GERRY seemed to think that some further precautions than merely
fixing the quorum might be necessary. He observed that as 17 wd. be a
majority of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might by possibility
be carried in the H. of Reps. by 2 large States, and in the Senate by
the same States with the aid of two small ones. -- He proposed that the
number for a quorum in the H. of Reps. should not exceed 50 nor be less
than 33, leaving the intermediate discretion to the Legislature.

Mr. KING, as the quorum could not be altered witht. the concurrence of
the President by less than 2/3 of each House, he thought there could be
no danger in trusting the Legislature.

Mr. CARROL this will be no security agst. a continuance of the quorums
at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased.

On [19] question on Mr. Kings motion "that not less than 33 in the H. of
Reps. nor less than 14 in the Senate shd. constitute a Quorum, which may
be increased by a law, on additions to [19] members in either House.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [20]

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MADISON moved to add to the end of Art. VI. Sect 3.
"and may be authorised to compel the attendance of absent members in
such manner & under such penalties as each House may provide." Agreed to
by all except Pena. which was divided.

Art: VI. Sect. 3. [21] agreed to as amended Nem. con. Agreed to nem.
con. [23]

Sect. 4. [22]

Sect. 5. [22]

Mr. MADISON observed that the right of expulsion (Art. VI. Sect. 6.)
[22] was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum:
and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved that
"with the concurrence of 2/3 " might be inserted between may & expel.

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MASON approved the idea.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. This power may be safely trusted to a majority. To
require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men
from factious motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.

Mr. CARROL thought that the concurrence of 2/3 at least ought to be
required.

On the question for [24] requiring 2/3 in cases of expelling a member.
[25]

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [25]

Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended [26] agreed to nem. con. Art: VI.
Sect. 7 [26, 22] taken up.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS urged that if the yeas & nays were proper at all any
individual ought to be authorised to call for them: and moved an
amendment to that effect. -- The small States may otherwise be under a
disadvantage, and find it difficult, to get a concurrence of 1/5

Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. ye. motion.

Mr. SHERMAN had rather strike out the yeas & nays altogether. They never
have done any good, and have done much mischief. They are not proper as
the reasons governing the voter never appear along with them.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was of the same opinion.

Col. MASON liked the Section as it stood. it was a middle way between
the two extremes.

Mr. GHORUM was opposed to the motion for allowing a single member to
call the yeas & nays, and recited the abuses of it, in Massts. 1 [27] in
stuffing the journals with them on frivolous occasions. 2 [27] in
misleading the people who never know the reasons determining the votes.

The motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays was
disagd. to nem. con.

Mr. CARROL & Mr. RANDOLPH moved Here insert the motion at the bottom of
page [*9, 28]

[*9] to strike out the words "each House" and to insert the words "the
House of Representatives" in Sect. 7. Art. 6. and to add to the Section
the words "and any member of the Senate shall be at liberty to enter his
dissent."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. WILSON observed that if the minority were to have
a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would have a
right to complain, if it were not extended to them: & to allow it to
both, would fill the Journals, like the records of a Court, with
replications, rejoinders &c.

[29] Question on Mr. Carrols motion to allow a member to enter his
dissent

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [30]

Mr. GERRY moved to strike out the words "when it shall be acting in its
legislative capacity" in order to extend the provision to the Senate
when exercising its peculiar authorities and to insert "except such
parts thereof as in their judgment require secrecy" after the words
"publish them." -- [It was thought by others that provision should be
made with respect to these when that part came under consideration which
proposed to vest those additional authorities in the Senate.]

On this question for striking out the words "when acting in its
Legislative capacity"

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [31]

Adjourned 

___________

1. See ante.

2. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The words "have not only" are transposed in the transcript to read
"not only have."

4. The word "clear" is substituted in the transcript for "cleared."

5. The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "of."

6. The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "into."

7. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "could."

8. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

9. In the printed Journal Delaware did not vote.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Georgia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware,
[9] Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 7."

11. In the transcript the words "be never" are transposed to read "never
be."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Georgia, aye -- 3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 7."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 6; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5."

14. See ante.

15. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the word "of" is crossed out and "a" is written
above it.

17. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

18. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

19. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware, aye --
2; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no. -- 9."

21. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. See ante.

23. In the transcript this reads as follows: "Sections 4 and 5, of
Article 6, were then agreed to, nem. con."

24. The word "for" is omitted in the transcript.

25. In the transcript the vote by States is omitted and the following
sentence is inserted: "ten States were in the affirmative, Pennsylvania,
divided."

26. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

27. The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the
transcript.

28. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

29. The words "On the " are here inserted in the transcript.

30. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, Virginia, South
Carolina, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

31. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, no -- 3; New Hampshire, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  AUGst 11.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. MADISON & Mr. RUTLIDGE moved "that each House shall keep a journal
of its proceeding, [1] & shall publish the same from time to time;
except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting not in
its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to require
secrecy."

Mr. MERCER. This implies that other powers than legislative will be
given to the Senate which he hoped would not be given. Mr. Madison & Mr.
R's motion. was disagd. to by all the States except Virga.

Mr. GERRY & Mr. SHARMAN moved to insert after the words "publish them"
the following "except such as relate to treaties & military operations."
Their object was to give each House a discretion in such cases. -- On
this question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Va. no. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no. [2]

Mr. ELSEWORTH. As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes, it may
as well be struck out altogether. The Legislature will not fail to
publish their proceedings from time to time. The people will call for it
if it should be improperly omitted.

Mr. WILSON thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper.
The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have
done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal
their proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in the existing
confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the
reform with a pretext by which week & suspicious minds may be easily
misled.

Mr. MASON thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a
conclave of their Legislature.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the Legislature might be trusted in this case if in
any.

[3] Question on [4] 1st. part of the section down to "publish them"
inclusive: 5 Agreed to nem. con.

[3] Question on the words to follow, to wit except such parts thereof as
may in their Judgment require secrecy." N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N.
J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [6]

The remaining part as to yeas & nays, -- [7] agreed to nem. con.

Art VI. Sect. 8. [8, 9] taken up.

Mr. KING remarked that the section authorized the 2 Houses to adjourn to
a new place. He thought this inconvenient. The mutability of place had
dishonored the federal Govt. and would require as strong a cure as we
could devise. He thought a law at least should be made necessary to a
removal of the Seat of Govt. Mr. MADISON, viewed the subject in the same
light, and joined with Mr. King in a motion requiring a law.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS proposed the additional alteration by inserting the
words "during the Session" &c."

Mr. SPAIGHT. this will fix the seat of Govt. at N. Y. The present
Congress will convene them there in the first instance, and they will
never be able to remove; especially if the Presidt. should be [10]
Northern Man.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS such a distrust is inconsistent with all Govt.

Mr. MADISON supposed that a central place for the seat of Govt. was so
just and wd. be so must insisted on by the H. of Representatives, that
though a law should be made requisite for the purpose, it could & would
be obtained. The necessity of a central residence of the Govt. wd. be
much greater under the new than old Govt. The members of the new Govt.
wd. be more numerous. They would be taken more from the interior parts
of the States; they wd. not like members of ye. present Congs. come so
often from the distant States by water. As the powers & objects of the
new Govt. would be far greater yn. heretofore, more private individuals
wd. have business calling them to the seat of it, and it was more
necessary that the Govt. should be in that position from which it could
contemplate with the most equal eye, and sympathize most equally with,
every part of the nation. These considerations he supposed would extort
a removal even if a law were made necessary. But in order to quiet
suspicions both within & without doors, it might not be amiss to
authorize the 2 Houses by a concurrent vote to adjourn at their first
meeting to the most proper place, and to require thereafter, the
sanction of a law to their removal.

The motion was accordingly moulded into the following form -- "the
Legislature shall at their first assembling determine on a place at
which their future sessions shall be held; neither House shall
afterwards, during the session of the House of Reps. without the consent
of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor shall they adjourn
to any other place than such as shall have been fixt by law"

Mr. GERRY thought it would be wrong to let the Presidt. check the will
of the 2 Houses on this subject at all

Mr. WILLIAMSON supported the ideas of Mr. Spaight

Mr. CARROL was actuated by the same apprehensions

Mr. MERCER, it will serve no purpose to require the two Houses at their
first meeting to fix on a place. They will never agree. After some
further expressions from others denoting an apprehension that the seat
of Govt. might be continued at an improper place if a law should be made
necessary to a removal, and [11] the motion above stated with another
for recommitting the section had been negatived, the section was left in
the shape it which it was reported as to this point. The words "during
the session of the Legislature were prefixed to the 8th section -- and
the last sentence "But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate
when it shall exercise the powers mention [12] in the _____ article"
struck struck out. The 8th. section as amended was then agreed to.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved according to notice to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 5.
[13] concerning money-bills which had been struck out. He argued 1. [14]
that he had not wished for this privilege whilst a proportional
Representation in the Senate was in contemplation, but since an equality
had been fixed in that house, the large States would require this
compensation at least. 2. [14] that it would make the plan more
acceptable to the people, because they will consider the Senate as the
more aristocratic body, and will expect that the usual guards agst. its
influence [15] be provided according to the example in [16] G. Britain.
3. [14] the privilege will give some advantage to the House of Reps. if
it extends to the originating only -- but still more, if it restrains
the Senate from amendg. 4. [14] he called on the smaller States to
concur in the measure, as the condition by which alone the compromise
had entitled them to an equality in the Senate. He signified that he
should propose instead of the original Section, a clause specifying that
the bills in question should be for the purpose of Revenue, in order to
repel ye. objection agst. the extent of the words "raising money," which
might happen incidentally, and that the Senate should not so amend or
alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in order to obviate the
inconveniences urged agst. a restriction of the Senate to a simple
affirmative or negative.

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion

Mr. PINKNEY was sorry to oppose the opportunity gentlemen asked to have
the question again opened for discussion, but as he considered it a mere
waste of time he could not bring himself to consent to it. He said that
notwithstanding what had been said as to the compromise, he always
considered this section as making no part of it. The rule of
Representation in the 1st. branch was the true condition of that in the
2d. branch. -- Several others spoke for & agst. the reconsideration, but
without going into the merits -- On the Question to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. [17] ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geo. ay. -- [18] Monday was then assigned --
[19]

Adjd.

___________

1. The transcript uses the word "proceeding" in the plural.

2. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, aye --
2; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

3. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The words "it was" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, no -- 4; New Hampshire, divided."

7. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. See ante.

9. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

10. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "after" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "mentioned" is substituted in the transcript for "mention."

13. See ante.

14. The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed in the transcript to
"first," "Secondly" etc.

15. The word "will' is here inserted in the transcript.

16. The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "in".

17. In the printed Journal N. Jersey -- No.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, [17] Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Maryland, no -- 1; South Carolina,
divided."

19. The words "for the reconsideration" are here inserted in the
transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  AUGst 13.   IN CONVENTION

Art. IV. Sect. 2 [1, 2] reconsidered -- 

Mr. WILSON & Mr. RANDOLPH moved to strike out "7 years" and insert "4
years," as the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of
Reps. Mr. Wilson said it was very proper the electors should govern
themselves by this consideration; but unnecessary & improper that the
Constitution should chain them down to it.

Mr. GERRY wished that in future the eligibility might be confined to
Natives. Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no
expence to influence them. Persons having foreign attachments will be
sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be made
instruments for their purposes. Every one knows the vast sums laid out
in Europe for secret services. He was not singular in these ideas. A
great many of the most influencial men in Massts. reasoned in the same
manner.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert 9 years instead of seven. He wished this
Country to acquire as fast as possible national habits. Wealthy
emigrants do more harm by their luxurious examples, than good, by the
money, they bring with them.

Col. HAMILTON was in general agst. embarrassing the Govt. with minute
restrictions. There was on one side the possible danger that had been
suggested. On the other side, the advantage of encouraging foreigners
was obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be
fond of coming here where they will be on a level with the first
Citizens. He moved that the section be so altered as to require merely
citizenship & inhabitancy. The right of determining the rule of
naturalization will then leave a discretion to the Legislature on this
subject which will answer every purpose.

Mr. MADISON seconded the motion. He wished to maintain the character of
liberality which had been professed in all the Constitutions &
publications of America. He wished to invite foreigners of merit &
republican principles among us. America was indebted to emigrations for
her settlement & Prosperity. That part of America which had encouraged
them most had advanced most rapidly in population, agriculture & the
arts. There was a possible danger he admitted that men with foreign
predilections might obtain appointments but it was by no means probable
that it would happen in any dangerous degree. For the same reason that
they would be attached to their native Country, our own people wd.
prefer natives of this Country to them. Experience proved this to be the
case. Instances were rare of a foreigner being elected by the people
within any short space after his coming among us. If bribery was to be
practised by foreign powers, it would not be attempted among the
electors but among the elected; and among natives having full Confidence
of the people not among strangers who would be regarded with a jeoulous
eye.

Mr. WILSON, cited Pennsylva. as a proof of the advantage of encouraging
emigrations. It was perhaps the youngest [except Georgia] settlemt. on
the Atlantic; yet it was at least among the foremost in population &
prosperity. He remarked that almost all the Genl. officers of the Pena.
line of the late army were foreigners. And no complaint had ever been
made against their fidelity or merit. Three of her deputies to the
Convention [Mr. R. Morris, Mr. Fitzimmons & himself] were also not
natives. He had no objection to Col. Hamiltons motion & would withdraw
the one made by himself.

Mr. BUTLER was strenuous agst. admitting foreigners into our public
Councils.

[3] Question on Col. Hamilton's Motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [4]

[3] Question on Mr. Williamson's moution to insert 9 years instead of
seven.

N. H. ay. Masts. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. WILSON's renewed the motion for 4 years instead of 7. & on [6]
question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [7]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to add to the end of the section [art IV. S. 2] a
proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights
of any person now a Citizen.

Mr. MERCER 2ded. the motion. It was necessary he said to prevent a
disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under and on [8] the
faith & according to the laws & Constitution from being on a [9] level
in all respects with natives.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. It might as well be said that all qualifications are
disfranchisemts. and that to require the age of 25 years was a
disfranchisement. The policy of the precaution was as great with regard
to foreigners now Citizens; as to those who are to be naturalized in
future.

Mr. SHERMAN. The U. States have not invited foreigners nor pledged their
faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with native Citizens. The
Individual States alone have done this. The former therefore are at
liberty to make any discriminations they may judge requisite.

Mr. GHORUM. When foreigners are naturalized it wd. seem as if they stand
on an equal footing with natives. He doubted then the propriety of
giving a retrospective force to the restriction.

Mr. MADISON animadverted on the peculiarity of the doctrine of Mr.
Sharman. It was a subtilty by which every national engagement might be
evaded. By parity of reason, wherever our public debts, or foreign
treaties become inconvenient nothing more would be necessary to relieve
us from them, than to new [10] model the Constitution. It was said that
the U. S. as such have not pledged their faith to the naturalized
foreigners, & therefore are not bound. Be it so, & that the States alone
are bound. Who are to form the New Constitution by which the condition
of that class of citizens is to be made worse than the other class? Are
not the States ye. Agents? will they not be the members of it? Did they
not appoint this Convention? Are not they to ratify its proceedings?
Will not the new Constitution be their Act? If the new Constitution then
violates the faith pledged to any description of people will not the
makers of it, will not the States, be the violators. To justify the
doctrine it must be said that the States can get rid of their [11]
obligation by revising the Constitution, though they could not do it by
repealing the law under which foreigners held their privileges. He
considered this a matter of real importance. It woud expose us to the
reproaches of all those who should be affected by it, reproaches which
wd. soon be ecchoed from the other side of the Atlantic; and would
unnecessarily enlist among the Adversaries of the reform a very
considerable body of Citizens: We should moreover reduce every State to
the dilemma of rejecting it or of violating the faith pledged to a part
of its Citizens.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS considered the case of persons under 25 years, [12] as
very different from that of foreigners. No faith could be pleaded by the
former in bar of the regulation. No assurance had ever been given that
persons under that age should be in all cases on a level with those
above it. But with regard to foreigners among us, the faith had been
pledged that they should enjoy the privileges of Citizens. If the
restriction as to age had been confined to natives, & had left
foreigners under 25 years, [12] eligible in this case, the
discrimination wd. have been an equal injustice on the other side.

Mr. PINKNEY remarked that the laws of the States had varied much the
terms of naturalization in different parts of America; and contended
that the U. S. could not be bound to respect them on such an occasion as
the present. It was a sort of recurrence to first principles.

Col. MASON was struck not like [Mr. Madison] with the peculiarity, but
the propriety of the doctrine of Mr. Sharman. The States have formed
different qualifications themselves, for enjoying different rights of
citizenship. Greater caution wd. be necessary in the ouset of the Govt.
than afterwards. All the great objects wd. be then [13] provided for.
Everything would be then set in Motion. If persons among us attached to
G. B. should work themselves into our Councils, a turn might be given to
our affairs & particularly to our Commercial regulations which might
have pernicious consequences. The great Houses of British Merchants will
spare no pains to insinuate the instruments of their views into the
Govt.

Mr. WILSON read the clause in the Constitution of Pena. giving to
foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of
citizens, combined it with the article of Confederation making the
Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation Pena. was
under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign
birth, and the just complaints which her failure would authorize: He
observed likewise that the Princes & States of Europe would avail
themselves of such breach of faith to deter their subjects from
emigrating to the U. S.

Mr. MERCER enforced the same idea of a breach of faith.

Mr. BALDWIN could not enter into the force of the arguments agst.
extending the disqualification to foreigners now Citizens. The
discrimination of the place of birth, was not more objectionable than
that of age which all had concurred in the propriety of.

[14] Question on the proviso of Mr. Govr. Morris in favor of foreigners
now Citizens

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [15]

Mr. CARROL moved to insert "5 years" instead "of seven," in Section 2d.
Art: IV

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [16]

The Section [Art IV. Sec. 2.] as formerly amended was then agreed to
nem. con.

Mr. WILSON moved that [in Art: V. Sect. 3. [17]] 9 years be reduced to
seven, which was disagd. to and the 3d. section [Art. V.] confirmed by
the following vote.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [18]

Art. IV. Sec 5. [19] being reconsidered.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved that the clause be altered so as to read -- "Bills
for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the
same shall originate in the House of Representatives and shall not be so
amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to
be raised, or change the mode of levying it, or the objects of its
appropriation." -- He would not repeat his reasons, but barely remind
the members from the smaller States of the compromise by which the
larger States were entitled to this privilege.

Col. MASON. This amendment removes all the objections urged agst. the
section as it stood at first. By specifying purposes of revenue, it
obviated the objection that the Section extended to all bills under
which money might incidentally arise. By authorising amendments in the
Senate it got rid of the objections that the Senate could not correct
errors of any sort, & that it would introduce into the House of Reps.
the practice of tacking foreign matter to money bills. These objections
being removed, the arguments in favor of the proposed restraint on the
Senate ought to have their full force. 1. [20] the Senate did not
represent the people, but the States in their political character. It
was improper therefore that it should tax the people. The reason was the
same agst. their doing it; as it had been agst. Congs. doing it. [21]
Nor was it in any respect necessary in order to cure the evils of our
Republican system. He admitted that notwithstanding the superiority of
the Republican form over every other, it had its evils. The chief ones,
were the danger of the majority oppressing the minority, and the
mischievous influence of demagogues. The Genl. Government of itself will
cure these. [22] As the States will not concur at the same time in their
unjust & oppressive plans, the General Govt. will be able to check &
defeat them, whether they result from the wickedness of the majority, or
from the misguidance of demagogues. Again, the Senate is not like the H.
of Reps. chosen frequently and obliged to return frequently among the
people. They are to be chosen by the Sts for 6 years, will probably
settle themselves at the seat of Govt. will pursue schemes for their own
aggrandizement -- will be able by wearyg. out the H. of Reps. and taking
advantage of their impatience at the close of a long Session, to extort
measures for that purpose. If they should be paid as he expected would
be yet determined & wished to be so, out of the Natl. Treasury, they
will particularly extort an increase of their wages. A bare negative was
a very different thing from that of originating bills. The practice in
Engld. was in point. The House of Lords does not represent nor tax the
people, because not elected by the people. If the Senate can originate,
they will in the recess of the Legislative Sessions, hatch their
mischievous projects, for their own purposes, and have their money bills
ready [23] cut & dried, (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the
H. of Reps. He compared the case to Poyning's law -- and signified that
the House of Reps. might be rendered by degrees like the Parliament of
Paris, the mere depository of the decrees of the Senate. As to the
compromise so much had passed on that subject that he would say nothing
about it. He did not mean by what he had said to oppose the permanency
of the Senate. On the contrary he had no repugnance to an increase of it
-- nor to allowing it a negative, though the Senate was not by its
present constitution entitled to it. But in all events he would contend
that the purse strings should be in the hands of the Representatives of
the people.

Mr. WILSON was himself directly opposed to the equality of votes granted
to the Senate by its present Constitution. At the same time he wished
not to multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean to enlarge on a
subject which had been so much canvassed, but would remark as an
insuperable objection agst. the proposed restriction of money bills to
the H. of Reps. that it would be a source of perpetual contentions where
there was no mediator to decide them. The Presidt. here could not like
the Executive Magistrate in England interpose by a prorogation, or
dissolution. This restriction had been found pregnant with altercation
in every State where the Constitution had established it. The House of
Reps. will insert other things in money bills, and by making them
conditions of each other, destroy the deliberative liberty of the
Senate. He stated the case of a Preamble to a money bill sent up by the
House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne, to the H. of Lords, in
which the conduct of the displaced Ministry, who were to be impeached
before the Lords, was condemned; the Commons thus extorting a premature
judgmt. without any hearing of the Parties to be tried, and the H. of
Lords being thus reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing
to the authority of a law, a protest on their Journals agst. its being
drawn into precedent. If there was any thing like Poynings law in the
present case, it was in the attempt to vest the exclusive right of
originating in the H. of Reps. and so far he was agst. it. He should be
equally so if the right were to be exclusively vested in the Senate.
With regard to the purse strings, it was to be observed that the purse
was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H. of
Reps. the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in
untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which
last. He could not conceive it to be any objection to the Senate's
preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for that purpose and
would be in the habits of business. War, Commerce, & Revenue were the
great objects of the Genl. Government. All of them are connected with
money.

The restriction in favor of the H. of Represts. would exclude the Senate
from originating any important bills whatever -- 

Mr. GERRY considered this as a part of the plan that would be much
scrutinized. Taxation & representation are strongly associated in the
minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their
immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses. In short the
acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not
restrained from originating Money bills.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS All the arguments suppose the right to originate
money [24] & to tax, to be exclusively vested in the Senate. -- The
effects commented on may be produced by a Negative only in the Senate.
They can tire out the other House, and extort their concurrence in
favorite measures, as well by withholding their negative, as by adhering
to a bill introduced by themselves.

Mr. MADISON thought If the substitute offered by Mr. Randolph for the
original section is to be adopted it would be proper to allow the Senate
at least so to amend as to diminish the sum [25] to be raised. Why
should they be restrained from checking the extravagance of the other
House? One of the greatest evils incident to Republican Govt. was the
spirit of contention & faction. The proposed substitute, which in some
respects lessened the objections agst. the section, had a contrary
effect with respect to this particular. It laid a foundation for new
difficulties and disputes between the two houses. The word revenue was
ambiguous. In many acts, particularly in the regulations of trade, the
object would be twofold. The raising of revenue would be one of them.
How could it be determined which was the primary or predominant one; or
whether it was necessary that revenue shd. be the sole object, in
exclusion even of other incidental effects. When the Contest was first
opened with G. B. their power to regulate trade was admitted. Their
power to raise revenue rejected. An accurate investigation of the
subject afterward proved that no line could be drawn between the two
cases. The words amend or alter, form an equal source of doubt &
altercation. When an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the
Senate to the House of Reps -- it will be called an origination under
the name of an amendment. The Senate may actually couch extraneous
matter under that name. In these cases, the question will turn on the
degree of connection between the matter & object of the bill and the
alteration or amendment offered to it. Can there be a more fruitful
source of dispute, or a kind of dispute more difficult to be settled?
His apprehensions on this point were not conjectural. Disputes had
actually flowed from this source in Virga. where the Senate can
originate no bill. The words "so as to increase or diminish the sum to
be raised," were liable to the same objections. In levying indirect
taxes, which it seemed to be understood were to form the principal
revenue of the new Govt. the sum to be raised, would be increased or
diminished by a variety of collateral circumstances influencing the
consumption, in general, the consumption of foreign or of domestic
articles -- of this or that particular species of articles, and even by
the mode of collection which may be closely connected with the
productiveness of a tax. -- The friends of the section had argued its
necessity from the permanency of the Senate. He could not see how this
argumt. applied. The Senate was not more permanent now than in the form
it bore in the original propositions of Mr. Randolph and at the time
when no objection whatever was hinted agst. its originating money bills.
Or if in consequence of a loss of the present question, a proportional
vote in the Senate should be reinstated as has been urged as the
indemnification the permanency of the Senate will remain the same. -- If
the right to originate be vested exclusively in the House of Reps.
either the Senate must yield agst. its judgment to that House, in which
case the Utility of the check will be lost -- or the Senate will be
inflexible & the H. of Reps. must adapt its money bill to the views of
the Senate, in which case, the exclusive right will be of no avail. --
As to the Compromise of which so much had been said, he would make a
single observation. There were 5 States which had opposed the equality
of votes in the Senate, viz. Masts. Penna. Virga. N. Carolina & S.
Carola. As a compensation for the sacrifice extorted from them on this
head, the exclusive origination of money bills in the other House had
been tendered. Of the five States a majority viz. Penna. Virga. & S.
Carola. have uniformly voted agst. the proposed compensation, on its own
merits, as rendering the plan of Govt. still more objectionable. Massts.
has been divided. N. Carolina alone has set a value on the compensation,
and voted on that principle. What obligation then can the small States
be under to concur agst. their judgments in reinstating the section?

Mr. DICKENSON. Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us.
It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of
the English Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever
could have discovered the odd & in the eye of those who are governed by
reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced
these discoveries, and experience has give a sanction to them. This is
then our guide. And has not experience verified the utility of
restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the people.
Whence the effect may have proceeded he could not say; whether from the
respect with which this privilege inspired the other branches of Govt.
to the H. of Commons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people
at large with regard to their rights, but the effect was visible & could
not be doubted -- Shall we oppose to this long experience, the short
experience of 11 Years which we had ourselves, on this subject. As to
disputes, they could not be avoided any way. If both Houses should
originate, each would have a different bill to which it would be
attached, and for which it would contend. -- He observed that all the
prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive
privilege to the H. of Repress. and these prejudices shd. never be
disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this
plan goes forth it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy
will be the watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries. Eight
States have inserted in their Constitutions the exclusive right of
originating money bills in favor of the popular branch of the
Legislature. Most of them however allowed the other branch to amend.
This he thought would be proper for us to do.

Mr. RANDOLPH regarded this point as of such consequence, that as he
valued the peace of this Country, he would press the adoption of it. We
had numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we ought not to
increase them. When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of
an aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little
monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking
from their immediate representatives, a right which has been so long
appropriated to them. -- The Executive will have more influence over the
Senate, than over the H. of Reps. Allow the Senate to originate in this
case, & that influence will be sure to mix itself in their deliberations
& plans. The Declaration of War he conceived ought not to be in the
Senate composed of 26 men only, but rather in the other House. In the
other House ought to be placed the origination of the means of war. As
to Commercial regulations which may involve revenue, the difficulty may
be avoided by restraining the definition to bills, for the mere or sole,
purpose of raising revenue. The Senate will be more likely to be corrupt
than the H. of Reps. and should therefore have less to do with money
matters. His principal object however was to prevent popular objections
against the plan, and to secure its adoption.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. The friends of this motion are not consistent in their
reasoning. They tell us that we ought to be guided by the long
experience of G. B. & not our own experience of 11 years: and yet they
themselves propose to depart from it. The H. of Commons not only have
the exclusive right of originating, but the Lords are not allowed to
alter or amend a money bill. Will not the people say that this
restriction is but a mere tub to the whale. They cannot but see that it
is of no real consequence; and will be more likely to be displeased with
it as an attempt to bubble them, than to impute it to a watchfulness
over their rights. For his part, he would prefer giving the exclusive
right to the Senate, if it was to be given exclusively at all. The
Senate being more conversant in business, and having more eisure, will
digest the bills much better, and as they are to have no effect, till
examined & approved by the H. of Reps. there can be no possible danger.
These clauses in the Constitutions of the States had been put in through
a blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over
now, they would be omitted. The experiment in S. Carolina, where the
Senate cannot originate or amend money bills, has shewn that it answers
no good purpose; and produces the very bad one of continually dividing &
heating the two houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of the amendment
of the Senate is pleasing to the other House they wink at the
encroachment; if it be displeasing, then the Constitution is appealed
to. Every Session is distracted by altercations on this subject. The
practice now becoming frequent is for the Senate not to make formal
amendments; but to send down a schedule of the alterations which will
procure the bill their assent.

Mr. CARROL. The most ingenious men in Maryd. are puzzled to define the
case of money bills, or explain the Constitution on that point; tho' it
seemed to be worded with all possible plainness & precision. It is a
source of continual difficulty & squabble between the two houses.

Mr. Mc.HENRY mentioned an instance of extraordinary subterfuge, to get
rid of the apparent force of the Constitution.

On [26] Question on the first part of the motion as to the exclusive
originating of Money bills in [26] H. of Reps.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Virga. ay.
Mr. Blair & Mr. M. no. Mr. R. Col. Mason and [27] Genl. Washington ay N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [28]

[29] Question on Originating by [30] H. of Reps. & amending by [30]
Senate, as reported Art. IV. Sect. 5.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. [31]
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [32]

[29] Question on the last clause of Sect: 5 -- Art. IV -- viz "No money
shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of
appropriations that shall originate in the House of Reps. It passed in
the negative

N.H. no. Mas. ay Con. no. N.J. no. Pa. no Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C.
no. S.C. no. Geo. no. [33]

Adjd.

___________

1. See ante.

2. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8."

6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

8. The words "and on" are omitted in the transcript.

9. The words "their actual" are substituted in the transcript for "being
on a."

10. In the transcript the word "new" is crossed out and the syllable
"re" is written above it.

11. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "their."

12. The words "of age" are here inserted in the transcript.

13. The words "be then" are transposed in the transcript to read "then
be."

14. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South, Carolina, Georgia, no --
6."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7; Pennsylvania, Divided."

17. See ante.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no -- 3."

19. See ante.

20. The figure "1" is changed to "First" in the transcript.

21. The word "Secondly" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. The word "them" is substituted in the transcript for "these."

23. The word "ready" is omitted in the transcript.

24. The word "money" is omitted in the transcript. In Madison's notes it
is written above the words "originate" and "&" without a caret
indicating its position. It appears to have been omitted in all previous
editions.

25. The transcript uses the word "sum" in the plural.

26. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

27. He disapproved & till now voted agst. the exclusive privilege, he
gave up his judgment he said because it was not of very material weight
with him & was made an essential point with others who if disappointed,
might be less cordial in other points of real weight.

28. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Virginia [Mr. Blair, and Mr. Madison no, Mr. Randolph, Colonel Mason and
General Washington, [27] aye], North Carolina, aye -- 4; Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia,
no -- 7."

29. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

30. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

31. In the printed Journ Virga. -- no.

32. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Virginia, [31] North Carolina aye -- 4; Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

33. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  AUG. 14.   IN CONVENTION

Article VI. Sect. 9. [1, 2] taken up.

Mr. PINKNEY argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was
degrading to them, and the more improper as their election into the
Legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it
was inconvenient, because the Senate might be supposed to contain the
fittest men. He hoped to see that body become a School of public
Ministers, a nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because the
Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the first talents and
abilities. He moved to postpone the section in order to take up the
following proposition viz -- "the members of each House shall be
incapable of holding any office under the U.S. for which they or any of
[3] others for their benefit receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of
any kind -- and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats
respectively"

Genl. MIFFLIN 2ded. the motion.

Col. MASON ironically proposed to strike out the whole section, as a
more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which
might not otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil -- for
compleating that Aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of
some among us, and for inviting into the Legislative Service, those
generous & benevolent characters who will do justice to each other's
merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In the present state of
American morals & manners, few friends it may be thought will be lost to
the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary &
depraved ambition.

Mr. MERCER. It is a first principle in political science, that wherever
the rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow out of it.
Elective Governments also necessarily become aristocratic, because the
rulers being few can & will draw emoluments for themselves from the
many. The Governments of America will become aristocracies. They are so
already. The public measures are calculated for the benefit of the
Governors, not of the people. The people are dissatisfied & complain.
They change their rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is
only a change of one scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The
people gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability & uncertainty
to their other evils. -- Governmts. can only be maintained by force or
influence. The Executive has not force, deprive him of influence [4] by
rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to Executive
offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority. The aristocratic
part will not even let him in for a share of the plunder. The
Legislature must & will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the
people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive ought to have a
Council, being members of both Houses. Without such an influence, the
war will be between the aristocracy & the people. He wished it to be
between the Aristocracy & the Executive. Nothing else can protect the
people agst. those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering
them throughout the U. States.

Mr. GERRY read a resolution of the Legislature of Massts. passed before
the Act of Congs. recommending the Convention, in which her deputies
were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the 5th.
art: of [5] Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to the
members of Congs. a capacity to hold offices under the Government. This
he said was repealed in consequence of the Act of Congs. with which the
State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified manner. The Sense of
the State however was still the same. He could not think with Mr.
Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading. Confidence is the road
to tyranny. As to Ministers & Ambassadors few of them were necessary. It
is the opinion of a great many that they ought to be discontinued, on
our part; that none may be sent among us, & that source of influence be
[6] shut up. If the Senate were to appoint Ambassadors as seemed to be
intended, they will multiply embassies for their own sakes. He was not
so fond of those productions as to wish to establish nurseries for them.
If they are once appointed, the House of Reps. will be obliged to
provide salaries for them, whether they approve of the measures or not.
If men will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such
offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are
actuated by such mercenary views, we had better chuse a single despot at
once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many.
According to the idea of one Gentlemen [Mr. Mercer] our Government it
seems is to be a Govt. of plunder. In that case it certainly would be
prudent to have but one rather than many to be employed in it. We cannot
be too circumspect in the formation of this System. It will be examined
on all sides and with a very suspicious eye. The People who have been so
lately in arms agst. G. B. for their liberties, will not easily give
them up. He lamented the evils existing at present under our
Governments, but imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to
the people. The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention
to the opportunities afforded by the new system to like or greater
abuses. As it now stands it is as compleat an aristocracy as ever was
framed If great powers should be given to the Senate we shall be
governed in reality by a Junto as has been apprehended. He remarked that
it would be very differently constituted from Congs -- 1. [7] there will
be but 2 deputies from each State, in Congs. there may be 7. and are
generally 5. -- 2. [8] they are chosen for six years, those of Congs.
annually. 3. [9] they are not subject to recall; those of Congs. are. 4.
In Congs. 9 States [10] are necessary for all great purposes -- here 8
persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever
agree to such a system? He moved to render the members of the H. of
Reps. as well as of the Senate ineligible not only during, but for one
year after the expiration of their terms. -- If it should be thought
that this will injure the Legislature by keeping out of it men of
abilities who are willing to serve in other offices it may be required
as a qualification for other offices, that the Candidate shall have
served a certain time in the Legislature.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Exclude the officers of the army & navy, and you form
a band having a different interest from & opposed to the civil power:
you stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking Lords who dare
not face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before
your troops shall have laid down their arms, and though the Civil
authority "be intrenched in parchment to the teeth" they will cut their
way to it. He was agst. rendering the members of the Legislature
ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible agn. after
having vacated their Seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail
ourselves of their services if the people chuse to give them their
confidence. There can be little danger of corruption either among the
people or the Legislatures who are to be the Electors. If they say, we
see their merits, we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence in
them, have they not a right to give them a preference; and can they be
properly abridged of it. Mr. WILLIAMSON; introduced his opposition to
the motion by referring to the question concerning "money bills." That
clause he said was dead. Its ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding
haunt us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to insist upon
[11] it as long as there was hope of retaining it. He had swallowed the
vote of rejection, with reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was
said on the other side was that the restriction was not convenient. We
have now got a House of Lords which is to originate money-bills. -- To
avoid another inconveniency, [12] we are to have a whole Legislature at
liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a self-denying
ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad as the Constitution
has been made by expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning
money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging the present
Section. He had scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the
Legislature of N. Carolina, which could not be traced up to office
hunting.

Mr. SHERMAN. The Constitution shd. lay as few temptations as possible in
the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the Country
grows more populous and, and [13] the means of education are more
diffused.

Mr. PINKNEY. No State has rendered the members of the Legislature
ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina the Judges are eligible into the
Legislature. It can not be supposed then that the motion will be
offensive to the people. If the State Constitutions should be revised he
believed restrictions of this sort wd. be rather diminished than
multiplied.

Mr. WILSON could not approve of the Section as it stood, and could not
give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among
the people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for the
welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had
also asked himself the serious question what he should say to his
constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he
sacrified his own Judgment in a case where they authorised him to
exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to
flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you suppose
the people of Penna. had not good sense enough to receive a good
Government? Under this impression he should certainly follow his own
Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would remark in addition
to the objections urged agst. it, that as one branch of the Legislature
was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other by the
people of the States, as both are to be paid by the States, and to be
appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate
the Natl. Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to Natl.
offices, & by that means take away its power of attracting those talents
which were necessary to give weight to the Governt. and to render it
useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which
aspired to Offices of dignity and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He
was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withold
from it the prospect of those rewards, which might engage it in the
career of public service. He observed that the State of Penna. which had
gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not
rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices of Govt.

Mr. ELSWORTH did not think the mere postponement of the reward would be
any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2 years
or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of qualifying themselves for
other offices. This he thought a sufficient security for obtaining the
services of the ablest men in the Legislature, although whilst members
they should be ineligible to Public offices. Besides, merit will be most
encouraged, when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate
only within the Legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged. 

Mr. MERCER was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the
appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of the
Legislative Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these,
it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able in our private
capacities to support & enforce it: nor will the best part of our
Citizens exert themselves for the purpose. -- It is a great mistake to
suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U. States? It
is The men whom it will bring into the Governt. and interest in
maintaining it that is [14] to govern them. The paper will only mark out
the mode & the form. Men are the substance and must do the business. All
Govt. must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France -- but
200,000 janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There will be no
such force here; influence then must be substituted; and he would ask
whether this could be done, if the members of the Legislature should be
ineligible to offices of State; whether such a disqualification would
not determine all the most influencial men to stay at home, and & prefer
appointments within their respective States.

Mr. WILSON was by no means satisfied with the answer given by Mr.
Elsewoth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members
must either go a second time into the Legislature, and disqualify
themselves -- or say to their Constituents, we served you before only
from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and haveg
answered this purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS put the case of a war, and the Citizen the [15] most
capable of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legislature.
What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the
commencement, or even in the Course of the late contest for our
liberties?

On [16] question for postponing in order to take up Mr. Pinkneys motion,
it was lost.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd. [17]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to insert, after "office," except offices in the
army or navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated.

Mr. BROOM 2ds. him.

Mr. RANDOLPH had been & should continue uniformly opposed to the
striking out of the clause; as opening a door for influence &
corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him, but those which
related to the case of war, and a co-existing incapacity of the fittest
commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would
agree to the exception proposed by Mr. Govr. Morris.

Mr. BUTLER & Mr. PINKNEY urged a general postponemt. of 9 Sect. Art. VI.
till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when
it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the
officers of State to be chosen out of that body. -- a general
postponement was agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI. sect. 10. [18, 19] taken up -- "that members be paid by their
respective States."

Mr. ELSEWORTH said that in reflecting on this subject he had been
satisfied that too much dependence on the States would be produced by
this mode of payment. He moved to strike [20] out and insert "that they
should" be paid out of the Treasury of the U.S. an allowance not
exceeding (blank) dollars per day or the present value thereof.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, remarked that if the members were to be paid by the
States it would throw an unequal burden on the distant States, which
would be unjust as the Legislature was to be a national Assembly. He
moved that the payment be out of the Natl. Treasury; leaving the quantum
to the discretion of the Natl. Legislature. There could be no reason to
fear that they would overpay themselves.

Mr. BUTLER contended for payment by the States; particularly in the case
of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective States, that
they will lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on them for
their support.

Mr. LANGDON was agst. payment by the States. There would be some
difficulty in fixing the sum; but it would be unjust to oblige the
distant States to bear the expence of their members in travelling to and
from the Seat of Govt.

Mr. MADISON. If the H. of Reps. is to be chosen biennially -- and the
Senate to be constantly dependent on the Legislatures which are chosen
annually, he could not see any chance for that stability in the Genl.
Govt. the want of which was a principal evil in the State Govts. His
fear was that the organization of the Govt. supposing the Senate to be
really independt. for six years, would not effect our purpose. It was
nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities of two of the State
Govts. which separately had been found insufficient. The Senate was
formed on the model of that of Maryld. The Revisionary check, on that of
N. York. What the effect of a union of these provisions might be, could
not be foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the Government was
indeed a circumstance which he thought would be favorable as he had on
several occasions undertaken to shew. He was however for fixing at least
two extremes not to be exceeded by the Natl. Legislre. in the payment of
themselves.

Mr. GERRY. There are difficulties on both sides. The observation of Mr.
Butler has weight in it. On the other side, the State Legislatures may
turn out the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such things have been
practised.

Col. MASON. It has not yet been noticed that the clause as it now stands
makes the House of Represents. also dependent on the State Legislatures;
so that both houses will be made the instruments of the politics of the
States whatever they may be.

Mr. BROOM could see no danger in trusting the Genl. Legislature with the
payment of themselves. The State Legislatures had this power, and no
complaint had been made of it.

Mr. SHERMAN was not afraid that the Legislature would make their own
wages too high; but too low, so that men ever so fit could not serve
unless they were at the same time rich. He thought the best plan would
be to fix a moderate allowance to be paid out of the Natl. Treasy. and
let the States make such additions as they might judge fit. He moved
that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further emoluments to be added by
the States.

Mr. CARROL had been much surprised at seeing this clause in the Report.
The dependence of both Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat;
especially as the members of the former are eligible to State offices.
The States can now say: if you do not comply with our wishes, we will
starve you: if you do we will reward you. The new Govt. in this form was
nothing more than a second edition of Congress in two volumes, instead
of one, and perhaps with very few amendments -- 

Mr. DICKENSON took it for granted that all were convinced of the
necessity of making the Genl. Govt. independent of the prejudices,
passions, and improper views of the State Legislatures. The contrary of
This was effected by the section as it stands. On the other hand there
were objections agst. taking a permanent standard as wheat which had
been suggested on a former occasion, as well as against leaving the
matter to the pleasure of the Natl. Legislature. He proposed that an Act
should be passed every 12 years by the Natl. Legislre. settling the
quantum of their wages. If the Genl. Govt. should be left dependent on
the State Legislatures, it would be happy for us if we had never met in
this Room.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was not unwilling himself to trust the Legislature with
authority to regulate their own wages, but well knew that an unlimited
discretion for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps not
insuperable objections. He thought changes in the value of money,
provided for by his motion in the words, "or the present value thereof."

Mr. L. MARTIN. As the Senate is to represent the States, the members of
it ought to be paid by the States.

Mr. CARROL. The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs of the
whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests. They ought then
not to be dependent on nor paid by the States.

On the question for paying the Members of the Legislature out of the
Natl. Treasury,

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [21]

Mr. ELSEWTH moved that the pay be fixed at 5 dollrs. or the present
value thereof per day during their attendance & for every thirty miles
in travelling to & from Congress.

Mr. STRONG preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at liberty to make
additions.

On [22] question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [23]

Mr. DICKENSON proposed that the wages of the members of both houses Sd.
be required to be the same.

Mr. BROOME seconded him.

Mr. GHORUM. this would be unreasonable. The Senate will be detained
longer from home, will be obliged to remove their families, and in time
of war perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should certainly be
higher. The members of the Senates in the States are allowed more, than
those of the other house. Mr. DICKENSON withdrew his motion

It was moved & agreed to amend the Section by adding -- "to be
ascertained by law."

The Section [Art VI. Sec. 10] as amended, agreed to nem. con.

Adjd.

___________

1. See ante.

2. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "of" is omitted in the trancript.

4. The transcript italicizes the word "influence."

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "be" is omitted in the transcript.

7. The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.

8. The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.

9. The figure "3" is changed to "In the third place" in the transcript.

10. The phrase "And finally, in Congress nine States" is substituted in
the transcript for "4. In Congs. 9 States."

11. The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "upon."

12. The word "inconveniency" is changed to " nconvenience" in the
transcript.

13. The word "as" is substituted in the transcript for "and."

14. The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "is."

15. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 5; Georgia, divided."

18. See ante.

19. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

20. The word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 9; Massachusetts, South Carolina, no -- 2."

22. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Virginia, aye -- 2;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY AUGUST 15. IN CONVENTION

Art: VI. Sect. 11. [1, 2] Agreed to nem. con.

Art: VI Sect. 12. [1, 3] taken up.

Mr. STRONG moved to amend the article so as to read -- "Each House shall
possess the right of originating all bills, except bills for raising
money for the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the same and for
fixing the salaries of the officers of the Govt. which shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments as in other cases"

Col. MASON, 2ds. the motion. He was extremely earnest to take this power
from the Senate, who he said could already sell the whole Country by
means of Treaties.

Mr. GHORUM urged the amendment as of great importance. The Senate will
first acquire the habit of preparing money bills, and then the practice
will grow into an exclusive right of preparing them.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS opposed it as unnecessary and inconvenient.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. some think this restriction on the Senate essential to
liberty, others think it of no importance. Why should not the former be
indulged. he was for an efficient and stable Govt. but many would not
strengthen the Senate if not restricted in the case of money bills. The
friends of the Senate would therefore lose more than they would gain by
refusing to gratify the other side. He moved to postpone the subject
till the powers of the Senate should be gone over. 

Mr. RUTLIDGE 2ds. the motion.

Mr. MERCER should hereafter be agst. returning to a reconsideration of
this section. He contended, (alluding to Mr. Mason's observations) that
the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged
to the Executive department; adding that Treaties would not be final so
as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative
authority. This was the case of Treaties in Great Britain; particularly
the late Treaty of Commerce with France.

Col. MASON. did not say that a Treaty would repeal a law; but that the
Senate by means of treaty [4] might alienate territory &c, without
legislative sanction. The cessions of the British Islands in 5 W. Indies
by Treaty alone were an example. If Spain should possess herself of
Georgia therefore the Senate might by treaty dismember the Union. He
wished the motion to be decided now, that the friends of it might know
how to conduct themselves.

On [5] question for postponing Sec: 12. it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay Ct. no. N. J. no Pena. no. Del. no Maryd. no. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. -- [6]

Mr. MADISON moved that all acts before they become laws should be
submitted both to the Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments, that
if either of these should object 2/3 of each House, if both should
object, 3/4 of each House, should be necessary to overrule the
objections and give to the acts the force of law -- [7]

See the motion at large in the Journal of this date, page 253, & insert
it here." [8]

["Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it
become a law, be severally presented to the President of the United
States, and to the judges of the supreme court for the revision of each.
If, upon such revision, they shall approve of it, they shall
respectively signify their approbation by signing it; but if, upon such
revision, it shall appear improper to either, or both, to be passed into
a law, it shall be returned, with the objections against it, to that
house, in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections
at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill: but if,
after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house, when either the
President, or a majority of the judges shall object, or three fourths,
where both shall object, shall agree to pass it, it shall, together with
the objections, be sent to the other house, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered; and, if approved by two thirds, or three fourths of the
other house, as the case may be, it shall become a law."]

Mr. WILSON seconds the motion

Mr. PINKNEY opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative
business: it will involve them in parties, and give a previous tincture
to their opinions.

Mr. MERCER heartily approved the motion. It is an axiom that the
Judiciary ought to be separate from the Legislative: but equally so that
it ought to be independent of that department. The true policy of the
axiom is that legislative usurpation and oppression may be obviated. He
disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the
Constitution should have authority to declare a law void. He thought
laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be
uncontroulable.

Mr. GERRY. This motion comes to the same thing with what had
been already negatived.

[10] Question on the motion of Mr. Madison.

N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Virga.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [11]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS regretted that something like the proposed check could
not be agreed to. He dwelt on the importance of public credit, and the
difficulty of supporting it without some strong barrier against the
instability of legislative Assemblies. He suggested the idea of
requiring three fourths of each house to repeal laws where the President
should not concur. He had no great reliance on the revisionary power as
the Executive was now to be constituted [elected by the [12] Congress].
The legislature will contrive to soften down the President. He recited
the history of paper emissions, and the perseverance of the legislative
assemblies in repeating them, with all the distressing effects of such
measures before their eyes. Were the National legislature formed, and a
war was now to break out, this ruinous expedient would be again resorted
to, if not guarded against. The requiring 3/4 to repeal would, though
not a compleat remedy, prevent the hasty passage of laws, and the
frequency of those repeals which destroy faith in the public, and which
are among our greatest calamities. -- 

Mr. DICKENSON was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to
the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought no such power
ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss what expedient to
substitute. The Justiciary of Arragon he observed became by degrees, the
lawgiver.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, suggested the expedient of an absolute negative in the
Executive. He could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of the
Executive, should be bound to say that a direct violation of the
Constitution was law. A controul over the legislature might have its
inconveniences. But view the danger on the other side. The most virtuous
Citizens will often as members of a legislative body concur in measures
which afterwards in their private capacity they will be ashamed of.
Encroachments of the popular branch of the Government ought to be
guarded agst. The Ephori at Sparta became in the end absolute. The
Report of the Council of Censors in Pennsylva. points out the many
invasions of the legislative department on the Executive numerous as the
latter [*13] is, within the short term of seven years, and in a State
where a strong party is opposed to the Constitution, and watching every
occasion of turning the public resentments agst. it. If the Executive be
overturned by the popular branch, as happened in England, the tyranny of
one man will ensue. In Rome where the Aristocracy overturned the throne,
the consequence was different. He enlarged on the tendency of the
legislative Authority to usurp on the Executive and wished the section
to be postponed, in order to consider of some more effectual check than
requiring 2/3 only to overrule the negative of the Executive.

Mr. SHERMAN. Can one man be trusted better than all the others if they
all agree? This was neither wise nor safe. He disapproved of Judges
meddling in politics and parties. We have gone far enough in forming the
negative as it now stands.

Mr. CARROL. when the negative to be overruled by 2/3 only was agreed to,
the quorum was not fixed. He remarked that as a majority was now to be
the quorum, 17. in the larger, and 8 in the smaller house might carry
points. The advantage that might be taken of this seemed to call for
greater impediments to improper laws. He thought the controuling power
however of the Executive could not be well decided, till it was seen how
the formation of that department would be finally regulated. He wished
the consideration of the matter to be postponed.

Mr. GHORUM saw no end to these difficulties and postponements. Some
could not agree to the form of Government before the powers were
defined. Others could not agree to the powers till it was seen how the
Government was to be formed. He thought a majority as large a quorum as
was necessary. It was the quorum almost every where fixt in the U.
States.

Mr. WILSON; after viewing the subject with all the coolness and
attention possible was most apprehensive of a dissolution of the Govt.
from the legislature swallowing up all the other powers. He remarked
that the prejudices agst. the Executive resulted from a misapplication
of the adage that the parliament was the palladium of liberty. Where the
Executive was really formidable, King and Tyrant, were naturally
associated in the minds of people; not legislature and tyranny. But
where the Executive was not formidable, the two last were most properly
associated. After the destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more
pure and unmixed tryanny sprang up in the parliament than had been
exercised by the monarch. He insisted that we had not guarded agst. the
danger on this side by a sufficient self-defensive power either to the
Executive or Judiciary department.

Mr. RUTLIDGE was strenuous agst. postponing; and complained much of the
tediousness of the proceedings.

Mr. ELSEWORTH held the same language. We grow more & more skeptical as
we proceed. If we do not decide soon, we shall be unable to come to any
decision.

The question for postponement passed in the negative: Del: & Maryd. only
being in the affirmative.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to change " 2/3 of each House" into " 3/4 as
requisite to overrule the dissent of the President. He saw no danger in
this, and preferred giving the power to the Presidt. alone, to admitting
the Judges into the business of legislation.

Mr. WILSON 2ds. the motion; referring to and repeating the ideas of Mr.
Carroll.

On this motion for 3/4 . instead of two thirds; it passed in the
affirmative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pena. divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [15]

Mr. MADISON, observing that if the negative of the President was
confined to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of
Resolutions, votes &c, proposed that or resolve" should be added after
"bill" in the beginning of sect 13. with an exception as to votes of
adjournment &c. -- after a short and rather confused conversation on the
subject, the question was put & rejected, the States [16] being as
follows,

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [17]

"Ten [18] days (Sundays excepted)" instead of "seven" were allowed to
the President for returning bills with his objections N. H. & Mas: only
voting agst. it.

The 13 Sect: of art. VI as amended was then agreed to.

Adjourned

___________

1. See ante.

2. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

4. The transcript uses the word "treaty" in the plural.

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 5."

7. This paragraph is stricken out in the transcript.

8. Madison's direction concerning the motion is omitted in the
transcript and the following sentence is inserted: "Mr. Madison moved
the following amendment of Article 6, Section 13." [9] 9. See ante.

10. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye
-- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

12. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

*13. The Executive consists at this time [14] of abt. 20 members.

14. The phrase "consisted at that time" is substituted in the transcript
for "consists at this time."

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 6; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Georgia, no -- 4; Pennsylvania, divided."

16. The word "votes" is substituted in the transcript for "States."

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware, North
Carolina, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

18. The transcript does not italicize the word "Ten."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY  AUGUST 16.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. RANDOLPH having thrown into a new form the motion, putting votes,
Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows "Every
order resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate & House
of Reps. may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment and in
the cases hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for
his revision; and before the same shall have force shall be approved by
him, or being disapproved by him shall be repassed by the Senate & House
of Reps. according to the rules & limitations prescribed in the case of
a Bill."

Mr. SHERMAN thought it unnecessary, except as to votes taking money out
of the Treasury which might be provided for in another place.

On [1] Question as moved by Mr. Randolph [2]

N. H. ay. Mas: not present, Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay.
Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [3]

The Amendment was made a Section 14. of Art VI.

Art: VII. Sect. 1. [4, 5] taken up.

Mr. L. MARTIN asked what was meant by the Committee of detail in the
expression "duties" and "imposts." If the meaning were the same, the
former was unnecessary; if different, the matter ought to be made clear.

Mr. WILSON, duties are applicable to many objects to which the word
imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to commerce; the
former extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &c.

Mr. CARROLL reminded the Convention of the great difference of interests
among the States, and doubts the propriety in that point of view of
letting a majority be a quorum.

Mr. MASON urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying
taxes duties &c, the prohibition in Sect 4 of art VI that no tax should
be laid on exports. He was unwilling to trust to its being done in a
future article. He hoped the Northn. States did not mean to deny the
Southern this security. It would hereafter be as desirable to the former
when the latter should become the most populous. He professed his
jealousy for the productions of the Southern or as he called them, the
staple States. He moved to insert the following amendment "provided that
no tax duty or imposition shall be laid by the Legislature of the U.
States on articles exported from any State"

Mr. SHERMAN had no objection to the proviso here, other than [6] it
would derange the parts of the report as made by the Committee, to take
them in such an order.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. It being of no consequence in what order points are
decided, he should vote for the clause as it stood, but on condition
that the subsequent part relating to negroes should also be agreed to.

Mr. GOVERNEUR MORRIS considered such a proviso as inadmissible any
where. It was so radically objectionable, that it might cost the whole
system the support of some members. He contended that it would not in
some cases be equitable to tax imports without taxing exports; and that
taxes on exports would be often the most easy and proper of the two.

Mr. MADISON 1. [7] the power of taxing [8] exports is proper in itself,
and as the States can not with propriety exercise it separately, it
ought to be vested in them collectively. 2. [7] it might with particular
advantage be exercised with regard to articles in which America was not
rivalled in foreign markets, as Tobo. &c. The contract between the
French Farmers Genl. and Mr. Morris stipulating that if taxes sd. be
laid in America on the export of Tobo. they sd. be paid by the Farmers,
shewed that it was understood by them, that the price would be thereby
raised in America, and consequently the taxes be paid by the European
Consumer. 3. [9] it would be unjust to the States whose produce was
exported by their neighbours, to leave it subject to be taxed by the
latter. This was a grievance which had already filled N. H. Cont. N.
Jery. Del: and N. Carolina with loud complaints, as it related to
imports, and they would be equally authorised by taxes by the States on
exports. 4. [9] The Southn. States being most in danger and most needing
naval protection, could the less complain if the burden should be
somewhat heaviest on them. 5. [10] we are not providing for the present
moment only, and time will equalize the situation of the States in this
matter. He was for these reasons agst. the motion

Mr. WILLIAMSON considered the clause proposed agst. taxes on exports as
reasonable and necessary.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was agst. Taxing exports; but thought the prohibition
stood in the most proper place, and was agst. deranging the order
reported by the Committee

Mr. WILSON was decidedly agst. prohibiting general taxes on exports. He
dwelt on the injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c
any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours.

Mr. GERRY thought the legislature could not be trusted with such a
power. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially,
raising one and depressing another part of it.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. However the legislative power may be formed, it will
if disposed be able to ruin the Country. He considered the taxing of
exports to be in many cases highly politic. Virginia has found her
account in taxing Tobacco. All Countries having peculiar articles tax
the exportation of them; as France her wines and brandies. A tax here on
lumber, would fall on the W. Indies & punish their restrictions on our
trade. The same is true of live stock and in some degree of flour. In
case of a dearth in the West Indies, we may extort what we please. Taxes
on exports are a necessary source of revenue. For a long time the people
of America will not have money to pay direct taxes. Seize and sell their
effects and you push them into Revolts.

Mr. MERCER was strenuous against giving Congress power to tax exports.
Such taxes were [11] impolitic, as encouraging the raising of articles
not meant for exportation. The States had now a right where their
situation permitted, to tax both the imports and exports of their
uncommercial neighbours. It was enough for them to sacrifice one half of
it. It had been said the Southern States had most need of naval
protection. The reverse was the case. Were it not for promoting the
carrying trade of the Northn. States, the Southn. States could let their
trade go into foreign bottoms, where it would not need our protection.
Virginia by taxing her tobacco had given an advantage to that of
Maryland.

Mr. SHERMAN. To examine and compare the States in relation to imports
and exports will be opening a boundless field. He thought the matter had
been adjusted, and that imports were to be subject, and exports not, to
be taxed. He thought it wrong to tax exports except it might be such
articles as ought not to be exported. The complexity of the business in
America would render an equal tax on exports impracticable. The
oppression of the uncommercial States was guarded agst. by the power to
regulate trade between the States. As to compelling foreigners, that
might be done by regulating trade in general. The Government would not
be trusted with such a power. Objections are most likely to be excited
by considerations relating to taxes & money. A power to tax exports
would shipwreck the whole.

Mr. CARROL was surprised that any objection should be made to an
exception of exports from the power of taxation.

It was finally agreed that the question concerning exports shd. lie over
for the place in which the exception stood in the report: Maryd. alone
voting agst. it

Sect: 1. [art. VII] [12, 13] agreed to: Mr. GERRY alone answering no.

[14] Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations &c.; [15]
agreed to nem. con.
[16] for coining money. agd. to nem. con.
[16] for regulating foreign coin. do. do.
[16] for fixing the standard of weights & measures. do. do.
[17] "To establish post-offices." Mr. GERRY moved to add, and
post-roads. 

Mr. MERCER 2ded. & on [18] question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "and emit bills on the credit of
the U. States" -- If the United States had credit such bills would be
unnecessary: if they had not, unjust & useless.

Mr. BUTLER, 2ds. the motion.

Mr. MADISON, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them a
tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views.
And promissory notes in that shape may in some emergencies be best.

Mr. Govr. MORRIS. striking out the words will leave room still for notes
of a responsible minister which will do all the good without the
mischief. The Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government, if
paper emissions be not prohibited.

Mr. GHORUM was for striking out, without inserting any prohibition. if
the words stand they may suggest and lead to the measure.

Col. [20] MASON had doubts on the subject. Congs. he thought would not
have the power unless it were expressed. Though he had a mortal hatred
to paper money, yet as he could not foresee all emergences, he was
unwilling to tie the hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late
war could not have been carried on, had such a prohibition existed.

Mr. GHORUM. The power as far as it will be necessary or safe, is
involved in that of borrowing.

Mr. MERCER was a friend to paper money, though in the present state &
temper of America, he should neither propose nor approve of such a
measure. He was consequently opposed to a prohibition of it altogether.
It will stamp suspicion on the Government to deny it a discretion on
this point. It was impolitic also to excite the opposition of all those
who were friends to paper money. The people of property would be sure to
be on the side of the plan, and it was impolitic to purchase their
further attachment with the loss of the opposite class of Citizens

Mr. ELSEWORTH thought this a favorable moment to shut and bar the door
against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had
been made, were now fresh in the public mind and had excited the disgust
of all the respectable part of America. By witholding the power from the
new Governt. more friends of influence would be gained to it than by
almost any thing else. Paper money can in no case be necessary. Give the
Government credit, and other resources will offer. The power may do
harm, never good.

Mr. RANDOLPH, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not
agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions
which [21] might arise.

Mr. WILSON. It will have a most salutary influence on the credit of the
U. States to remove the possibility of paper money. This expedient can
never succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered, and as long as it can
be resorted to, it will be a bar to other resources. 

Mr. BUTLER. remarked that paper was a legal tender in no Country in
Europe. He was urgent for disarming the Government of such a power.

Mr. MASON was still averse to tying the hands of the Legislature
altogether. If there was no example in Europe as just remarked, it might
be observed on the other side, that there was none in which the
Government was restrained on this head.

Mr. READ, thought the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as
the mark of the Beast in Revelations.

Mr. LANGDON had rather reject the whole plan than retain the three words
"(and emit bills")

On the motion for striking out

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay.
[*23] N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [22]

The clause for borrowing money, [25] agreed to nem. con.

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The phrase "it was agreed to" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; New Jetsey, no -- 1; Massachusetts, not
present."

4. See ante.

5. The words "was then" are here in inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The figures "1" and "2" are changed in the transcript to "First" and
"Secondly."

8. The words "laying taxes on" are substituted in the transcript for
"taxing."

9. The figures "3" and "4" are changed in the transcript to Thirdly" and
"Fourthly."

10. The figure "5" is changed in the transcript to "And finally."

11. The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "were."

12. This phrase was erroncously copied in the transcript as "Article 1,
Section 1," but was corrected when printed.

13. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

14. The word "The" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript these three lines are changed to read as follows:
"Several clauses, -- for coining money -- for regulating foreign coin,
-- for fixing the standard of weights and measures, -- were agreed to,
nem. Con."

17. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

18. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; New Hampshire,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, no -- 5."

20. The word "Mr." is substituted in the transcript for "Col."

21. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "which."

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, [*23] North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; New Jersey, Maryland, no -- 2."

*23. This vote in the affirmative by Virga. was occasioned by the
acquiescence of Mr. Madison who became satisfied that striking out the
words would not disable the Govt. from the use of public notes as far as
they could be safe & proper; & would only cut off the pretext for a
paper currency, [24] and particularly for making the bills a tender [24]
either for public or private debts.

24. The transcript italicizes the words "paper currency" and "a tender."

25. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

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FRIDAY  AUGUST 17th.   IN CONVENTION

Art VII. Sect. 1. [1, 2] resumed. on the clause "to appoint [3]
Treasurer by ballot."

Mr. GHORUM moved to insert "joint" before ballot, as more convenient as
well as reasonable, than to require the separate concurrence of the
Senate.

Mr. PINKNEY 2ds. the motion. Mr. SHERMAN opposed it as favoring the
larger States.

Mr. READ moved to strike out the clause, leaving the appointment of the
Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive. The Legislature was an
improper body for appointments. Those of the State legislatures were a
proof of it. The Executive being responsible would make a good choice.

Mr. MERCER 2ds. the motion of Mr. Read.

On the motion for inserting the word "joint" before ballot N. H. ay.
Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay. [4]

Col. MASON in opposition to Mr. Reads motion desired it might be
considered to whom the money would belong; if to the people, the
legislature representing the people ought to appoint the keepers of it.

On striking out the clause as amended by inserting "Joint" N. H. no.
Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay.
Geo. no. [5]

[6] "To constitute inferior tribunals" [7] agreed to nem. con. [8]

"To make rules as to captures on land & water" -- do. d [9, 6] "To
declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies &c" &c [10]
considered.

Mr. MADISON moved to strike out "and punishment" &c. [11]

Mr. MASON doubts the safety of it, considering the strict rule of
construction in criminal cases. He doubted also the propriety of taking
the power in all these cases wholly from the States.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS thought it would be necessary to extend the
authority farther, so as to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting
in general. Bills of exchange for example might be forged in one State
and carried into another:

It was suggested by some other member that foreign paper might be
counterfeited by Citizens; and that it might be politic to provide by
national authority for the punishment of it.

Mr. RANDOLPH did not conceive that expunging "the punishment" would be a
constructive exclusion of the power. He doubted only the efficacy of the
word "declare."

Mr. WILSON was in favor of the motion. Strictness was not necessary in
giving authority to enact penal laws; though necessary in enacting &
expounding them.

On motion [12] for striking out "and punishment" as moved by Mr. Madison

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [13]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "declare the law" and insert
"punish" before "piracies." and on the question N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct.
no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [14]

Mr. MADISON, and Mr. RANDOLPH moved to insert, "define &," before
"punish."

Mr. WILSON, thought "felonies" sufficiently defined by common law.

Mr. DICKENSON concurred with Mr. Wilson.

Mr. MERCER was in favor of the amendment.

Mr. MADISON. felony at common law is vague. It is also defective. One
defect is supplied by Stat: of Anne as to running away with vessels
which at common law was a breach of trust only. Besides no foreign law
should be a standard farther than [15] is expressly adopted -- If the
laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the citizens of
different States would be subject to different punishments for the same
offence at sea. There would be neither uniformity nor stability in the
law -- The proper remedy for all these difficulties was to vest the
power proposed by the term "define" in the Natl. legislature.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS would prefer designate to define, the latter being as
he he conceived, limited to the preexisting meaning. -- It was said by
others to be applicable to the creating of offences also, and therefore
suited the case both of felonies & of piracies. The motion of Mr. M. &
Mr. R was agreed to.

Mr. ELSEWORTH enlarged the motion so as to read "to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting the
securities and current coin of the U. States, and offences agst. the law
of Nations" which was agreed to nem. con.

[16] "To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its
legislature." [17]

Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out "on the application of its legislature"

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ds.

Mr. L. MARTIN opposed it as giving a dangerous & unnecessary power. The
consent of the State ought to precede the introduction of any extraneous
force whatever.

Mr. MERCER supported the opposition of Mr. Martin.

Mr. ELSEWORTH proposed to add after "legislature" "or Executive."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The Executive may possibly be at the head of the
Rebellion. The Genl. Govt. should enforce obedience in all cases where
it may be necessary.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. In many cases The Genl. Govt. ought not to be able to
interpose, unless called upon. He was willing to vary his motion so as
to read, "or without it when the legislature cannot meet."

Mr. GERRY was agst. letting loose the myrmidons of the U. States on a
State without its own consent. The States will be the best Judges in
such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massts. in the late
insurrection, if the Genl. authority had intermeddled.

Mr. LANGDON was for striking out as moved by Mr. Pinkney. The
apprehension of the national force, will have a salutary effect in
preventing insurrections.

Mr. RANDOLPH. If the Natl. Legislature is to judge whether the State
legislature can or cannot meet, that amendment would make the clause as
objectionable as the motion of Mr. Pinkney.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. We are acting a very strange part. We first form a
strong man to protect us, and at the same time wish to tie his hands
behind him, The legislature may surely be trusted with such a power to
preserve the public tranquility.

On the motion to add "or without it [application] when the legislature
cannot meet" [18]

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C.
divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19] So agreed to -- [20]

Mr. MADISON and Mr. DICKENSON moved to insert as explanatory, after
"State" -- "against the Government thereof" There might be a rebellion
agst. the U. States -- which [21] was Agreed to nem. con.

On the clause as amended N. H. ay. Mas [*22] abst. Ct. ay. Pen. abst.
Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg. ay -- so it was
lost. [23]

[24] "To make war"

Mr. PINKNEY opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. Its
proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps.
would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the
best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most
capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in
[25] Senate, so as to give no advantage to [25] large States, the power
will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in
such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one
authority to make war, and another peace.

Mr. BUTLER. The objections agst. the Legislature lie in [26] great
degree agst. the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President,
who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but
when the Nation will support it. Mr. MADISON and Mr. GERRY moved to
insert "declare," striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the
power to repel sudden attacks.

Mr. SHARMAN thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to
repel and not to commence war. "Make" [27] better than "declare" the
latter narrowing the power too much.

Mr. GERRY never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war.

Mr. ELSWORTH. there is a material difference between the cases of making
war and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into
it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. peace attended with
intricate & secret negociations.

Mr. MASON was agst. giving the power of war to the Executive, because
not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so
constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than
facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to
"make."

On the motion to insert declare -- in place of make, it was agreed to.
N. H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no. [*29] Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [31]

Mr. PINKNEY's motion to strike out [32] whole clause, [33] disagd. to
without call of States.

Mr. BUTLER moved to give the Legislature [32] power of peace, as they
were to have that of war.

Mr. GERRY 2ds. him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested
in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give
up part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by
an Enemy than the whole Legislature.

On the motion for adding "and peace" after "war" [34] N. H. no. Mas. no.
Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no S. C. no. Geo. no.
[35]

Adjourned

___________

1. See ante.

2. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, no -- 3."

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
South Carolina, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

6. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The phrase "as also the clause" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. The words "do. do." are omitted in the transcript.

10. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the following phrase is here added: "after the
words, ' To declare the law."'

12. The words "the question" are substituted in the transcript for
"motion."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, no -- 3."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 3."

15. The word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

17. The phrase "was next considered" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The phrase "it was agreed to" is here added in the transcript.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Delaware,
Maryland, no -- 3; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, divided."

20. The words "So agreed to" are omitted in the transcript.

21. The words "The motion" are substituted in the transcript for "which."

*22. In the printed Journal, Mas. no.

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 4; Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, no -- 4; Massachusetts, [22] Pennsylvania, absent. So it was
lost."

24. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

25. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

26. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

27. The word "is" is here inserted in the transcript.

28. The transcript here inserts the following: "Connecticut voted in the
negative; but."

*29. On the remark by Mr. King that "make" war might be understood to
"conduct" it which was an Executive function, Mr. Elseworth gave up his
objection, and the vote of Cont. [30] was changed to -- ay.

30. The words "of Cont. are omittd in the transcript.

31. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, [*29] Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; New Hampshire, no -- 1; Massachusetts, absent."

32. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

33. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

34. The transcript here adds the following: "it was unanimously
negatived."

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SATURDAY  AUGUST 18.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. MADISON submitted in order to be referred to the Committee of detail
the following powers as proper to be added to those of the General
Legislature

"To dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U. States"

"To institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein"

"To regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the
limits of the U. States

"To exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the Seat of the
General Government, and over a district around the same, not exceeding
_____ square miles; the Consent of the Legislature of the State or
States comprizing the same, being first obtained"

"To grant charters of incorporation in cases where the public good may
require them, and the authority of a single State may be incompetent"

"To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited time"

"To establish an University"

"To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful
knowledge and discoveries"

"To authorize the Executive to procure and hold for the use of the U. S.
landed property for the erection of Forts, Magazines, and other
necessary buildings"

These propositions were referred to the Committee of detail which had
prepared the Report and at the same time the following which were moved
by Mr. Pinkney: in both cases unanimously.

"To fix and permanently establish the seat of Government of the U. S. in
which they shall possess the exclusive right of soil & jurisdiction"

"To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature and the arts &
sciences"

"To grant charters of incorporation"

"To grant patents for useful inventions"

"To secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time"

"To establish public institutions, rewards and immunities for the
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades and manufactures"

"That funds which shall be appropriated for [1] payment of public
Creditors, shall not during the time of such appropriation, be diverted
or applied to any other purpose and that the Committee prepare a clause
or clauses for restraining the Legislature of the U. S. from
establishing a perpetual revenue"

"To secure the payment of the public debt"

"To secure all creditors under the New Constitution from a violation of
the public faith when pledged by the authority of the Legislature"

"To grant letters of mark and reprisal"

"To regulate Stages on the post roads"

Mr. MASON introduced the subject of regulating the militia. He thought
such a power necessary to be given to the Genl. Government. He hoped
there would be no standing army in time of peace, unless it might be for
a few garrisons. The Militia ought therefore to be the more effectually
prepared for the public defence. Thirteen States will never concur in
any one system, if the displining of the Militia be left in their hands.
If they will not give up the power over the whole, they probably will
over a part as a select militia. He moved as an addition to the
propositions just referred to the Committee of detail, & to be referred
in like manner, "a power to regulate the militia."

Mr. GERRY remarked that some provision ought to be made in favor of
public Securities, and something inserted concerning letters of marque,
which he thought not included in the power of war. He proposed that
these subjects should also go to a Committee.

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to refer a clause "that funds appropriated to public
creditors should not be diverted to other purposes."

Mr. MASON was much attached to the principle, but was afraid such a
fetter might be dangerous in time of war. He suggested the necessity of
preventing the danger of perpetual revenue which must of necessity
subvert the liberty of any Country. If it be objected to on the
principle of Mr. Rutlidge's motion that public credit may require
perpetual provisions, that case might be excepted: it being declared
that in other cases, no taxes should be laid for a longer term than
_____ years. He considered the caution observed in Great Britain on this
point as the paladium of the public liberty.

Mr. RUTLIDGE's motion was referred -- He then moved that a Grand
Committee be appointed to consider the necessity and expediency of the
U. States assuming all the State debts -- A regular settlement between
the Union & the several States would never take place. The assumption
would be just as the State debts were contracted in the common defence.
It was necessary, as the taxes on imports the only sure source of
revenue were to be given up to the Union. It was politic, as by
disburdening the people of the State debts it would conciliate them to
the plan.

Mr. KING and Mr. PINKNEY seconded the motion

[Col. MASON interposed a motion that the Committee prepare a clause for
restraining perpetual revenue, which was agreed to nem. con.]

Mr. SHERMAN thought it would be better to authorise the Legislature to
assume the State debts, than to say positively it should be done. He
considered the measure as just and that it would have a good effect to
say something about the Matter.

Mr. ELSEWORTH differed from Mr. Sherman -- As far as the State debts
ought in equity to be assumed, he conceived that they might and would be
so.

Mr. PINKNEY observed that a great part of the State debts were of such a
nature that although in point of policy and true equity they ought, [2]
yet would they not be viewed in the light of foederal expenditures.

Mr. KING thought the matter of more consequence than Mr. Elseworth
seemed to do; and that it was well worthy of commitment. Besides the
considerations of justice and policy which had been mentioned, it might
be remarked that the State Creditors an active and formidable party
would otherwise be opposed to a plan which transferred to the Union the
best resources of the States without transferring the State debts at the
same time. The State Creditors had generally been the strongest foes to
the impost-plan. The State debts probably were of greater amount than
the foederal. He would not say that it was practicable to consolidate
the debts, but he thought it would be prudent to have the subject
considered by a Committee.

On Mr. Rutlidge's motion, that [3] Come. be appointed to consider of the
assumption &c [4]

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. .S C. ay. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. GERRY's motion to provide for public securities, for stages on
post-roads, and for letters of marque & reprisal, were [6] committed
nem. con.

Mr. KING suggested that all unlocated lands of particular States ought
to be given up if State debts were to be assumed: -- Mr. Williamson
concurred in the idea.

A Grand Committee was appointed consisting of * transfer hither the
appointment & names of the Committee. [7] [The Come. appointed by ballot
were [8] Mr. Langdon, Mr. King, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Livingston, Mr. Clymer,
Mr. Dickenson, Mr. Mc.Henry, Mr. Mason, Mr. Williamson, Mr. C. C.
Pinkney, [9] Mr. Baldwin.]

Mr. RUTLIDGE remarked on the length of the Session, the probable
impatience of the public and the extreme anxiety of many members of the
Convention to bring the business to an end; concluding with a motion
that the Convention meet henceforward precisely at 10 OC. A. M. and that
precisely at 4 OC. P. M. the President adjourn the House without motion
for the purpose. and that no motion to adjourn sooner be allowed

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [10]

Mr. ELSEWORTH observed that a Council had not yet been provided for the
President. He conceived there ought to be one. His proposition was that
it should be composed of the President of the Senate -- the
Chief-Justice, and the ministers as they might be estabd. for the
departments of foreign & domestic affairs, war finance and marine, who
should advise but not conclude the President.

Mr. PINKNEY wished the proposition to lie over, as notice had been given
for a like purpose by Mr. Govr. Morris who was not then on the floor.
His own idea was that the President shd. be authorised to call for
advice or not as he might chuse. Give him an able Council and it will
thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself under their sanction.

Mr. GERRY was agst. letting the heads of the departments, particularly
of finance have any thing to do in business connected with legislation.
He mentioned the Chief Justice also as particularly exceptionable. These
men will also be so taken up with other matters as to neglect their own
proper duties.

Mr. DICKENSON urged that the great appointments should be made by the
Legislature, in which case they might properly be consulted by the
Executive, but not if made by the Executive himself -- This subject by
general consent lay over; & the House proceeded to the clause "To raise
armies."

Mr. GHORUM moved to add "and support" after "raise." Agreed to nem. con.
and then the clause [11] agreed to nem. con. as amended

Mr. GERRY took notice that there was no check here agst. standing armies
in time of peace. The existing Congs. is so constructed that it cannot
of itself maintain an army. This wd. not be the case under the new
system. The people were jealous on this head, and great opposition to
the plan would spring from such an omission. He suspected that
preparations of force were now making agst. it. [he seemed to allude to
the activity of the Govr. of N. York at this crisis in disciplining the
militia of that State.] He thought an army dangerous in time of peace &
could never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number. He
proposed that there shall [12] not be kept up in time of peace more than
thousand troops. His idea was that the blank should be filled with two
or three thousand.

Instead of "to build and equip fleets" -- "to provide & maintain a navy"
[13] agreed to nem. con. as a more convenient definition of the power.

[14] "To make rules for the Government and regulation of the land &
naval forces," [13] added from the existing Articles of Confederation.

Mr. L. MARTIN and Mr. GERRY now regularly moved "provided that in time
of peace the army shall not consist of more than thousand men."

Genl. PINKNEY asked whether no troops were ever to be raised untill an
attack should be made on us?

Mr. GERRY. if there be no restriction, a few States may establish a
military Govt.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, reminded him of Mr. Mason's motion for limiting the
appropriation of revenue as the best guard in this case. Mr. LANGDON saw
no room for Mr. Gerry's distrust of the Representatives of the people.

Mr. DAYTON. preparations for war are generally made in [15] peace; and a
standing force of some sort may, for ought we know, become unavoidable.
He should object to no restrictions consistent with these ideas.

The motion of Mr. Martin & Mr. Gerry was disagreed to nem. con.

Mr. MASON moved as an additional power "to make laws for the regulation
and discipline of the militia of the several States reserving to the
States the appointment of the officers." He considered uniformity as
necessary in the regulation of the Militia throughout the Union.

Genl. PINKNEY mentioned a case during the war in which a dissimilarity
in the militia of different States had produced the most serious
mischiefs. Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up a
proper discipline of their militia.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was for going as far in submitting the militia to the
Genl. Government as might be necessary, but thought the motion of Mr.
Mason went too far. He moved that the militia should have the same arms
& exercise and be under rules established by the Genl. Govt. when in
actual service of the U. States and when States neglect to provide
regulations for militia, it shd. be regulated & established by the
Legislature of [16] U. S. The whole authority over the Militia ought by
no means to be taken away from the States whose consequence would pine
away to nothing after such a sacrifice of power. He thought the Genl.
Authority could not sufficiently pervade the Union for such a purpose,
nor could it accomodate itself to the local genius of the people. It
must be vain to ask the States to give the Militia out of their hands.

Mr. SHERMAN 2ds. the motion.

Mr. DICKENSON. We are come now to a most important matter, that of the
sword. His opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up
all authority over the Militia. He proposed to restrain the general
power to one fourth part at a time, which by rotation would discipline
the whole Militia.

Mr. BUTLER urged the necessity of submitting the whole Militia to the
general Authority, which had the care of the general defence.

Mr. MASON. had suggested the idea of a select militia. He was led to
think that would be in fact as much as the Genl. Govt. could
advantageously be charged with. He was afraid of creating insuperable
objections to the plan. He withdrew his original motion, and moved a
power "to make laws for regulating and disciplining the militia, not
exceeding one tenth part in any one year, and reserving the appointment
of officers to the States."

Genl. PINKNEY, renewed Mr. Mason's original motion. For a part to be
under the Genl. and [17] part under the State Govts. wd. be an incurable
evil. he saw no room for such distrust of the Genl. Govt.

Mr. LANGDON 2ds. Genl. Pinkney's renewal. He saw no more reason to be
afraid of the Genl. Govt. than of the State Govts. He was more
apprehensive of the confusion of the different authorities on this
subject, than of either.

Mr. MADISON thought the regulation of the Militia naturally appertaining
to the authority charged with the public defence. It did not seem in its
nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities. If the States
would trust the Genl. Govt. with a power over the public treasure, they
would from the same consideration of necessity grant it the direction of
the public force. Those who had a full view of the public situation wd.
from a sense of the danger, guard agst. it: the States would not be
separately impressed with the general situation, nor have the due
confidence in the concurrent exertions of each other.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. considered the idea of a select militia as impracticable;
& if it were not it would be followed by a ruinous declension of the
great body of the Militia. The States will [18] never submit to the same
militia laws. Three or four shilling's as a penalty will enforce
obedience better in New England, than forty lashes in some other places.

Mr. PINKNEY thought the power such an one as could not be abused, and
that the States would see the necessity of surrendering it. He had
however but a scanty faith in Militia. There must be also a real
military force. This alone can effectually answer the purpose. The
United States had been making an experiment without it, and we see the
consequence in their rapid approaches towards anarchy. [19]

Mr. SHERMAN, took notice that the States might want their Militia for
defence agst. invasions and insurrections, and for enforcing obedience
to their laws. They will not give up this point. In giving up that of
taxation, they retain a concurrent power of raising money for their own
use.

Mr. GERRY thought this the last point remaining to be surrendered. If it
be agreed to by the Convention, the plan will have as black a mark as
was set on Cain. He had no such confidence in the Genl. Govt. as some
gentlemen professed, and believed it would be found that the States have
not.

Col. MASON. thought there was great weight in the remarks of Mr.
Sherman, and moved an exception to his motion "of such part of the
Militia as might be required by the States for their own use."

Mr. READ doubted the propriety of leaving the appointment of the Militia
officers in [20] the States. In some States they are elected by the
legislatures; in others by the people themselves. He thought at least an
appointment by the State Executives ought to be insisted on.

On [21] committing to the grand Committee last appointed, the latter
motion of Col. Mason, & the original one revived by Gel. Pinkney

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [22]

Adjourned

___________

1. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The words "to be" are here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The transcript here adds the following: "it was agreed to." 

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 4; Pennsylvania,
divided."

6. In the transcript he word "were" is crossed out and "was" is written
above it.

7. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

8. The phrase "The Come. appointed by ballot were" is omitted in the
transcript.

9. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no -- 2."

11. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "should" is substituted in the transcript for "shall."

13. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The words "A clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

15. The words "time of" are here inserted in the transcript.

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "will."

19. This had reference to the disorders particularly which had occurred
in Massachts. which had called for the interposition of the federal
troops.

20. The word "in" is crossed out in the transcript and "to" is written
above it.

21. The words "the question for" are here inserted in transcript.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
PEnnsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 8; Connecticut, New Jersey, no -- 2; Maryland, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  AUGUST 20.   IN CONVENTION

Mr. PINKNEY submitted to the House, in order to be referred to the
Committee of detail, the following propositions -- 

"Each House shall be the Judge of its own privileges, and shall have
authority to punish by imprisonment every person violating the same; or
who, in the place where the Legislature may be sitting and during the
time of its Session, shall threaten any of its members for any thing
said or done on the House -- or who shall assault any of them therefor
-- or who shall assault or arrest any witness or other person ordered to
attend either of the Houses in his way going or returning; or who shall
rescue any person arrested by their order."

"Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the supreme Executive shall
have authority to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court
upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions"

"The privileges and benefit of the Writ of Habeas corpus shall be
enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and
shall not be suspended by the Legislature except upon the most urgent
and pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding _____
months."

"The liberty of the Press shall be inviolably preserved"

"No troops shall be kept up in time of peace, but by consent of the
Legislature"

"The military shall always be subordinate to the Civil power, and no
grants of money shall be made by the Legislature for supporting military
Land forces, for more than one year at a time"

"No soldier shall be quartered in any House in time of peace without
consent of the owner."

"No person holding the office of President of the U. S., a Judge of
their supreme Court, Secretary for the department of Foreign Affairs, of
Finance, of Marine, of War, or of _____, shall be capable of holding at
the same time any other office of Trust or Emolument under the U. S. or
an individual State"

"No religious test or qualification shall ever be annexed to any oath of
office under the authority of the U. S."

"The U. S. shall be for ever considered as one Body corporate and
politic in law, and entitled to all the rights privileges and
immunities, which to Bodies corporate do or ought to appertain"

"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have the power of making the great
seal which shall be kept by the President of the U. S. or in his absence
by the President of the Senate, to be used by them as the occasion may
require. -- It shall be called the great Seal of the U. S. and shall be
affixed to all laws."

"All Commissions and writs shall run in the name of the U. S."

"The Jurisdiction of the supreme Court shall be extended to all
controversies between the U. S. and an individual State, or the U. S.
and the Citizens of an individual State"

These propositions were referred to the Committee of detail without
debate or consideration of them, by the House.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. by Mr. PINKNEY submitted the following
propositions which were in like manner referred to the Committee of
Detail.

"To assist the President in conducting the public affairs there shall be
a council of State composed of the following officers -- 1. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall from time to time recommend such
alterations of and additions to the laws of the U. S. as may in his
opinion, be necessary to the due administration of Justice, and such as
may promote useful learning and inculcate sound morality throughout the
Union: He shall be President of the Council in the absence of the
President

2. The Secretary of Domestic Affairs who shall be appointed by the
President and hold his office during pleasure. It shall be his duty to
attend to matters of general police, the State of Agriculture and
manufactures, the opening of roads and navigations, and the facilitating
communications thro' the U. States; and he shall from time to time
recommend such measures and establishments as may tend to promote those
objects.

3. The Secretary of Commerce and Finance, who shall also be appointed by
the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to superintend all
matters relating to the public finances, to prepare & report plans of
revenue and for the regulation of expenditures, and also to recommend
such things as may in his Judgment promote the commercial interests of
the U. S.

4. The Secretary of foreign affairs who shall also be appointed by the
President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to correspond with all
foreign Ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, & consider such as may be
transmitted from abroad; and generally to attend to the interests of the
U. S. in their connections with foreign powers.

5. The Secretary of War who shall also be appointed by the President
during pleasure. It shall be his duty to superintend every thing
relating to the war- Department, such as the raising and equipping of
troops, the care of military stores, public fortifications, arsenals &
the like -- also in time of war to prepare & recommend plans of offence
and Defence.

6. The Secretary of the Marine who shall also be appointed during
pleasure -- It shall be his duty to superintend every thing relating to
the Marine -- Department, the public Ships, Dock-Yards, Naval-Stores &
arsenals -- also in [1] time of war, to prepare and recommend plans of
offence and defence.

The President shall also appoint a Secretary of State to hold his office
during pleasure; who shall be Secretary to the Council of State, and
also public Secretary to the President. It shall be his duty to prepare
all public despatches from the President which he shall countersign

The President may from time to time submit any matter to the discussion
of the Council of State, and he may require the written opinions of any
one or more of the members: But he shall in all cases exercise his own
judgment, and either Conform to such opinions or not as he may think
proper; and every officer abovementioned shall be responsible for his
opinion on the affairs relating to his particular Department.

Each of the officers abovementioned shall be liable to impeachment. &
removal from office for neglect of duty malversation, or corruption"

Mr. GERRY moved "that the Committee be instructed to report proper
qualifications for the President, and [2] mode of trying the Supreme
Judges in cases of impeachment.

The clause "to call forth the aid of the Militia &c. was postponed till
report should be made as to the power over the Militia referred
yesterday to the Grand Committee of eleven.

Mr. MASON moved to enable Congress "to enact sumptuary laws." No
Government can be maintained unless the manners be made consonant to it.
Such a discretionary power may do good and can do no harm. A proper
regulation of excises & of trade may do a great deal but it is best to
have an express provision. It was objected to sumptuary laws that they
were contrary to nature. This was a vulgar error. The love of
distinction it is true is natural; but the object of sumptuary laws is
not to extinguish this principle but to give it a proper direction.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. The best remedy is to enforce taxes & debts. As far as
the regulation of eating & drinking can be reasonable, it is provided
for in the power of taxation.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS argued that sumptuary laws tended to create a landed
Nobility, by fixing in the great-landholders and their posterity their
present possessions.

Mr. GERRY. the law of necessity is the best sumptuary law.

On [1] Motion of Mr. Mason "as to Sumptuary laws"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [3]

[4] "And to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this
Constitution, in the Government of the U. S. or any department or
officer thereof."

Mr. MADISON and Mr. PINKNEY moved to insert between "laws" and
"necessary" "and establish all offices," it appearing to them liable to
cavil that the latter was not included in the former.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, Mr. WILSON, Mr. RUTLIDGE and Mr. ELSEWORTH urged that
the amendment could not be necessary.

On the motion for inserting "and establish all offices"

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [5]

The clause as reported was then agreed to nem. con.

Art: VII sect. 2 [6] concerning Treason which see. [7]

Mr. MADISON, thought the definition too narrow. It did not appear to go
as far as the Stat. of Edwd. III. He did not see why more latitude might
not be left to the Legislature. It wd. be as safe as in the hands of
State legislatures; and it was inconvenient to bar a discretion which
experience might enlighten, and which might be applied to good purposes
as well as be abused.

Mr. MASON was for pursuing the Stat: of Edwd. III

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was for giving to the Union an exclusive right to
declare what shd. be treason. In case of a contest between the U. S. and
a particular State, the people of the latter must, under the disjunctive
terms of the clause, be traitors to one or other authority.

Mr. RANDOLPH thought the clause defective in adopting the words "in
adhering" only. The British Stat: adds, "giving them aid and comfort"
which had a more extensive meaning.

Mr. ELSEWORTH considered the definition as the same in fact with that of
the Statute.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS "adhering" does not go so far as "giving aid and
Comfort" or the latter words may be restrictive of "adhering," in either
case the Statute is not pursued.

Mr. WILSON held "giving aid and comfort" to be explanatory, not
operative words; and that it was better to omit them.

Mr. DICKENSON, thought the addition of "giving aid & comfort"
unnecessary & improper; being too vague and extending too far. He wished
to know what was meant by the "testimony of two witnesses" whether they
were to be witnesses to the same overt act or to different overt acts.
He thought also that proof of an overt-act ought to be expressed as
essential in the case.

DOCr. JOHNSON considered "giving aid & comfort" as explanatory of
"adhering" & that something should be inserted in the definition
concerning overt-acts. He contended that Treason could not be both agst.
the U. States -- and individual States; being an offence agst. the
Sovereignty which can be but one in the same community.

Mr. MADISON remarked that "and" before "in adhering" should be changed
into "or" otherwise both offences viz of levying war, & of adhering to
the Enemy might be necessary to constitute Treason. He added that as the
definition here was of treason against the U. S. it would seem that the
individual States wd. be left in possession of a concurrent power so far
as to define & punish treason particularly agst. themselves; which might
involve double punishmt.

It was moved that the whole clause be recommitted which was lost,
the votes being equally divided.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. ay. -- [8]

Mr. WILSON & DOCr. JOHNSON moved, that "or any of them" after "United
States" be struck out in order to remove the embarrassment: which was
agreed to nem. con.

Mr. MADISON. This had [9] not removed the embarrassment. The same Act
might be treason agst. the United States as here defined -- and agst. a
particular State according to its laws.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. There can be no danger to the genl. authority from this;
as the laws of the U. States are to be paramount.

DOCr. JOHNSON was still of opinion there could be no Treason agst. a
particular State. It could not even at present, as the Confederation now
stands, the Sovereignty being in the Union; much less can it be under
the proposed system.

Col. MASON. The United States will have a qualified sovereignty. only.
The individual States will retain a part of the Sovereignty. An Act may
be treason agst. a particular State which is not so agst. the U. States.
He cited the Rebellion of Bacon in Virginia as an illustration of the
doctrine.

DOCr. JOHNSON: That case would amount to Treason agst. the Sovereign,
the Supreme Sovereign, the United States.

Mr. KING observed that the controversy relating to Treason might be of
less magnitude than was supposed; as the Legislature might punish
capitally under other names than Treason.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS and Mr. RANDOLPH wished to substitute the words of the
British Statute and moved to postpone Sect 2. art VII in order to
consider the following substitute -- "Whereas it is essential to the
preservation of liberty to define precisely and exclusively what shall
constitute the crime of Treason, it is therefore ordained, declared &
established, that if a man do levy war agst. the U. S., within their
territories, or be adherent to the enemies of the U. S. within the said
territories, giving them aid and comfort within their territories or
elsewhere, and thereof be provably attainted of open deed by the people
of his condition, he shall be adjudged guilty of Treason."

On this question

N. H. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [10]

It was [11] moved to strike out "agst. [12] United States" after
"treason" so as to define treason generally, and on this question

Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [13]

It was then moved to insert after "two witnesses" the words "to the same
overt act." DOCr. FRANKLIN wished this a mendment to take place --
prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily
made use of against innocence.

Mr. WILSON. much may be said on both sides. Treason may sometimes be
practised in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult -- as
in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.

On the question -- as to same overt act

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [14]

Mr. KING moved to insert before the word "power" the word "sole," giving
the U. States the exclusive right to declare the punishment of Treason.

Mr. BROOM 2ds. the motion.

Mr. WILSON in cases of a general nature, treason can only be agst. the
U- States. and in such they shd. have the sole right to declare the
punishment -- yet in many cases it may be otherwise. The subject was
however intricate and he distrusted his present judgment on it.

Mr. KING this amendment results from the vote defining, treason
generally by striking out agst. the U. States; which excludes any
treason agst. particular States. These may however punish offences as
high misdemesnors.

On [15] inserting the word "sole." It passed in the negative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. -- [16]

Mr. WILSON. the clause is ambiguous now. "Sole" ought either to have
been inserted -- or "against the U. S." to be re-instated.

Mr. KING no line can be drawn between levying war and adhering to [17]
enemy -- agst. the U. States and agst. an individual State-Treason agst.
the latter must be so agst. the former.

Mr. SHERMAN, resistance agst. the laws of the U. States as distinguished
from resistance agst. the laws of a particular State, forms the line.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. the U. S. are sovereign on their [18] side of the line
dividing the jurisdictions -- the States on the other -- each ought to
have power to defend their respective Sovereignties.

Mr. DICKENSON, war or insurrection agst. a member of the Union must be
so agst. the whole body; but the Constitution should be made clear on
this point.

The clause was reconsidered nem. con -- & then, Mr. WILSON & Mr.
ELSEWORTH moved to reinstate "agst. the U. S." after "Treason" -- on
which question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. MADISON was not satisfied with the footing on which the clause now
stood. As Treason agst. the U. States involves treason agst. particular
States, and vice versa, the same act may be twice tried & punished by
the different authorities. Mr. GOVr. MORRIS viewed the matter in the
same light -- 

It was moved & 2ded. to amend the sentence to read -- "Treason agst. the
U. S. shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to
their enemies" which was agreed to.

Col. MASON moved to insert the words "giving them aid [20] and comfort,"
as restrictive of "adhering to their Enemies &c." the latter he thought
would be otherwise too indefinite -- This motion was agreed to: Cont.
Del: & Georgia only being in the Negative.

Mr. L. MARTIN moved to insert after conviction &c -- "or on confession
in open court" -- and on the question, (the negative States thinking the
words superfluous) it was agreed to

N. H: ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. no. [21]

Art: VII. Sect. 2, as amended was then agreed to nem. con.

[22] Sect. 3 [23] taken up "white & other" struck out nem. con. as
superfluous.

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to require the first census to be taken within
"three" instead of "six" years from the first meeting of the Legislature
-- and on [24] question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [25]

Mr. KING asked what was the precise meaning of direct taxation? No one
answd.

Mr. GERRY moved to add to the [26] 3d. Sect. art. VII, the following
clause "That from the first meeting, of the Legislature of the U. S.
until a Census shall be taken all monies for supplying the public
Treasury by direct taxation shall be raised from the several States
according to the number of their Representatives respectively in the
first branch"

Mr. LANGDON. This would bear unreasonably hard on N. H. and he must be
agst. it.

Mr. CARROL. opposed it. The number of Reps. did not admit of a
proportion exact enough for a rule of taxation. Before any question the
House

Adjourned

___________

1. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, aye
-- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 8."

4. The words "On the clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Maryland, aye -- 2;
New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Georgia, no -- 9."

6. See ante.

7. In the transcript the words "which see" are crossed out and the
phrase "was then taken up" is written above them.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 5 New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 5; North Carolina,
divided."

9. The word "has" is substituted in the transcript for "had."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Virginia, aye -- 2;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

11. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georiga, aye
-- 8; Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 2."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 3."

15. The words "the question for" are here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Dealaware, South Carolina, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia no -- 6."

17. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The word "one" is substituted in the transcript for "their."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 5."

20. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 7;
Massachusetts, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 3; North Carolina,
Divided."

22. In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: "Article 7, Sect.
3 was taken up. The words 'white and others,' were Struck out" ...

23. See ante.

24. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

25. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye -- 9; Carolina, Georgia, no -- 2."

26. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  AUGUST 21.   IN CONVENTION

Governour LIVINGSTON from the Committee of Eleven to whom was referred
the propositions respecting the debts of the several States and also the
Militia entered on the 18th. inst: delivered the following report:

"The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to fulfil the engagements
which have been entered into by Congress, and to discharge as well the
debts of the U. S. as the debts incurred by the several States during
the late war, for the common defence and general welfare"

"To make laws for organizing arming and disciplining the militia, and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the
U. S. reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the
officers, and the authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by the U. States"

Mr. GERRY considered giving the power only, without adopting the
obligation, as destroying the security now enjoyed by the public
creditors of the U-States. He enlarged on the merit of this class of
citizens, and the solemn faith which had been pledged under the existing
Confederation. If their situation should be changed as here proposed
great opposition would be excited agst. the plan. He urged also that as
the States had made different degrees of exertion to sink their
respective debts, those who had done most would be alarmed, if they were
now to be saddled with a share of the debts of States which had done
least. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It means neither more nor less than the confederation as it
relates to this subject.

Mr. ELSEWORTH moved that the Report delivered in by Govr. Livingston
should lie on the table. [1] Agreed to nem. con.

Art: VII. Sect. 3. [2] resumed. -- Mr. DICKENSON moved to postpone this
in order to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 4. and to limit the number of
representatives to be allowed to the large States. Unless this were done
the small States would be reduced to entire insignificancy, [3] and
encouragement given to the importation of slaves.

Mr. SHERMAN would agree to such a reconsideration, but did not see the
necessity of postponing the section before the House. -- Mr. DICKENSON
withdrew his motion. Art: VII. Sect. 3. [4] then agreed to 10 ays.
Delaware alone being [5] no.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to add to Sect. 3. the following clause "and all
accounts of supplies furnished, services performed, and monies advanced
by the several States to the U. States, or by the U. S. to the several
States shall be adjusted by the same rule"

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS 2ds. the motion.

Mr. GHORUM, thought it wrong to insert this in the Constitution. The
Legislature will no doubt do what is right. The present Congress have
such a power and are now exercising it.

Mr. SHERMAN unless some rule be expressly given none will exist under
the new system.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. Though The contracts of Congress will be binding, there
will be no rule for executing them on the States; and one ought to be
provided.

Mr. SHERMAN withdrew his motion to make way for one of Mr. WILLIAMSON to
add to Sect. 3. "By this rule the several quotas of the States shall be
determined in Settling the expences of the late war."

Mr. CARROL brought into view the difficulty that might arise on this
subject from the establishment of the Constitution as intended without
the unanimous consent of the States

Mr. WILLIAMSON's motion was postponed nem- con-

Art: VI Sect. 12. [6] which had been postponed Aug: 15. [7] was now
called for by Col. MASON, who wished to know how the proposed amendment
as to money bills would be decided, before he agreed to any further
points.

Mr. GERRY's motion of yesterday that previous to a census, direct
taxation be proportioned on the States according to the number of
Representatives, was taken up. He observed that the principal acts of
Government would probably take place within that period, and it was but
reasonable that the States should pay in proportion to their share in
them.

Mr. ELSEWORTH thought such a rule unjust. there was a great difference
between the number of Represents., and the number of inhabitants as a
rule in this case. Even if the former were proportioned as nearly as
possible to the latter, it would be a very inaccurate rule. A State
might have one Representative only that had inhabitants enough for 1 1/2
or more, if fractions could be applied, &c -- . He proposed to amend the
motion by adding the words "subject to a final liquidation by the
foregoing rule when a census shall have been taken."

Mr. MADISON. The last apportionment of Congs., on which the number of
Representatives was founded, was conjectural and meant only as a
temporary rule till a Census should be established.

Mr. READ. The requisitions of Congs. had been accomodated to the the
impoverishments produced by the war; and to other local and temporary
circumstances -- 

Mr. WILLIAMSON opposed Mr. Gerry's motion

Mr. LANGDON was not here when N. H. was allowed three members. If [8] it
was more than her share; he did not wish for them.

Mr. BUTLER contended warmly for Mr. Gerry's motion as founded in reason
and equity.

Mr. ELSEWORTH's proviso to Mr. Gerry's motion was agreed to nem. con.

Mr. KING thought the power of taxation given to the Legislature rendered
the motion of Mr. Gerry altogether unnecessary.

On Mr. Gerry's motion as amended

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
Ci. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [9]

On a question, Shall Art: VI Sect. 12. with the amendment to it proposed
& entered on the 15 instant, as called for by Col. Mason be now taken
up? it passed in the Negative.

N. H. ay. Mas no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no [10]

Mr. L. MARTIN. The power of taxation is most likely to be criticised by
the public. Direct taxation should not be used but in case of absolute
necessity; and then the States will be best Judges of the mode. He
therefore moved the following addition to Sect: 3. Art: VII "And
whenever the Legislature of the U: S: shall find it necessary that
revenue should be raised by direct taxation, having apportioned the
same, according to the above rule on the several States, requisitions
shall be made of the respective States to pay into the Continental
Treasury their respective quotas within a time in the said requisitions
specified, and in case of any of the States failing to comply with such
requisitions, then and then only to devise and pass acts directing the
mode, and authorizing the collection of the same"

Mr. McHENRY 2ded. the motion -- there was no debate, and on the question

N. H. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pena. no. Del. no. Md. divd. (Jenifer &
Carrol no). Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [11]

Art. VII. Sect. 4. [12, 13] -- Mr. LANGDON. by this section the States
are left at liberty to tax exports. N. H. therefore with other
nonexporting States, will be subject to be taxed by the States exporting
its produce. This could not be admitted. It seems to be feared that the
Northern States will oppress the trade of the Southn. This may be
guarded agst. by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 or 3/4 of the
legislature in such cases.

Mr. ELSEWORTH. It is best as it stands. The power of regulating trade
between the States will protect them agst. each other. Should this not
be the case, the attempts of one to tax the produce of another passing
through its hands, will force a direct exportation and defeat
themselves. There are solid reasons agst. Congs. taxing exports. 1. [14]
it will discourage industry, as taxes on imports discourage luxury. 2.
[14] The produce of different States is such as to prevent uniformity in
such taxes. There are indeed but a few articles that could be taxed at
all; as Tobo. rice & indigo, and a tax on these alone would be partial &
unjust. 3. [14] The taxing of exports would engender incurable
jealousies.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Tho' N. C. has been taxed by Virga. by a duty on 12,000
Hhs of her Tobo. exported thro' Virga. yet he would never agree to this
power. Should it take take place, it would distroy the last hope of an
adoption of the plan.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. These local considerations ought not to impede the
general interest. There is great weight in the argument, that the
exporting States will tax the produce of their uncommercial neighbours.
The power of regulating the trade between Pa. & N. Jersey will never
prevent the former from taxing the latter. Nor will such a tax force a
direct exportation from N. Jersey. The advantages possessed by a large
trading City, outweigh the disadvantage of a moderate duty; and will
retain the trade in that channel. -- If no tax can be laid on exports,
an embargo cannot be laid though in time of war such a measure may be of
critical importance. Tobacco, lumber and live-stock are three objects
belonging to different States, of which great advantage might be made by
a power to tax exports. To these may be added Ginseng and Masts for
Ships by which a tax might be thrown on other nations. The idea of
supplying the West Indies with lumber from Nova Scotia is one of the
many follies of lord Sheffield's pamphlets. The State of the Country
also will change, and render duties on exports, as skins, beaver & other
peculiar raw materials, politic in the view of encouraging American
Manufactures.

Mr. BUTLER was strenuously opposed to a power over exports; as unjust
and alarming to the Staple-States.

Mr. LANGDON suggested a prohibition on the States from taxing the
produce of other States exported from their harbours.

Mr. DICKENSON. The power of taxing exports may be inconvenient at
present; but it must be of dangerous consequence to prohibit it with
respect to all articles and for ever. He thought it would be better to
except particular articles from the power.

Mr. SHERMAN. It is best to prohibit the National legislature in all
cases. The States will never give up all power over trade. An
enumeration of particular articles would be difficult invidious and
improper.

Mr. MADISON As we aught to be governed by national and permanent views,
it is a sufficient argument for giving ye. power over exports that a
tax, tho' it may not be expedient at present, may be so hereafter. A
proper regulation of exports may & probably will be necessary hereafter,
and for the same purposes as the regulation of imports; viz, for revenue
-- domestic manufactures -- and procuring equitable regulations from
other nations. An Embargo may be of absolute necessity, and can alone be
effectuated by the Genl. authority. The regulation of trade between
State and State can not effect more than indirectly to hinder a State
from taxing its own exports; by authorizing its Citizens to carry their
commodities freely into a neighbouring State which might decline taxing
exports in order to draw into its channel the trade of its neighbours.
As to the fear of disproportionate burdens on the more exporting States,
it might be remarked that it was agreed on all hands that the revenue
wd. principally be drawn from trade, and as only a given revenue would
be needed, it was not material whether all should be drawn wholly from
imports -- or half from those, and half from exports. The imports and
exports must be pretty nearly equal in every State -- and relatively the
same among the different States.

Mr. ELSEWORTH did not conceive an embargo by the Congress interdicted by
this section.

Mr. McHENRY conceived that power to be included in the power of war.

Mr. WILSON. Pennsylvania exports the produce of Maryd. N. Jersey,
Delaware & will by & by when the River Delaware is opened, export for
N-York. In favoring the general power over exports therefore, he opposed
the particular interest of his State. He remarked that the power had
been attacked by reasoning which could only have held good in case the
Genl Govt. had been compelled, instead of authorized, to lay duties on
exports. To deny this power is to take from the Common Govt. half the
regulation of trade. It was his opinion that a power over exports might
be more effectual than that over imports in obtaining beneficial
treaties of commerce

Mr. GERRY was strenuously opposed to the power over exports. It might be
made use of to compel the States to comply with the will of the Genl.
Government, and to grant it any new powers which might be demanded. We
have given it more power already than we know how will be exercised. It
will enable the Genl. Govt. to oppress the States as much as Ireland is
oppressed by Great Britain.

Mr. FITZIMMONS would be agst. a tax on exports to be laid immediately;
but was for giving a power of laying the tax when a proper time may call
for it. This would certainly be the case when America should become a
manufacturing Country. He illustrated his argument by the duties in G.
Britain on wool &c.

Col. MASON. If he were for reducing the States to mere corporations as
seemed to be the tendency of some arguments, he should be for subjecting
their exports as well as imports to a power of general taxation. He went
on a principle often advanced & in which he concurred, that "a majority
when interested will oppress the minority." This maxim had been verified
by our own Legislature [of Virginia]. If we compare the States in this
point of view the 8 Northern States have an interest different from the
five Southn. States; and have in one branch of the legislature 36 votes
agst. 29. and in the other, in the proportion of 8 agst. 5. The Southern
States had therefore good ground for their suspicions. The case of
Exports was not the same with that of imports. The latter were the same
throughout the States: The former very different. As to Tobacco other
nations do raise it, and are capable of raising it as well as Virga. &c.
The impolicy of taxing that article had been demonstrated by the
experiment of Virginia.

Mr. CLYMER remarked that every State might reason with regard to its
particular productions, in the same manner as the Southern States. The
middle States may apprehend an oppression of their wheat flour,
provisions &c. and with more reason, as these articles were exposed to a
competition in foreign markets not incident to Tobo. rice &c. They may
apprehend also combinations agst. them between the Eastern & Southern
States as much as the latter can apprehend them between the Eastern &
middle. He moved as a qualification of the power of taxing Exports that
it should be restrained to regulations of trade, by inserting after the
word "duty" Sect 4 art VII the words, "for the purpose of revenue."

On [15] Question on Mr. Clymer's motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [16]

Mr. MADISON. In order to require 2/3 of each House to tax exports -- as
a lesser evil than a total prohibition moved to insert the words "unless
by consent of two thirds of the Legislature."

Mr. WILSON 2ds. and on this question, it passed in the Negative. N. H.
ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no [Col.
Mason, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Blair no. Genl. Washington & J. M. ay.] N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [17, 18] Question on Sect: 4. art VII. as far as
to "no tax shl. be laid on exports -- It passed in the affirmative.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay
(Genl. W. & J. M. no) N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. L. MARTIN, proposed to vary the Sect: 4. art VII. so as to allow a
prohibition or tax on the importation of slaves. 1. [20] as five slaves
are to be counted as 3 free men in the apportionment of Representatives;
such a clause wd. leave an encouragement to this trafic. 2. [21] slaves
weakened one part of the Union which the other parts were bound to
protect: the privilege of importing them was therefore unreasonable. 3.
[22] it was inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and
dishonorable to the American character to have such a feature in the
Constitution.

Mr. RUTLIDGE did not see how the importation of slaves could be
encouraged by this Section. He was not apprehensive of insurrections and
would readily exempt the other States from the obligation to protect the
Southern against them. -- Religion & humanity had nothing to do with
this question. Interest alone is the governing principle with nations.
The true question at present is whether the Southn. States shall or
shall not be parties to the Union. If the Northern States consult their
interest, they will not oppose the increase of Slaves which will
increase the commodities of which they will become the carriers.

Mr. ELSEWORTH was for leaving the clause as it stands. let every State
import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom of slavery are
considerations belonging to the States themselves. What enriches a part
enriches the whole, and the States are the best judges of their
particular interest. The old confederation had not meddled with this
point, and he did not see any greater necessity for bringing it within
the policy of the new one:

Mr. PINKNEY. South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibits
the slave trade. In every proposed extension of the powers of the
Congress, that State has expressly & watchfully excepted that of
meddling with the importation of negroes. If the States be all left at
liberty on this subject, S. Carolina may perhaps by degrees do of
herself what is wished, as Virginia & Maryland have already [23] done.

Adjourned

___________

1. The words "which was" are here inserted in the transcript.

2. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "insignificancy" is changed to "insgnificance" in the
transcript.

4. The word "was" is here inserted in the trancript.

5. The word "being" is omitted in the transcripty.

6. See ante.

7. The words "on the fifiteenth of August" are substituted in the
transcript for "Aug: 15."

8. The word "if" is omitted in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads "Massachusetts, South Carolina, aye
-- 2; New Hampshire, connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 8; North Carolina, divided."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8; Maryland, divided [Jenifer
and Caroll, no]."

12. See ante.

13. The words "was then taken up" are here inserted in the transcript.

14. The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed in the transcript to
"First," "Secondly" and "Thirdly."

15. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye -- 5; uConnecticut, Maryland,
Virginia [Col. Mason, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Blair, no; General Washington,
Mr. Madison, aye] North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

18. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcrpt.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Maryland, Virginia [Genl. Washington and Mr. Madison, no] North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georiga, aye -- 7; New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -- 4."

20. The figure "1" is changed in the transcript to "In the first place."

21. The figure "2" is changed in the transcript to "In the second
place."

22. The figure "3" is changed in the transcript to "And in the third
place."

23. The words "have already" are transposed in the transcript to read
"already have."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  AUGUST 22.   IN CONVENTION

Art VII sect 4. [1, 2] resumed. Mr. SHERMAN was for leaving the clause
as it stands. He disapproved of the slave trade; yet as the States were
now possessed of the right to import slaves, as the public good did not
require it to be taken from them, & as it was expedient to have as few
objections as possible to the proposed scheme of Government, he thought
it best to leave the matter as we find it. He observed that the
abolition of Slavery seemed to be going on in the U. S. & that the good
sense of the several States would probably by degrees compleat it. He
urged on the Convention the necessity of despatching its business.

Col. MASON. This infernal trafic originated in the avarice of British
Merchants. The British Govt. constantly checked the attempts of Virginia
to put a stop to it. The present question concerns not the importing
States alone but the whole Union. The evil of having slaves was
experienced during the late war. Had slaves been treated as they might
have been by the Enemy, they would have proved dangerous instruments in
their hands. But their folly dealt by the slaves, as it did by the
Tories. He mentioned the dangerous insurrections of the slaves in Greece
and Sicily; and the instructions given by Cromwell to the Commissioners
sent to Virginia, to arm the servants & slaves, in case other means of
obtaining its submission should fail. Maryland & Virginia he said had
already prohibited the importation of slaves expressly. N. Carolina had
done the same in substance. All this would be in vain if S. Carolina &
Georgia be at liberty to import. The Western people are already calling
out for slaves for their new lands, and will fill that Country with
slaves if they can be got thro' S. Carolina & Georgia. Slavery
discourages arts & manufactures. The poor despise labor when performed
by slaves. They prevent the immigration of Whites, who really enrich &
strengthen a Country. They produce the most pernicious effect on
manners. Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the
judgment of heaven on a Country. As nations can not be rewarded or
punished in the next world they must be in this. By an inevitable chain
of causes & effects providence punishes national sins, by national
calamities. He lamented that some of our Eastern brethren had from a
lust of gain embarked in this nefarious traffic. As to the States being
in possession of the Right to import, this was the case with many other
rights, now to be properly given up. He held it essential in every point
of view that the Genl. Govt. should have power to prevent the increase
of slavery.

Mr. ELSWORTH. As he had never owned a slave could not judge of the
effects of slavery on character: He said however that if it was to be
considered in a moral light we ought to go farther and free those
already in the Country. -- As slaves also multiply so fast in Virginia &
& Maryland that it is cheaper to raise than import them, whilst in the
sickly rice swamps foreign supplies are necessary, if we go no farther
than is urged, we shall be unjust towards S. Carolina & Georgia. Let us
not intermeddle. As population increases poor laborers will be so plenty
as to render slaves useless. Slavery in time will not be a speck in our
Country. Provision is already made in Connecticut for abolishing it. And
the abolition has already taken place in Massachusetts. As to the danger
of insurrections from foreign influence, that will become a motive to
kind treatment of the slaves.

Mr. PINKNEY. If slavery be wrong, it is justified by the example of all
the world. He cited the case of Greece Rome & other antient States; the
sanction given by France England, Holland & other modern States. In all
ages one half of mankind have been slaves. If the S. States were let
alone they will probably of themselves stop importations. He wd. himself
as a Citizen of S. Carolina vote for it. An attempt to take away the
right as proposed will produce serious objections to the Constitution
which he wished to see adopted.

General PINKNEY declared it to be his firm opinion that if himself & all
his colleagues were to sign the Constitution & use their personal
influence, it would be of no avail towards obtaining the assent of their
Constituents. S. Carolina & Georgia cannot do without slaves. As to
Virginia she will gain by stopping the importations. Her slaves will
rise in value, & she has more than she wants. It would be unequal to
require S. C. & Georgia to confederate on such unequal terms. He said
the Royal assent before the Revolution had never been refused to S.
Carolina as to Virginia. He contended that the importation of slaves
would be for the interest of the whole Union. The more slaves, the more
produce to employ the carrying trade; The more consumption also, and the
more of this, the more of revenue for the common treasury. He admitted
it to be reasonable that slaves should be dutied like other imports, but
should consider a rejection of the clause as an exclusion of S. Carola.
from the Union.

Mr. BALDWIN had conceived national objects alone to be before the
Convention, not such as like the present were of a local nature. Georgia
was decided on this point. That State has always hitherto supposed a
Genl. Governmt. to be the pursuit of the central States who wished to
have a vortex for every thing -- that her distance would preclude her
from equal advantage -- & that she could not prudently purchase it by
yielding national powers. From this it might be understood in what light
she would view an attempt to abridge one of her favorite prerogatives.
If left to herself, she may probably put a stop to the evil. As one
ground for this conjecture, he took notice of the sect of ______ which
he said was a respectable class of people, who carried their ethics
beyond the mere equality of men, extending their humanity to the claims
of the whole animal creation.

Mr. WILSON observed that if S. C. & Georgia were themselves disposed to
get rid of the importation of slaves in a short time as had been
suggested, they would never refuse to Unite because the importation
might be prohibited. As the Section now stands all articles imported are
to be taxed. Slaves alone are exempt. This is in fact a bounty on that
article.

Mr. GERRY thought we had nothing to do with the conduct of the States as
to Slaves, but ought to be careful not to give any sanction to it.

Mr. DICKENSON considered it as inadmissible on every principle of honor
& safety that the importation of slaves should be authorised to the
States by the Constitution. The true question was whether the national
happiness would be promoted or impeded by the importation, and this
question ought to be left to the National Govt. not to the States
particularly interested. If Engd. & France permit slavery, slaves are at
the same time excluded from both those Kingdoms. Greece and Rome were
made unhappy by their slaves. He could not believe that the Southn.
States would refuse to confederate on the account apprehended;
especially as the power was not likely to be immediately exercised by
the Genl. Government.

Mr. WILLIAMSON stated the law of N. Carolina on the subject, to wit that
it did not directly prohibit the importation of slaves. It imposed a
duty of ?. on each slave imported from Africa. ?0 on each from
elsewhere, & ?0 on each from a State licensing manumission. He thought
the S. States could not be members of the Union if the clause shd. be
rejected, and that it was wrong to force any thing down, not absolutely
necessary, and which any State must disagree to.

Mr. KING thought the subject should be considered in a political light
only. If two States will not agree to the Constitution as stated on one
side, he could affirm with equal belief on the other, that great & equal
opposition would be experienced from the other States. He remarked on
the exemption of slaves from duty whilst every other import was
subjected to it, as an inequality that could not fail to strike the
commercial sagacity of the Northn. & middle States.

Mr. LANGDON was strenuous for giving the power to the Genl. Govt. He cd.
not with a good conscience leave it with the States who could then go on
with the traffic, without being restrained by the opinions here given
that they will themselves cease to import slaves.

Genl. PINKNEY thought himself bound to declare candidly that he did not
think S. Carolina would stop her importations of slaves in any short
time, but only stop them occasionally as she now does. He moved to
commit the clause that slaves might be made liable to an equal tax with
other imports which he he thought right & wch. wd. remove one difficulty
that had been started.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. If the Convention thinks that N. C. S. C. & Georgia will
ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be
untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those States will
never be such fools as to give up so important an interest. He was
strenuous agst. striking out the Section, and seconded the motion of
Genl. Pinkney for a commitment.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS wished the whole subject to be committed including the
clauses relating to taxes on exports & to a navigation act. These things
may form a bargain among the Northern & Southern States.

Mr. BUTLER declared that he never would agree to the power of taxing
exports.

Mr. SHERMAN said it was better to let the S. States import slaves than
to part with them, if they made that a sine qua non. He was opposed to a
tax on slaves imported as making the matter worse, because it implied
they were property. He acknowledged that if the power of prohibiting the
importation should be given to the Genl. Government that it would be
exercised. He thought it would be its duty to exercise the power.

Mr. READ was for the commitment provided the clause concerning taxes on
exports should also be committed.

Mr. SHERMAN observed that that clause had been agreed to & therefore
could not [3] committed.

Mr. RANDOLPH was for committing in order that some middle ground might,
if possible, be found. He could never agree to the clause as it stands.
He wd. sooner risk the constitution. He dwelt on the dilemma to which
the Convention was exposed. By agreeing to the clause, it would revolt
the Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the States having no
slaves. On the other hand, two States might be lost to the Union. Let us
then, he said, try the chance of a commitment.

On the question for committing the remaining part of Sect. 4 & 5. [4] of
art: 7. N. H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. ay N. J. ay Pa. no. Del. no Maryd.
ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. LANGDON moved to commit Sect. 6. [4] as to [6]
navigation act by two thirds of each House

Mr. GORHAM did not see the propriety of it. Is it meant to require a
greater proportion of votes? He desired it to be remembered that the
Eastern States had no motive to Union but a commercial one. They were
able to protect themselves. They were not afraid of external danger, and
did not need the aid of the Southn. States.

Mr. WILSON wished for a commitment in order to reduce the proportion of
votes required.

Mr. ELSWORTH was for taking the plan as it is. This widening of opinions
has [7] a threatening aspect. If we do not agree on this middle &
moderate ground he was afraid we should lose two States, with such
others as may be disposed to stand aloof, should fly into a variety of
shapes & directions, and most probably into several confederations and
not without bloodshed.

On [8] Question for committing [6] Sect. as to 6 navigation act to a
member from each State -- N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay.
Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [9]

The Committee appointed were Mr. Langdon, King, Johnson, Livingston,
Clymer, Dickenson, L. Martin, Madison, Williamson, C. C. Pinkney, &
Baldwin.

To this committee were referred also the two clauses abovementioned, of
the 4 & 5. Sect: of Art. 7.

Mr. RUTLIDGE, fron the Committee to whom were referred on the 18 & 20th.
instant the propositions of Mr. Madison & Mr. Pinkney, made the Report
following. -- 

[Here insert the Report from the Journal of the Convention of this
date.] [10]

["The committee report, that in their opinion the following additions
should be made to the report now before the convention namely,

"At the end of the first clause of the first section of the seventh
article add, 'for payment of the debts and necessary expenses of the
United States; provided that no law for raising any branch of revenue,
except what may be specially appropriated for the payment of interest on
debts or loans, shall continue in force for more than _____ years.'

"At the end of the second clause, second section, seventh article, add,
'and with Indians, within the limits of any state, not subject to the
laws thereof.'

"At the end of the sixteenth clause of the second section, seventh
article, add, 'and to provide, as may become necessary, from time to
time, for the well managing and securing the common property and general
interests and welfare of the United States in such manner as shall not
interfere with the governments of individual states, in matters which
respect only their internal police, or for which their individual
authorities [11] may be competent.'

"At the end of the first section, tenth article, add, 'he shall be of
the age of thirty five years, and a citizen of the United States, and
shall have been an inhabitant thereof for twenty one years.'

"After the second section of the tenth article, insert the following as
a third section:

'The President of the United States shall have a privy council, which
shall consist of the president of the senate, the speaker of the house
of representatives, the chief justice of the supreme court, and the
principal officer in the respective departments of foreign affairs,
domestic affairs, war, marine, and finance, as such departments of
office shall from time to time be established, whose duty it shall be to
advise him in matters respecting the execution of his office, which he
shall think proper to lay before them: but their advice shall not
conclude him, nor affect his responsibility for the measures which he
shall adopt.'

"At the end of the second section of the eleventh article, add, 'the
judges of the supreme court shall be triable by the senate, on
impeachment by the house of representatives.'

"Between the fourth and fifth lines of the third section of the eleventh
article, after the word 'controversies,' insert 'between the United
States and an individual state, or the United States and an individual
person."'] [12]

A motion to rescind the order of the House respecting the hours of
meeting & adjourning, was negatived:

    Mass: Pa. Del. Mard. ................ ay [13]
    N. H. Con: N. J. Va. N. C. S. C. Geo. no [14]


Mr. GERRY & Mr. Mc.HENRY moved to insert after the 2d. sect. [15] Art:
7, the Clause following, to wit, "The Legislature shall pass no bill of
attainder nor any ex post facto law." [16]

Mr. GERRY urged the necessity of this prohibition, which he said was
greater in the National than the State Legislature, because the number
of members in the former being fewer [17] were on that account the more
to be feared.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought the precaution as to ex post facto laws
unnecessary; but essential as to bills of attainder

Mr. ELSEWORTH contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian who would
not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It can not then
be necessary to prohibit them.

Mr. WILSON was against inserting any thing in the Constitution as to ex
post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on theConstitution -- and
proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or
are constituting a Government which [18] will be so.

The question being divided, The first part of the motion relating to
bills of attainder was agreed to nem. contradicente.

On the second part relating to ex post facto laws -- 

Mr. CARROL remarked that experience overruled all other calculations. It
had proved that in whatever light they might be viewed by civilians or
others, the State Legislatures had passed them, and they had taken
effect.

Mr. WILSON. If these prohibitions in the State Constitutions have no
effect, it will be useless to insert them in this Constitution. Besides,
both sides will agree to the principle, & [19] will differ as to its
application.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. Such a prohibitory clause is in the Constitution of N.
Carolina, and tho it has been violated, it has done good there & may do
good here, because the Judges can take hold of it.

DOCr. JOHNSON thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an improper
suspicion of the National Legislature.

Mr. RUTLIDGE was in favor of the clause. On the question for inserting
the prohibition of ex post facto laws.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Virga.
ay N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [20]

The report of the committee of 5. made by Mr. Rutlidge, was taken up &
then postponed that each member might furnish himself with a copy.

The Report of the Committee of Eleven delivered in & entered on the
Journal of the 21st. inst. was then taken up. and the first clause
containing the words "The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to
fulfil the engagements which have been entered into by Congress" being
under consideration,

Mr. ELSWORTH argued that they were unnecessary. The U. S. heretofore
entered into Engagements by Congs. who were their agents. They will
hereafter be bound to fulfil them by their new agents.

Mr. RANDOLPH thought such a provision necessary: for though the U.
States will be bound, the new Govt. will have no authority in the case
unless it be given to them.

Mr. MADISON thought it necessary to give the authority in order to
prevent misconstruction. He mentioned the attempts made by the Debtors
to British subjects to shew that contracts under the old Government,
were dissolved by the Revolution which destroyed the political identity
of the Society.

Mr. GERRY thought it essential that some explicit provision should be
made on this subject, so that no pretext might remain for getting rid of
the public engagements.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved by way of amendment to substitute -- "The
Legislature shall discharge the debts & fulfil the engagements, of the
U. States."

It was moved to vary the amendment by striking out "discharge the debts"
& to insert "liquidate the claims," which being negatived,

The amendment moved by Mr. Govr. Morris was agreed to all the States
being in the affirmative.

It was moved & 2ded. to strike the following words out of the 2d. clause
of the report "and the authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by the U. S." Before a question was taken

The House adjourned

___________

1. See ante.

2. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "be" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. See ante.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7; New
Hampshire, Pennyslvania, Delaware, no -- 3; Massachusetts, absent."

6. The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "had" is substituted in the transcript for "has."

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 9;
Connecticut, New Jersey, no -- 2.'

10. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

11. The transcript uses the word "authorities" in the singular.

12. Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention ... which formed
the Constitution of the United States (1819), p. 277.

13. The figure "4" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. The figure "7" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The word "of" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. The proceedings on this motion involving the two questions on
"attainders & ex post facto laws," are not so fully stated in the
Printed Journal.

17. The word "they" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "which."

19. The word "but" is substituted in the transcript for "&."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, no -- 3; North Carolina,
divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

IN CONVENTION   THURSDAY  AUG: 23, 1787 [1]

The Report of the Committee of Eleven made Aug: 21. [2] being taken up,
and the following clause being under consideration to wit "To make laws
for organizing, arming & disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such part [3] of them as may be employed in the service of the U. S.
reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers,
and authority of training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed -- "

Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out the last member -- "and authority of
training &c. He thought it unnecessary. The States will have this
authority of course if not given up.

Mr. ELSWORTH doubted the propriety of striking out the sentence. The
reason assigned applies as well to the other reservation of the
appointment to offices. He remarked at the same time that the term
discipline was of vast extent and might be so expounded as to include
all power on the subject.

Mr. KING, by way of explanation, said that by organizing, the Committee
meant, proportioning the officers & men -- by arming, specifying the
kind size & caliber of arms -- & by disciplining prescribing the manual
exercise evolutions &c.

Mr. SHERMAN withdrew his motion

Mr. GERRY. This power in the U. S. as explained is making the States
drill-sergeants. He had as lief let the Citizens of Massachussets be
disarmed, as to take the command from the States, and subject them to
the Genl. Legislature. It would be regarded as a system of Despotism.

Mr. MADISON observed that "arming" as explained did not did not extend
to furnishing arms; nor the term "disciplining" to penalties & Courts
Martial for enforcing them.

Mr. KING added, to his former explanation that arming meant not only to
provide for uniformity of arms, but included [4] authority to regulate
the modes of furnishing, either by the Militia themselves, the State
Governments, or the National Treasury: that laws for disciplining, must
involve penalties and every thing necessary for enforcing penalties.

Mr. DAYTON moved to postpone the paragraph, in order to take up the
following proposition

"To establish an uniform & general system of discipline for the Militia
of these States, and to make laws for organizing, arming, disciplining &
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the U.
S., reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the
officers, and all authority over the Militia not herein given to the
General Government"

On the question to postpone in favor of this proposition: it passed in
the Negative

N. H. no. Mas no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. P. no. Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. ELSWORTH & Mr. SHERMAN moved to postpone the 2d. clause in favor of
the following "To establish an uniformity of arms, exercise &
organization for the Militia, and to provide for the Government of them
when called into the service of the U. States" The object of this
proposition was to refer the plan for the Militia to the General Govt.
but [6] leave the execution of it to the State Govts.

Mr. LANGDON said He could not understand the jealousy expressed by some
Gentleman. [7] The General & State Govts. were not enemies to each
other, but different institutions for the good of the people of America.
As one of the people he could say, the National Govt. is mine, the State
Govt. is mine. In transferring power from one to the other, I only take
out of my left hand what it can not so well use, and put it into my
right hand where it can be better used.

Mr. GERRY thought it was rather taking out of the right hand & putting
it into the left. Will any man say that liberty will be as safe in the
hands of eighty or a hundred men taken from the whole continent, as in
the hands of two or three hundred taken from a single State.

Mr. DAYTON was against so absolute a uniformity. In some States there
ought to be a greater proportion of cavalry than in others. In some
places rifles would be most proper, in others muskets &c.

Genl. PINKNEY preferred the clause reported by the Committee, extending
the meaning of it to the case of fines &c.

Mr. MADISON. The primary object is to secure an effectual discipline of
the Militia. This will no more be done if left to the States separately
than the requisitions have been hitherto paid by them. The States
neglect their Militia now, and the more they are consolidated into one
nation, the less each will rely on its own interior provisions for its
safety & the less prepare its Militia for that purpose; in like manner
as the militia of a State would have been still more neglected than it
has been if each County had been independently charged with the care of
its Militia. The Discipline of the Militia is evidently a National
concern, and ought to be provided for in the National Constitution.

Mr. L. MARTIN was confident that the States would never give up the
power over the Militia; and that, if they were to do so the militia
would be less attended to by the Genl. than by the State Governments.

Mr. RANDOLPH asked what danger there could be that the Militia could be
brought into the field and made to commit suicide on themselves. This is
a power that can not from its nature be abused, unless indeed the whole
mass should be corrupted. He was for trammelling the Genl. Govt.
wherever there was danger, but here there could be none. He urged this
as an essential point; observing that the Militia were every where
neglected by the State Legislatures, the members of which courted
popularity too much to enforce a proper discipline. Leaving the
appointment of officers to the States protects the people agst. every
apprehension that could produce murmur.

On [8] Question on Mr. Elsworth's Motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [9]

A motion was then made to recommit the 2d. clause which was negatived.

On the question to agree to the 1st. part of the clause, namely

"To make laws for organizing arming & disciplining the Militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the U.
S."

N. H ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [10]

Mr. MADISON moved to amend the next part of the clause so as to read
"reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers,
under the rank of General officers"

Mr. SHERMAN considered this as absolutely inadmissible. He said that if
the people should be so far asleep as to allow the most influential
officers of the militia to be appointed by the Genl. Government, every
man of discernment would rouse them by sounding the alarm to them.

Mr. GERRY. Let us at once destroy the State Govts. have an Executive for
life or hereditary, and a proper Senate, and then there would be some
consistency in giving full powers to the Genl. Govt. but as the States
are not to be abolished, he wondered at the attempts that were made to
give powers inconsistent with their existence. He warned the Convention
agst. pushing the experiment too far. Some people will support a plan of
vigorous Government at every risk. Others of a more democratic cast will
oppose it with equal determination, and a Civil war may be produced by
the conflict.

Mr. MADISON. As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States,
it is necessary to guard agat. it by sufficient powers to the Common
Govt. and as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing
armies, it is best to prevent them, by an effectual provision for a good
Militia.

On the Question to agree to Mr. Madison's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. [11] ay. [12]

On the question to agree to the "reserving to the States the appointment
of the officers." It was agreed to nem: contrad: On the question on the
clause "and the authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by the U. S. -- "

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [13]

On the question to agree to Art. VII. Sect. 7. [14] as reported It
passed nem. contrad:

Mr. PINKNEY urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other
officers of the U. S. independent of external influence and moved to
insert, after Art VII Sect 7. the clause following -- "No person holding
any office of profit or trust [15] under the U. S. shall without the
consent of the Legislature, accept of any present, emolument, office or
title of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State which
passed nem: contrad.

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to amend Art: VIII [14] to read as follows,

"This Constitution & the laws of the U. S. made in pursuance thereof,
and all Treaties made under the authority of the U. S. shall be the
supreme law of the several States and of their citizens and inhabitants;
and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their
decisions, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the several States,
to the contrary notwithstanding." which was agreed to nem: contrad: 

Art: IX [14] being next for consideration,

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS argued agst. the appointment of officers by the Senate.
He considered the body as too numerous for the [16] purpose; as subject
to cabal; and as devoid of responsibility. If Judges were to be tried by
the Senate according to a late report of a Committee it was particularly
wrong to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies which its own
decrees were to create.

Mr. WILSON was of the same opinion & for like reasons.

The [17] art IX being waived and art VII. sect 1. [18] resumed,

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike the following words out of the 18
clause "enforce treaties" as being superfluous, since treaties were to
be "laws" -- which was agreed to nem: contrad:

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to alter [19] 1st. part. of [19] 18. clause sect.
1. to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel
invasions."

art. VII [20] so as to read "to provide for calling forth the Militia

which was agreed to nem: contrad

On the question then to agree to the 18 clause of Sect. 1. art: 7. as
amended it passed in the affirmative nem: contradicente.

Mr. C- PINKNEY moved to add as an additional power to be vested in the
Legislature of the U. S. "To negative all laws passed by the several
States interfering in the opinion of the Legislature with the general
interests and harmony of the Union; provided that two thirds of the
members of each House assent to the same"

This principle he observed had formerly been agreed to. He considered
the precaution as essentially necessary: The objection drawn from the
predominance of the large States had been removed by the equality
established in the Senate.

Mr. BROOME 2ded. the proposition.

Mr. SHERMAN thought it unnecessary; the laws of the General Government
being Supreme & paramount to the State laws according to the plan, as it
now stands.

Mr. MADISON proposed that it should be committed. He had been from the
beginning a friend to the principle; but thought the modification might
be made better.

Mr. MASON wished to know how the power was to be exercised. Are all laws
whatever to be brought up? Is no road nor bridge to be established
without the Sanction of the General Legislature? Is this to sit
constantly in order to receive & revise the State Laws? He did not mean
by these remarks to condemn the expedient, but he was apprehensive that
great objections would lie agst. it.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought it unnecessary, & having been already decided, a
revival of the question was a waste of time.

Mr. WILSON considered this as the key-stone wanted to compleat the wide
arch of Government, we are raising. The power of self-defence had been
urged as necessary for the State Governments. It was equally necessary
for the General Government. The firmness of Judges is not of itself
sufficient. Something further is requisite. It will be better to prevent
the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn
the Constitution. Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in
this manner. It is worse than making mere corporations of them whose bye
laws would not be subject to this shackle.

Mr. ELSEWORTH observed that the power contended for wd. require either
that all laws of the State Legislatures should previously to their
taking effect be transmitted to the Genl. Legislature, or be repealable
by the Latter; or that the State Executives should be appointed by the
Genl. Government, and have a controul over the State laws. If the last
was medit. ated let it be declared.

Mr. PINKNEY declared that he thought the State Executives ought to be so
appointed with such a controul, & that it would be so provided if
another Convention should take place.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS did not see the utility or practicability of the
proposition of Mr. Pinkney, but wished it to be referred to the
consideration of a Committee.

Mr. LANGDON was in favor of the proposition. He considered it as
resolvable into the question whether the extent of the National
Constitution was to be judged of by the Genl. or the State Governments.

On the question for commitment, it passed in the negative.

N. H. ay. Masts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del: ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [21]

Mr. PINKNEY then withdrew his proposition.

The 1st. sect. of art: VII [22] being so amended as to read "The
Legislature shall fulfil the engagements and discharge the debts of the
U. S. & shall have the power to lay & collect taxes duties imposts &
excises," was agreed to.

Mr. BUTLER expressed his dissatisfaction lest it should compel payment
as well to the Blood-suckers who had speculated on the distresses of
others, as to those who had fought & bled for their country. He would be
ready he said tomorrow to vote for a discrimination between those
classes of people, and gave notice that he should [23] move for a
reconsideration.

Art IX. sect. 1. [24] being resumed, to wit "The Senate of the U. S.
shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and
Judges of the Supreme Court."

Mr. MADISON observed that the Senate represented the States alone, and
that for this as well as other obvious reasons it was proper that the
President should be an agent in Treaties.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS did not know that he should agree to refer the making
of Treaties to the Senate at all, but for the present wd. move to add,
as an amendment to the section after "Treaties" -- [25] "but no Treaty
shall be binding on the U. S. which is not ratified by a law." 

Mr. MADISON suggested the inconvenience of requiring a legal
ratification of treaties of alliance for the purposes of war &c &c

Mr. GHORUM. Many other disadvantages must be experienced if treaties of
peace & all negociations are to be previously ratified -- and if not
previously, the Ministers would be at a loss how to proceed. What would
be the case in G. Britain if the King were to proceed in this manner.
American Ministers must go abroad not instructed by the same Authority
(as will be the case with other Ministers) which is to ratify their
proceedings.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. As to treaties of alliance, they will oblige foreign
powers to send their Ministers here, the very thing we should wish for.
Such treaties could not be otherwise made, if his amendment shd.
succeed. In general he was not solicitous to multiply & facilitate
Treaties. He wished none to be made with G. Britain, till she should be
at war. Then a good bargain might be made with her. So with other
foreign powers. The more difficulty in making treaties, the more value
will be set on them.

Mr. WILSON. In the most important Treaties, the King of G.

Britain being obliged to resort to Parliament for the execution of them,
is under the same fetters as the amendment of Mr. Morris will impose on
the Senate. It was refused yesterday to permit even the Legislature to
lay duties on exports. Under the clause, without the amendment, the
Senate alone can make a Treaty, requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to
be sent to some one particular port.

Mr. DICKINSON concurred in the amendment, as most safe and proper, tho'
he was sensible it was unfavorable to the little States; wch. would
otherwise have an equal share in making Treaties.

DOCr. JOHNSON thought there was something of solecism in saying that the
acts of a Minister with plenipotentiary powers from one Body, should
depend for ratification on another Body. The Example of the King of G.
B. was not parallel. Full & compleat power was vested in him. If the
Parliament should fail to provide the necessary means of execution, the
Treaty would be violated.

Mr. GHORUM in answer to Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, said that negociations on the
spot were not to be desired by us, especially if the whole Legislature
is to have any thing to do with Treaties. It will be generally
influenced by two or three men, who will be corrupted by the Ambassadors
here. In such a Government as ours, it is necessary to guard against the
Government itself being seduced.

Mr. RANDOLPH observing that almost every Speaker had made objections to
the clause as it stood, moved in order to a further consideration of the
subject, that the Motion of Mr. Govr. Morris should be postponed, and on
this question It was lost the States being equally divided.

Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [26]

On Mr. Govr. Morris Motion

Masts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
divd. S. C. no. Geo. no. [27]

The several clauses of Sect: 1. Art IX, were then separately postponed
after inserting "and other public Ministers" next after "Ambassadors."

Mr. MADISON hinted for consideration, whether a distinction might not be
made between different sorts of Treaties -- Allowing the President &
Senate to make Treaties eventual and of Alliance for limited terms --
and requiring the concurrence of the whole Legislature in other
Treaties.

The 1st. Sect art IX. was finally referred nem: con: to the committee of
Five, and the House then

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The words "the twenty-first of August" are substituted in the
transcript for "Aug: 21."

3. The transcript uses the word "part" in the plural.

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia, aye
-- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 8."

6. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "gentleman" is used in the plural in the transcript.

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, aye; the other ten
States, no."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsyalvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Connecticut, Maryland, no -- 2."

11. In the printed Journal, Geo: no.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Georgia, [FN*] aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, aye --
7; Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4."

14. See ante.

15. The words "profit or trust" are transposed to read "trust or profit"
in the transcript.

16. The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

17. The word "the" is crossed out in the transcript.

18. See ante.

19. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

20. The transcript omits "sect. 1. art. VII."

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

22. The phrase "The first clause of article 7. section 1" is substituted
in the transcript for "The 1st sect of art: VII."

23. The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "should."

24. See p. -- .

25. The words "the following" are here inserted in the transcript.

26. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5."

27. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye -- 1;
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  AUGUST 24, 1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Governour LIVINGSTON, from the Committee of Eleven, to whom were
referred the two remaining clauses of the 4th. Sect & the 5 & 6 Sect: of
the 7th. art: [2] delivered in the following Report:

"Strike out so much of the 4th Sect: as was referred to the Committee
and insert -- "The migration or importation of such persons as the
several States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800, but a tax or duty
may be imposed on such migration or importation at a rate not exceeding
the average of the duties laid on imports."

"The 5 Sect: to remain as in the Report"

"The 6 Sect to be stricken out"

Mr. BUTLER, according to notice, moved that clause 1st. sect. 1. of Art
VII, as to the discharge of debts, be reconsidered tomorrow. He dwelt on
the division of opinion concerning the domestic debts, and the different
pretensions of the different classes of holders.

Genl. PINKNEY 2ded. him.

Mr. RANDOLPH wished for a reconsideration in order to better the
expression, and to provide for the case of the State debts as is done by
Congress.

On the question for reconsidering

N. H. no. Mas: ay. Cont. ay N. J. ay. Pena. absent. Del. ay Md. no. Va.
ay. N. C. absent, S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [3] -- and tomorrow assigned for
the reconsideration.

Sect: 2 & 3 of art: IX [4] being taken up,

Mr. RUTLIDGE said this provision for deciding controversies between the
States was necessary under the Confederation, but will be rendered
unnecessary by the National Judiciary now to be established, and moved
to strike it out.

DOCr. JOHNSON 2ded. the Motion

Mr. SHERMAN concurred: so did Mr. DAYTON.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for postponing instead of striking out, in order to
consider whether this might not be a good provision, in cases where the
Judiciary were interested or too closely connected with the parties.

Mr. GHORUM had doubts as to striking out. The Judges might be connected
with the States being parties -- He was inclined to think the mode
proposed in the clause would be more satisfactory than to refer such
cases to the Judiciary.

On the Question for postponing the 2d. & 3d. Section, it passed in the
negative

N. H. ay. Masts. no. Cont. no N. J. no. Pena. abst. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [5]

Mr. WILSON urged the striking out, the Judiciary being a better
provision.

On Question for striking out [6] 2 & 3 Sections [7] Art: IX N. H. ay.
Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. abst Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no.
S. C. ay. Geo. no. [8]

Art. X. sect. 1. [9] "The executive power of the U. S. shall be vested
in a single person. His stile shall be "The President of the U. S. of
America" and his title shall be "His Excellency." He shall be elected by
ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of
seven years; but shall not be elected a second time.

On the question for vesting the power in a single person. It was agreed
to nem: con: So also on the Stile and title.

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to insert "joint" before the word "ballot," as the
most convenient mode of electing.

Mr. SHERMAN objected to it as depriving the States represented in the
Senate of the negative intended them in that house.

Mr. GHORUM said it was wrong to be considering at every turn whom the
Senate would represent. The public good was the true object to be kept
in view. Great delay and confusion would ensue if the two Houses shd.
vote separately, each having a negative on the choice of the other.

Mr. DAYTON. It might be well for those not to consider how the Senate
was constituted, whose interest it was to keep it out of sight. -- If
the amendment should be agreed to, a joint [10] ballot would in fact
give the appointment to one House. He could never agree to the clause
with such an amendment. There could be no doubt of the two Houses
separately concurring in the same person for President. The importance &
necessity of the case would ensure a concurrence.

Mr. CARROL moved to strike out "by the Legislature" and insert "by the
people."

Mr. WILSON 2ded. him & on the question

N. H. no. Massts. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va.
no N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [11]

Mr. BREARLY was opposed to the motion for [12] inserting the word
"joint." The argument that the small States should not put their hands
into the pockets of the large ones did not apply in this case.

Mr. WILSON urged the reasonableness of giving the larger States a larger
share of the appointment, and the danger of delay from a disagreement of
the two Houses. He remarked also that the Senate had peculiar powers
balancing the advantage given by a joint balot in this case to the other
branch of the Legislature.

Mr. LANGDON. This general officer ought to be elected by the joint &
general voice. In N. Hampshire the mode of separate votes by the two
Houses was productive of great difficulties. The negative of the Senate
would hurt the feelings of the man elected by the votes of the other
branch. He was for inserting "joint" tho' unfavorable to N. Hampshire as
a small State.

Mr. WILSON remarked that as the President of the Senate was to be
President of the U. S. that Body in cases of vacancy might have an
interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way, if its separate
concurrence should be required.

Mr. MADISON. If the amendment be agreed to the rule of voting will give
to the largest State, compared with the smallest, an influence as 4 to 1
only, altho the population is as 10 to 1. This surely can not be
unreasonable as the President is to act for the people not for the
States. The President of the Senate also is to be occasionally President
of the U. S. and by his negative alone can make 3/4 of the other branch
necessary to the passage of a law. This is another advantage enjoyed by
the Senate.

On the question for inserting "joint," it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Masts. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [13]

Mr. DAYTON then moved to insert, after the word "Legislatures" [14] the
words "each State having one vote" Mr. BREARLEY 2ded. him, and on the
question it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [15]

Mr. PINKNEY moved to insert after the word "Legislature" the words "to
which election a majority of the votes of the members present shall be
required" &

On this question, it passed in the affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [16]

Mr. READ moved "that in case the numbers for the two highest in votes
should be equal, then the President of the Senate shall have an
additional casting vote," which was disagreed to by a general negative.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed the election of the President by the
Legislature. He dwelt on the danger of rendering the Executive
uninterested in maintaining the rights of his Station, as leading to
Legislative tyranny. If the Legislature have the Executive depedent on
them, they can perpetuate & support their usurpations by the influence
of tax-gatherers & other officers, by fleets armies &c. Cabal &
corruption are attached to that mode of election: so also [17] is
ineligibility a second time. Hence the Executive is interested in
Courting popularity in the Legislature by sacrificing his Executive
Rights; & then he can go into that Body, after the expiration of his
Executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of his policy. To these
considerations he added that rivals would be continually intrigueing to
oust the President from his place. To guard against all these evils he
moved that the President "shall be chosen by Electors to be chosen by
the People of the several States"

Mr. CARROL 2ded. him & on the question it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [18]

Mr. DAYTON moved to postpone the consideration of the two last clauses
of Sect. 1. art. X. which was disagreed to without a count of the
States.

Mr. BROOME moved to refer the two clauses to a Committee of a member
from each State, & on the question, it failed the States being equally
divided

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [19]

On the question taken on the first part of Mr. Govr. Morris's Motion
towit "shall be chosen by electors" as an abstract question, it failed
the States being equally divided.

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. divd. N. Jersey ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd.
Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [20]

The consideration of the remaining clauses of Sect 1. art X. was then
postponed till tomorrow at the instance of the Deputies of New Jersey.

Sect. 2. Art: X [21] being taken up, the word information was transposed
& inserted after "Legislature"

On motion of Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, "he may" was struck out, & "and" inserted
before "recommend" in clause 2d. sect 2d. art: X. in order to make it
the duty of the President to recommend, & thence prevent umbrage or
cavil at his doing it.

Mr. SHERMAN objected to the sentence "and shall appoint officers in all
cases not otherwise provided for by [22] this Constitution." He admitted
it to be proper that many officers in the Executive Department should be
so appointed -- but contended that many ought not, as general officers
in the army in time of peace &c. Herein lay the corruption in G.
Britain. If the Executive can model the army, he may set up an absolute
Government; taking advantage of the close of a war and an army commanded
by his creatures. James 2d. was not obeyed by his officers because they
had been appointed by his predecessors not by himself. He moved to
insert "or by law" after the word "Constitution."

On Motion of Mr. MADISON "officers" was truck out and "to offices"
inserted, in order to obviate doubts that he might appoint officers
without a previous creation of the offices by the Legislature.

On the question for inserting "or by law as moved by Mr. Sherman

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. absent. S. C. no. Geo. no. [23]

Mr. DICKINSON moved to strike out the words "and shall appoint to
offices in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution"
and insert -- "and shall appoint to all offices established by this
Constitution, except in cases herein otherwise provided for, and to all
offices which may hereafter be created by law."

Mr. RANDOLPH observed that the power of appointments was a formidable
one both in the Executive & Legislative hands -- and suggested whether
the Legislature should not be left at liberty to refer appointments in
some cases, to some State authority.

Mr. DICKENSON's motion, it [24] passed in the affirmative N. H. no. Mas.
no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C.
no. Geo. ay. [25]

Mr. DICKINSON then moved to annex to his last amendment "except where by
law the appointment shall be vested in the Legislatures or Executives of
the several States." Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the motion

Mr. WILSON -- If this be agreed to it will soon be a standing
instruction from the State Legislatures to pass no law creating offices,
unless the appts. be referred to them.

Mr. SHERMAN objected to "Legislatures" in the motion, which was struck
out by consent of the movers.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. This would be putting it in the power of the States to
say, "You shall be viceroys but we will be viceroys over you" -- 

The Motion was negatived without a Count of the States -- 

Ordered unanimously that the order respecting the adjournment at 4
OClock be repealed, & that in future the House assemble at 10 OC. &
adjourn at 3 OC. [26]

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. See ante.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Geogia, aye -- 7; New
Hampshire, Maryland, no -- 2; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, absent."

4. See ante.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 7; Pennsylvania, absent."

6. The word "the " is here inserted in the transcript.

7. The word "of" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina,
aye -- 8; North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 2; Pennsylvania, absent."

9. See ante.

10. The transcript does not italicize the word "joint."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye -- 2;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9."

12. The words "the motion for" are omitted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye --
7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia, no -- 4."

14. In the transcript the word "Legislatures" is in the singular.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 6."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; New Jersey, no -- 1."

17. The word "also" is omitted in the transcript.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no --
6."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5; Connecticut, divided."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4; Connecticut, Maryland, divided;
Massachusetts, absent."

21. See ante.

22. The word "in" is substituted in the transcript for "by."

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9; North Carolina, absent."

24. The word "it" is omitted in the transcript.

25. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 6; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 4; North Carolina,
absent."

26. The letters "OC" are omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY   AUGUST 25, 1787 [1] IN CONVENTION

The 1st. clause of 1 Sect. of art: VII [2] being reconsidered

Col. MASON objected to the term "shall" -- fullfil the engagements &
discharge the debts &c as too strong. It may be impossible to comply
with it. The Creditors should be kept in the same plight. They will in
one respect be necessarily and properly in a better. The Government will
be more able to pay them. The use of the term shall will beget
speculations and increase the pestilent practice of stock-jobbing. There
was a great distinction between original creditors & those who purchased
fraudulently of the ignorant and distressed. He did not mean to include
those who have bought Stock in open market. He was sensible of the
difficulty of drawing the line in this case, but He did not wish to
preclude the attempt. Even fair purchasers at 4. 5. 6. 8 for 1 did not
stand on the same footing with [3] first Holders, supposing them not to
be blameable. The interest they receive even in paper is equal to their
purchase money. What he particularly wished was to leave the door open
for buying up the securities, which he thought would be precluded by the
term "shall" as requiring nominal payment, & which was not inconsistent
with his ideas of public faith. He was afraid also the word shall, might
extend to all the old continental paper.

Mr. LANGDON wished to do no more than leave the Creditors in statu quo.

Mr. GERRY said that for himself he had no interest in the question being
not possessed of more of the securities than would, by the interest, pay
his taxes. He would observe however that as the public had received the
value of the literal amount, they ought to pay that value to some body.
The frauds on the soldiers ought to have been foreseen. These poor &
ignorant people could not but part with their securities. There are
other creditors who will part with any thing rather than be cheated of
the capital of their advances. The interest of the States he observed
was different on this point, some having more, others less than their
proportion of the paper. Hence the idea of a scale for reducing its
value had arisen. If the public faith would admit, of which he was not
clear, he would not object to a revision of the debt so far as to compel
restitution to the ignorant & distressed, who have been defrauded. As to
Stock-jobbers he saw no reason for the censures thrown on them. They
keep up the value of the paper. Without them there would be no market.

Mr. BUTLER said he meant neither to increase nor diminish the security
of the creditors.

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to postpone the clause in favor of the following "All
debts contracted & engagements entered into, by or under the authority
of Congs. shall be as valid agst. the U. States under this constitution
as under the Confederation." DOCr. JOHNSON. The debts are debts of the
U- S- of the great Body of America. Changing the Government can not
change the obligation of the U- S- which devolves of course on the New
Government. Nothing was in his opinion necessary to be said. If any
thing, it should be a mere declaration as moved by Mr. Randolph.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, said he never had become a public Creditor that he
might urge with more propriety the compliance with public faith. He had
always done so and always would, and preferr'd the term shall as most
explicit. As to buying up the debt, the term shall was not inconsistent
with it, if provision be first made for paying the interest: if not,
such an expedient was a mere evasion. He was content to say nothing as
the New Government would be bound of course -- but would prefer the
clause with the term "shall, because it would create many friends to the
plan.

On Mr. Randolph's Motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no Del. ay. Maryd. ay Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo ay. [4]

Mr. SHERMAN thought it necessary to connect with the clause for laying
taxes duties &c an express provision for the object of the old debts &c
-- and moved to add to the 1st. clause of 1st. sect. art VII "for the
payment of said debts and for the defraying the expences that shall be
incurred for the common defence and general welfare."

The proposition, as being unnecessary was disagreed to, Connecticut
alone, being in the affirmative.

The Report of the Committee of eleven [see friday the 24th. instant]
being taken up,

Genl. PINKNEY moved to strike out the words "the year eighteen hundred"
as the year limiting the importation of slaves, and to insert the words
"the year eighteen hundred and eight"

Mr. GHORUM 2ded. the motion

Mr. MADISON. Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be
apprehended from the liberty to import slaves. So long a term will be
more dishonorable to the National [5] character than to say nothing
about it in the Constitution.

On the motion; which passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [6]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was for making the clause read at once, " [7]
importation of slaves into N. Carolina, S. Carolina & Georgia shall not
be prohibited &c." This he said would be most fair and would avoid the
ambiguity by which, under the power with regard to naturalization, the
liberty reserved to the States might be defeated. He wished it to be
known also that this part of the Constitution was a compliance with
those States. If the change of language however should be objected to by
the members from those States, he should not urge it.

Col: MASON was not against using the term "slaves" but agst. naming N.
C. S. C. & Georgia, lest it should give offence to the people of those
States.

Mr. SHERMAN liked a description better than the terms proposed, which
had been declined by the old Congs. & were not pleasing to some people.

Mr. CLYMER concurred with Mr. Sherman

Mr. WILLIAMSON said that both in opinion & practice he was against
slavery; but thought it more in favor of humanity, from a view of all
circumstances, to let in S. C. & Georgia on those terms, than to exclude
them from the Union.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS withdrew his motion.

Mr. DICKENSON wished the clause to be confined to the States which had
not themselves prohibited the importation of slaves, and for that
purpose moved to amend the clause so as to read "The importation of
slaves into such of the States as shall permit the same shall not be
prohibited by the Legislature of the U- S- until the year 1808" -- which
was disagreed to nem: cont: [8]

The first part of the report was then agreed to, amended as follows.

"The migration or importation of such persons as the several States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Legislature prior to the year 1808."

    N. H. Mas. Con. Md. N. C. S. C. Geo: ay [9]
    N. J. Pa. Del. Virga..............   no [10]


Mr. BALDWIN in order to restrain & more explicitly define "the average
duty" moved to strike out of the 2d. part the words "average of the
duties laid on imports" and insert "common impost on articles not
enumerated" which was agreed to nem: cont:

Mr. SHERMAN was agst. this 2d. part, as acknowledging men to be
property, by taxing them as such under the character of slaves.

Mr. KING & Mr. LANGDON considered this as the price of the 1st. part.

Genl. PINKNEY admitted that it was so.

Col: MASON. Not to tax, will be equivalent to a bounty on the
importation of slaves.

Mr. GHORUM thought that Mr. Sherman should consider the duty, not as
implying that slaves are property, but as a discouragement to the
importation of them.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS remarked that as the clause now stands it implies that
the Legislature may tax freemen imported.

Mr. SHERMAN in answer to Mr. Ghorum observed that the smallness of the
duty shewed revenue to be the object, not the discouragement of the
importation.

Mr. MADISON thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that
there could be property in men. The reason of duties did not hold, as
slaves are not like merchandize, consumed, &c

Col. MASON (in answr. to Govr. Morris) the provision as it stands was
necessary for the case of Convicts in order to prevent the introduction
of them.

It was finally agreed nem: contrad: to make the clause read "but a tax
or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for
each person," and then the 2d. part as amended was agreed to.

Sect 5. art. VII was agreed to nem: con: as reported.

Sect. 6. art. VII. in the Report, was postponed.

On motion of Mr. MADISON 2ded. by Mr. GOVr. MORRIS Art VIII was
reconsidered and after the words "all treaties made," were inserted nem:
con: the words "or which shall be made" This insertion was meant to
obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting, by
making the words "all treaties made" to refer to them, as the words
inserted would refer to future treaties.

Mr. CARROL & Mr. L. MARTIN expressed their apprehensions, and the
probable apprehensions of their constituents, that under the power of
regulating trade the General Legislature, might favor the ports of
particular States, by requiring vessels destined to or from other States
to enter & clear thereat, as vessels belonging or bound to Baltimore, to
enter & clear at Norfolk &c They moved the following proposition

"The Legislature of the U: S: shall not oblige vessels belonging to
citizens thereof, or to foreigners, to enter or pay duties or imposts in
any other State than in that to which they may be bound, or to clear out
in any other than the State in which their cargoes may be laden on
board; nor shall any privilege or immunity be granted to any vessels on
entering or clearing out, or paying duties or imposts in one State in
preference to another"

Mr. GHORUM thought such a precaution unnecessary; & that the revenue
might be defeated, if vessels could run up long rivers, through the
jurisdiction of different States without being required to enter, with
the opportunity of landing & selling their cargoes by the way.

Mr. Mc.HENRY & Genl. PINKNEY made the following propositions "Should it
be judged expedient by the Legislature of the U. S. that one or more
ports for collecting duties or imposts other than those ports of
entrance & clearance already established by the respective States,
should be established, the Legislature of the U. S. shall signify the
same to the Executives of the respective States, ascertaining the number
of such ports judged necessary; to be laid by the said Executives before
the Legislatures of the States at their next Session; and the
Legislature of the U. S. shall not have the power of fixing or
establishing the particular ports for collecting duties or imposts in
any State, except the Legislature of such State shall neglect to fix and
establish the same during their first session to be held after such
notification by the Legislature of the U. S. to the Executive of such
State"

"All duties imposts & excises, prohibitions or restraints laid or made
by the Legislature of the U. S. shall be uniform & equal throughout the
U. S."

These several propositions were referred, nem: con: to a Committee
composed of a member from each State. The committee appointed by ballot
were Mr. Langdon, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Dayton, Mr. Fitzimmons,
Mr. Read, Mr. Carrol, Mr. Mason, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Butler, Mr. Few.

On the question now taken on Mr. Dickinson motion of yesterday, allowing
appointments to offices, to be referred by the Genl. Legislature to the
Executives of the Several States" as a farther amendment to sect. 2,
art. X. the votes were,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. divided. Va. ay. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [12]

In amendment of the same section, [13] "other public Ministers" were
inserted after "ambassadors."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out of the section -- "and may
correspond with the supreme Executives of the several States" as
unnecessary and implying that he could not correspond with others.

Mr. BROOME 2ded. him.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. ay. [14]

[15] "Shall receive ambassadors & other public Ministers," [16] agreed
to, nem. con.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to amend the "power to grant reprieves & pardon [17]"
so as to read "to grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the
Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate."

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. no Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no.
Geo. no. [18]

[19] "except in cases of impeachment" [20] inserted nem: con: after
"pardon" [17]

On the question to agree to -- "but his pardon shall not be pleadable in
bar" [21]

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S.
C. ay. Geo. no. [22]

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript

2. See ante.

3. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; Pennsylvania, no -- 1."

5. The word "American" is substituted in the transcript for "National."

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no -- 4."

7. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. In the printed Journal, Cont. Virga. & Georgia voted in the
affirmative.

9. The figure "7" is here inserted in the transcript.

10. The figure "4" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. See ante.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North
Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 6; Maryland, divided."

13. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Maryland, no -- 1."

15. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

16. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The transcript uses the word "pardon" in the plural.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

19. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

20. The word "were" is here inserted in the transcript.

21. The phrase "It passed in the negative" is here inserted in the
transcript.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Geogia, no -- 6."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  AUGst 27th, 1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Art X. Sect. 2. [2] being resumed.

Mr. L. MARTIN moved to insert the words "after conviction" after the
words "reprieves and pardons"

Mr. WILSON objected that pardon before conviction might be necessary in
order to obtain the testimony of accomplices. He stated the case of
forgeries in which this might particularly happen. -- 

Mr. L. MARTIN withdrew his motion.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to amend the clause giving the Executive the command
of the Militia, so as to read "and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual service of the U. S." and on the Question

N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. N. J. abst. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [3]

The clause for removing the President on impeachment by the House of
Reps. and conviction in the supreme Court, of Treason, Bribery or
corruption, was postponed nem: con: at the instance of Mr. GOVr. MORRIS,
who thought the Tribunal an improper one, particularly, if the first
judge was to be of the privy Council. 

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS objected also to the President of the Senate being
provisional successor to the President, and suggested a designation of
the Chief Justice.

Mr. MADISON added as a ground of objection that the Senate might retard
the appointment of a President in order to carry points whilst the
revisionary power was in the President of their own body, but suggested
that the Executive powers during a vacancy, be administered by the
persons composing the Council to the President.

Mr. WILLIAMSON suggested that the Legislature ought to have power to
provide for occasional successors & moved that the last clause [of 2
sect. X art: ] relating to a provisional successor to the President be
postponed.

Mr. DICKINSON 2ded. the postponement, remarking that it was too vague.
What is the extent of the term "disability" & who is to be the judge of
it?

The postponement was agreed to nem: con:

Col: MASON & Mr. MADISON, moved to add to the oath to be taken by the
supreme Executive "and will to the best of my judgment and power
preserve protect and defend the Constitution of the U. S."

Mr. WILSON thought the general provision for oaths of office, in a
subsequent place, rendered the amendment unnecessary -- 

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C.
abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [4]

Art: XI. [5] being [6] taken up.

DOCr. JOHNSON suggested that the judicial power ought to extend to
equity as well as law -- and moved to insert the words "both in law and
equity" after the words "U. S." in the 1st. line, of sect. 1.

Mr. READ objected to vesting these powers in the same Court.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. absent. Ct. ay. N. J. abst. P. ay. Del. no. Md. no.
Virga. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [7]

On the question to agree to Sect. 1. art. XI. as amended. [8]

N. H. ay. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. N. J. abst. Del. no.

Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.

Mr. DICKINSON moved as an amendment to sect. 2. art XI [5] after the
words "good behavior" the words "provided that they may be removed by
the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of
Representatives."

Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the
Judges should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be
removeable without a trial. Besides it was fundamentally wrong to
subject Judges to so arbitrary an authority.

Mr. SHERMAN saw no contradiction or impropriety if this were made part
of the constitutional regulation of the Judiciary establishment. He
observed that a like provision was contained in the British Statutes.

Mr. RUTLIDGE. If the Supreme Court is to judge between the U. S. and
particular States, this alone is an insuperable objection to the motion.

Mr. WILSON considered such a provision in the British Government as less
dangerous than here, the House of Lords & House of Commons being less
likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief Justice Holt, he remarked,
had successively offended by his independent conduct, both houses of
Parliament. Had this happened at the same time, he would have been
ousted. The judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on
every [9] gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our
Govt.

Mr. RANDOLPH opposed the motion as weakening too much the independence
of the Judges.

Mr. DICKINSON was not apprehensive that the Legislature composed of
different branches constructed on such different principles, would
improperly unite for the purpose of displacing a Judge.

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Dickinson's Motion [10]

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. ay. N. J. abst. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. no.

On the question on Sect. 2. art: XI as reported. Del & Maryd. only no.

Mr. MADISON and Mr. Mc.HENRY moved to reinstate the words "increased or"
before the word "diminished" in the 2d. sect. art XI.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed it for reasons urged by him on a former
occasion -- 

Col: MASON contended strenuously for the motion. There was no weight he
said in the argument drawn from changes in the value of the metals,
because this might be provided for by an increase of salaries so made as
not to affect persons in office, and this was the only argument on which
much stress seemed to have been laid.

Genl. PINKNEY. The importance of the Judiciary will require men of the
first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than
the U. S. can allow [11] in the first instance. He was not satisfied
with the expedient mentioned by Col: Mason. He did not think it would
have a good effect or a good appearance, for new Judges to come in with
higher salaries than the old ones.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said the expedient might be evaded & therefore amounted
to nothing. Judges might resign, and then be reappointed to increased
salaries.

On the question

N. H. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. ay. S. C. no. Geo.
abst. also Mas. N. J. & N. C. [12]

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MADISON then moved to add the following words to
sect. 2. art XI. "nor increased by any Act of the Legislature which
shall operate before the expiration of three years after the passing
thereof"

On this question

N. H. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. S. C. no. Geo. abst.
also Mas. N. J. & N. C. [13] 

Sect. 3. art. XI [14] being taken up, the following clause was postponed
-- viz. "to the trial of impeachments of officers of the U. S." by which
the jurisdiction of the supreme Court was extended to such cases.

Mr. MADISON & Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to insert after the word
"controversies" the words "to which the U. S. shall be a party." which
was agreed to nem: con:

DOCr. JOHNSON moved to insert the words "this Constitution and the"
before the word "laws"

Mr. MADISON doubted whether it was not going too far to extend the
jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising under the
Constitution & whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases not
of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.

The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con: it being generally
supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases
of a Judiciary nature.

On motion of Mr. RUTLIDGE the words "passed by the Legislature" were
struck out, and after the words "U. S" were inserted nem. con: the words
"and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority"
conformably to a preceding amendment in another place.

The clause "in cases of impeachment," was postponed.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS wished to know what was meant by the words "In all the
cases before mentioned it [jurisdiction] shall be appellate with such
exceptions &c," whether it extended to matters of fact as well as law --
and to cases of Common law as well as Civil law. 

Mr. WILSON. The Committee he believed meant facts as well as law &
Common as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction of the federal Court of
Appeals had he said been so construed.

Mr. DICKINSON moved to add after the word "appellate" the words both as
to law & fact which was agreed to nem: con:

Mr. MADISON & Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out the beginning of the
3d. sect. "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court" & to insert the words
"the Judicial power" which was agreed to nem: con:

The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to insert "In all the
other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in
such manner as the Legislature shall direct"

Del. Virga. ay [15]

N. H Con. P. M. S. C. G no [16]

On a question for striking out the last sentence of sect. 3.

"The Legislature may assign &c." [17]

N. H. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
[18]

Mr. SHERMAN moved to insert after the words "between Citizens of
different States" the words, "between Citizens of the same State
claiming lands under grants of different States" -- according to the
provision in the 9th. Art: of the Confederation -- which was agreed to
nem: con:

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. See ante.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 6; Delaware, South
Carolina, no -- 2; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent."

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Delaware, no, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent."

5. See ante.

6. The word "next" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; Delaware,
Maryland, no -- 2; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, absent"

8. The transcript here inserts the following: "the States were the same
as on the preceding question." The vote by States is omitted.

9. The word "any" is substituted in the transcript for "every."

10. The transcript here inserts the following: "it was negatived,
Connecticut, aye; all the other States present, no." The vote by States
is omitted.

11. The word "afford" is substituted in the transcript for "allow."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, aye -- 1; New Hampshire
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 5; Maryland,
divided. Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, absent."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 2; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 5;
Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, absent."

14. See ante.

15. The figure "2" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. The figure "6" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The phrase "it" passed nem. con." is here added in the transcript.

18. The vote by States is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  AUGUST 28, 1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. SHERMAN from the Committee to whom were referred several
propositions on the 25th. instant, made the following report -- [2]

That there be inserted after the 4 clause of [3] 7th. section

"Nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give preference to the
ports of one State over those of another, or oblige vessels bound to or
from any State to enter, clear or pay duties in another and all tonnage,
duties, imposts & excises laid by the Legislature shall be uniform
throughout the U. S."

Ordered to lie on the table. [4]

Art XI Sect. 3 [5, 6] It was moved to strike out the words

"it shall be appellate" & to insert the words "the supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction," -- in order to prevent uncertainty whether
"it" referred to the supreme Court, or to the Judicial power.

On the question

N. H ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. abst. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N
C ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [7]

Sect. 4. [8] was so amended nem: con: as to read "The trial of all
crimes (except in cases of impeachment) shall be by jury, and such trial
shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, then the trial shall
be at such place or places as the Legislature may direct." The object of
this amendment was to provide for trial by jury of offences committed
out of any State.

Mr. PINKNEY, urging the propriety of securing the benefit of the Habeas
corpus in the most ample manner, moved "that it should not be suspended
but on the most urgent occasions, & then only for a limited time, not
exceeding twelve months"

Mr. RUTLIDGE was for declaring the Habeas Corpus inviolable. [9] He did
not conceive that a suspension could ever be necessary at the same time
through all the States.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved that "The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended; unless where in cases of Rebellion or invasion
the public safety may require it."

Mr. WILSON doubted whether in any case a suspension could be necessary,
as the discretion now exists with Judges, in most important cases to
keep in Gaol or admit to Bail.

The first part of Mr. Govr. Morris' motion, to the word "unless" was
agreed to nem: con: -- on the remaining part;

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no.: [10]

Sec. 5. of art: XI. [8] was agreed to nem: con: [10]

Art: XII. [8] being [12] taken up.

Mr. WILSON & Mr. SHERMAN moved to insert after the words "coin money"
the words "nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing but gold &
silver coin a tender in payment of debts" making these prohibitions
absolute, instead of making the measures allowable (as in the XIII art:)
with the consent of the Legislature of the U. S.

Mr. GHORUM thought the purpose would be as well secured by the provision
of art: XIII which makes the consent of the Genl.them from an equal rank
Legislature necessary, and that in that mode, no opposition would be
excited; whereas an absolute prohibition of paper money would rouse the
most desperate opposition from its partizans.

Mr. SHERMAN thought this a favorable crisis for crushing paper money. If
the consent of the Legislature could authorise emissions of it, the
friends of paper money, would make every exertion to get into the
Legislature in order to licence it.

The question being divided; on the 1st. part -- "nor emit bills of
credit"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [13]

The remaining part of Mr. Wilson's & Sherman's motion was agreed to nem:
con:

Mr. KING moved to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Congs.
establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in
private contracts.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. This would be going too far. There are a thousand
laws, relating to bringing actions -- limitations of actions & [14]
which affect contracts. The Judicial power of the U. S. will be a
protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and within the State
itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done among
themselves.

Mr. SHERMAN. Why then prohibit bills of credit?

Mr. WILSON was in favor of Mr. King's motion.

Mr. MADISON admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a
prohibition but thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by the
utility of it. He conceived however that a negative on the State laws
could alone secure the effect. Evasions might and would be devised by
the ingenuity of [15] Legislatures.

Col: MASON. This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen
that can not be foreseen, where some kind of interference will be proper
& essential. He mentioned the case of limiting the period for bringing
actions on open account -- that of bonds after a certain lapse of time
-- asking whether it was proper to tie the hands of the States from
making provision in such cases.

Mr. WILSON. The answer to these objections is that retrospective [16]
interferences [17] only are to be prohibited.

Mr. MADISON. Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post
facto laws, which will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences
null & void.

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved instead of Mr. King's Motion to insert -- "nor pass
bills of attainder nor retrospective [18] laws" on which motion

N. H. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Virga. no. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. MADISON moved to insert after the word "reprisal" (art. XII) the
words "nor lay embargoes." He urged that such acts by the States would
be unnecessary -- impolitic -- and unjust.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the States ought to retain this power in order to
prevent suffering & injury to their poor.

Col: MASON thought the amendment would be not only improper but
dangerous, as the Genl. Legislature would not sit constantly and
therefore could not interpose at the necessary moments. He enforced his
objection by appealing to the necessity of sudden embargoes during the
war, to prevent exports, particularly in the case of a blockade.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS considered the provision as unnecessary; the power of
regulating trade between State & State already vested in the Genl.
Legislature, being sufficient.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [20]

Mr. MADISON moved that the words "nor lay imposts or duties on imports"
be transferred from art: XIII where the consent of the Genl. Legislature
may licence the act -- into art: XII which will make the prohibition on
the States absolute. He observed that as the States interested in this
power by which they could tax the imports of their neighbors passing
thro' their markets, were a majority, they could give the consent of the
Legislature, to the injury of N. Jersey, N. Carolina &c -- 

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion

Mr. SHERMAN thought the power might safely be left to the Legislature of
the U. States.

Col: MASON, observed that particular States might wish to encourage by
import [21] duties certain manufactures for which they enjoyed natural
advantages, as Virginia, the manufacture of Hemp &c.

Mr. MADISON. The encouragement of Manufactures in that mode requires
duties not only on imports directly from foreign Countries, but from the
other States in the Union, which would revive all the mischiefs
experienced from the want of a Genl. Government over commerce.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del: ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [22]

Art: XII as amended [23] agreed to nem: con:

Art: XIII [24] being [25] taken up. Mr. KING moved to insert after the
word "imports" the words "or exports" so as to prohibit the states from
taxing either, -- &

On this question it passed in the affirmative.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. P. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [26]

Mr. SHERMAN moved to add after the word "exports" -- the words "nor with
such consent but for the use of the U. S." -- so as to carry the
proceeds of all State duties on imports & [27] exports, into the common
Treasury.

Mr. MADISON liked the motion as preventing all State imposts -- but
lamented the complexity we were giving to the commercial system.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought the regulation necessary to prevent the
Atlantic States from endeavoring to tax the Western States -- & promote
their interest by opposing the navigation of the Mississippi which would
drive the Western people into the arms of G. Britain.

Mr. CLYMER thought the encouragement of the Western Country was suicide
on [28] the old States. If the States have such different interests that
they can not be left to regulate their own manufactures without
encountering the interests of other States, it is a proof that they are
not fit to compose one nation.

Mr. KING was afraid that the regulation moved by Mr. Sherman would too
much interfere with a policy of States respecting their manufactures,
which may be necessary. Revenue he reminded the House was the object of
the general Legislature.

On Mr. Sherman's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [29]

Art XIII was then agreed to as amended.

Art. XIV [30] was [31] taken up.

Genl. PINKNEY was not satisfied with it. He seemed to wish some
provision should be included in favor of property in slaves.

On the question on Art: XIV.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided. [32]

Art: XV [30] being taken up, the words "high misdemesnor," were struck
out, and [33] "other crime" inserted, in order to comprehend all proper
cases: it being doubtful whether "high misdemeanor" had not a technical
meaning too limited.

Mr. BUTLER and Mr. PINKNEY moved "to require fugitive slaves and
servants to be delivered up like criminals."

Mr. WILSON. This would oblige the Executive of the State to do it at the
public expence.

Mr. SHERMAN saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering
a slave or servant, than a horse.

Mr. BUTLER withdrew his proposition in order that some particular
provision might be made apart from this article. Art XV as amended was
then agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The phrase "which was ordered to lie on the table" is here added in
the transcript.

3. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. This sentence is omitted in the transcript.

5. See ante.

6. The words "being considered" are here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Maryland, no -- 1; New Jersey absent."

8. See ante.

9. The word "inviolate" is substituted in the transcript for
"inviolable."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 7; North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 3."

11. The vote on this section as stated in the printed Journal is not
unanimous; the statement here is probably the right one.

12. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 8; Virginia, no -- 1; Maryland, divided."

14. The character "&" is changed in the transcript to "&c."

15. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. The transcript does not italicize the word "retrospective."

17. The transcript italicized the word "interferences."

18. In the printed Journal -- "ex post facto."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, no -- 3."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware, South
Carolina, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

21. The word "impost" is substituted in the transcript for "import."

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Delaware, North
Carolina, aye -- 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

23. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

24. See ante.

25. The words "was then" are substituted in the transcript for "being."

26. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, aye -- 6; Connecticut,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5."

27. The word "or" is substituted for "&" in the transcript.

28. The words "the part of" are here inserted in the transcript.

29. In the transcript the vote reads: New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Massachusetts, Maryland, no -- 2."

30. See ante.

31. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

32. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye -- 9; Georgia, divided.

33. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  AUGUST 29th, 1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Art: XVI. [2, 3], taken up.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to substitute in place of it, the words of the
Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did not understand
precisely the meaning of the article.

Mr. WILSON & DOCr. JOHNSON supposed the meaning to be that Judgments in
one State should be the ground of actions in other States, & that acts
of the Legislatures should be included, for the sake of Acts of
insolvency &c.

Mr. PINKNEY moved to commit art XVI, with the following proposition, "To
establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting
the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange"

Mr. GHORUM was for agreeing to the article, and committing the
proposition.

Mr. MADISON was for committing both. He wished the Legislature might be
authorized to provide for the execution of Judgments in other States,
under such regulations as might be expedient. He thought that this might
be safely done, and was justified by the nature of the Union.

Mr. RANDOLPH said there was no instance of one nation executing
judgments of the Courts of another nation. He moved the following
proposition:

"Whenever the act of any State, whether Legislative, Executive or
Judiciary shall be attested & exemplified under the seal thereof, such
attestation and exemplification, shall be deemed in other States as full
proof of the existence of that act -- and its operation shall be binding
in every other State, in all cases to which it may relate, and which are
within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State, wherein the said
act was done."

On the question for committing Art: XVI. with Mr. Pinkney's motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [4]

The motion of Mr. Randolph was also committed nem: con:

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to commit also the following proposition on the
same subject.

"Full faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Legislature shall
by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts, records,
and proceedings," and it was committed nem: contrad:

The committee appointed for these references, were Mr. Rutlidge, Mr.
Randolph, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Wilson, & Mr. Johnson.

Mr. DICKENSON mentioned to the House that on examining Blackstone's
Commentaries, he found that the terms, [5] "ex post facto" related to
criminal cases only; that they would not consequently restrain the
States from retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some further
provision for this purpose would be requisite.

Art. VII Sect. 6 by ye. Committee of eleven reported to be struck out
(see the 24 instant) being now taken up,

Mr. PINKNEY moved to postpone the Report in favor of the following
proposition -- "That no act of the Legislature for the purpose of
regulating the commerce of the U- S. with foreign powers, or among the
several States, shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the
members of each House." He remarked that there were five distinct
commercial interests. 1. the fisheries & W. India trade, which belonged
to the N. England States. 2. the interest of N. York lay in a free
trade. 3. Wheat & flour the Staples of the two Middle States (N. J. &
Penna.). 4 Tobo. the staple of Maryd. & Virginia & partly of N.
Carolina. 5. Rice & Indigo, the staples of S. Carolina & Georgia. These
different interests would be a source of oppressive regulations if no
check to a bare majority should be provided. States pursue their
interests with less scruple than individuals. The power of regulating
commerce was a pure concession on the part of the S. States. They did
not need the protection of the N. States at present.

Mr. MARTIN 2ded. the motion

Genl. PINKNEY said it was the true interest of the S. States to have no
regulation of commerce; but considering the loss brought on the commerce
of the Eastern States by the revolution, their liberal conduct towards
the views [*6] of South Carolina, and the interest the weak Southn.
States had in being united with the strong Eastern States, he thought it
proper that no fetters should be imposed on the power of making
commercial regulations; and that his constituents though prejudiced
against the Eastern States, would be reconciled to this liberality. He
had himself, he said, prejudices agst. the Eastern States before he came
here, but would acknowledge that he had found them as liberal and candid
as any men whatever.

Mr. CLYMER. The diversity of commercial interests of necessity creates
difficulties, which ought not to be increased by unnecessary
restrictions. The Northern & middle States will be ruined, if not
enabled to defend themselves against foreign regulations.

Mr. SHERMAN, alluding to Mr. Pinkney's enumeration of particular
interests, as requiring a security agst. abuse of the power; observed
that the diversity was of itself a security, adding that to require more
than a majority to decide a question was always embarrassing as had been
experienced in cases requiring the votes of nine States in Congress.

Mr. PINKNEY replied that his enumeration meant the five minute
interests. It still left the two great divisions of Northern & Southern
Interests.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, opposed the object of the motion as highly injurious.
Preferences to American ships will multiply them, till they can carry
the Southern produce cheaper than it is now carried. -- A navy was
essential to security, particularly of the S. States, and can only be
had by a navigation act encouraging American bottoms & seamen. In those
points of view then alone, itis the interest of the S. States that
navigation acts should be facilitated. Shipping he said was the worst &
most precarious kind of property, and stood in need of public patronage.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was in favor of making two thirds instead of a majority
requisite, as more satisfactory to the Southern people. No useful
measure he believed had been lost in Congress for want of nine votes. As
to the weakness of the Southern States, he was not alarmed on that
account. The sickliness of their climate for invaders would prevent
their being made an object. He acknowledged that he did not think the
motion requiring 2/3 necessary in itself, because if a majority of 7
Northern States should push their regulations too far, the S. States
would build ships for themselves: but he knew the Southern people were
apprehensive on this subject and would be pleased with the precaution.

Mr. SPAIGHT was against the motion. The Southern States could at any
time save themselves from oppression, by building ships for their own
use.

Mr. BUTLER differed from those who considered the rejection of the
motion as no concession on the part of the S. States. He considered the
interests of these and of the Eastern States, to be as different as the
interests of Russia and Turkey. Being notwith-standing desirous of
conciliating the affections of the East: States. he should vote agst.
requiring 2/3 instead of a majority.

Col. MASON. If the Govt. is to be lasting, it must be founded in the
confidence & affections of the people, and must be so constructed as to
obtain these. The Majority will be governed by their interests. The
Southern States are the minority in both Houses. Is it to be expected
that they will deliver themselves bound hand & foot to the Eastern
States, and enable them to exclaim, in the words of Cromwell on a
certain occasion -- "the lord hath delivered them into our hands.

Mr. WILSON took notice of the several objections and remarked that if
every peculiar interest was to be secured, unanimity ought to be
required. The majority he said would be no more governed by interest
than the minority. It was surely better to let the latter be bound hand
and foot than the former. Great inconveniences had, he contended, been
experienced in Congress from the article of confederation requiring nine
votes in certain cases.

Mr. MADISON, went into a pretty full view of the subject. He observed
that the disadvantage to the S. States from a navigation act, lay
chiefly in a temporary rise of freight, attended however with an
increase of Southn. as well as Northern Shipping -- with the emigration
of Northern Seamen & merchants to the Southern States -- & with a
removal of the existing & injurious retaliations among the States on
each other. The power of foreign nations to obstruct our retaliating
measures on them by a corrupt influence would also be less if a majority
shd. be made competent than if 2/3 of each House shd. be required to
Legislative acts in this case. An abuse of the power would be qualified
with all these good effects. But he thought an abuse was rendered
improbable by the provision of 2 branches -- by the independence of the
Senate, by the negative of the Executive, by the interest of Connecticut
& N: Jersey which were agricultural, not commercial States; by the
interior interest which was also agricultural in the most commercial
States, [8] by the accession of Western States which wd. be altogether
agricultural. He added that the Southern States would derive an
essential advantage in the general security afforded by the increase of
our maritime strength. He stated the vulnerable situation of them all,
and of Virginia in particular. The increase of the coasting trade, and
of seamen, would also be favorable to the S. States, by increasing, the
consumption of their produce. If the Wealth of the Eastern should in a
still greater proportion be augmented, that wealth wd. contribute the
more to the public wants, and be otherwise a national benefit.

Mr. RUTLIDGE was agst. the motion of his colleague. It did not follow
from a grant of the power to regulate trade, that it would be abused. At
the worst a navigation act could bear hard a little while only on the S.
States. As we are laying the foundation for a great empire, we ought to
take a permanent view of the subject and not look at the present moment
only. He reminded the House of the necessity of securing the West India
trade to this country. That was the great object, and a navigation Act
was necessary for obtaining it.

Mr. RANDOLPH said that there were features so odious in the constitution
as it now stands, that he doubted whether he should be able to agree to
it. A rejection of the motion would compleat the deformity of the
system. He took notice of the argument in favor of giving the power over
trade to a majority, drawn from the opportunity foreign powers would
have of obstructing retaliating [9] measures, if two thirds were made
requisite. He did not think there was weight in that consideration. The
difference between a majority & two thirds did not afford room for such
an opportunity. Foreign influence would also be more likely to be
exerted on the President who could require three fourths by his
negative. He did not mean however to enter into the merits. What he had
in view was merely to pave the way for a declaration which he might be
hereafter obliged to make if an accumulation of obnoxious ingredients
should take place, that he could not give his assent to the plan.

Mr. GORHAM. If the Government is to be so fettered as to be unable to
relieve the Eastern States what motive can they have to join in it, and
thereby tie their own hands from measures which they could otherwise
take for themselves. The Eastern States were not led to strengthen the
Union by fear for their own safety. He deprecated the consequences of
disunion, but if it should take place it was the Southern part of the
Continent that had the [10] most reason to dread them. He urged the
improbability of a combination against the interest of the Southern
States, the different situations of the Northern & Middle States being a
security against it. It was moreover certain that foreign ships would
never be altogether excluded especially those of Nations in treaty with
us.

On the question to pospone in order to take up Mr. Pinkney's Motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [11]

The Report of the Committee for striking out sect: 6. requiring two
thirds of each House to pass a navigation act was then agreed to, nem:
con:

Mr. BUTLER moved to insert after art: XV. "If any person bound to
service or labor in any of the U. States shall escape into another
State, he or she shall not be discharged from such service or labor, in
consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State to which they
escape, but shall be delivered up to the person justly claiming their
service or labor," which was agreed to nem: con:

Art: XVII [12] being [13] taken up, Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out
the two last sentences, to wit "If the admission be consented to, the
new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States.
But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning
the public debt, which shall be then subsisting." -- He did not wish to
bind down the Legislature to admit Western States on the terms here
stated.

Mr. MADISON opposed the motion, insisting that the Western States
neither would nor ought to submit to a union which degraded them from an
equal rank with [17] other States.

Col: MASON. If it were possible by just means to prevent emigrations to
the Western Country, it might be good policy. But go the people will as
they find it for their interest, and the best policy is to treat them
with that equality which will make them friends not enemies.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, did not mean to discourage the growth of the Western
Country. He knew that to be impossible. He did not wish however to throw
the power into their hands.

Mr. SHERMAN, was agst. the motion, & for fixing an equality of
privileges by the Constitution.

Mr. LANGDON was in favor of the Motion, he did not know but
circumstances might arise which would render it inconvenient to admit
new States on terms of equality.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for leaving the Legislature free. The existing small
States enjoy an equality now, and for that reason are admitted to it in
the Senate. This reason is not applicable to new Western States.

On Mr. Govr. Morris's motion for striking out.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [14]

Mr. L. MARTIN & Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out of art XVII. "but
to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present shall
be necessary." Before any question was taken on this motion,

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved the following proposition as a substitute for the
XVII art:

"New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union: but no
new State shall be erected within the limits of any of the present
States, without the consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as
of the Genl. Legislature"

The first part to Union inclusive was agreed to nem: con:

Mr. L. MARTIN opposed the latter part. Nothing he said would so alarm
the limited States as to make the consent of the large States claiming
the Western lands, necessary to the establishment of new States within
their limits. It is proposed to guarantee the States. Shall Vermont be
reduced by force in favor of the States claiming it? Frankland & the
Western country of Virginia were in a like situation.

On Mr. Govr. Morris's motion to substitute &c it was agreed to.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [15]

Art: XVII -- [16] before the House, as amended.

Mr. SHERMAN was against it. He thought it unnecessary. The Union can not
dismember a State without its consent.

Mr. LANGDON thought there was great weight in the argument of Mr. Luther
Martin, and that the proposition substituted by Mr. Govr. Morris would
excite a dangerous opposition to the plan.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought on the contrary that the small States would be
pleased with the regulation, as it holds up the idea of dismembering the
large States.

Mr. BUTLER. If new States were to be erected without the consent of the
dismembered States, nothing but confusion would ensue. Whenever taxes
should press on the people, demagogues would set up their schemes of new
States.

DOCr. JOHNSON agreed in general with the ideas of Mr. Sherman, but was
afraid that as the clause stood, Vermont would be subjected to N. York,
contrary to the faith pledged by Congress. He was of opinion that
Vermont ought to be compelled to come into the Union.

Mr. LANGDON said his objections were connected with the case of Vermont.
If they are not taken in, & remain exempt from taxes, it would prove of
great injury to N. Hampshire and the other neighbouring States

Mr. DICKINSON hoped the article would not be agreed to. He dwelt on the
impropriety of requiring the small States to secure the large ones in
their extensive claims of territory.

Mr. WILSON. When the majority of a State wish to divide they can do so.
The aim of those in opposition to the article, he perceived, was that
the Genl. Government should abet the minority, & by that means divide a
State against its own consent.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. If the forced division of States is the object of the
new System, and is to be pointed agst. one or two States, he expected,
the Gentleman [17] from these would pretty quickly leave us.

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. See ante.

3. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, no -- 2."

5. The transcript uses the word "terms" in the singular.

*6. He meant the permission to import slaves. An understanding on the
two subjects of navigation and slavery, had taken place between those
parts of the Union, which explains the vote on the motion depending, as
well as the language of Genl Pinkney & others.

7. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "and" here inserted in the transcript.

9. The word "retaliatory" is substituted in the transcript for
"retaliating."

10. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, aye--4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 7."

12. See p. -- .

13. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. In the transcript the vote reads: New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 5."

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; New
Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 5."

16. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. The transcript uses the word "Gentleman" in the plural.

18. The transcript uses the word "Gentleman" in the plural.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY  AUGUST 30th 1787. [1]  IN CONVENTION

Art XVII [2] resumed for a question on it as amended by Mr. Govr.
Morris's substitutes. [3]

Mr. CARROL moved to strike out so much of the article as requires the
consent of the State to its being divided. He was aware that the object
of this prerequisite might be to prevent domestic disturbances, but such
was our situation with regard to the Crown lands, and the sentiments of
Maryland on that subject, that he perceived we should again be at sea,
if no guard was provided for the right of the U. States to the back
lands. He suggested that it might be proper to provide that nothing in
the Constitution should affect the Right of the U. S. to lands ceded by
G. Britain in the Treaty of peace, and proposed a committment to a
member from each State. He assured the House that this was a point of a
most serious nature. It was desirable above all things that the act of
the Convention might be agreed to unanimously. But should this point be
disregarded, he believed that all risks would be run by a considerable
minority, sooner than give their concurrence.

Mr. L. MARTIN 2ded. the motion for a committment.

Mr. RUTLIDGE is it to be supposed that the States are to be cut up
without their own consent. The case of Vermont will probably be
particularly provided for. There could be no room to fear, that Virginia
or N. Carolina would call on the U. States to maintain their Government
over the Mountains.

Mr. WILLIAMSON said that N. Carolina was well disposed to give up her
western lands, but attempts at compulsion was [4] not the policy of the
U. S. He was for doing nothing in the constitution in the present case,
and for leaving the whole matter in Statu quo.

Mr. WILSON was against the committment. Unanimity was of great
importance, but not to be purchased by the majority's yielding to the
minority. He should have no objection to leaving the case of [5] new
States as heretofore. He knew of [6] nothing that would give greater or
juster alarm than the doctrine, that a political society is to be torne
asunder without its own consent. On Mr. Carrol's motion for commitment

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [7]

Mr. SHERMAN moved to postpone the substitute for art: XVII agreed to
yesterday in order to take up the following amendment "The Legislature
shall have power to admit other States into the Union, and new States to
be formed by the division or junction of States now in the Union, with
the consent of the Legislature of such States." [The first part was
meant for the case of Vermont to secure its admission.]

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [8]

DOCr. JOHNSON moved to insert the words "hereafter formed or" after the
words "shall be" in the substitute for art: XVII, [the more clearly to
save Vermont as being already formed into a State, from a dependence on
the consent of N. York to [9] her admission.] The motion was agreed to
Del. & Md. only dissenting.

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS moved to strike out the word "limits" in the
substitute, and insert the word "jurisdiction" [This also [10] meant to
guard the case of Vermont, the jurisdiction of N. York not extending
over Vermont which was in the exercise of sovereignty, tho' Vermont was
within the asserted limits of New York]

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [11]

Mr. L. MARTIN, urged the unreasonableness of forcing & guaranteeing the
people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the Western people, of N.
Carolina, & of Georgia, & the people of Maine, to continue under the
States now governing them, without the consent of those States to their
separation. Even if they should become the majority, the majority of
Counties, as in Virginia may still hold fast the dominion over them.
Again the majority may place the seat of Government entirely among
themselves & for their own conveniency, [12] and still keep the injured
parts of the States in subjection, under the guarantee of the Genl.
Government agst. domestic violence. He wished Mr. Wilson had thought a
little sooner of the value of political bodies. In the beginning, when
the rights of the small States were in question, they were phantoms,
ideal beings. Now when the Great States were to be affected, political
societies were of a sacred nature. He repeated and enlarged on the
unreasonableness of requiring the small States to guarantee the Western
claims of the large ones. -- It was said yesterday by Mr. Govr. Morris,
that if the large States were to be split to pieces without their
consent, their representatives here would take their leave. If the Small
States are to be required to guarantee them in this manner, it will be
found that the Representatives of other States will with equal firmness
take their leave of the Constitution on the table.

It was moved by Mr. L. MARTIN to postpone the substituted article, in
order to take up the following. "The Legislature of the U. S. shall have
power to erect New States within as well as without the territory
claimed by the several States or either of them, and admit the same into
the Union: provided that nothing in this constitution shall be construed
to affect the claim of the U. S. to vacant lands ceded to them by the
late treaty of peace. which passed in the negative: N. J. Del. & Md.
only ay.

On the question to agree to Mr. Govr. Morris's substituted article as
amended in the words following,

"New States may be admitted by the Legislature into the Union: but no
new State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the jurisdiction
of any of the present States without the consent of the Legislature of
such State as well as of the General Legislature"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [13]

Mr. DICKINSON moved to add the following clause to the last -- "Nor
shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts
thereof, without the consent of the Legislatures of such States, as well
as of the Legislature of the U. States." which was agreed to without a
count of the votes.

Mr. CARROL moved to add -- "Provided nevertheless that nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the U. S. to
vacant lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace." This he said might
be understood as relating to lands not claimed by any particular States,
but he had in view also some of the claims of particular States.

Mr. WILSON was agst. the motion. There was nothing in the Constitution
affecting one way or the other the claims of the U. S. & it was best to
insert nothing leaving every thing on that litigated subject in statu
quo.

Mr. MADISON considered the claim of the U. S. as in fact favored
by the jurisdiction of the judicial power of the U. S. over
controversies to which they whould be parties. He thought it best
on the whole to be silent on the subject. He did not view the
proviso of Mr. Carrol as dangerous; but to make it neutral & fair,
it ought to go farther & declare that the claims of particular States
also should not be affected.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the proviso harmless, especially with the addition
suggested by Mr. Madison in favor of the claims of particular States.

Mr. BALDWIN did not wish any undue advantage to be given to Georgia. He
thought the proviso proper with the addition proposed. It should be
remembered that if Georgia has gained much by the cession in the Treaty
of peace, she was in danger during the war, of a Uti possidetis.

Mr. RUTLIDGE thought it wrong to insert a proviso where there was
nothing which it could restrain, or on which it could operate.

Mr. CARROL withdrew his motion and moved the following. "Nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to alter the claims of the U. S. or of
the individual States to the Western territory, but all such claims
shall be examined into & decided upon, by the Supreme Court of the U.
States."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to postpone this in order to take up the
following.

"The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the U. States; and nothing in this constitution contained,
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of the U. S. or
of any particular State." -- The postponemt. agd. to nem. con.

Mr. L. MARTIN moved to amend the proposition of Mr. Govr. Morris by
adding -- "But all such claims may be examined into & decided upon by
the supreme Court of the U. States."

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. this is unnecessary, as all suits to which the U. S.
are parties, are already to be decided by the Supreme Court.

Mr. L. MARTIN, it is propor in order to remove all doubts on this
point.

[14] Question on Mr. L. Martin's amendatory motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no --
[15] States not farther called the negatives being sufficient & the
point [16] given up.

The Motion of Mr. Govr. Morris was then agreed to, Md. alone dissenting.

Art: XVIII [17] being taken up, -- the word "foreign" was struck out.
nem: con: as superfluous, being implied in the term "invasion."

Mr. DICKINSON moved to strike out "on the application of its
Legislature, against" He thought it of essential importance to the
tranquility of the U. S. that they should in all cases suppress domestic
violence, which may proceed from the State Legislature itself, or from
disputes between the two branches where such exist

Mr. DAYTON mentioned the Conduct of Rho: Island as shewing the necessity
of giving latitude to the power of the U. S. on this subject.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [18]

On a question for striking out "domestic violence" and insertg.
"insurrections." It passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

Mr. DICKINSON moved to insert the words, "or Executive" after the words
"application of its Legislature" -- The occasion itself he remarked
might hinder the Legislature from meeting.

On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [20]

Mr. L. MARTIN moved to subjoin to the last amendment the words "in the
recess of the Legislature"

On which question [21] 

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S.
C. no. Geo. no.

On [22] Question on the last clause as amended

N. H. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [23]

Art: XIX [24, 25] taken up.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS suggested that the Legislature should be left at
liberty to call a Convention, whenever they please.

The art: was agreed to nem: con:

Art: XX. [24, 25] taken up. -- [26] "or affirmation" was [27] added
after "oath."

Mr. PINKNEY moved to add to the art: -- "but no religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the authority of the U. States"

Mr. SHERMAN thought it unnecessary, the prevailing liberality being a
sufficient security agst. such tests.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Genl. PINKNEY approved the motion. The motion was
agreed to nem: con: and then then whole

Article; N. C. only no -- & Md. divided 

Art: XXI. [28, 29] taken up. viz: [30] The ratifications of the
Conventions of _____ States shall be sufficient for organizing this
Constitution."

Mr. WILSON proposed to fill the blank with "seven" that being a majority
of the whole number & sufficient for the commencement of the plan.

Mr. CARROL moved to postpone the article in order to take up the Report
of the Committee of Eleven (see Tuesday Augst. 28) [31] -- and on the
question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [32]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought the blank ought to be filled in a twofold way,
so as to provide for the event of the ratifying States being contiguous
which would render a smaller number sufficient, and the event of their
being dispersed, which wd. require a greater number for the introduction
of the Government.

Mr. SHERMAN. observed that the States being now confederated by articles
which require unanimity in changes, he thought the ratification in this
case of ten States at least ought to be made necessary.

Mr. RANDOLPH was for filling the blank with "nine" that being a
respectable majority of the whole, and being a number made familiar by
the constitution of the existing Congress.

Mr. WILSON mentioned "eight" as preferable.

Mr. DICKINSON asked whether the concurrence of Congress is to be
essential to the establishment of the system, whether the refusing
States in the Confederacy could be deserted -- and whether Congress
could concur in contravening the system under which they acted?

Mr. MADISON, remarked that if the blank should be filled with "seven"
eight, or "nine" -- the Constitution as it stands might be put in force
over the whole body of the people, tho' less than a majority of them
should ratify it.

Mr. WILSON. As the Constitution stands, the States only which ratify can
be bound. We must he said in this case go to the original powers of
Society. The House on fire must be extinguished, without a scrupulous
regard to ordinary rights.

Mr. BUTLER was in favor of "nine." He revolted at the idea, that one or
two States should restrain the rest from consulting their safety.

Mr. CARROL moved to fill the blank with "the thirteen," unanimity being
necessary to dissolve the existing confederacy which had been
unanimously established.

Mr. KING thought this amendt. necessary, otherwise as the Constitution
now stands it will operate on the whole though ratified by a part only.

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The transcript uses the word "substitutes" in the singular.

4. In the transcript the word "was" is crossed out and "were" is written
above it.

5. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, aye -- 5; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, aye -- 5; New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

9. The word "for" is substituted in the transcript for "to."

10. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 7; New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4."

12. The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the
transcript.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 8; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 3."

14. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: New Jersey, Maryland, aye -- 2;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, no -- 6."

16. The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. See ante.

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: New Jersey, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 6."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; Massachusetts, Virginia, no -- 2; Maryland, divided."

21. the transcript here adds the words: "Maryland only, aye," and omits
the vote by States.

22. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Delaware, Maryland, no -- 2 "

24. See ante.

25. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

26. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

27. In the transcript the word "was" is crossed out and "were" is
written above it.

28. See ante.

29. The words "being then" are here inserted in the transcript.

30. The word "viz" is omitted in the transcript.

31. The words "the twenty-eighth of August" are substituted in the
transcript for "Tuesday Augst. 28."

32. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  AUGUST 31st  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. KING moved to add to the end of art: XXI the words "between the said
States" so as to confine the operation of the Govt. to the States
ratifying it.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. no. Virga. ay. N. C.
ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [2]

Mr. MADISON proposed to fill the blank in the article with "any seven or
more States entitled to thirty three members at least in the House of
Representatives according to the allotment made in the 3 Sect: of art:
4." This he said would require the concurrence of a majority both of the
States and [3] people.

Mr. SHERMAN doubted the propriety of authorizing less than all the
States to execute the Constitution, considering the nature of the
existing Confederation. Perhaps all the States may concur, and on that
supposition it is needless to hold out a breach of faith.

Mr. CLYMER and Mr. CARROL moved to postpone the consideration of Art:
XXI in order to take up the Reports of Committees not yet acted on. On
this question, the States were equally divided.

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no.
N. C no. S. C. no. G. ay. [4]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "Conventions of the" after
"ratifications," leaving the States to pursue their own modes of
ratification.

Mr. CARROL mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution of Maryland
pointed out therein, and that no other mode could be pursued in that
State.

Mr. KING thought that striking out "Conventions" as the requisite mode
was equivalent to giving up the business altogether. Conventions alone,
which will avoid all the obstacles from the complicated formation of the
Legislatures, will succeed, and if not positively required by the plan,
its enemies will oppose that mode.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said he meant to facilitate the adoption of the plan,
by leaving the modes approved by the several State Constitutions to be
followed.

Mr. MADISON considered it best to require Conventions; among other
reasons, for this, that the powers given to the Genl. Govt. being taken
from the State Govts. the Legislatures would be more disinclined than
conventions composed in part at least of other men; and if disinclined,
they could devise modes apparently promoting, but really, thwarting the
ratification. The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other
States, where no mode of change was pointed out by the Constitution, and
all officers were under oath to support it. The people were in fact, the
fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were
got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a
principle in the Bills of rights, that first principles might be
resorted to.

Mr. Mc.HENRY said that the officers of Govt. in Maryland were under oath
to support the mode of alteration prescribed by the Constitution.

Mr. GHORUM, urged the expediency of "Conventions" also Mr. PINKNEY, for
reasons, formerly urged on a discussion of this question.

Mr. L. MARTIN insisted on a reference to the State Legislatures. He
urged the danger of commotions from a resort to the people & to first
principles in which the Governments might be on one side & the people on
the other. He was apprehensive of no such consequences however in
Maryland, whether the Legislature or the people should be appealed to.
Both of them would be generally against the Constitution. He repeated
also the peculiarity in the Maryland Constitution.

Mr. KING observed that the Constitution of Massachussets was made
unalterable till the year 1790, yet this was no difficulty with him. The
State must have contemplated a recurrence to first principles before
they sent deputies to this Convention.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to postpone art. XXI [5] & [6] take up art: XXII [5]
on which question,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no S. C. no. Geo. no. [7]

On Mr. Govr. Morris's motion to strike out "Conventions of the," it was
negatived.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. S.
C. no. Geo. ay. [8]

On [9] filling the blank in Art: XXI with "thirteen" moved by Mr. CARROL
& L. MARTIN

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no -- all no. except Maryland. [10]

Mr. SHERMAN & Mr. DAYTON moved to fill the blank with "ten"

Mr. WILSON supported the motion of Mr. MADISON, requiring a majority
both of the people and of States.

Mr. CLYMER was also in favor of it.

Col: MASON was for preserving ideas familiar to the people. Nine States
had been required in all great cases under the Confederation & that
number was on that account preferable

On the question for "ten"

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [11]

On question for "nine"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay [12]

Art: XXI. as amended was then agreed to by all the States, Maryland
excepted, & Mr. Jenifer being, ay.

Art: XXII [32, 13] taken up, to wit, "This Constitution shall be laid
before the U. S. in Congs. assembled for their approbation; and it is
the opinion of this Convention that it should be afterwards submitted to
a Convention chosen, in each State under the recommendation of its
Legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention"

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. PINKNEY moved to strike out the words "for their
approbation" On this question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. [*14] Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [15]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. PINKNEY then moved to amend the art: so as to
read

"This Constitution shall be laid before the U. S. in Congress assembled;
and it is the opinion of this Convention that it should afterwards be
submitted to a Convention chosen in each State, in order to receive the
ratification of such Convention: to which end the several Legislatures
ought to provide for the calling Conventions within their respective
States as speedily as circumstances will permit." -- Mr. GOVr. MORRIS
said his object was to impress in stronger terms the necessity of
calling Conventions in order to prevent enemies to the plan, from giving
it the go by. When it first appears, with the sanction of this
Convention, the people will be favorable to it. By degrees the State
officers, & those interested in the State Govts. will intrigue & turn
the popular current against it.

Mr. L. MARTIN believed Mr. Morris to be right, that after a while the
people would be agst. it, but for a different reason from that alledged.
He believed they would not ratify it unless hurried into it by surprize.

Mr. GERRY enlarged on the idea of Mr. L. Martin in which he concurred,
represented the system as full of vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of
distroying the existing Confederation, without the unanimous consent of
the parties to it.

[16] Question on Mr. Govr. Morris's & Mr. Pinkney's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [17]

Mr. GERRY moved to postpone art: XXII.

Col: MASON 2ded. the motion, declaring that he would sooner chop off his
right hand than put it to the Constitution as it now stands. He wished
to see some points not yet decided brought to a decision, before being
compelled to give a final opinion on this article. Should these points
be improperly settled, his wish would then be to bring the whole subject
before another general Convention.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was ready for a postponement. He had long wished for
another Convention, that will have the firmness to provide a vigorous
Government, which we are afraid to do.

Mr. RANDOLPH stated his idea to be, in case the final form of the
Constitution should not permit him to accede to it, that the State
Conventions should be at liberty to propose amendments to be submitted
to another General Convention which may reject or incorporate them, as
shall [18] be judged proper.

On the question for postponing

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [19]

On the question on Art: XXII

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [20]

Art: XXIII [21] being taken up, as far as the words "assigned by
Congress" inclusive, was agreed to nem: con: the blank having been first
filled with the word "nine" as of course.

On a motion for postponement the residue of the clause, concerning the
choice of the President &c.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [22]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS then moved to strike out the words "choose the
President of the U. S. and" -- this point, of choosing the President not
being yet finally determined, & on this question

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay Del. ay. Md. divd. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. [*23] Geo. ay. [24]

Art: XXIII as amended was then agreed to nem: con:

The Report of the Grand Committee of eleven made by Mr. SHERMAN was then
taken up (see Aug: 28). [25]

On the question to agree to the following clause, to be inserted after
Sect. 4. art: VII. "nor shall any regulation of commerce or revenue give
preference to the ports of one State over those of another." Agreed to
nem: con:

On the clause "or oblige vessels bound to or from any State to enter
clear or pay duties in another"

Mr. MADISON thought the restriction wd. be inconvenient, as in the River
Delaware, if a vessel cannot be required to make entry below the
jurisdiction of Pennsylvania.

Mr. FITZIMMONS admitted that it might be inconvenient, but thought it
would be a greater inconveniency [26] to require vessels bound to
Philada. to enter below the jurisdiction of the State.

Mr. GORHAM & Mr. LANGDON, contended that the Govt. would be so fettered
by this clause, as to defeat the good purpose of the plan. They
mentioned the situation of the trade of Mas. & N. Hampshire, the case of
Sandy Hook which is in the State of N. Jersey, but where precautions
agst. smuggling into N. York, ought to be established by the Genl.
Government.

Mr. Mc.HENRY said the clause would not shreeen a vessel from being
obliged to take an officer on board as a security for due entry &c.

Mr. CARROL was anxious that the clause should be agreed to. He assured
the House, that this was a tender point in Maryland.

Mr. JENNIFER urged the necessity of the clause in the same point of
view.

On the question for agreeing to it

N. H. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. ay. [27]

The word "tonnage" was struck out, nem: con: as comprehended in "duties"

On [28] question on the clause of the Report "and all duties, imposts &
excises, laid by the Legislature shall be uniform throughout the U. S."
It was agreed to nem: con: [*29]

On motion of Mr. SHERMAN it was agreed to refer such parts of the
Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts of Reports as have
not been acted on, to a Committee of a member from each State; the
Committee appointed by ballot, being -- Mr. Gilman, Mr. King, Mr.
Sherman, Mr. Brearly, Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Carrol, Mr.
Madison, Mr. Williamson, Mr. Butler & Mr. Baldwin.

[The House [31] adjourned]

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. In place of the vote by State the transcript reads: "nine States
voted in the affirmative; Maryland, no; Delaware, absent."

3. The word "the" is here in the transcript.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 5; Connecticut,
divided."

5. See ante.

6. The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Georgia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 6."

9. The words "the question for" are here inserted in the transcript.

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "all the States were no, except
Maryland."

11. In the transcript the vote reads: Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Georgia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 7."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 3."

13. The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.

*14. In the printed Journal N. Jersey -- no.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, [23] Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye -- 8; Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia, no -- 3".

16. The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye -- 4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

18. The word "may" is substituted in the transcript for "shall."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Maryland, North
Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: ten States aye; Maryland no."

21. See ante.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- . 7"

*23. In printed Journal -- S.C. -- no.

24. In the transcript the vote read: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, [23] Georgia, aye -- 9; New Hampshire, no; Maryland, divided."

25. In the transcript this date reads "the twenty-eighth of August."

26. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

27. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 8;
New Hampshire, South Carolina, no -- 8."

28. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

*29. In printed Journal N.H. and S.C. entered as [30] in the negative.

30. The word "as" is omitted in the transcript.

31. The words "The House" are omitted in the transcript.

32. See ante.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  SEPr 1.  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. BREARLEY from the Comme. of eleven to which were referred yesterday,
the postponed parts of the Constitution, & parts of Reports not acted
upon, made the following partial report. That in lieu of the 9th. Sect:
of art: 6. the words following be inserted viz "The members of each
House shall be ineligible to any civil office under the authority of the
U. S. during the time for which they shall respectively be elected, and
no person holding an office under the U. S. shall be a member of either
House during his continuance in office."

Mr. RUTLIDGE from the Committee to whom were referred sundry
propositions (see Aug: 29), together with art: XVI, reported that the
following additions be made to the Report -- viz

After the word "States" in the last line on the Margin of the 3d. page
(see the printed Report) -- add "to establish uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies."

And insert the following as Art: XVI viz

"Full faith and credit ought to be given in each State to the public
acts, records, and Judicial proceedings of every other State, and the
Legislature shall by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, Records, & proceedings shall be proved, and the effect which
Judgments obtained in one State, shall have in another."

After receiving these reports

The House adjourned to 10 OC. on Monday next [2]

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The phrase "to 10 OC on Monday next" is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  SEPr 3.  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to amend the Report concerning the respect to be
paid to Acts Records &c of one State, in other States (see Sepr. 1.) by
striking out "judgments obtained in one State shall have in another" and
to insert the word "thereof" after the word "effect"

Col: MASON favored the motion, particularly if the "effect" was to be
restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings Mr. WILSON remarked, that
if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the provision
would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all
Independent Nations.

DOCr. JOHNSON thought the amendment as worded would authorise the Genl.
Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State, in
another State.

Mr. RANDOLPH considered it as strengthening the general objection agst.
the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government was so
loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He
was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the Legislature
to provide for the effect of Judgments.

On the amendment as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris

Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no. [2]

On motion of Mr. MADISON, [3] "ought to" was [4] struck out, and "shall"
inserted; and "shall" between "Legislature" & "by general laws" struck
out, and "may" inserted, nem: con:

On the question to agree to the report as amended viz "Full faith &
credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records &
judicial proceedings of every other State, and the Legislature may by
general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts records &
proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof" 5 Agreed to witht.
a count of [6] Sts.

The clause in the Report "To establish uniform laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies" being taken up.

Mr. SHERMAN observed that Bankruptcies were in some cases punishable
with death by the laws of England, & He did not chuse to grant a power
by which that might be done here.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said this was an extensive & delicate subject. He would
agree to it because he saw no danger of abuse of the power by the
Legislature of the U. S.

On the question to agree to the clause

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [7]

Mr. PINKNEY moved to postpone the Report of the Committee of Eleven (see
Sepr. 1) in order to take up the following,

"The members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office
under the U. S. for which they or any other for their benefit, receive
any salary, fees or emoluments of any kind, and the acceptance of such
office shall vacate their seats respectively." He was strenuously
opposed to an ineligibility of members to office, and therefore wished
to restrain the proposition to a mere incompatibility. He considered the
eligibility of members of the Legislature to the honorable offices of
Government, as resembling the policy of the Romans, in making the temple
of virtue the road to the temple of fame.

On this question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no. [8]

Mr. KING moved to insert the word "created" before the word "during" in
the Report of the Committee. This he said would exclude the members of
the first Legislature under the Constitution, as most of the offices wd.
then be created.

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion. He did not see why members of the
Legislature should be ineligible to vacancies happening during the term
of their election.

Mr. SHERMAN was for entirely incapacitating members of the Legislature.
He thought their eligibility to offices would give too much influence to
the Executive. He said the incapacity ought at least to be extended to
cases where salaries should be increased as well as created, during the
term of the member. He mentioned also the expedient by which the
restriction could be evaded to wit: an existing officer might be
translated to an office created, and a member of the Legislature be then
put into the office vacated.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS contended that the eligibility of members to office wd.
lessen the influence of the Executive. If they cannot be appointed
themselves, the Executive will appoint their relations & friends,
retaining the service & votes of the members for his purposes in the
Legislature. Whereas the appointment of the members deprives him of such
an advantage.

Mr. GERRY. thought the eligibility of members would have the
effect of opening batteries agst. good officers, in order to drive
them out & make way for members of the Legislature.

Mr. GORHAM was in favor of the amendment. Without it we go further than
has been done in any of the States, or indeed any other Country. The
experience of the State Governments where there was no such
ineligibility, proved that it was not necessary; on the contrary that
the eligibility was among the inducements for fit men to enter into the
Legislative service

Mr. RANDOLPH was inflexibly fixed against inviting men into the
Legislature by the prospect of being appointed to offices.

Mr. BALDWIN remarked that the example of the States was not applicable.
The Legislatures there are so numerous that an exclusion of their
members would not leave proper men for offices. The case would be
otherwise in the General Government.

Col: MASON. Instead of excluding merit, the ineligibility will keep out
corruption, by excluding office-hunters.

Mr. WILSON considered the exclusion of members of the Legislature, as
increasing the influence of the Executive as observed by Mr. Govr.
Morris at the same time that it would diminish, the general energy of
the Government. He said that the legal disqualification for office would
be odious to those who did not wish for office, but did not wish either
to be marked by so degrading a distinction.

Mr. PINKNEY. The first Legislature will be composed of the ablest men to
be found. The States will select such to put the Government into
operation. Should the Report of the Committee or even the amendment be
agreed to, The great offices, even those of the Judiciary Department
which are to continue for life, must be filled whilst those most capable
of filling them will be under a disqualification.

On the question on Mr. King's motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. no. Geo. no. [9]

The amendment being thus lost by the equal division of the States, Mr.
WILLIAMSON moved to insert the words "created or the emoluments whereof
shall have been increased" before the word "during" in the Report of the
Committee

Mr. KING 2ded. the motion, &

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay

N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. divided. [10]

The last clause rendering a Seat in the Legislature & an office
incompatible was agreed to nem. con:

The Report as amended & agreed to is as follows.

"The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office
under the authority of the U. States, created, or the emoluments
whereof shall have been increased during the time for which they
shall respectively be elected -- and no person holding any office
under the U. S. shall be a member of either House during his
continuance in office."

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 6;
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 3."

3. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

4. The word "was" is crossed out in the transcript and "were" is written
above it.

5. The words "it was" are here inserted in the transcript.

6. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

7. In place of the vote by States the transcript reads: "Pennsylvania.
North Carolina, aye -- 2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina, aye -- 4; Georgia, divided."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  SEPr 4.  1787. [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. BREARLY from the Committee of eleven made a further partial
Report as follows

"The Committee of Eleven to whom sundry resolutions &c were
referred on the 31st. of August, report that in their opinion the
following additions and alterations should be made to the Report
before the Convention, viz

    [*2] (1.) The first clause of sect: 1. art. 7. to read as follow --
'The Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes duties
imposts & excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence &
general welfare, of the U. S.'

    (2). At the end of the 2d. clause of sect. 1. art. 7. add 'and with
the Indian Tribes.'

    (3) In the place of the 9th. art. Sect. 1. to be inserted 'The
Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but
no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two
thirds of the members present.'

    (4) After the word 'Excellency' in sect. 1. art. 10. to be
inserted. 'He shall hold his office during the term of four years,
and together with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be
elected in the following manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in
such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors
equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House
of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Legislature. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and
vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be
an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall
make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of
votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify and transmit
sealed to the Seat of the Genl. Government, directed to the
President of the Senate -- The President of the Senate shall in that
House open all the certificates; and the votes shall be then & there
counted. The Person having the greatest number of votes shall be
the President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors;
and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have
an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately
choose by ballot one of them for President: but if no person have
a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall
choose by ballot the President. And in every case after the choice
of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes
shall be vice- president: but if there should remain two or more
who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the
vice-President. The Legislature may determine the time of
choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of
certifying and transmitting their votes.'

    (5) 'Sect. 2. No person except a natural born citizen or a
Citizen of the U. S. at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
shall be eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be
elected to that office, who shall be under the age of thirty five
years, and who has not been in the whole, at least fourteen years
a resident within the U. S.'

    (6) 'Sect. 3. The vice-president shall be ex officio President of
the Senate, except when they sit to try the impeachment of the
President, in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and
excepting also when he shall exercise the powers and duties of
President, in which case & in case of his absence, the Senate shall
chuse a President pro tempore -- The vice President when acting
as President of the Senate shall not have a vote unless the House
be equally divided.'

    (7) 'Sect. 4. The President by and with the advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties; and he shall
nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
shall appoint ambassadors, and other public Ministers, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the U. S., whose
appointments are not otherwise herein provided for. But no
Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the
members present.'

    (8) After the words -- "into the service of the U. S." in sect. 2.
art: 10. add 'and may require the opinion in writing of the principal
officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject
relating to the duties of their respective offices.'

[3] The latter part of Sect. 2. Art: 10. to read as follows.

    (9) [3] 'He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by
the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for
Treason, or bribery, and in case of his removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation or inability to discharge the powers or
duties of his office, the vice-president shall exercise those powers
and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability
of the President be removed.'

The (1st.) clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con.

The (2) clause was also agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause was postponed in order to decide previously on the
mode of electing the President.

The (4) clause was accordingly taken up.

Mr. GORHAM disapproved of making the next highest after the
President, the vice-President, without referring the decision to the
Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of
votes. as the regulation stands a very obscure man with very few
votes may arrive at that appointment

Mr. SHERMAN said the object of this clause of the report of the
Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility, which was attached to
the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive
independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was
to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were
sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection
to requiring the vice-President to be chosen in like manner, where
the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance

Mr. MADISON was apprehensive that by requiring both the
President & vice President to be chosen out of the five highest
candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much
to making candidates instead of giving their votes in order to a
definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the business, the
election would, in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It
would have the effect at the same time, he observed, of giving the
nomination of the candidates to the largest States.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS concurred in, & enforced the remarks of Mr.
Madison.

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. PINKNEY wished for a particular explanation
& discussion of the reasons for changing the mode of electing the
Executive.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said he would give the reasons of the
Committee and his own. The 1st. was the danger of intrigue &
faction if the appointmt. should be made by the Legislature. 2. [4]
the inconveniency [5] of an ineligibility required by that mode in
order to lessen its evils. 3. [6] The difficulty of establishing a Court
of Impeachments, other than the Senate which would not be so
proper for the trial nor the other branch for the impeachment of
the President, if appointed by the Legislature, 4. [7] No body had
appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. 5.
[8] Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people.
6. [9] the indispensible necessity of making the Executive
independent of the Legislature. -- As the Electors would vote at
the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from
each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be
impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making
the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of
impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after
the trial of the impeachment.

Col: MASON confessed that the plan of the Committee had
removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal
and corruption. It was liable however to this strong objection, that
nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the
Senate, an improper body for the purpose

Mr. BUTLER thought the mode not free from objections, but much
more so than an election by the Legislature, where as in elective
monarchies, cabal faction & violence would be sure to prevail.

Mr. PINKNEY stated as objections to the mode 1. [10] that it threw
the whole appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate. 2. [10]
The Electors will be strangers to the several candidates and of
course unable to decide on their comparative merits. 3. [10] It
makes the Executive reeligible which will endanger the public
liberty. 4. [10] It makes the same body of men which will in fact
elect the President his Judges in case of an impeachment.

Mr. WILLIAMSON had great doubts whether the advantage of
reeligibility would balance the objection to such a dependence of
the President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought at
least the Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on the
list

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said the principal advantage aimed at was that
of taking away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be
made if thought necessary ineligible on this as well as on any other
mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed
on this plan than any other.

Mr. BALDWIN thought the plan not so objectionable when well
considered, as at first view. The increasing intercourse among the
people of the States, would render important characters less &
less unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less & less
likely to have the eventual appointment thrown into their hands.

Mr. WILSON. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will
also divide [11] people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult
of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an
opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan
on the whole a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid of
one great evil, that of cabal & corruption; & Continental
Characters will multiply as we more & more coalesce, so as to
enable the electors in every part of the Union to know & judge of
them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of
reeligibility on its own merits, which the former mode of election
seems to forbid. He thought it might be better however to refer
the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate,
and to confine it to a smaller number than five of the Candidates.
The eventual election by the Legislature wd. not open cabal anew,
as it would be restrained to certain designated objects of choice,
and as these must have had the previous sanction of a number of
the States: and if the election be made as it ought as soon as the
votes of the electors are opened & it is known that no one has a
majority of the whole, there can be little danger of corruption.
Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this
business, was that the House of Reps. will be so often changed as
to be free from the influence & faction to which the permanence
of the Senate may subject that branch.

Mr. RANDOLPH preferred the former mode of constituting the
Executive, but if the change was to be made, he wished to know
why the eventual election was referred to the Senate and not to
the Legislature? He saw no necessity for this and many objections
to it. He was apprehensive also that the advantage of the eventual
appointment would fall into the hands of the States near the Seat
of Government.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said the Senate was preferred because fewer
could then, say to the President, you owe your appointment to us.
He thought the President would not depend so much on the
Senate for his re-appointment as on his general good conduct.

The further consideration of the Report was postponed that each
member might take a copy of the remainder of it.

The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven --
to wit, -- "To prepare & report a plan for defraying the expences
of the Convention"

[12] Mr. PINKNEY moved a clause declaring "that each House should
be judge of the privilege [14] of its own members. Mr. GOVr. MORRIS
2ded. the motion

Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MADISON expressed doubts as to the
propriety of giving such a power, & wished for a postponement.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought it so plain a case that no postponement
could be necessary.

Mr. WILSON thought the power involved, and the express insertion
of it needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other
public bodies, as Courts &c. Every Court is the judge of its own
privileges.

Mr. MADISON distinguished between the power of Judging of
privileges previously & duly established, and the effect of the
motion which would give a discretion to each House as to the
extent of its own privileges. He suggested that it would be better to
make provision for ascertaining by law, the privileges of each
House, than to allow each House to decide for itself. He suggested
also the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be
allowed to the Executive.

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

*2. This is an exact copy. The variations in that in the printed Journal
are occasioned by its incorporation of subsequent amendments. This
remark is applicable to other cases.

3. The figure "9" transposed to precede the sentence beginning "The
latter" ... in the transcript.

4. The figure "2" is changed in the transcript to "The next was."

5. The word "inconveniency" is changed in the transcript to
"inconvenience".

6. The figure "3" is changed in the transcript to "The third was."

7. The figure "4" is changed in the transcript to "In the fourth place."

8. The figure "5" is changed in the transcript to "In the fifth place."

9. The figure "6" is changed in the transcript to "And finally, the
sixth reason was."

10. The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed in the transcript to
"Secondly," etc.

11. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. This motion not inserted [8] in the printed Journal.

13. The words "is not contained" are substituted in the transcript for"
not inserted."

14. The transcript uses the word "privilege" in the plural.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  SEPr 5.  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. BREARLEY from the Committee of Eleven made a farther report as
follows,

    (1) To add to the clause "to declare war" the words "and grant
letters of marque and reprisal"

    (2) To add to the clause "to raise and support armies" the words
"but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term
than two years"

    (3) Instead of sect: 12. art 6. say -- "All bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall be subject
to alterations and amendments by the Senate: no money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations
made by law."

    (4) Immediately before the last clause of sect. 1. art. 7. insert "To
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district
(not exceeding ten miles square) as may by Cession of particular
States and the acceptance of the Legislature become the seat of the
Government of the U. S. and to exercise like authority over all places
purchased for the erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
Dock-Yards, and other needful buildings"

    (5) "To promote the progress of Science and [2] useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors & inventors, the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries"

This report being taken up. -- The (1) clause was agreed to nem: con:

To the (2) clause Mr. GERRY objected that it admitted of appropriations
to an army, for two years instead of one, for which he could not
conceive a reason. that it implied that [3] there was to be a standing
army which he inveighed against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary
even for so great an extent of Country as this, and if necessary, some
restriction on the number & duration ought to be provided: Nor was this
a proper time for such an innovation. The people would not bear it.

Mr. SHERMAN remarked that the appropriations were permitted only, not
required to be for two years. As the Legislature is to be biennially
elected, it would be inconvenient to require appropriations to be for
one year, as there might be no Session within the time necessary to
renew them. He should himself he said like a reasonable restriction on
the number and continuance of an army in time of peace.

The clause (2) was [4] agreed to nem: con:

The (3) clause, Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to postpone. It had been agreed
to in the Committee on the ground of compromise, and he should feel
himself at liberty to dissent to [5] it, if on the whole he should not
be satisfied with certain other parts to be settled. -- 

Mr. PINKNEY 2ded. the motion

Mr. SHERMAN was for giving immediate ease to those who looked on this
clause as of great moment, and for trusting to their concurrence in
other proper measures.

On the question for postponing 

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [6]

So much of the (4) clause as related to the seat of Government was
agreed to nem: con:

On the residue, to wit, "to exercise like authority over all places
purchased for forts &c.

Mr. GERRY contended that this power might be made use of to enslave any
particular State by buying up its territory, and that the strongholds
proposed would be a means of awing the State into an undue obedience to
the Genl. Government.

Mr. KING thought himself the provision unnecessary, the power being
already involved: but would move to insert after the word "purchased"
the words "by the consent of the Legislature of the State" This would
certainly make the power safe.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion, which was agreed to nem: con: as was
then the residue of the clause as amended.

The (5) clause was agreed to nem: con:

The following resolution & order being reported from the Committee of
eleven, to wit,

"Resolved that the U. S. in Congress be requested to allow and cause to
be paid to the Secretary and other officers of this Convention such sums
in proportion to their respective times of service, as are allowed to
the Secretary & similar officers of Congress."

"Ordered that the Secretary make out & transmit to the Treasury office
of the U. S. an account for the said Services, & for the incidental
expenses of this Convention"

The resolution & order were separately agreed to nem: con:

Mr. GERRY gave notice that he should move to reconsider articles XIX.
XX. XXI. XXII.

Mr. WILLIAMSON gave like notice as to the Article fixing the number of
Representatives, which he thought too small. He wished also to allow
Rho: Island more than one, as due to her probable number of people, and
as proper to stifle any pretext arising from her absence on the
occasion.

The Report made yesterday as to the appointment of the Executive being
[7] taken up.

Mr. PINKNEY renewed his opposition to the mode, arguing 1. [8] that the
electors will not have sufficient knowledge of the fittest men, & will
be swayed by an attachment to the eminent men of their respective
States. Hence 2dly. the dispersion of the votes would leave the
appointment with the Senate, and as the President's reappointment will
thus depend on the Senate he will be the mere creature of that body. 3.
[8] He will combine with the Senate agst. the House of Representatives.
4. [8] This change in the mode of election was meant to get rid of the
ineligibility of the President a second time, whereby he will become
fixed for life under the auspices of the Senate

Mr. GERRY did not object to this plan of constituting the Executive in
itself, but should be governed in his final vote by the powers that may
be given to the President.

Mr. RUTLIDGE was much opposed to the plan reported by the Committee. It
would throw the whole power into the Senate. He was also against a
re-eligibility. He moved to postpone the Report under consideration &
take up the original plan of appointment by the Legislature, to wit. "He
shall be elected by joint ballot by the Legislature to which election a
majority of the votes of the members present shall be required: He shall
hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected
a second time."

On this motion to postpone

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [9]

Col. MASON admitted that there were objections to an appointment by the
Legislature as originally planned. He had not yet made up his mind, but
would state his objections to the mode proposed by the Committee. 1.
[10] It puts the appointment in fact into the hands of the Senate, as it
will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any
one candidate: and as the Existing President will always be one of the 5
highest, his reappointment will of course depend on the Senate. 2. [10]
Considering the powers of the President & those of the Senate, if a
coalition should be established between these two branches, they will be
able to subvert the Constitution -- The great objection with him would
be removed by depriving the Senate of the eventual election. He
accordingly moved to strike out the words "if such number be a majority
of that of the electors."

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion. He could not agree to the clause
without some such modification. He preferred making the highest tho' not
having a majority of the votes, President, to a reference of the matter
to the Senate. Referring the appointment to the Senate lays a certain
foundation for corruption & aristocracy.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought the point of less consequence than it was
supposed on both sides. It is probable that a majority of votes will
fall on the same man. As each elector is to give two votes, more than
1/4 will give a majority. Besides as one vote is to be given to a man
out of the State, and as this vote will not be thrown away, 1/2 the
votes will fall on characters eminent & generally known. Again if the
President shall have given satisfaction, the votes will turn on him of
course, and a majority of them will reappoint him, without resort to the
Senate: If he should be disliked, all disliking him, would take care to
unite their votes so as to ensure his being supplanted.

Col. MASON those who think there is no danger of there not being a
majority for the same person in the first instance, ought to give up the
point to those who think otherwise.

Mr. SHERMAN reminded the opponents of the new mode proposed that if the
small states had the advantage in the Senate's deciding among the five
highest candidates, the large States would have in fact the nomination
of these candidates

On the motion of Col: Mason

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. *11 Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [12]

Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "Senate" and insert the word
"Legislature"

Mr. MADISON considered it as [13] a primary object to render an eventual
resort to any part of the Legislature improbable. He was apprehensive
that the proposed alteration would turn the attention of the large
States too much to the appointment of candidates, instead of aiming at
an effectual appointment of the officer, as the large States would
predominate in the Legislature which would have the final choice out of
the Candidates. Whereas if the Senate in which the small States
predominate should have this [14] final choice, the concerted effort of
the large States would be to make the appointment in the first instance
conclusive.

Mr. RANDOLPH. We have in some revolutions of this plan made a bold
stroke for Monarchy. We are now doing the same for an aristocracy. He
dwelt on the tendency of such an influence in the Senate over the
election of the President in addition to its other powers, to convert
that body into a real & dangerous Aristocracy.

Mr. DICKINSON was in favor of giving the eventual election to the
Legislature, instead of the Senate. It was too much influence to be
superadded to that body.

On the question moved by Mr. Wilson

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [15]

Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to strike out the word "majority" and
insert "one third" so that the eventual power might not be exercised if
less than a majority, but not less than 1/3 of the Electors should vote
for the same person.

Mr. GERRY objected that this would put it in the power of three or four
States to put in whom they pleased.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. There are seven States which do not contain one third of
the people. If the Senate are to appoint, less than one sixth of the
people will have the power.

On the question 

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [16] 

Mr. GERRY suggested that the eventual election should be made by six
Senators and seven Representatives chosen by joint ballot of both
Houses.

Mr. KING observed that the influence of the Small States in the Senate
was somewhat balanced by the influence of the large States in bringing
forward the candidates; [*17] and also by the Concurrence of the small
States in the Committee in the clause vesting the exclusive origination
of Money bills in the House of Representatives.

Col: MASON moved to strike out the word "five" and insert the word
"three" as the highest candidates for the Senate to choose out of.

Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion

Mr. SHERMAN would sooner give up the plan. He would prefer seven or
thirteen.

On the question moved by Col: Mason & Mr. Gerry

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [19]

Mr. SPAIGHT and Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out "five" and insert
"thirteen" -- to which all the States disagreed -- except N. C. & S. C.

Mr. MADISON & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert after "Electors" the words
"who shall have balloted" so that the non voting electors not being
counted might not increase the number necessary as a majority of the
whole, to decide the choice without the agency of the Senate.

On this question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [20]

Mr. DICKINSON moved, in order to remove ambiguity from the intention of
the clause as explained by the vote, to add, after the words "if such
number be a majority of the whole number of the electors" the word
"appointed"

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Delaware Md. ay. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [21]

Col: MASON. As the mode of appointment is now regulated, he could not
forbear expressing his opinion that it is utterly inadmissible. He would
prefer the Government of Prussia to one which will put all power into
the hands of seven or eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than
absolute monarchy. The words "and of their giving their votes" being
inserted on motion for that purpose, after the words "The Legislature
may determine the time of chusing and assembling the electors."

The House adjourned

___________

1. They year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.

4. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. The word "to" is crossed out in the transcript and "from" is written
above it.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Massachusetts, Virginia, no -- 2."

7. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. The figures "1," "3" and "4" are changed to "first," "Thirdly" and
"Fourthly" in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, South Carolina,
aye -- 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 8; New Hampshire, divided."

10. The figures "1" and "2" are changed in the transcript to "First" and
"Secondly."

*11. In printed Journal Maryland -- no.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, [*11] North Carolina,
aye; the other nine States, no."

13. The word "as" is stricken out in the transcript.

14. The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "this."

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Virginia, South
Carolina, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7; New Hampshire, divided."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, North Carolina, aye;
the other nine States, no."

*17. This explains the compromise mentioned above [18] by Mr. Govr.
Morris. Col. Mason Mr. Gerry & other members from large States set great
value on this privilege of originating money bills. Of this the members
from the small States, with some from the large States who wished a high
mounted Govt endeavored to avail themselves, by making that privilege,
the price of arrangements in the constitution favorable to the small
States, and to the elevation of the Government.

18. The words "alluded to" are substituted in the transcript for
"mentioned above."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, North Carolina, aye;
nine States, no."

20. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 2."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY  SEPr 6.  1787. [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. KING and Mr. GERRY moved to insert in the (5) [2] clause of the
Report (see Sepr. 4 [3] ) after the words "may be entitled in the
Legislature" the words following -- "But no person shall be appointed an
elector who is a member of the Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any
office of profit or trust under the U. S." which passed nem: con:

Mr. GERRY proposed, as the President was to be elected by the Senate out
of the five highest candidates, that if he should not at the end of his
term be re-elected by a majority of the Electors, and no other candidate
should have a majority, the eventual election should be made by the
Legislature. This he said would relieve the President from his
particular dependence on the Senate for his continuance in office.

Mr. KING liked the idea, as calculated to satisfy particular members &
promote unanimity, & as likely to operate but seldom.

Mr. READ opposed it, remarking that if individual members were to be
indulged, alterations would be necessary to satisfy most of them.

Mr. WILLIAMSON espoused it as a reasonable precaution against the undue
influence of the Senate.

Mr. SHERMAN liked the arrangement as it stood, though he should not be
averse to some amendments. He thought he said that if the Legislature
were to have the eventual appointment instead of the Senate, it ought to
vote in the case by States, in favor of the small States, as the large
States would have so great an advantage in nominating the candidates.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought favorably of Mr. Gerry's proposition. It would
free the President from being tempted in naming to Offices, to Conform
to the will of the Senate, & thereby virtually give the appointments to
office, to the Senate.

Mr. WILSON said that he had weighed carefully the report of the
Committee for remodelling the constitution of the Executive; and on
combining it with other parts of the plan, he was obliged to consider
the whole as having a dangerous tendency to aristocracy; as throwing a
dangerous power into the hands of the Senate. They will have in fact,
the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them,
the virtual appointment to offices; among others the offices of the
Judiciary Department. They are to make Treaties; and they are to try all
impeachments. In allowing them thus to make the Executive & Judiciary
appointments, to be the Court of impeachments, and to make Treaties
which are to be laws of the land, the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary
powers are all blended in one branch of the Government. The power of
making Treaties involves the case of subsidies, and here as an
additional evil, foreign influence is to be dreaded. According to the
plan as it now stands, the President will not be the man of the people
as he ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate. He cannot even appoint
a tide-waiter without the Senate. He had always thought the Senate too
numerous a body for making appointments to office. The Senate, will
moreover in all probability be in constant Session. They will have high
salaries. And with all those powers, and the President in their
interest, they will depress the other branch of the Legislature, and
aggrandize themselves in proportion. Add to all this, that the Senate
sitting in conclave, can by holding up to their respective States
various and improbable candidates, contrive so to scatter their votes,
as to bring the appointment of the President ultimately before
themselves. Upon the whole, he thought the new mode of appointing the
President, with some amendments, a valuable improvement; but he could
never agree to purchase it at the price of the ensuing parts of the
Report, nor befriend a system of which they make a part.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS expressed his wonder at the observations of Mr. Wilson
so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report to the new
modification of it before the House, and entered into a comparative view
of the two, with an eye to the nature of Mr. Wilsons objections to the
last. By the first the Senate he observed had a voice in appointing the
President out of all the Citizens of the U. S: by this they were limited
to five candidates previously nominated to them, with a probability of
being barred altogether by the successful ballot of the Electors. Here
surely was no increase of power. They are now to appoint Judges
nominated to them by the President. Before they had the appointment
without any agency whatever of the President. Here again surely no
additional power. If they are to make Treaties as the plan now stands,
the power was the same in the printed plan. If they are to try
impeachments, the Judges must have been triable by them before. Wherein
then lay the dangerous tendency of the innovations to establish an
aristocracy in the Senate? As to the appointment of officers, the weight
of sentiment in the House, was opposed to the exercise of it by the
President alone; though it was not the case with himself. If the Senate
would act as was suspected, in misleading the States into a fallacious
disposition of their votes for a President, they would, if the
appointment were withdrawn wholly from them, make such representations
in their several States where they have influence, as would favor the
object of their partiality.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. replying to Mr. Morris: observed that the aristocratic
complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of appointing the
President which makes him dependent on the Senate.

Mr. CLYMER said that the aristocratic part to which he could never
accede was that in the printed plan, which gave the Senate the power of
appointing to offices.

Mr. HAMILTON said that he had been restrained from entering into the
discussions by his dislike of the Scheme of Govt. in General; but as he
meant to support the plan to be recommended, as better than nothing, he
wished in this place to offer a few remarks. He liked the new
modification, on the whole, better than that in the printed Report. In
this the President was a Monster elected for seven years, and ineligible
afterwards; having great powers, in appointments to office, &
continually tempted by this constitutional disqualification to abuse
them in order to subvert the Government. Although he should be made
re-eligible, still if appointed by the Legislature, he would be tempted
to make use of corrupt influence to be continued in office. It seemed
peculiarly desireable therefore that some other mode of election should
be devised. Considering the different views of different States, & the
different districts Northern Middle & Southern, he concurred with those
who thought that the votes would not be concentered, and that the
appointment would consequently in the present mode devolve on the
Senate. The nomination to offices will give great weight to the
President. Here then is a mutual connection & influence, that will
perpetuate the President, and aggrandize both him & the Senate. What is
to be the remedy? He saw none better than to let the highest number of
ballots, whether a majority or not, appoint the President. What was the
objection to this? Merely that too small a number might appoint. But as
the plan stands, the Senate may take the candidate having the smallest
number of votes, and make him President.

Mr. SPAIGHT & Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to insert "seven" instead of "four"
years for the term of the President -- [4]

On this motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [5]

Mr. SPAIGHT & Mr. WILLIAMSON, then moved to insert "six" instead of
"four."

On which motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no [6]

On the term "four" all the States were ay, except N. Carolina, no.

On the question [7] (Clause 4. in the Report) for Appointing [8]
President by electors -- down to the words, -- "entitled in the
Legislature" inclusive.

N. H. ay. Mas: ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [9]

It was moved that the Electors meet at the seat of the Genl. Govt.
which passed in the Negative. N. C. only being ay.

It was [10] moved to insert the words "under the seal of the State"
after the word "transmit" in [8] 4th clause of the Report which was
disagreed to; as was another motion to insert the words "and who shall
have given their votes" after the word "appointed" in the 4th. Clause of
the Report as added yesterday on motion of Mr. Dickinson.

On several motions, the words "in presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives" were inserted after the word "counted" and the word
"immediately" before the word "choose"; and the words "of the Electors"
after the word "votes."

Mr. SPAIGHT said if the election by Electors is to be crammed down, he
would prefer their meeting altogether and deciding finally without any
reference to the Senate and moved "That the Electors meet at the seat of
the General Government."

Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion, on which all the States were in the
negative except N: Carolina.

On motion the words "But the election shall be on the same day
throughout the U. S." were added after the words "transmitting their
votes"

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo -- ay. [11]

On a question on the sentence in clause (4). "if such number be a
majority of that of the Electors appointed."

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

On a question on the clause referring the eventual appointment of the
President to the Senate

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no.
[13] Here the call ceased.

Mr. MADISON made a motion requiring 2/3 at least of the Senate to be
present at the choice of a President. Mr. PINKNEY 2ded. the motion

Mr. GORHAM thought it a wrong principle to require more than a majority
in any case. In the present case [14] it might prevent for a long time
any choice of a President.

On the question moved by Mr. M. & Mr. P.

N. H. ay: Mas. abst. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del.no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [15]

Mr. WILLIAMSON suggested as better than an eventual choice by the
Senate, that this choice should be made by the Legislature, voting by
States and not per capita.

Mr. SHERMAN suggested the House of Reps as preferable to the
Legislature, and moved, accordingly,

To strike out the words "The Senate shall immediately choose &c." and
insert "The House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot
one of them for President, the members from each State having one vote."

Col: MASON liked the latter mode best as lessening the aristocratic
influence of the Senate.

On the Motion of Mr. Sherman

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [16]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS suggested the idea of providing that in all cases, the
President in office, should not be one of the five Candidates; but be
only re-eligible in case a majority of the electors should vote for him.
[This was another expedient for rendering the President independent of
the Legislative body for his continuance in office.]

Mr. MADISON remarked that as a majority of members wd. make a quorum in
the H. of Reps. it would follow from the amendment of Mr. Sherman giving
the election to a majority of States, that the President might be
elected by two States only, Virga. & Pena. which have 18 members, if
these States alone should be present

On a motion that the eventual election of Presidt. in case of an
equality [17] of the votes of the electors be referred to the House of
Reps.

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [18]

Mr. KING moved to add to the amendment of Mr. Sherman "But a quorum for
this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the
States," and also of a majority of the whole number of the House of
Representatives."

Col: MASON liked it as obviating the remark of Mr. Madison -- The motion
as far as "States" inclusive was agd. to. On the residue to wit, "and
also of a majority of the whole number of the House of Reps. it passed
in the Negative.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [19]

The Report relating to the appointment of the Executive stands as
amended, as follows,

"He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together
with the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the
following manner.

Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a
number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the
Legislature:

But no person shall be appointed an Elector who is a member of the
Legislature of the U. S. or who holds any office of profit or trust
under the U. S.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot
for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the
same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the
persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they
shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the General
Government, directed to the President of the Senate.

The President of the Senate shall in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives open all the certificates & the votes shall
then be counted.

The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President
(if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed)
and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal
number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
choose by ballot one of them for President, the Representation from each
State having one vote. But if no person have a majority, then from the
five highest on the list, the House of Representatives shall in like
manner choose by ballot the President. In the choice of a President by
the House of Representatives, a Quorum shall consist of a member or
members from two thirds of the States [ [*20] and the concurrence of a
majority of all the States shall be necessary to such choice.] -- And in
every case after the choice of the President, the person having the
greatest number of votes of the Electors shall be the vicepresident:
But, if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate
shall choose from them the vice-President.

The Legislature may determine the time of choosing the Electors, and of
their giving their votes; and the manner of certifying and transmitting
their votes -- But the election shall be on the same day throughout the
U. States."

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The word "fourth" is substituted in the transcript for "(5)," the
latter being an error.

3. In the transcript the date reads: "the fourth of September."

*4. Transfer hither what is brackets. [23]
[An ineligibility wd have followed (tho' it would seem from the vote not
in the opinion of all) this prolongation of the term.]

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Virginia, North
Carolina, aye -- 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, South Carolina,
aye -- 2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 9."

7. The words "on the" are here inserted in the transcript.

8. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
Georgia, aye -- 9; North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 2."

10. The word "then" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 8; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, no -- 3."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 3."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye -- 7;
North Carolina, no."

14. The word "case" is omitted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -- 4; Massachusetts,
absent."

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10. Delaware, no -- 1."

17. The transcript does not italicize the words "an equality."

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye --
7; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 3."

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

*20. NOTE. This clause was not inserted on this day, but on the 7th. 21
Sepr. See Friday the 7th. [22]

21. The word "of" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. The word "inst." is here inserted in the transcript.

23. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  SEPr 7.  1787. [1]  IN CONVENTION

The mode of constituting the Executive being resumed, Mr. RANDOLPH
moved, to insert in the first Section of the report made yesterday [2]

"The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the U. S. shall act
as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the
President and Vice-President; and such officer shall act accordingly
until the time of electing a President shall arrive."

Mr. MADISON observed that this, as worded, would prevent a supply of the
vacancy by an intermediate election of the President, and moved to
substitute -- "until such disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected. [*3]

Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS 2ded. the motion, which was agreed to. It seemed to
be an objection to the provision with some, that according to the
process established for chusing the Executive there would be difficulty
in effecting it at other than the fixed periods; with others, that the
Legislature was restrained in the temporary appointment to "officers" of
the U. S: They wished it to be at liberty to appoint others than such.

On the Motion of Mr. Randolph as amended, it passed in the affirmative

N. H. divided. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [4]

Mr. GERRY moved "that in the election of President by the House of
Representatives, no State shall vote by less than three members, and
where that number may not be allotted to a State, it shall be made up by
its Senators; and a concurrence of a majority of all the States shall be
necessary to make such choice." Without some such provision five
individuals might possibly be competent to an election; these being a
majority of two thirds of the existing number of States; and two thirds
being a quorum for this business.

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion

Mr. READ observed that the States having but one member only in the
House of Reps. would be in danger of having no vote at all in the
election: the sickness or absence either of the Representative or one of
the Senators would have that effect.

Mr. MADISON replied that, if one member of the House of Representatives
should be left capable of voting for the State, the states having one
Representative only would still be subject to that danger. He thought it
an evil that so small a number at any rate should be authorized, to
elect. Corruption would be greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself
was liable to this further weighty objection that the representatives of
a Minority of the people, might reverse the choice of a majority of the
States and of the people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency [5]
might yet be provided.

Mr. GERRY withdrew the first part of his motion; and on the, -- Question
on the 2d. part viz. "and a concurrence of a majority of all the States
shall be necessary to make such choice" to follow the words "a member or
members from two thirds of the States" -- 

It was agreed to nem: con:

The section 2 (see Sepr. 4) requiring that the President should be a
natural-born Citizen, &c & have been resident for fourteen years, & be
thirty five years of age, was agreed to nem: con:

[6] Section 3. (see Sepr. 4). "The vice President shall be ex-officio
President of the Senate"

Mr. GERRY opposed this regulation. We might as well put the President
himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must
subsist between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely
improper. He was agst. having any vice President.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The vice president then will be the first heir
apparent that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice
president, the President of the Senate would be temporary successor,
which would amount to the same thing.

Mr. SHERMAN saw no danger in the case. If the vice-President were not to
be President of the Senate, he would be without employment, and some
member by being made President must be deprived of his vote, unless when
an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be
but seldom.

Mr. RANDOLPH concurred in the opposition to the clause.

Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed that such an officer as vice-President was
not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode
of election which required two to be chosen at the same time.

Col: MASON, thought the office of vice-President an encroachment on the
rights of the Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative &
Executive, which as well as the Judiciarydepartments, [7] ought to be
kept as separate as possible. He took occasion to express his dislike of
any reference whatever of the power to make appointments to either
branch of the Legislature. On the other hand he was averse to vest so
dangerous a power in the President alone. As a method for avoiding both,
he suggested that a privy Council of six members to the president should
be established; to be chosen for six years by the Senate, two out of the
Eastern two out of the middle, and two out of the Southern quarters of
the Union, & to go out in rotation two every second year; the
concurrence of the Senate to be required only in the appointment of
Ambassadors, and in making treaties, which are more of a legislative
nature. This would prevent the constant sitting of the Senate which he
thought dangerous, as well as keep the departments separate & distinct.
It would also save the expence of constant sessions of the Senate. He
had he said always considered the Senate as too unwieldy & expensive for
appointing officers, especially the smallest, such as tide waiters &c.
He had not reduced his idea to writing, but it could be easily done if
it should be found acceptable.

On the question shall the vice President be ex officio President of the
Senate?

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del ay. Mas no. Va. ay. N.
C. abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [8]

The other parts of the same Section (3) [9] were then agreed to.

The Section 4. -- to wit, "The President by & with the advice and
consent of the Senate shall have power to make Treaties &c" [10]

Mr. WILSON moved to add, after the word "Senate" the words, "and House
of Representatives." As treaties he said are to have the operation of
laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also. The circumstance of
secrecy in the business of treaties formed the only objection; but this
he thought, so far as it was inconsistent with obtaining the Legislative
sanction, was outweighed by the necessity of the latter.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the only question that could be made was whether the
power could be safely trusted to the Senate. He thought it could; and
that the necessity of secresy in the case of treaties forbade a
reference of them to the whole Legislature.

Mr. FITZIMMONS 2ded. the motion of Mr. Wilson, & on the question N. H.
no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C.
no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [11]

The first sentence as to making treaties was then Agreed to: nem: con:

[12] "He shall nominate &c Appoint Ambassadors &c."

Mr. WILSON objected to the mode of appointing, as blending a branch of
the Legislature with the Executive. Good laws are of no effect without a
good Executive; and there can be no good Executive without a responsible
appointment of officers to execute. Responsibility is in a manner
destroyed by such an agency of the Senate. He would prefer the council
proposed by Col: Mason, provided its advice should not be made
obligatory on the President.

Mr. PINKNEY was against joining the Senate in these appointments, except
in the instance of Ambassadors whom [13] he thought ought not to be
appointed by the President.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said that as the President was to nominate, there would
be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be
security. As Congress now make appointments there is no responsibility.

Mr. GERRY. The idea of responsibility in the nomination to offices is
chimerical. The President can not know all characters, and can therefore
always plead ignorance.

Mr. KING. As the idea of a Council proposed by Col. Mason has been
supported by Mr. Wilson, he would remark that most of the
inconveniencies charged on the Senate are incident to a Council of
Advice. He differed from those who thought the Senate would sit
constantly. He did not suppose it was meant that all the minute officers
were to be appointed by the Senate, or any other original source, but by
the higher officers of the departments to which they belong. He was of
opinion also that the people wold be alarmed at an unnecessary creation
of new Corps which must increase the expence as well as influence of the
Government.

On the question on these words in the clause viz -- "He shall nominate &
by & with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
ambassadors, and other public ministers (and Consuls) [14] Judges of the
Supreme Court." [15] Agreed to nem: con: the insertion of "and consuls"
having first taken place.

On the question on the following words "And all other officers of [16]
U.S."

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [17]

On motion of Mr. SPAIGHT -- "that the President shall have power to fill
up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of the next Session
of the Senate" It was agreed to nem: con:

[16] Section 4. "The President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate shall have power to make Treaties" -- "But no treaty shall be
made without the consent of two thirds of the members present" -- this
last [18] being before the House.

Mr. WILSON thought it objectionable to require the concurrence of 2/3
which puts it in [19] the power of a minority to controul the will of a
majority.

Mr. KING concurred in the objection; remarking that as the Executive was
here joined in the business, there was a check which did not exist in
Congress where The concurrence of 2/3 was required.

Mr. MADISON moved to insert after the word "treaty" the words "except
treaties of peace" allowing these to be made with less difficulty than
other treaties -- It was agreed to nem: con:

Mr. MADISON then moved to authorise a concurrence of two thirds of the
Senate to make treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the
President." -- The President he said would necessarily derive so much
power and importance from a state of war that he might be tempted, if
authorised, to impede a treaty of peace.

Mr. BUTLER 2ded. the motion

Mr. GORHAM thought the precaution [20] unnecessary as the means of
carrying on the war would not be in the hands of the President, but of
the Legislature.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought the power of the President in this case
harmless; and that no peace ought to be made without the concurrence of
the President, who was the general Guardian of the National interests.

Mr. BUTLER was strenuous for the motion, as a necessary security against
ambitious & corrupt Presidents. He mentioned the late perfidious policy
of the Statholder in Holland; and the artifices of the Duke of Marlbro'
to prolong the war of which he had the management.

Mr. GERRY was of opinion that in treaties of peace a greater rather than
less proportion of votes was necessary, than in other treaties. In
Treaties of peace the dearest interests will be at stake, as the
fisheries, territory &c. In treaties of peace also there is more dander
to the extremities of the Continent, of being sacrificed, than on any
other occasions.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought that Treaties of peace should be guarded at least
by requiring the same concurrence as in other Treaties.

On the motion of Mr. Madison & Mr. Butler

N.H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N.J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [21]

On the part of the clause concerning treaties amended by the exception
as to Treaties of peace,

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N.C. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. no. [22]

[23] "and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in
each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the
duties of their respective offices," being before the House

Col: MASON [*24] said that in rejecting a Council to the President we
were about to try an experiment on which the most despotic Governments
had never ventured. The Grand Signor himself had his Divan. He moved to
postpone the consideration of the clause in order to take up the
following 

"That it be an instruction to the Committee of the States to prepare a
clause or clauses for establishing an Executive Council, as a Council of
State, for the President of the U. States, to consist of six members,
two of which from the Eastern, two from the middle, and two from the
Southern States, with a Rotation and duration of office similar to those
of the Senate; such Council to be appointed by the Legislature or by the
Senate."

Doctor FRANKLIN 2ded. the motion. We seemed he said too much to fear
cabals in appointments by a number, and to have too much confidence in
those of single persons. Experience shewed that caprice, the intrigues
of favorites & mistresses, &c [25] were nevertheless the means most
prevalent in monarchies. Among instances of abuse in such modes of
appointment, he mentioned the many bad Governors appointed in G. B. for
the Colonies. He thought a Council would not only be a check on a bad
President but be a relief to a good one.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The question of a Council was considered in the
Committee, where it was judged that the Presidt. by persuading his
Council, to concur in his wrong measures, would acquire their protection
for them.

Mr. WILSON approved of a Council in preference to making the Senate a
party to appointmts.

Mr. DICKENSON was for a Council. It wd. be a singular thing if the
measures of the Executive were not to undergo some previous discussion
before the President.

Mr. MADISON was in favor of the instruction to the Committee proposed by
Col: Mason.

The motion of Mr. [26] Mason was negatived. Maryd. ay. S.C. ay. Geo. ay
-- N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no Pa. no. Del. no. Va. no. N C no.
[27]

On the question, [28] "authorising the President to call for the
opinions of the Heads of Departments, in writing": it passed in the
affirmative, N. H. only being no. [*29]

The clause was then unanimously agreed to -- 

Mr. WILLIAMSON & Mr. SPAIGHT moved "that no Treaty of Peace affecting
Territorial rights shd.; be made without the concurrence of two thirds
of the members of the Senate present.

Mr. KING. It will be necessary to look out for securities for some other
rights, if this principle be established; he moved to extend the motion
-- "to all present rights of the U. States."

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The words "the following" are here inserted in the transcript.

*3. In the printed Journal this amendment is put into the original
Motion.

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6; Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina, no -- 4; New Hampshire, divided."

5. The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the
transcript.

6. This paragraph is changed in the transcript to read as follows: "The
third section, 'The Vice-President shall be ex-officio President of the
Senate' being then considered."

7. The letter "s" is stricken from the word "departments" in the
transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; New Jersey, Maryland, no -- 2; North Carolina, absent."

9. The figure "3" is omitted in the transcript.

10. The phrase "was then taken up" is here added in the transcript.

11. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

12. The words "On the clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

13. The word "who" is substituted in the transcript for "whom."

14. The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The words "it was" are here inserted in the transcript.

16. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 9; Pennsylvania, South Carolina, no -- 2."

18. The words "being considered, and the last clause" are substituted in
the transcript for "this last."

19. The word "into" is substituted in the transcript for "in."

20. In the transcript the word "precaution" is stricken out and the word
"security" is written above it.

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8."

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, aye -- 8; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no -- 3."

23. The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

*24. In the printed Journal, Mr. Madison is erroneously substituted for
Col: Mason.

25. The character "&C" is omitted in the transcript.

26. The word "Col." is substituted in the transcript for "Mr."

27. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8".

28. The word "for" is here inserted in the transcript.

*29. Not so stated in the Printed Journal; but conformable to the result
-- afterwards appearing.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SATURDAY  SEPTEMBER 8th.   IN CONVENTION

The last Report of [1] Committee of Eleven (see Sepr. 4) was resumed.

Mr. KING moved to strike out the "exception of Treaties of peace" from
the general clause requiring two thirds of the Senate for making
Treaties

Mr. WILSON wished the requisition of two thirds to be struck out
altogether If the majority cannot be trusted, it was a proof, as
observed by Mr. Ghorum, that we were not fit for one Society.

A reconsideration of the whole clause was agreed to.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS was agst. striking out the "exception of Treaties of
peace" If two thirds of the Senate should be required for peace, the
Legislature will be unwilling, to make war for that reason, on account
of the Fisheries or the Mississippi, the two great objects of the Union.
Besides, if a majority of the Senate be for peace, and are not allowed
to make it, they will be apt to effect their purpose in the more
disagreeable mode, of negativing the supplies for the war.

Mr. WILLIAMSON remarked that Treaties are to be made in the branch of
the Govt. where there may be a majority of the States without a majority
of the people. Eight men may be a majority of a quorum, & should not
have the power to decide the conditions of peace. There would be no
danger, that the exposed States, as S. Carolina or Georgia, would urge
an improper war for the Western Territory.

Mr. WILSON If two thirds are necessary to make peace, the minority may
perpetuate war, against the sense of the majority.

Mr. GERRY enlarged on the danger of putting the essential rights of the
Union in the hands of so small a number as a majority of the Senate,
representing, perhaps, not one fifth of the people. The Senate will be
corrupted by foreign influence.

Mr. SHERMAN was agst. leaving the rights established by the Treaty of
peace, to the Senate, & moved to annex a "proviso that no such rights
shd. be ceded without the sanction of the Legislature.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS seconded the ideas of Mr. Sherman.

Mr. MADISON observed that it had been too easy in the present Congress
to make Treaties altho' nine States were required for the purpose.

On the question for striking [2] "except Treaties of peace"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [3]

Mr. WILSON & Mr. DAYTON move to strike out the clause requiring two
thirds of the Senate for making Treaties -- on which,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. no Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [4]

Mr. RUTLIDGE & Mr. GERRY move that "no Treaty [5] be made without the
consent of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate" -- according to the
example in the present Congs.

Mr. GHORUM. There is a difference in the case, as the President's
consent will also be necessary in the new Govt.

On the question

N. H. no. Mass. no. (Mr. Gerry ay) Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [6]

Mr. SHARMAN movd. that no Treaty [7] be made without a Majority of the
whole number of the Senate. Mr. GERRY seconded him.

Mr. WILLIAMSON. This will be less security than 2/3 as now required .
Mr. SHERMAN. It will be less embarrassing.

On the question, it passed in the negative.

N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [8]

Mr. MADISON movd. that a Quorum of the Senate consist of 2/3 of all the
members.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS -- This will put it in the power of one man to break up
a Quorum.

Mr. MADISON, This may happen to any Quorum.

On the Question it passed in the negative

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [9]

Mr. WILLIAMSON & Mr. GERRY, movd. "that no Treaty shd. be made witht.
previous notice to the members, & a reasonable time for their
attending."

On the Question

All the States no, except N. C. S. C. & Geo. ay.

On the question on [10] clause of the Report of the Come. of Eleven
relating to Treaties by 2/3 of the Senate. All the States were ay --
except Pa. N. J. & Geo. no.

Mr. GERRY movd. that no officer [7] be appd. but to offices created by
the Constitution or by law" -- This was rejected as unnecessary by six
no's & five ays; [11]

The Ayes. Mas. Ct. N. J. N. C. Geo. -- Noes. N. H. Pa.: Del. Md. Va. S.
C. [12]

The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments agst. the
President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up. Col. MASON. Why is the
provision restrained to Treason & bribery only? Treason as defined in
the Constitution will not reach many great and dangerous offences.
Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution
may not be Treason as above defined. As bills of attainder which have
saved the British Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary
to extend: the power of impeachments. He movd. to add after "bribery"
"or maladministration."

Mr. GERRY seconded him.

Mr. MADISON So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
pleasure of the Senate.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS, it will not be put in force & can do no harm. An
election of every four years will prevent maladministration.

Col. MASON withdrew "maladministration" & substitutes "other high crimes
& misdemesnors agst. the State"

On the question thus altered

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. [*13] Geo. ay. [14]

Mr. MADISON, objected to a trial of the President by the Senate,
especially as he was to be impeached by the other branch of the
Legislature, and for any act which might be called a misdemesnor. The
President under these circumstances was made improperly dependent. He
would prefer the Supreme Court for the trial of impeachments, or rather
a tribunal of which that should form a part.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS thought no other tribunal than the Senate could be
trusted. The supreme Court were too few in number and might be warped or
corrupted. He was agst. a dependence of the Executive on the
Legislature, considering the Legislative tyranny the great danger to be
apprehended; but there could be no danger that the Senate would say
untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty of crimes or facts,
especially as in four years he can be turned out.

Mr. PINKNEY disapproved of making the Senate the Court of Impeachments,
as rendering the President too dependent on the Legislature. If he
opposes a favorite law, the two Houses will combine agst. him, and under
the influence of heat and faction throw him out of office.

Mr. WILLIAMSON thought there was more danger of too much lenity than
[15] too much rigour towards the President, considering the number of
cases in which the Senate was associated with the President.

Mr. SHERMAN regarded the Supreme Court as improper to try the President,
because the Judges would be appointed by him.

On motion by Mr. MADISON to strike out the words -- "by the Senate"
after the word "conviction" 

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [16]

In the amendment of Col: Mason just agreed to, the word "State" after
the words "misdemeanors against" was struck out, and the words "United
States" inserted unanimously, [17] in order to remove ambiguity.

On the question to agree to [18] clause as amended,

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont ay N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del ay Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

On motion [20] "The vice-President and other Civil officers of the U. S.
shall be removed from office on impeachment and conviction as aforesaid"
was added to the clause on the subject of impeachments.

The clause of the report made on the 5th. [15] Sepr. & postponed was
taken up, to wit -- "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives; and shall be subject to alterations and
amendments by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in consequence of appropriations made by law."

It was moved to strike out the words "and shall be subject to
alterations and amendments by the Senate" and insert the words used in
the Constitution of Massachussetts on the same subject -- [21] "but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other bills" -- which
was agreed too nem: con:

On the question On the first part of the clause -- "All bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the house of Representatives' [*22]

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [24]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to add to clause (3) [25] of the report made on
Sepr. 4. [26] the words "and every member shall be on oath" which being
agreed to, and a question taken on the clause so amended viz -- "The
Senate of the U. S. shall have power to try all impeachments; but no
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the
members present; and every member shall be on oath"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [27]

Mr. GERRY repeated his motion above made on this day, in the form
following "The Legislature shall have the sole right of establishing
offices not herein [28] provided for," which was again negatived: Mas.
Cont. & Geo. only being ay.

Mr. Mc.HENRY observed that the President had not yet been any where
authorised to convene the Senate, and moved to amend Art. X. sect. 2. by
striking out the words "he may convene them [the Legislature] on
extraordinary occasions" & insert "He may convene both or either of the
Houses on extraordinary occasions." This he added would also provide for
the case of the Senate being in Session at the time of convening the
Legislature.

Mr. WILSON said he should vote agst. the motion, because it implied that
the senate might be in Session, when the Legislature was not, which he
thought improper.

On the question

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [29]

A Committee was then appointed by Ballot to revise the stile of and
arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House. The
committee consisted of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Govr. Morris, Mr.
Madison and Mr. King.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved that previous to this work of the Committee the
clause relating to the number of the House of Representatives shd. be
reconsidered for the purpose of increasing the number.

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the Motion.

Mr. SHERMAN opposed it. he thought the provision on that subject
amply sufficient.

Col: HAMILTON expressed himself with great earnestness and anxiety in
favor of the motion. He avowed himself a friend to a vigorous
Government, but would declare at the same time, that [30] he held it
essential that the popular branch of it should be on a broad foundation.
He was seriously of opinion that the House of Representatives was on so
narrow a scale as to be really dangerous, and to warrant a jealousy in
the people for their liberties. He remarked that the connection between
the President & Senate would tend to perpetuate him, by corrupt
influence. It was the more necessary on this account that a numerous
representation in the other branch of the Legislature should be
established.

On the motion of Mr. Williamson to reconsider, it was negatived

[*31] N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [32]

Adjd.

___________

1. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

2. The word "out" is here inserted in the transcript.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 8; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no -- 3."

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, aye -- 1; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9; Connecticut, divided."

5. The word "shall" is here inserted in the transcript.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts (Mr. Gerry, aye),
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no
-- 8."

7. The word "shall" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 6."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no --
6."

10. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The words "by six no's & five ayes" are stricken out in the
transcript.

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 6."

*13. In the printed Journal, S. Carolina -- no.

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, [*13]
Georgia, aye -- 8; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -- 3."

15. The word "of" is here inserted in the transcript.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Virginia, aye -- 2;
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 9."

17. The words "inserted unanimously" are transposed in the transcript to
read "unanimously inserted."

18. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; Pennsylvania, no -- 1."

20. The words "the following" are here inserted in the transcript.

21. The word "viz" is here inserted in the transcript.

*22. This was a conciliatory vote, the effect of the compromise formerly
alluded to. See Note Wednesday Sepr. 5. [23]

23. The words "Wednesday, Sepr. 5," are stricken out in the transcript
and "page -- " is inserted in their place.

24. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Delaware, Maryland, no -- 2."

25. The words "the third clause" are substituted in the transcript for
"clause (3)."

26. The words "the fourth of September" are substituted in the
transcript for "Sepr. 4."

27. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no -- 2."

28. The word "heretofore" is substituted in the transcript for "herein."

29. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 4."

30. The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.

*31. This motion & vote are entered on the Printed journal of the
ensuing morning.

32. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

MONDAY  SEPr 10.  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. GERRY moved to reconsider Art XIX. viz. "On the application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment
of this Constitution, the Legislature of the U. S. shall call a
Convention for that purpose." [see Aug. 6.] [2] This Constitution he
said is to be paramount to the State Constitutions. It follows, hence,
from this article that two thirds of the States may obtain a Convention,
a majority of which can bind the Union to innovations that may subvert
the State-Constitutions altogether. He asked whether this was a
situation proper to be run into.

Mr. HAMILTON 2ded. the motion, but he said with a different view from
Mr. Gerry. He did not object to the consequence stated by Mr. Gerry.
There was no greater evil in subjecting the people of the U. S. to the
major voice than the people of a particular State. It had been wished by
many and was much to have been desired that an easier mode for [3]
introducing amendments had been provided by the articles of [4]
Confederation. It was equally desireable now that an easy mode should be
established for supplying defects which will probably appear in the New
System. The mode proposed was not adequate. The State Legislatures will
not apply for alterations but with a view to increase their own powers.
The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most
sensible to the necessity of amendments, and ought also to be empowered,
whenever two thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention.
There could be no danger in giving this power, as the people would
finally decide in the case.

Mr. MADISON remarked on the vagueness of the terms, "call a Convention
for the purpose," as sufficient reason for reconsidering the article.
How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the force
of its acts?

On the motion of Mr. Gerry to reconsider

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. GEO ay. [5]

Mr. SHERMAN moved to add to the article "or the Legislature may propose
amendments to the several States for their approbation, but no
amendments shall be binding until consented to by the several States."

Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion

Mr. WILSON moved to insert "two thirds of" before the words "several
States" -- on which amendment to the motion of Mr. Sherman

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [6]

Mr. WILSON then moved to insert "three fourths of" before "the several
Sts" which was agreed to nem: con:

Mr. MADISON moved to postpone the consideration of the amended
proposition in order to take up the following,

"The Legislature of the U. S. whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures
of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution,
which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when
the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the
Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the
Legislature of the U S:" [*7]

Mr. HAMILTON 2ded. the motion.

Mr. RUTLIDGE said he never could agree to give a power by which the
articles relating to slaves might be altered by the States not
interested in that property and prejudiced against it. In order to
obviate this objection, these words were added to the proposition: [*7]
"provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year 1808,
shall in any manner affect the 4 & 5 sections of the VII article" -- The
postponement being agreed to,

On the question on the proposition of Mr. Madison & Mr. Hamilton as
amended

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo ay. [9]

Mr. GERRY moved to reconsider art: XXI and XXII. from the latter of
which "for the approbation of Congs." had been struck out. He objected
to proceeding to change the Government without the approbation of
Congress, as being improper and giving just umbrage to that body. He
repeated his objections also to an annulment of the confederation with
so little scruple or formality.

Mr. HAMILTON concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indecorum of not
requiring the approbation of Congress. He considered this as a necessary
ingredient in the transaction. He thought it wrong also to allow nine
States as provided by art XXI. to institute a new Government on the
ruins of the existing one. He Wd. propose as a better modification of
the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent to Congress
in order that the same if approved by them, may be communicated to the
State Legislatures, to the end that they may refer it to State
Conventions; each Legislature declaring that if the Convention of the
State should think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying
States, the same shd. take effect accordingly.

Mr. GORHAM. Some States will say that nine States shall be sufficient to
establish the plan, others will require unanimity for the purpose. And
the different and conditional ratifications will defeat the plan
altogether.

Mr. HAMILTON. No Convention convinced of the necessity of the plan will
refuse to give it effect on the adoption by nine States. He thought this
mode less exceptionable than the one proposed in the article, and [10]
would attain the same end.

Mr. FITZIMMONS remarked that the words "for their approbation" had been
struck out in order to save Congress from the necessity of an Act
inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation under which they held
their authority.

Mr. RANDOLPH declared, if no change should be made in the [11] this part
of the plan, he should be obliged to dissent from the whole of it. He
had from the beginning he said been convinced that radical changes in
the system of the Union were necessary. Under this conviction he had
brought forward a set of republican propositions as the basis and
outline of a reform. These Republican propositions had however, much to
his regret, been widely, and in his opinion, irreconcileably departed
from. In this state of things it was his idea and he accordingly meant
to propose, that the State Conventions shd. be at liberty to offer
amendments to the plan; and that these should be submitted to a second
General Convention, with full power to settle the Constitution finally.
He did not expect to succeed in this proposition, but the discharge of
his duty in making the attempt, would give quiet to his own mind.

Mr. WILSON was against a reconsideration for any of the purposes which
had been mentioned.

Mr. KING thought it would be more respectful to Congress to submit the
plan generally to them; than in such a form as expressly and necessarily
to require their approbation or disapprobation. The assent of nine
States be considered as sufficient; and that it was more proper to make
this a part of the Constitution itself, than to provide for it by a
supplemental or distinct recommendation.

Mr. GERRY urged the indecency and pernicious tendency of dissolving in
so slight a manner, the solemn obligations of the articles of
confederation. If nine out of thirteen can dissolve the compact, Six out
of nine will be just as able to dissolve the new one hereafter.

Mr. SHERMAN was in favor of Mr. King's idea of submitting the plan
generally to Congress. He thought nine States ought to be made
sufficient: but that it would be best [12] to make it a separate act and
in some such form as that intimated by Col: Hamilton, than to make it a
particular article of the Constitution.

On the question for reconsidering the two articles, XXI & XXII -- 

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [13]

Mr. HAMILTON then moved to postpone art XXI in order to take up the
following, containing the ideas he had above expressed, viz Resolved
that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be transmitted to the U. S. in
Congress assembled, in order that if the same shall be agreed to by
them, it may be communicated to the Legislatures of the several States,
to the end that they may provide for its final ratification by referring
the same to the Consideration of a Convention of Deputies in each State
to be chosen by the people thereof, and that it be recommended to the
said Legislatures in their respective acts for organizing such
convention to declare, that if the said Convention shall approve of the
said Constitution, such approbation shall be binding and conclusive upon
the State, and further that if the said Convention should be of opinion
that the same upon the assent of any nine States thereto, ought to take
effect between the States so assenting, such opinion shall thereupon be
also binding upon such State, and the said Constitution shall take
effect between the States assenting thereto"

Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion.

Mr. WILSON. This motion being seconded, it is necessary now to speak
freely. He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of the expedient
proposed, particularly the suspending the plan of the Convention on the
approbation of Congress. He declared it to be worse than folly to rely
on the concurrence of the Rhode Island members of Congs. in the plan.
Maryland has voted on this floor; for requiring the unanimous assent of
the 13 States to the proposed change in the federal System. N. York has
not been represented for a long time past in the Convention. Many
individual deputies from other States have spoken much against the plan.
Under these circusmtances can it be safe to make the assent of Congress
necessary. After spending four or five months in the laborious & arduous
task of forming a Government for our Country, we are ourselves at the
close throwing insuperable obstacles in the way of its success.

Mr. CLYMER thought that the mode proposed by Mr. Hamilton would fetter &
embarrass Congs. as much as the original one, since it equally involved
a breach of the articles of Confederation.

Mr. KING concurred with Mr. Clymer. If Congress can accede to one mode,
they can to the other. If the approbation of Congress be made necessary,
and they should not approve, the State Legislatures will not propose the
plan to Conventions; or if the States themselves are to provide that
nine States shall suffice to establish the System, that provision will
be omitted, every thing will go into confusion, and all our labor be
lost.

Mr. RUTLIDGE viewed the matter in the same light with Mr. King. On the
question to postpone in order to take up Col: Hamilton's motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [14]

A Question being then taken on the article XXI. It was agreed to
unanimously.

Col: HAMILTON withdrew the remainder of the motion to postpone art XXII,
observing that his purpose was defeated by the vote just given;

Mr. WILLIAMSON & Mr. GERRY moved to re-instate the words "for the
approbation of Congress" in art: XXII which was disagreed to nem: con:

Mr. RANDOLPH took this opportunity to state his objections to the
System. They turned on the Senate's being made the Court of Impeachment
for trying the Executive -- on the necessity of 3/4 instead of 2/3 of
each house to overrule the negative of the President -- on the smallness
of the number of the Representative branch, -- on the want of limitation
to a standing army -- on the general clause concerning necessary and
proper laws -- on the want of some particular restraint on navigation
acts -- on the power to lay duties on exports -- on the Authority of the
General Legislature to interpose on the application of the Executives of
the States -- on the want of a more definite boundary between the
General & State Legislatures -- and between the General and State
Judiciaries -- on the the unqualified power of the President to pardon
treasons -- on the want of some limit to the power of the Legislature in
regulating their own compensations. With these difficulties in his mind,
what course he asked was he to pursue? Was he to promote the
establishment of a plan which he verily believed would end in Tyranny?
He was unwilling he said to impede the wishes and Judgment of the
Convention, but he must keep himself free, in case he should be honored
with a seat in the Convention of his State, to act according to the
dictates of his judgment. The only mode in which his embarrassments
could be removed, was that of submitting the plan to Congs. to go from
them to the State Legislatures, and from these to State Conventions
having power to adopt reject or amend; the process to close with another
General Convention with full power to adopt or reject the alterations
proposed by the State Conventions, and to establish finally the
Government. He accordingly proposed a Resolution to this effect.

DOCr. FRANKLIN 2ded. the motion

Col: MASON urged & obtained that the motion should lie on the table for
a day or two to see what steps might be taken with regard to the parts
of the system objected to by Mr. Randolph.

Mr. PINKNEY moved "that it be an instruction to the Committee for
revising the stile and arrangement of the articles agreed on, to prepare
an Address to the People, to accompany the present Constitution, and to
be laid with the same before the U. States in Congress."

[*15] The motion itself was referred to the Committee, nem: con:

[*15] Mr. RANDOLPH moved to refer to the Committee also a motion
relating to pardons in cases of Treason -- which was agreed to nem: con:

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. In the transcript the date reads: "the sixth of August."

3. The word "of" is found in the transcript in place of "for."

4. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; New Jersey, no -- 1; New Hampshire,
divided."

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

*7. The Printed Journal makes the succeeding proviso as to sections 4 &
5. of art: VII [8] moved by Mr. Rutlidge, part of the proposition of Mr.
Madison.

8. The words "the fourth and fifth sections of the seventh article" are
substituted in the transcript for "sections 4 & 5. of art: VII."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 9; Delaware, no -- 1; New Hampshire, divided."

10. The words "while it" are substituted in the transcript for "and."

11. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

12. The word "best" is crossed out in the transcript and "better" is
written above it.

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, no -- 3; New Hampshire,
divided."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

*15. These motions [16] not entered in the printed Journal.

16. The word "are" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

TUESDAY  SEPr 11. 1787 [1] IN CONVENTION

The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement not being made
& being waited for,

The House Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

WEDNESDAY  SEPr 12. 1787. [1]  IN CONVENTION

DOCr. JOHNSON from the Committee of stile &c. reported a digest of the
plan, of which printed copies were ordered to be furnished to the
members. He also reported a letter to accompany the plan, to Congress.
(Here insert a transcript of the former from the annexed sheet as
printed [*2] and of the latter from the draft as finally agreed to. [3]

WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN ORDER TO FORM a more perfect
union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for
the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

                           ARTICLE I

    Sect. 1. ALL legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives.

    Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members chosen every second year by the people of the several
states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state
legislature.

    No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to
the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of
that state in which he shall be chosen.

    Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to servitude for
a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all
other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three
years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they
shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed
one for every forty thousand, but each state shall have at least one
representative: and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of
New-Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five,
New-York six, New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Deleware one,
Maryland six, Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, South- Caroline five,
and Georgia three.

    When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the
Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies.

    The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and
other officers; and they shall have the sole power of impeachment.

    Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six
years: and each senator shall have one vote.

    Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the
first election, they shall be divided [*5] [by lot] as equally as may be
into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be
vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at
the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the
expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every
second year: and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise,
during the recess of the Legislature of any state, the Executive
thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of
the Legislature.

    No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age
of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for
which he shall be chosen.

    The Vice-President of the United States shall be, ex officio [6]
President of the senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally
divided.

    The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President
pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall
exercise the office of President of the United States.

    The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.
When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:
And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of the members present.

    Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office
of honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial,
judgment and punishment, according to law.

    Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the
legislature thereof: but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations.

    The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such
meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall
by law appoint a different day.

    Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall
constitute a quorum to do business: but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day, and may be authorised to compel the
attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such
penalties as each house may provide.

    Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings; punish its
members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds, expel a member.

    Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their
judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of
either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those
present, be entered on the journal.

    Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the
consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

    Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a
compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid
out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases,
except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective
houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any
other place.

    No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no person
holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of
either house during his continuance in office.

    Sect. 7. The enacting stile of the laws shall be, "Be it enacted by
the senators and representatives in Congress assembled." All bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives: but the
senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.

    Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives
and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the
president of the United States. If he approve he shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it, with his objections to that house in which it
shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their
journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration
two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that
house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both
houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the
persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal
of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return,
in which case it shall not be a law.

    Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be
approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by
[*7] three-fourths of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

    Sect. 8. The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer.
They shall have power

    To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of
the United States.

    To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

    To regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes.

    To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.

    To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin,
and fix the standard of weights and measures.

    To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and
current coin of the United States.

    To establish post offices and post roads.

    To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.

    To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court.

    To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and [*9] [punish] offences against the law of nations.

    To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make
rules concerning captures on land and water.

    To raise and support armies: but no appropriation of money to
that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

     To provide and maintain a navy.

    To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces.

    To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

    To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

    To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of
particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of
the [11] government of the United States, and to exercise like authority
over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state
in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings -And

    To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.

    Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as the
several states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight
hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such
importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

    The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it.

    No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law.

    No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census
herein before directed to be taken.

    No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.

    No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence
of appropriations made by law.

    No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States. And no
person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without
the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument,
office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or
foreign state.

    Sect. 10. No state shall coin money, nor [12] emit bills of credit, nor
[12] make any thing but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of
debts, nor [12] pass any bill of attainder, nor [12] ex post facto laws, nor
[12] laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts; nor 12 grant
letters of marque and reprisal, nor [12] enter into any treaty, alliance,
or confederation, nor [12] grant any title of nobility.

    No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or
duties on imports or exports, nor [12] with such consent, but to the use
of the treasury of the United States. Nor [12] keep troops nor [12] ships
of war in time of peace, nor [12] enter into any agreement or compact
with another state, nor [12] with any foreign power. Nor [12] engage in
any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger
of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay until the
Congress can be consulted.

                               II

    Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the
United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of
four years, and, together with the vice-president, chosen for the same
term, be elected in the following manner:

    Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of
senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in
Congress: but no senator or representative shall be appointed an
elector, nor any person holding an office of trust or profit under the
United States.

    The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by
ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an
inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a
list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each;
which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat
of the general government, directed to the president of the senate.
The president of the senate shall in the presence of the senate and
house of representatives open all the certificates, and the votes shall
then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes
shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who
have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the
house of representatives shall immediately chuse by ballot one of
them for president; and if no person have a majority, then from the
five highest on the list the said house shall in like manner choose the
president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by
states and not per capita, the representation from each state having
one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or
members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice
of the president by the representatives, the person having the greatest
number of votes of the electors shall be the vice-president. But if
there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate
shall choose from them by ballot the vice-president.

    The Congress may determine the time of chusing the electors, and
the time in which they shall give their votes; but the election shall be
on the same day throughout the United States.

    No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United
States, at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible
to the office of president; neither shall any person be eligible to that
office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and
been fourteen years a resident within the United States.

    In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of
the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the
Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the president and vice-president,
declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer
shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the period for
chusing another president arrive.

    The president shall, at stated times, receive a fixed compensation
for his services, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished
during the period for which he shall have been elected.

    Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation: "I _____, do solemnly swear (or
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the
United States, and will to the best of my judgment and power,
preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States."

    Sect. 2. The president shall be commander in chief of the army
and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States:
[13] he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in
each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the
duties of their respective offices, when called into the actual service
of the United States, [13] and he shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of
impeachment.

    He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and
consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for.

    The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions
which shall expire at the end of their next session.

    Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress
information of the state of the union, and recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient: he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses,
or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with
respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such
time as he shall think proper: he shall receive ambassadors and other
public ministers: he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.

    Sect. 4. The president, vice-president and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.

                              III

    Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and
equity, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for
their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office.

    Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, both in law
and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority. To all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls. To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To
controversies to which the United States shall be a party. To
controversies between two or more States; between a state and
citizens of another state; between citizens of different States;
between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and
foreign States, citizens or subjects.

    In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall
have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the
supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and
fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make.

    The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state,
the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law
have directed.

    Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them
aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court.

    The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood
nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

                              IV

    Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.
And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in
which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the
effect thereof.

    Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states. A person charged in
any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from
justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the
executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered up,
and removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

    No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping
into another, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be
discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on
claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.

    Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this
union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the
jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the
junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent
of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress.

    The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States: and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of
any particular state.

    Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
union a Republican form of government, and shall protect each of
them against invasion; and on application of the legislature or
executive, against domestic violence.

                               V

    The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem
necessary, or on the application of two-thirds of the legislatures of
the several states, shall propose amendments to this constitution,
which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part thereof, when
the same shall have been ratified by three- fourths at least of the
legislatures of the several states, or by conventions in three-fourths
thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed
by the Congress: Provided, that no amendment which may be made
prior to the year 1808 shall in any manner affect the _____ and
_____ section of [14] _____ article

                              VI

    All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the
adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United
States under this Constitution as under the confederation.

    This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.

    The senators and representatives beforementioned, and the
members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and
judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution;
but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any
office or public trust under the United States.

                              VII

    The ratification of the conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the States
so ratifying the same.

                          LETTER [15]

We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United
States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which as appeared to us
the most adviseable.

The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of
making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and regulating
commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities
should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the
Union: but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one
body of men is evident -- Hence [16] results the necessity of a
different organization.

It is obviously impracticable in the foederal government of these States
to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide
for the interest and safety of all -- Individuals entering into society
must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of
the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on
the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with
precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and
those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion this difficulty
was encreased by a difference among the several States as to their
situation, extent, habits, and particular interests.

In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view,
that which appears [17] to us the greatest interest of every true
American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved our
prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This
important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds,
led each State in the Convention to be less rigid on [18] points of
inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and thus
the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of
amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity
of our political situation rendered indispensible.

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not
perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had her
interest alone been consulted, the consequences might have been
particularly disagreeable or [19] injurious to others; that it is liable
to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and
believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear
to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent
wish.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to reconsider the clause requiring three fourths of
each House to overrule the negative of the President, in order to strike
out 3/4 and insert 2/3 . He had he remarked himself proposed 3/4 instead
of 2/3 , but he had since been convinced that the latter proportion was
the best. The former puts too much in the power of the President.

Mr. SHERMAN was of the same opinion; adding that the States would not
like to see so small a minority and the President, prevailing over the
general voice. In making laws regard should be had to the sense of the
people, who are to be bound by them, and it was more probable that a
single man should mistake or betray this sense than the Legislature

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. Considering the difference between the two proportions
numerically, it amounts in one House to two members only; and in the
other to not more than five; according to the numbers of which the
Legislature is at first to be composed. It is the interest moreover of
the distant States to prefer 3/4 as they will be oftenest absent and
need the interposing check of the President. The excess rather than the
deficiency of laws was to be dreaded. The example of N. York shews that
2/3 is not sufficient to answer the purpose.

Mr. HAMILTON added his testimony to the fact that 2/3 in N. York had
been ineffectual either where a popular object, or a legislative faction
operated; of which he mentioned some instances.

Mr. GERRY. It is necessary to consider the danger on the other side
also. 2/3 will be a considerable, perhaps a proper security. 3/4 puts
too much in the power of a few men. The primary object of the
revisionary check of the President is not to protect the general
interest, but to defend his own department. If 3/4 be required, a few
Senators having hopes from the nomination of the President to
offices, will combine with him and impede proper laws. Making the
vice-President Speaker increases the danger.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was less afraid of too few than of too many laws.
He was most of all afraid that the repeal of bad laws might be
rendered too difficult by requiring 3/4 to overcome the dissent of the
President.

Col: MASON had always considered this as one of the most exceptionable
parts of the System. As to the numerical argument of Mr. Govr. Morris,
little arithmetic was necessary to understand that 3/4 was more than 2/3
, whatever the numbers of the Legislature might be. The example of New
York depended on the real merits of the laws. The Gentlemen citing it,
had no doubt given their own opinions. But perhaps there were others of
opposite opinions who could equally paint the abuses on the other side.
His leading view was to guard against too great an impediment to the
repeal of laws.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS dwelt on the danger to the public interest from the
instability of laws, as the most to be guarded against. On the other
side there could be little danger. If one man in office will not consent
where he ought, every fourth year another can be substituted. This term
was not too long for fair experiments. Many good laws are not tried long
enough to prove their merit. This is often the case with new laws
opposed to old habits. The Inspection laws of Virginia & Maryland to
which all are now so much attached were unpopular at first.

Mr. PINKNEY was warmly in opposition to 3/4 as putting a dangerous power
in the hands of a few Senators headed by the President.

Mr. MADISON. When 3/4 was agreed to, the President was to be elected by
the Legislature and for seven years. He is now to be elected by the
people and for four years. The object of the revisionary power is
twofold. 1. [20] to defend the Executive Rights 2. [20] to prevent
popular or factious injustice. It was an important principle in this &
in the State Constitutions to check legislative injustice and
incroachments. The Experience of the States had demonstrated that their
checks are insufficient. We must compare the danger from the weakness of
2/3 with the danger from the strength of 3/4 . He thought on the whole
the former was the greater. As to the difficulty of repeals, it was
probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of
limiting the duration of laws so as to require renewal instead of
repeal.

The reconsideration being agreed to. On the question to insert 2/3 in
place of 3/4.

N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Mr.
Mc.Henry no. Va. no. Genl. Washington Mr. Blair, Mr. Madison no. Col.
Mason, Mr. Randolph ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [21]

Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed to the House that no provision was yet made for
juries in Civil cases and suggested the necessity of it.

Mr. GORHAM. It is not possible to discriminate equity cases from those
in which juries are proper. The Representatives of the people may be
safely trusted in this matter.

Mr. GERRY urged the necessity of Juries to guard agst. corrupt Judges.
He proposed that the Committee last appointed should be directed to
provide a clause for securing the trial by Juries

Col: MASON perceived the difficulty mentioned by Mr. Gorham. The jury
cases can not be specified. A general principle laid down on this and
some other points would be sufficient. He wished the plan had been
prefaced with a Bill of Rights, & would second a Motion if made for the
purpose. It would give great quiet to the people; and with the aid of
the State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.

Mr. GERRY concurred in the idea & moved for a Committee to
prepare a Bill of Rights.

Col: MASON 2ded. the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN, was for securing the rights of the people where requisite.
The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution;
and being in force are sufficient. There are many cases where juries are
proper which can not be discriminated. The Legislature may be safely
trusted.

Col: MASON. The Laws of the U. S. are to be paramount to State Bills of
Rights.

On the question for a Come. to prepare a Bill of Rights

N. H. no. Mas. abst. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [22]

The Clause relating to exports being reconsidered, at the instance of
Col: Mason, who urged that the restriction on the States would prevent
the incidental duties necessary for the inspection & safe-keeping of
their produce, and be ruinous to the Staple States, as he called the
five Southern States, he moved as follows -- "provided nothing herein
contained shall be construed to restrain any State from laying duties
upon exports for the sole purpose of defraying the charges of
inspecting, packing, storing and indemnifying the losses, in keeping the
commodities in the care of public officers, before exportation." In
answer to a remark which he anticipated, towit, that the States could
provide for these expences, by a tax in some other way, he stated the
inconveniency [23] of requiring the Planters to pay a tax before the
actual delivery for exportation.

Mr. MADISON 2ded. the motion. It would at least be harmless; and might
have the good effect of restraining the States to bona fide duties for
the purpose, as well as of authorising explicitly such duties; tho'
perhaps the best guard against an abuse of the power of the States on
this subject, was the right in the Genl. Government to regulate trade
between State & State.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS saw no objection to the motion. He did not consider the
dollar per Hhd laid on Tobo. in Virga. as a duty on exportation, as no
drawback would be allowed on Tobo. taken out of the Warehouse for
internal consumption.

Mr. DAYTON was afraid the proviso wd. enable Pennsylva. to tax N. Jersey
under the idea of Inspection duties of which Pena. would Judge.

Mr. GORHAM & Mr. LANGDON, thought there would be no security if the
proviso shd. be agreed to, for the States exporting thro' other States,
agst. the [24] oppressions of the latter. How was redress to be obtained
in case duties should be laid beyond the purpose expressed?

Mr. MADISON. There will be the same security as in other cases. The
jurisdiction of the supreme Court must be the source of redress. So far
only had provision been made by the plan agst. injurious acts of the
States. His own opinion was, that this was insufficient. A negative on
the State laws alone could meet all the shapes which these could assume.
But this had been overruled.

Mr. FITZIMMONS. Incidental duties on Tobo. & flour, never have been &
never can be considered as duties on exports.

Mr. DICKINSON. Nothing will save [25] States in the situation of N.
Hampshire N Jersey Delaware &c from being oppressed by their neighbors,
but requiring the assent of Congs. to inspection duties. He moved that
this assent shd. accordingly be required.

Mr. BUTLER 2ded. the motion.

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

*2. "This is a literal copy of the printed Report. The Copy in the
printed Journal contains some of the alterations subsequently made in
the House. [4]

3. Madison's direction concerning the report is omitted in the
transcript.

4. No transcript of the report was, however, made by Madison, but it was
copied by Payne and inserted in this place in the Payne transcript. The
text here printed is a copy of the printed report accompanying Madison's
notes.

*5. The words, "by lot," were not in the Report as printed; but were
inserted in manuscript, as a typografical error, departing from the text
of the Report referred to the Committee of Style & arrangment.

6. The words "ex officio" are omitted in the transcript.

*7. In the entry of this Report in the printed Journal "two thirds" are
substituted for "three fourths." This change was made after the Report
was received.

8. This is a mistake on Madison's part.

*9. [punish] a typographical omission. [10]

10. The words "in the printed Report" are here added in the transcript.

11. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

12. The word "or" is substituted in the transcript for "nor," the letter
"n" having been crossed off in Madison's printed copy.

13. The phrase "when called into the actual service of the United
States" is transposed in the transcript so that it follows the words
"several States."

14. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

15. The draft of the letter accompanied the draft of the Constitution
reported on this date, but was not printed with it. The Journal says:
"The draft of a letter to Congress being at the same time reported was
read once throughout; and afterwards agreed to by paragraphs." (See
Journal of the Federal Convention (1819), page 367.) The letter does not
appear to have caused debate. Having been accepted September 12th, it
was printed with the final Constitution September 17th. The text here
used is that of the final print, which was also copied by Payne for the
transcript. The letter is printed in full, infra, page 639.

16. The word "Thence" is substituted in the transcript for "Hence."

17. The word "appeared" is substituted in the transcript for "appears."

18. The word "in" is substituted in the transcript for "on"

19. The word "and" is substituted in the transcript for "or"

20. The figures "1" and "2" are changed in the transcript to "first" and
"secondly."

21. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland
[Mr. McHenry, no.], North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 6;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia [General Washington, Mr.
Blair, Mr. Madison, no; Col. Mason, Mr. Randolph, aye], no -- 4; New
Hampshire divided."

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye -- 5; Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5; Massachusetts, absent." This
was the copyist's error as Madison's orginal notes agree with the
Journal, which reads: "Which passed unanimously in the negative."

23. The word "inconveniency" is changed in the transcript to
"inconvenience."

24. The word "these" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

25. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

THURSDAY  SEPR 13.  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Col: MASON. He had moved without success for a power to make sumptuary
regulations. He had not yet lost sight of his object. After descanting
on the extravagance of our manners, the excessive consumption of foreign
superfluities, and the necessity of restricting it, as well with
oeconomical as requblican views, he moved that a Committee be appointed
to report articles of association for encouraging by the advice the
influence and the example of the members of the Convention, oeconomy
frugality and american manufactures.

DOCr. JOHNSON 2ded. the motion which was without debate agreed to; nem:
con: and a Committee appointed, consisting of Col: Mason, Docr.
Franklin, Mr. Dickenson, Docr. Johnson, and Mr. Livingston. [*2]

Col: MASON renewed his proposition of yesterday on the subject of
inspection laws, with an additional clause giving to Congress a controul
over them in case of abuse -- as follows,

"Provided that no State shall be restrained from imposing the usual
duties on produce exported from such State, for the sole purpose of
defraying the charges of inspecting, packing, storing, and indemnifying
the losses on such produce, while in the custody of public officers: but
all such regulations shall in case of abuse, be subject to the revision
and controul of Congress."

There was no debate & on the question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S.
C. no. Geo. ay. [4]

The Report from the Committee of stile & arrangement, was taken up, in
order to be compared with the articles of the plan as agreed to by the
House & referred to the Committee, and to receive the final corrections
and sanction of the Convention.

Art. 1. sect. 2. On motion of Mr. RANDOLPH the word "servitude" was
struck out, and "service" [*5] unanimously inserted, the former being
thought to express the condition of slaves, & the latter the obligations
of free persons.

Mr. DICKENSON & Mr. WILSON moved to strike out "and direct taxes," from
sect. 2. art. 1. as improperly placed in a clause relating merely to the
Constitution of the House of Representatives.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The insertion here was in consequence of what had
passed on this point; in order to exclude the appearance of counting the
negroes in the Representation. The including of them may now be referred
to the object of direct taxes, and incidentally only to that of
Representation.

On the motion to strike out "and direct taxes" from this place

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [6]

Art. 1. sect. 7 " -- if any bill shall not be returned by the president
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to
him &c"

Mr. MADISON, moved to insert between "after" and "it" in Sect. 7. Art. 1
the words "the day on which," in order to prevent a question whether the
day on which the bill be presented, ought to be counted or not as one of
the ten days.

Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the motion.

Mr. GOVERNUr. MORRIS. The amendment is unnecessary. The law knows no
fractions of days.

A number of members being very impatient & calling for the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no S. C. no. Geo. no -- [7]

DOCr. JOHNSON made a further report from the Committee of stile &c of
the following resolutions to be substituted for 22 & 23 articles

"Resolved that the preceding Constitution be laid before the U. States
in Congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this Convention,
that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates
chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of
its Legislature, for their assent & ratification; & that each Convention
assenting & ratifying the same should give notice thereof to the U.S. in
Congs. assembled.

"Resolved that it is the opinion of this Convention that as soon as the
Conventions of nine States, shall have ratified this Constitution, the
U.S. in Congs. assembled should fix a day on which electors should be
appointed by the States which shall have ratified the same; and a day on
which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President; and the
time and place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution --
That after such publication the Electors should be appointed, and the
Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on
the day fixed for the election of the President, and should transmit
their votes certified signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution
requires, to the Secretary of the U. States in Congs. assembled: that
the Senators and Representatives should convene at the time & place
assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President for the sole
purpose of receiving, opening, and counting the votes for President, and
that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President
should without delay proceed to execute this Constitution."

Adjourned

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

*2. This motion & appointment of the Comittee, not [3] in the printed
Journal. No report was made by the Come.

3. The words "do not appear" are substituted in the transcript for
"not."

4. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 3."

*5. See page 372 of the printed Journal.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

7. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY  SEPR 14TH  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

The Report of the Committee of Stile & arrangement being resumed,

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved to reconsider in order to increase the number of
Representatives fixed for the first Legislature. His purpose was to make
an addition of one half generally to the number allotted to the
respective States; and to allow two to the smallest States.

On this motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. [2]

Art. 1. sect. 3. -- the words [*3] "by lot" were struck out nem: con: on
motion of Mr. MADISON, that some rule might prevail in the rotation that
would prevent both the members from the same State from going out at the
same time.

"Ex officio" struck out of the same section as superfluous: nem: con:
and "or affirmation." after "oath" inserted also unanimously.

Mr. RUTLIDGE and Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved "that persons impeached be
suspended from their office [5] until they be tried and acquitted"

Mr. MADISON. The President is made too dependent already on the
Legislature, by the power of one branch to try him in consequence of an
impeachment by the other. This intermediate suspension, will put him in
the power of one branch only. They can at any moment, in order to make
way for the functions of another who will be more favorable to their
views, vote a temporary removal of the existing Magistrate.

Mr. KING concurred in the opposition to the amendment

On the question to agree to it

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [6]

Art. 1. sect. 4. "except as to the places of choosing Senators" [7]
added nem: con: to the end of the first clause, in order to exempt the
seats of Govt. in the States from the power of Congress.

Art. 1. Sect. 5. "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings,
and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in
their judgment require secresy."

Col: MASON & Mr. GERRY moved to insert after the word "parts" the words
"of the proceedings of the Senate" so as to require publication of all
the proceedings of the House of Representatives.

It was intimated on the other side that cases might arise where secresy
might be necessary in both Houses. Measures preparatory to a declaration
of war in which the House of Reps. was to concur, were instanced.

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H. no. (Rh. I abs) Mas. no. Con: no. (N. Y. abs) N. J. no. Pen. ay.
Del. no. Mary. ay. Virg. no. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geor. no. [8]

Mr. BALDWIN observed that the clause, Art. 1. Sect 6. declaring that no
member of Congs. "during the time for which he was elected; shall be
appointed to any Civil office under the authority of the U.S. which
shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been
increased during such time," would not extend to offices created by the
Constitution; and the salaries of which would be created, not increased
by Congs. at their first session. The members of the first Congs.
consequently might evade the disqualification in this instance. -- He
was neither seconded nor opposed; nor did any thing further pass on the
subject.

Art. 1. Sect. 8. The Congress "may by joint ballot appoint a Treasurer"

Mr. RUTLIDGE moved to strike out this power, and let the Treasurer be
appointed in the same manner with other officers.

Mr. GORHAM & Mr. KING said that the motion, if agreed, to would have a
mischievous tendency. The people are accustomed & attached to that mode
of appointing Treasurers, and the innovation will multiply objections to
the System.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS remarked that if the Treasurer be not appointed by the
Legislature, he will be more narrowly watched, and more readily
impeached.

Mr. SHERMAN. As the two Houses appropriate money, it is best for them to
appoint the officer who is to keep it; and to appoint him as they make
the appropriation, not by joint but several votes.

Genl. PINKNEY. The Treasurer is appointed by joint ballot in South
Carolina. The consequence is that bad appointments are made, and the
Legislature will not listen to the faults of their own officer.

On the motion to strike out

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [9]

Art 1. sect. 8. [10] "but all such duties imposts & excises, shall be
uniform throughout the U.S." was [11] unanimously annexed to the power
of taxation.

[12] To define & punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and
"punish" offences against the law of nations.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to strike out "punish" before the words "offences
agst. the law of nations," so as to let these be definable as well as
punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.

Mr. WILSON hoped the alteration would by no means be made. To pretend to
define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the
civilized nations of the world, would have a look of arrogance, that
would make us ridiculous.

Mr. GOVr. [13] The word define is proper when applied to offences in
this case; the law of nations being often too vague and deficient to be
a rule.

On the question to strike out the word "punish" it passed in the
affirmative

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [14]

DOCr. FRANKLIN moved [*15] to add after the words "post roads" Art I.
Sect. 8. "a power to provide for cutting canals where deemed necessary"

Mr. WILSON 2ded. the motion

Mr. SHERMAN objected. The expence in such cases will fall on the U.
States, and the benefit accrue to the places where the canals may be
cut.

Mr. WILSON. Instead of being an expence to the U.S. they may be made a
source of revenue.

Mr. MADISON suggested an enlargement of the motion into a power "to
grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the U.S. might
require & the legislative provisions of individual States may be
incompetent." His primary object was however to secure an easy
communication between the States which the free intercourse now to be
opened, seemed to call for. The political obstacles being removed, a
removal of the natural ones as far as possible ought to follow.

Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the proposition

Mr. KING thought the power unnecessary.

Mr. WILSON. It is necessary to prevent a State from obstructing the
general welfare.

Mr. KING. The States will be prejudiced and divided into parties by it.
In Philada. & New York, It will be referred to the establishment of a
Bank, which has been a subject of contention in those Cities. In other
places it will be referred to mercantile monopolies.

Mr. WILSON mentioned the importance of facilitating by canals, the
communication with the Western Settlements. As to Banks he did not think
with Mr. King that the power in that point of view would excite the
prejudices & parties apprehended. As to mercantile monopolies they are
already included in the power to regulate trade.

Col: MASON was for limiting the power to the single case of Canals. He
was afraid of monopolies of every sort, which he did not think were by
any means already implied by the Constitution as supposed by Mr. Wilson.

The motion being so modified as to admit a distinct question specifying
& limited to the case of canals,

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C no. Geo. ay. [16]

The other part fell of course, as including the power rejected. Mr.
MADISON & Mr. PINKNEY then moved to insert in the list of powers vested
in Congress a power -- "to establish an University, in which no
preferences or distinctions should be allowed on account of Religion."

Mr. WILSON supported the motion

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. It is not necessary. The exclusive power at the Seat
of Government, will reach the object.

On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. divd. Dr. Johnson ay. Mr. Sherman no. N. J. no.
Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [17]

Col: MASON, being sensible that an absolute prohibition of standing
armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to
insert something pointing out and guarding against the danger of them,
moved to preface the clause (Art I sect. 8) "To provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining the Militia &c" with the words" "And that the
liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger of
standing armies in time of peace" Mr. RANDOLPH 2ded. the motion

Mr. MADISON was in favor of it. It did not restrain Congress from
establishing a military force in time of peace if found necessary; and
as armies in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is
well to discountenance them by the Constitution, as far as will consist
with the essential power of the Govt. on that head.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS opposed the motion as setting a dishonorable mark of
distinction on the military class of Citizens

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. BEDFORD concurred in the opposition. On the question

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Maryd. no Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [18]

Col: MASON moved to strike out from the clause (art I sect 9.) "No bill
of attainder nor any expost facto law shall be passed" the words "nor
any ex post facto law." He thought it not sufficiently clear that the
prohibition meant by this phrase was limited to cases of a criminal
nature, and no Legislature ever did or can altogether avoid them in
Civil cases.

Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion but with a view to extend the prohibition to
"Civil cases," which he thought ought to be done.

On the question; all the States were -- no

Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. GERRY, moved to insert a declaration "that the liberty
of the Press should be inviolably observed."

Mr. SHERMAN. It is unnecessary. The power of Congress does not extend to
the Press.

On the question, it passed in the negative

N. H. no. [*19] Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [20]

Art. I. Sect. 9. "No capitation tax shall be laid, unless &c"

Mr. READ moved to insert after "capitation" the words, "or other direct
tax" He was afraid that some liberty might otherwise be taken to saddle
the States, with a readjustment by this rule, of past requisitions of
Congs. -- and that his amendment by giving another cast to the meaning
would take away the pretext. Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded. the motion which was
agreed to,

On motion of Col: MASON [21] "or enumeration" [22] inserted after, as
explanatory of "Census" Con. & S. C. only, no.

[Here insert the amendment added in the lateral margin. [23]

At the end of the clause "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any State" was added the following amendment conformably
to a vote on the _____ day of [24] _____ viz -- no preference shall be
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State
over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be
obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another.]

Col. MASON moved a clause requiring "that an Account of the public
expenditures should be annually published" Mr. GERRY 2ded. the motion

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS urged that this wd. be impossible in many cases.

Mr. KING remarked, that the term expenditures went to every minute
shilling. This would be impracticable. Congs. might indeed make a
monthly publication, but it would be in such general statements as would
afford no satisfactory information.

Mr. MADISON proposed to strike out "annually" from the motion & insert
"from time to time," which would enjoin the duty of frequent
publications and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature.
Require too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing.
The articles of Confederation require half-yearly publications on this
subject. A punctual compliance being often impossible, the practice has
ceased altogether.

Mr. WILSON 2ded. & supported the motion. Many operations of
finance can not be properly published at certain times.

Mr. PINKNEY was in favor of the motion.

Mr. FITZIMMONS. It is absolutely impossible to publish expenditures in
the full extent of the term.

Mr. SHERMAN thought "from time to time" the best rule to be given.

"Annual" was struck out -- & those words -- inserted nem: con: The
motion of Col: Mason so amended was then agreed to nem: con: and added
after -- "appropriations by law as follows -- "and a regular statement
and account of the receipts & expenditures of all public money shall be
published from time to time"

Here insert the Amendment at the foot of the page [25]

[*26] The first clause of Art. I Sect 10 -- was altered so as to read --
'No State shall enter into any Treaty alliance or confederation; grant
letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make
any thing but gold & silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any
bill of attainder, ex post [27] law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or grant any title of nobility."

Mr. GERRY entered into observations inculcating the importance of public
faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from
impairing the obligation of contracts, alledging that Congress ought to
be laid under the like prohibitions, he made a motion to that effect. He
was not 2ded.

Adjourned 

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, aye -- 5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 6."

*3. "By lot" had been re-instated from the Report of five made Aug. 6.
as a correction of the printed report by the Come. of stile &
arrangement. [4]

4. In the transcript this note reads as follows: "By lot," had been
reinstated from the Report of the Committee of five made on the sixth of
August, as a correction of the printed Report by the Committee of style,
&c."

5. The transcript uses the word "office" in the plural.

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, South Carolina,
Georgia, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Pednnsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no -- 8."

7. The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, North
Carolina, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 7."

9. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye
-- 8; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no -- 3."

10. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

11. The word "was" is changed in the transcript to "were".

12. The words "On the clause" are here inserted in the transcript.

13. The name "Morris" is here inserted in the transcript.

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye -- 6;
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no -- 5."

*15. This motion by Dr. Franklin not stated in the printed Journal, as
are some other motions.

16. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 8."

17. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, aye 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no -- 6; Connecticut, divided [Dr.
Johnson, aye; Mr. Sherman, no].

18. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 9."

*19. In the printed Journal N. Hampshire ay.

20. In the transcript the vote reads: Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia,
South Carolina, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, [19] Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7."

21. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

22. The word "were" is here inserted in the transcript.

23. Madison's direction concerning the amendment is omitted in the
transcript.

24. The date "thirty-first of August" is supplied in the transcript.

25. Madison's derection concerning the amendment is omitted in the
transcript.

*26. In the printed Journal N. Hampshire ay.

27. The word "facto" is here inserted in the transcript.

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SATURDAY  SEPR 15TH  1787 [1]  IN CONVENTION

Mr. CARROL reminded the House that no address to the people had yet been
prepared. He considered it of great importance that such an one should
accompany the Constitution. The people had been accustomed to such on
great occasions, and would expect it on this. He moved that a Committee
be appointed for the special purpose of preparing an Address.

Mr. RUTLEDGE objected on account of the delay it would produce and the
impropriety of addressing the people before it was known whether
Congress would approve and support the plan. Congress, if an address be
thought proper can prepare as good a one. The members of the Convention
can also explain the reasons of what has been done to their respective
Constituents.

Mr. SHERMAN concurred in the opinion that an address was both
unnecessary and improper.

On the motion of Mr. Carrol

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. [*2] abst. S. C. [*2] no. Geo. no [3]

Mr. LANGDON. Some gentlemen have been very uneasy that no increase of
the number of Representatives has been admitted. It has in particular
been thought that one more ought to be allowed to N. Carolina. He was of
opinion that an additional one was due both to that State & to Rho:
Island, & moved to reconsider for that purpose.

Mr. SHERMAN. When the Committee of eleven reported the apportionment --
five Representatives were thought the proper share of N. Carolina.
Subsequent information however seemed to entitle that State to another.

On the motion to reconsider

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pen. divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [4]

Mr. LANGDON moved to add 1 member to each of the Representations of N.
Carolina & Rho: Island.

Mr. KING was agst. any change whatever as opening the door for delays.
There had been no official proof that the numbers of N. C. are greater
than before estimated, and he never could sign the Constitution if Rho:
Island is so be allowed two members that is, one fourth of the number
allowed to Massts, which will be known to be unjust.

Mr. PINKNEY urged the propriety of increasing the number of Reps.
allotted to N. Carolina.

Mr. BEDFORD contended for an increase in favor of Rho: Island, and of
Delaware also

On the question for allowing two Reps. to Rho: Island, it passed in the
negative

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [5]

On the question for allowing six to N. Carolina, it passed in the
negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [6]

Art 1. Sect. 10. (paragraph 2). "No State shall, without the consent of
Congress lay imposts or duties on imports or exports; nor with such
consent, but to the use of the Treasury of the U. States."

In consequence of the proviso moved by Col: Mason: and agreed to on the
13 [7] Sepr., this part of the section was laid aside in favor of the
following substitute viz. "No State shall, without the consent of
Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing its Inspection laws; and the
nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or
exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the U. S; and all such
laws shall be subject to the revision and controul of the Congress"

On a motion to strike out the last part "and all such laws shall be
subject to the revision and controul of the Congress" it passed in the
negative.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [8]

The substitute was then agreed to: Virga. alone being in the negative.

The remainder of the paragraph being under consideration -- viz -- "nor
keep troops nor ships of war in time of peace, nor enter into any
agreement or compact with another State, nor with any foreign power. Nor
engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or
the danger of invasion be so imminent as not to admit of delay, until
Congress can be consulted"

Mr. Mc.HENRY & Mr. CARROL moved that "no State shall be restrained from
laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbours and
erecting light-houses."

Col. MASON in support of this explained and urged the situation of the
Chesapeak which peculiarly required expences of this sort.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS. The States are not restrained from laying tonnage as
the Constitution now Stands. The exception proposed will imply the
contrary, and will put the States in a worse condition than the
gentleman [Col Mason] wishes.

Mr. MADISON. Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage
duties depends on the extent of the power "to regulate commerce." These
terms are vague, but seem to exclude this power of the States. They may
certainly be restrained by Treaty. He observed that there were other
objects for tonnage Duties as the support of Seamen &c. He was more &
more convinced that the regulation of Commerce was in its nature
indivisible and ought to be wholly under one authority.

Mr. SHERMAN. The power of the U. States to regulate trade being supreme
can controul interferences of the State regulations when [9] such
interferences happen; so that there is no danger to be apprehended from
a concurrent jurisdiction.

Mr. LANGDON insisted that the regulation of tonnage was an essential
part of the regulation of trade, and that the States ought to have
nothing to do with it. On motion "that no State shall lay any duty on
tonnage without the Consent of Congress"

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. [10]

The remainder of the paragraph was then remoulded and passed as follows
viz -- "No State shall without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any
agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or
engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as
will not admit of delay."

[11] Art II. sect. 1. (paragraph 6) "or the period for chusing another
president arrive" was changed into "or a President shall be elected"
conformably to a vote of the _____ day of 

Mr. RUTLIDGE and DOCr. FRANKLIN moved to annex to the end of paragraph
7. Sect. 1. art II -- "and he [the President] shall not receive, within
that period, any other emolument from the U. S. or any of them," on
which question

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [12]

Art: II. Sect. 2. "he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons
for offences against the U. S. &c"

Mr. RANDOLPH moved to "except cases of treason." The prerogative of
pardon in these cases was too great a trust. The President may himself
be guilty. The Traytors may be his own instruments.

Col: MASON supported the motion.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS had rather there should be no pardon for treason, than
let the power devolve on the Legislature.

Mr. WILSON. Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed
in the hands of the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he
can be impeached and prosecuted.

Mr. KING thought it would be inconsistent with the Constitutional
separation of the Executive & Legislative powers to let the prerogative
be exercised by the latter. A Legislative body is utterly unfit for the
purpose. They are governed too much by the passions of the moment. In
Massachussets, one assembly would have hung all the insurgents in that
State: the next was equally disposed to pardon them all. He suggested
the expedient of requiring the concurrence of the Senate in Acts of
Pardon.

Mr. MADISON admitted the force of objections to the Legislature, but the
pardon of treasons was so peculiarly improper for the President that he
should acquiesce in the transfer of it to the former, rather than leave
it altogether in the hands of the latter. He would prefer to either an
association of the Senate as a Council of advice, with the President.

Mr. RANDOLPH could not admit the Senate into a share of the Power. the
great danger to liberty lay in a combination between the President &
that body.

Col: MASON. The Senate has already too much power. There can be no
danger of too much lenity in legislative pardons, as the Senate must con
concur, & the President moreover can require 2/3 of both Houses.

On the motion of Mr. Randolph.

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. divd. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [13]

Art II. Sect. 2. (paragraph 2) To the end of this, Mr. GOVERNr. MORRIS
moved to annex "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of law, or in the heads of Departments."

Mr. SHERMAN 2ded. the motion.

Mr. MADISON. It does not go far enough if it be necessary at all.
Superior officers below Heads of Departments ought in some cases to have
the appointment of the lesser offices.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS There is no necessity. Blank commissions can be sent --

On the motion

N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. divd. Va. no.
N. C. ay. S C no. Geo. no. [14]

The motion being lost by the [15] equal division of votes, It was urged
that it be put a second time, some such provision being too necessary to
be omitted, and on a second question it was agreed to nem. con.

Art II. Sect. 1. The words, "and not per capita" -- were struck out as
superfluous -- and the words "by the Representatives" also -- as
improper, the choice of a [16] President being in another mode as well
as eventually by the House of Reps.

Art. II. Sect. 2. After [17] "officers of the U. S. whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for." were added the words "and which shall
be established by law."

Art III. Sect. 2. parag: 3. Mr. PINKNEY & Mr. GERRY moved to annex to
the end, "And a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil
cases."

Mr. GORHAM. The constitution of Juries is different in different States
and the trial itself is usual in different cases in different States.

Mr. KING urged the same objections

Genl. PINKNEY also. He thought such a clause in the Constitution would
be pregnant with embarrassments. The motion was disagreed to nem: con:

Art. IV. Sect 2. parag: 3. the term "legally" was struck out, and [18]
"under the laws thereof" inserted after the word "State," in compliance
with the wish of some who thought the term legal [19] equivocal, and
favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view.

Art. IV. Sect 3. "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction
of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congs"

Mr. GERRY moved to insert after "or parts of States" the words "or a
State and part of a State" which was disagreed to by a large majority;
it appearing to be supposed that the case was comprehended in the words
of the clause as reported by the Committee.

Art. IV. Sect. 4. After the word "Executive" were inserted the words
"when the Legislature can not be convened."

Art. V. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of
the several States shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof, when the
same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the
Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
the Congress: Provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the
year 1808 shall in any manner affect the 1 & 4 clauses in the 9. section
of article 1"

Mr. SHERMAN expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might
be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them
altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Senate. He thought
it reasonable that the proviso in favor of the States importing slaves
should be extended so as to provide that no State should be affected in
its internal police, or deprived of its equality in the Senate.

Col: MASON thought the plan of amending the Constitution exceptionable &
dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to
depend, in the first immediately, in the second, ultimately, on
Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the
people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily
believed would be the case.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. GERRY moved to amend the article so as to require
a Convention on application of 2/3 of the Sts.

Mr. MADISON did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to
propose amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a
call a Convention on the like application. He saw no objection however
against providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except
only that difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which
in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided.

The motion of Mr. GOVr. MORRIS & Mr. GERRY was agreed to nem: con: [see
the first part of the article as finally past] [20]

Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out of art. V. after "legislatures" the
words "of three fourths" and so after the word "Conventions" leaving
future Conventions to act in this matter, like the present Conventions
[21] according to circumstances.

On this motion

N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [22]

Mr. GERRY moved to strike out the words "or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof"

On this [23] motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [24]

Mr. SHERMAN moved according to his idea above expressed to annex to the
end of the article a further proviso "that no State shall without its
consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate."

Mr. MADISON. Begin with these special provisos, and every State will
insist on them, for their boundaries, exports &c. 

On the motion of Mr. Sherman

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N.
C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [25]

Mr. SHERMAN then moved to strike out art V altogether.

Mr. BREARLEY 2ded. the motion, on which

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del divd. Md. no. Va. no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. [26]

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS moved to annex a further proviso -- "that no State,
without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the
Senate"

This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small
States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the
question, saying no.

Col: MASON expressing his discontent at the power given to Congress by a
bare majority to pass navigation acts, which he said would not only
enhance the freight, a consequence he did not so much regard -- but
would enable a few rich merchants in Philada N. York & Boston, to
monopolize the Staples of the Southern States & reduce their value
perhaps 50 Per Ct. -- moved a further proviso "that no law in [27]
nature of a navigation act be passed before the year 1808, without the
consent of 2/3 of each branch of the Legislature"

On this [28] motion

N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. abst. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [29]

Mr. RANDOLPH animadverting on the indefinite and dangerous power given
by the Constitution to Congress, expressing the pain he felt at
differing from the body of the Convention, on the close of the great &
awful subject of their labours, and anxiously wishing for some
accomodating expedient which would relieve him from his embarrassments,
made a motion importing "that amendments to the plan might be offered by
the State Conventions, which should be submitted to and finally decided
on by another general Convention" Should this proposition be
disregarded, it would he said be impossible for him to put his name to
the instrument. Whether he should oppose it afterwards he would not then
decide but he would not deprive himself of the freedom to do so in his
own State, if that course should be prescribed by his final judgment.

Col: MASON 2ded. & followed Mr. Randolph in animadversions on the
dangerous power and structure of the Government, concluding that it
would end either in monarchy, or a tyrannical aristocracy; which, he was
in doubt, but one or other, he was sure. This Constitution had been
formed without the knowledge or idea of the people. A second Convention
will know more of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a
system more consonant to it. It was improper to say to the people, take
this or nothing. As the Constitution now stands, he could neither give
it his support or [30] vote in Virginia; and he could not sign here what
he could not support there. With the expedient of another Convention as
proposed, he could sign.

Mr. PINKNEY. These declarations from members so respectable at the close
of this important scene, give a peculiar solemnity to the present
moment. He descanted on the consequences of calling forth the
deliberations & amendments of the different States on the subject of
Government at large. Nothing but confusion & contrariety could [31]
spring from the experiment. The States will never agree in their plans,
and the Deputies to a second Convention coming together under the
discordant impressions of their Constituents, will never agree.
Conventions are serious things, and ought not to be repeated. He was not
without objections as well as others to the plan. He objected to the
contemptible weakness & dependence of the Executive. He objected to the
power of a majority only of Congs. over Commerce. But apprehending the
danger of a general confusion, and an ultimate decision by the sword, he
should give the plan his support.

Mr. GERRY, stated the objections which determined him to withhold his
name from the Constitution. 1. the duration and reeligibility of the
Senate. 2. the power of the House of Representatives to conceal their
journals. 3. the power of Congress over the places of election. 4 the
unlimited power of Congress over their own compensation. 5. [32]
Massachusetts has not a due share of Representatives allotted to her. 6.
[32] 3/5 of the Blacks are to be represented as if they were freemen. 7.
[32] Under the power over commerce, monopolies may be established. 8.
The vice president being made head of the Senate. He could however he
said get over all these, if the rights of the Citizens were not rendered
insecure 1. [33] by the general power of the Legislature to make what
laws they may please to call necessary and proper. 2. [34] raise armies
and money without limit. 3. [35] to establish a tribunal without juries,
which will be a Star-chamber as to Civil cases. Under such a view of the
Constitution, the best that could be done he conceived was to provide
for a second general Convention.

On the question on the proposition of Mr. Randolph. All the States
answered -- no

On the question to agree to the Constitution, as amended. All the States
ay.

The Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed.

And the House adjourned.

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

*2. In the printed Journal N. Carolina -- no & S.Carol: omitted.

3. In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, aye -- 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, South Carolina, [2] Georgia, no -- 6; North Carolina, [2]
absent."

4. In the transcript the vote reads: New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 8; Massachusetts, New Jersey, no -- 2; Pennsylvania, divided.

5. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no -- 6."

6. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 5; New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no --
6."

7. The word "of" is here inserted in transcript.

8. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, no -- 7; Pennsylvania, divided."

9. In Madison's notes the word "when" is written above "which." The
transcript uses "when."

10. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye -- 6; Pennsylvania,
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no -- 4; Connecticut, divided."

11. In the transcript this paragraph reads as follows: "article 2, sect.
I, (the sixth paragraph) the words 'or the period for choosing another
President arrive,' were changed into, 'or a President shall be elected,'
conformably to a vote of the seventh of September."

12. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 7;
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Carolina, no -- 4."

13. In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, Georgia, aye -- 2; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, no -- 8; Connecticut, divided."

14. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye -- 5; Massachusetts, Delaware,
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 5; Maryland, divided."

15. The word "an" is substituted in the transcript for "the."

16. The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.

17. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

18. The expression "the words" is here inserted in the transcript.

19. The transcript italicizes the word "legal."

20. Mardison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

21. The transcript uses the word "Conventions" in the singular.

22. In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusette, Connecticut, New
Jersey, aye -- 3; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 7; New Hampshire, divided."

23. The word "which" is substituted in the transcript for "this."

24. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, aye -- 1; New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 10."

25. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, aye -- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8."

26. In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, aye --
2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no -- 8; Delaware, divided."

27. The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.

28. The word "which" is substituted in the transcript for "this."

29. In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye
-- 3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, no -- 7; North Carolina,
absent."

30. The word "or" is changed in the transcript to "nor."

31. The word "will is substituted in the transcript for "could."

32. The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.

33. The figure "1" is changed in the transcript to "first."

34. The figure "2" is changed in the transcript to "secondly, to."

35. The figure "3" is changed in the transcript to "thirdly."

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MONDAY SEPr 17, 1787: [1] IN CONVENTION

The engrossed Constitution being read,

DOCr. FRANKLIN rose with a speech in his hand, which he had reduced to
writing for his own conveniency, [2] and which Mr. Wilson read in the
words following.

Mr. President

I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do
not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them:
For having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being
obliged by better information, or fuller consideration, to change
opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but
found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more
apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the
judgment of others. Most men indeed as well as most sects in Religion,
think themselves in possession of all truth, and that wherever others
differ from them it is so far error. Steele a Protestant in a Dedication
tells the Pope, that the only difference between our Churches in their
opinions of the certainty of their doctrines is, the Church of Rome is
infallible and the Church of England is never in the wrong. But though
many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility
as of that of their sect, few express it so naturally as a certain
french lady, who in a dispute with her sister, said "I don't know how it
happens, Sister but I meet with no body but myself, that's always in the
right -- Il n'y a que moi qui a toujours raison."

In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its
faults, if they are such; because I think a general Government necessary
for us, and there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing to
the people if well administered, and believe farther that this is likely
to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in
Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall
become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of
any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may
be able to make a better Constitution. For when you assemble a number of
men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble
with those men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of
opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an
assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes
me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it
does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with
confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like those of the
Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of separation,
only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats.
Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better,
and because I am not sure, that it is not the best. The opinions I have
had of its errors, I sacrifice to the public good. I have never
whispered a syllable of them abroad. Within these walls they were born,
and here they shall die. If every one of us in returning to our
Constituents were to report the objections he has had to it, and
endeavor to gain partizans in support of them, we might prevent its
being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary effects &
great advantages resulting naturally in our favor among foreign Nations
as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity. Much of
the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and securing
happiness to the people, depends, on opinion, on the general opinion of
the goodness of the Government, as well as well as of the wisdom and
integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own sakes as a
part of the people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act heartily
and unanimously in recommending this Constitution (if approved by
Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever our influence may
extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors to the means of having
it well administred.

On the whole, Sir, I can not help expressing a wish that every member of
the Convention who may still have objections to it, would with me, on
this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to make
manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument. -- 

He then moved that the Constitution be signed by the members and offered
the following as a convenient form viz. "Done in Convention by the
unanimous consent of the States present the 17th. of Sepr. &c -- In
Witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names."

This ambiguous form had been drawn up by Mr. G. M. in order to gain the
dissenting members, and put into the hands of Docr. Franklin that it
might have the better chance of success.

Mr. GORHAM said if it was not too late he could wish, for the purpose of
lessening objections to the Constitution, that the clause declaring "the
number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every forty thousand"
which had produced so much discussion, might be yet reconsidered, in
order to strike out 40,000 & insert "thirty thousand." This would not he
remarked establish that as an absolute rule, but only give Congress a
greater latitude which could not be thought unreasonable.

Mr. KING & Mr. CARROL seconded & supported the idea of Mr. Gorham.

When the PRESIDENT rose, for the purpose of putting the question, he
said that although his situation had hitherto restrained him from
offering his sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it
might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not
forbear expressing his wish that the alteration proposed might take
place. It was much to be desired that the objections to the plan
recommended might be made as few as possible. The smallness of the
proportion of Representatives had been considered by many members of the
Convention an insufficient security for the rights & interests of the
people. He acknowledged that it had always appeared to himself among the
exceptionable parts of the plan, and late as the present moment was for
admitting amendments, he thought this of so much consequence that it
would give [3] much satisfaction to see it adopted [*4]

No opposition was made to the proposition of Mr. Gorham and it was
agreed to unanimously.

On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled in order to be
signed. It was agreed to all the States [6] answering ay.

Mr. RANDOLPH then rose and with an allusion to the observations of Docr.
Franklin apologized for his refusing to sign the Constitution
notwithstanding the vast majority & venerable names that would give
sanction to its wisdom and its worth. He said however that he did not
mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose the Constitution
without doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his
duty as it should be prescribed by his future judgment. He refused to
sign, because he thought the object of the Convention would be
frustrated by the alternative which it presented to the people. Nine
States will fail to ratify the plan and confusion must ensue. With such
a view of the subject he ought not, he could not, by pledging himself to
support the plan, restrain himself from taking such steps as might
appear to him most consistent with the public good.

Mr. GOVr. MORRIS said that he too had objections, but considering the
present plan as the best that was to be attained, he should take it with
all its faults. The majority had determined in its favor and by that
determination he should abide. The moment this plan goes forth all other
considerations will be laid aside, and the great question will be, shall
there be a national Government or not? and this must take place or a
general anarchy will be the alternative. He remarked that the signing in
the form proposed related only to the fact that the [7] States present
were unanimous.

Mr. WILLIAMSON suggested that the signing should be confined to the
letter accompanying the Constitution to Congress, which might perhaps do
nearly as well, and would he found be [8] satisfactory to some members
[*9] who disliked the Constitution. For himself he did not think a
better plan was to be expected and had no scruples against putting his
name to it.

Mr. HAMILTON expressed his anxiety that every member should sign. A few
characters of consequence, by opposing or even refusing to sign the
Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the latent sparks
which [10] lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may
soon subside. No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his
[11] were known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy
and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good to be expected from
the plan on the other.

Mr. BLOUNT said he had declared that he would not sign, so as to pledge
himself in support of the plan, but he was relieved by the form proposed
and would without committing himself attest the fact that the plan was
the unanimous act of the States in Convention.

DOCr. FRANKLIN expressed his fears from what Mr. Randolph had said, that
he thought himself alluded to in the remarks offered this morning to the
House. He declared that when drawing up that paper he did not know that
any particular member would refuse to sign his name to the instrument,
and hoped to be so understood. He professed a high sense of obligation
to Mr. Randolph for having brought forward the plan in the first
instance, and for the assistance he had given in its progress, and hoped
that he would yet lay aside his objections, and by concurring with his
brethren, prevent the great mischief which the refusal of his name might
produce.

Mr. RANDOLPH could not but regard the signing in the proposed form, as
the same with signing the Constitution. The change of form therefore
could make no difference with him. He repeated that in refusing to sign
the Constitution, he took a step which might be the most awful of his
life, but it was dictated by his conscience, and it was not possible for
him to hesitate, much less, to change. He repeated also his persuasion,
that the holding out this plan with a final alternative to the people,
of accepting or rejecting it in toto, would really produce the anarchy &
civil convulsions which were apprehended from the refusal of individuals
to sign it.

Mr. GERRY described the painful feelings of his situation, and the
embarrassment [12] under which he rose to offer any further observations
on the subject wch. had been finally decided. Whilst the plan was
depending, he had treated it with all the freedom he thought it
deserved. He now felt himself bound as he was disposed to treat it with
the respect due to the Act of the Convention. He hoped he should not
violate that respect in declaring on this occasion his fears that a
Civil war may result from the present crisis of the U. S. In
Massachussetts, particularly he saw the danger of this calamitous event
-- In that State there are two parties, one devoted to Democracy, the
worst he thought of all political evils, the other as violent in the
opposite extreme. From the collision of these in opposing and resisting
the Constitution, confusion was greatly to be feared. He had thought it
necessary, for this & other reasons that the plan should have been
proposed in a more mediating shape, in order to abate the heat and
opposition of parties. As it has been passed by the Convention, he was
persuaded it would have a contrary effect. He could not therefore by
signing the Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all events.
The proposed form made no difference with him. But if it were not
otherwise apparent, the refusals to sign should never be known from him.
Alluding to the remarks of Docr. Franklin, he could not he said but view
them as levelled at himself and the other gentlemen who meant not to
sign;

Genl. PINKNEY. We are not likely to gain many converts by the ambiguity
of the proposed form of signing. He thought it best to be candid and let
the form speak the substance. If the meaning of the signers be left in
doubt, his purpose would not be answered. He should sign the
Constitution with a view to support it with all his influence, and
wished to pledge himself accordingly.

DOCr. FRANKLIN. It is too soon to pledge ourselves before Congress and
our Constituents shall have approved the plan.

Mr. INGERSOL did not consider the signing, either as a mere attestation
of the fact, or as pledging the signers to support the Constitution at
all events; but as a recommendation, of what, all things considered, was
the most eligible.

On the motion of Docr. Franklin

N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.
C. ay. S. C. divd. [*13] Geo. ay. [15]

Mr. KING suggested that the Journals of the Convention should be either
destroyed, or deposited in the custody of the President. He thought if
suffered to be made public, a bad use would be made of them by those who
would wish to prevent the adoption of the Constitution.

Mr. WILSON prefered the second expedient, he had at one time liked the
first best; but as false suggestions may be propagated it should not be
made impossible to contradict them.

A question was then put on depositing the Journals and other papers of
the Convention in the hands of the President, on which,

N. H. ay. Mtts. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Md. [*18] no.
Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [19]

The President having asked what the Convention meant should be done with
the Journals &c, whether copies were to be allowed to the members if
applied for. It was Resolved nem: con "that he retain the Journal and
other papers, subject to the order of the [22] Congress, if ever formed
under the Constitution.

The members then proceeded to sign the instrument. [23]

[24] Whilst the last members were signing it [25] Doctr. FRANKLIN
looking towards the Presidents Chair, at the back of which a rising sun
happened to be painted, observed to a few members near him, that
Painters had found it difficult to distinguish in their art a rising
from a setting sun. I have said he, often and often in the course of the
Session, and the vicisitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue,
looked at that behind the President without being able to tell whether
it was rising or setting: But now at length I have the happiness to know
that it is a rising and not a setting Sun

[24] The Constitution being signed by all the members except Mr.
Randolph, Mr. Mason, and Mr. Gerry who declined giving it the sanction
of their names, the Convention dissolved itself by an Adjournment sine
die -- 

[26] The few alterations and corrections made in these debates which are
not in my hand writing, were dictated by me and made in my presence by
John C. Payne.

JAMES MADISON.

___________

1. The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.

2. The word "conveniency" is changed in the transcript to "convenience."

3. The word "him" is here inserted in the transcript.

*4. Transfer the remarks in brackets, to the bottom margin. [5] [This
was the only occasion on which the President entered at all into the
discussions of the Convention].

5. Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.

6. The word "States" is italicized in the transcript.

7. The transcript italicizes the word "the."

8. The words "be found" are substituted in the transcript for "the found
be."

*9. He alluded to Mr. Blount for one.

10. The word "which" is changed in the transcript to "that."

11. The word "own" is here inserted in the transcript.

12. The transcript uses the word "embarrassment" in the plural.

*13. Genl. Pinkney & Mr Butler disliked the equivocal form of the [14]
signing, and on that account voted in the negative.

14. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

15. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; South Carolina, [*16] divided."

*16. To be transferred hither. [17]

17. Madison's direction concerning his note is omitted in the transcript.

*18. This negative of Maryland was occasioned by the language of the
instructions to the Deputies of that State, which required them to
report to the State, the proceedings of the Convention.

19. In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye -- 10; Maryland, [20] no -- 1."

20. Transfer. [21]

21. Madison's direction concerning his note is omitted in the transcript.

22. The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.

23. In place of the word "instrument," the transcript inserts the
following words: "Constitution, as finally amended, as follows." The
Constitution is then inserted.

24. These two final paragraphs of Madison's notes are transposed in the
transcript to follow the signatures to the Constitution.

25. The word "it" is omitted in the transcript.

26. This statement and Madison's signature are omitted in the
transcript.

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