                    SUPREME COURT U.S.

       [United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812)]

                    THE UNITED STATES
                            v.
                    HUDSON AND GOODWIN

                           1812
                         Feb. 13th

                 Absent ... Washington, Justice

[Syllabus:] The courts of the U. States have no common law jurisdiction in 
cases of libel against the government of the United States. But they have 
the power to fine for contempts, to imprison for contumacy, and to enforce 
the observance of their orders, &c.

THIS was a case certified from the Circuit Court for the District of 
Connecticut, in which, upon argument of a general demurrer to an indictment 
for a libel on the President and Congress of the United States, contained in 
the Connecticut Currant, of the 7th of May, 1806, charging them with having 
in secret voted two millions of dollars as a present to Bonaparte for leave 
to make a treaty with Spain, the judges of that court were divided in 
opinion upon the question, whether the Circuit Court of the United States 
had a common law jurisdiction in cases of libel.

PINKNEY, Attorney General, in behalf of the United States, and DANA for the 
Defendants, declined arguing the case.

The Court, having taken time to consider, the following opinion was 
delivered (on the last day of the term, all the judges being present) by 
JOHNSON, J.

The only question which this case presents is, whether the Circuit Courts of 
the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases. 
We state it thus broadly because a decision on a case of libel will apply to 
every case in which jurisdiction is not vested in those courts by statute.

Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by 
this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public 
opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been 
asserted; and the general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of 
opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition.

The course of reasoning which leads to this conclusion is simple, obvious, 
and admits of but little illustration. The powers of the general Government 
are made up of concessions from the several states -- whatever is not 
expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The judicial 
power of the United States is a constituent part of those concessions -- 
that power is to be exercised by Courts organized for the purpose, and 
brought into existence by an effort of the legislative powers of the Union. 
Of all the Courts which the United States may, under their general powers, 
constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived 
immediately from the constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot 
deprive it. All other Courts created by the general Government possess no 
jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can 
be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general Government will 
authorize them to confer.

It is not necessary to inquire whether the general Government, in any and 
what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its Courts a jurisdiction 
in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not 
been conferred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those Courts 
as a consequence of their creation.

And such is the opinion of the majority of the Court: For, the power which 
congress possess to create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily 
implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those Courts to particular 
objects; and when a Court is created, and its operations confined to certain 
specific objects, with what propriety can it assume to itself a jurisdiction 
-- much more extended -- in its nature very indefinite -- applicable to a 
great variety of subjects -- varying in every state in the Union -- and with 
regard to which there exists no definite criterion of distribution between 
the district and Circuit Courts of the same district?

The only ground on which it has ever been contended that this jurisdiction 
could be maintained is, that, upon the formation of any political body, an 
implied power to preserve its own existence and promote the end and object 
of its creation, necessarily results to it. But without examining how far 
this consideration is applicable to the peculiar character of our 
constitution, it may be remarked that it is a principle by no means peculiar 
to the common law. It is coeval, probably, with the first formation of a 
limited Government; belongs to a system of universal law, and may as well 
support the assumption of many other powers as those more peculiarly 
acknowledged by the common law of England.

But if admitted as applicable to the state of things in this country, the 
consequence would not result from it which is here contended for. If it may 
communicate certain implied powers to the general Government, it would not 
follow that the Courts of that Government are vested with jurisdiction over 
any particular act done by an individual in supposed violation of the peace 
and dignity of the sovereign power. The legislative authority of the Union 
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment for it, and declare the 
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.

Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from 
the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the 
state is not among those powers. To fine for contempt -- imprison for 
contumacy -- inforce the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be 
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all 
others: and so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately 
derived from statute; but all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common 
law cases we are of opinion is not within their implied powers.


