                    U.S. Supreme Court 

     CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)

                       387 U.S. 523 

  CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY
                   OF SAN FRANCISCO. 
     APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF
              CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE 
                     DISTRICT. No. 92. 
                  Argued February 15, 1967. 
                    Decided June 5, 1967. 

Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for 
refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his 
consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters 
which he leased and residential use of which allegedly violated the 
apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection ordinance 
unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections, appellant 
while awaiting trial sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of 
prohibition, which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 
360, and similar cases, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that 
the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The State Supreme Court 
denied a petition for hearing. Held:

     1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who
     has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement
     inspection of his personal residence. Frank v. Maryland,
     supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 528-534.

          (a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
          which is enforceable against the States through
          the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of
          "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to
          safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
          against arbitrary invasions by governmental
          officials. P. 528. 

          (b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an
          unconsented warrantless search of private
          property is "unreasonable." Pp. 528-529. 

          (c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v.
          Maryland, supra, Fourth Amendment interests
          are not merely "peripheral" where municipal fire,
          health, and housing inspection programs are
          involved whose purpose is to determine the
          existence of physical conditions not complying
          with local ordinances. Those programs,
          moreover, are enforceable by criminal process,
          as is refusal to allow an inspection. Pp. 529-531.

          (d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot
          be justified on the grounds that they make
          minimal demands on occupants; [387 U.S. 523, 524]
          that warrants in such cases are unfeasible; or that
          area inspection programs could not function
          under reasonable search-warrant requirements.
          Pp. 531-533. 

     2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be
     issued for area code-enforcement inspections is not dependent
     on the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates the
     code but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's
     appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards
     to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants
     will necessarily vary with the municipal program being
     enforced. Pp. 534-539. 

     3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency
     situations should normally be sought only after entry is refused.
     Pp. 539-540.

     4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to
     insist that the inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 540.

237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded.

Marshall W. Krause argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs
was Donald M. Cahen.

Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney
General, and Gloria F. DeHart, Deputy Attorney General.

Leonard J. Kerpelman filed a brief for Homeowners in Opposition to Housing 
Authoritarianism, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Thomas M. O'Connor, 
John W. Sholenberger, Roger Arnebergh, Barnett I. Shur, Alexander G. Brown, 
David Stahl and Robert E. Michalski for the Member Municipalities of the 
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and by Elliot L. Richardson, 
Attorney General, Willie J. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Edward T. 
Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Max Rosenblatt, Lewis H. Weinstein and Loyd 
M. Starrett for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. [387 U.S. 523, 525] 

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 , this Court upheld, by a five-to-four 
vote, a state court conviction of a home-owner who refused to permit a 
municipal health inspector to enter and inspect his premises without a 
search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 , a similar conviction was 
affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since those closely divided decisions, 
more intensive efforts at all levels of government to contain and eliminate 
urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection techniques, while 
numerous decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth 
Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 . In view of the growing 
nationwide importance of the problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this 
case and in See v. City of Seattle, post, p. 541, to re-examine whether 
administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, 
violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U.S. 808 .

Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court alleging that he
was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco
Housing Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his
residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court
because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its
face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal
affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.
Appellant properly raised and had considered by the California courts the
federal constitutional questions he now presents to this Court.

Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this prohibition 
proceeding, we shall set forth the parties' factual allegations. On November 
6, 1963, an inspector [387 U.S. 523, 526] of the Division of Housing 
Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an 
apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible 
violations of the city's Housing Code. [1] The building's manager informed 
the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear 
of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the building's 
occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the 
inspector confronted appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of 
the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the 
inspector lacked a search warrant.

The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant, and
appellant again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed
ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's office. When appellant
failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22.
They informed appellant that he was required by law to permit an inspection
under 503 of the Housing Code:

     "Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized
     employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as
     may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall,
     upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to
     enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises
     in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the
     Municipal Code." [387 U.S. 523, 527]

Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his apartment 
without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed charging him 
with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. 
[2] Appellant was arrested on December 2 and released on bail. When his 
demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, appellant filed this petition 
for a writ of prohibition.

Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that 503 is contrary to the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it authorizes municipal officials 
to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable 
cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists therein. 
Consequently, appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted under 507 for 
refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by 503. 
Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price, and decisions in other States, 
[3] the District [387 U.S. 523, 528] Court of Appeal held that 503 does not 
violate Fourth Amendment rights because it "is part of a regulatory scheme 
which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that 
section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not 
be exercised under unreasonable conditions." Having concluded that Frank v. 
Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, 
must be overruled, we reverse.

                            I. 

The Fourth Amendment provides that, "The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless 
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The 
Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people 
which "is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 . As 
such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 .

Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against 
"unreasonable searches and seizures" into workable guidelines for the 
decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years 
divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle, 
justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been 
followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of 
private property without proper consent [387 U.S. 523, 529] is 
"unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, 
e. g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 
U.S. 48 ; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 ; Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20 . As the Court explained in Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14 :

     "The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a
     grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
     chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
     surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield
     to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
     officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."

In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to 
permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of 
locating and abating a suspected public nuisance. Although Frank can 
arguably be distinguished from this case on its facts, [4] the Frank opinion 
has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the 
rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District Court of Appeal so interpreted Frank 
in this case, and that ruling is the core of appellant's challenge here. We 
proceed to a re-examination of the factors which [387 U.S. 523, 530] 
persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction of the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches.

To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and housing inspection 
programs "touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests 
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official 
intrusion," 359 U.S., at 367 , because the inspections are merely to 
determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with minimum 
standards prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector 
does not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search for 
"evidence of criminal action" which may be used to secure the owner's 
criminal conviction, historic interests of "self-protection" jointly 
protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments [5] are said not to be 
involved, but only the less intense "right to be secure from intrusion into 
personal privacy." Id., at 365. 

We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private 
property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for 
the fruits and instrumentalities of crime. For this reason alone, Frank 
differed from the great bulk of Fourth Amendment cases which have been 
considered by this Court. But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment 
interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely "peripheral." It is 
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are 
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is 
suspected of criminal behavior. [6] For instance, even the most law-abiding 
citizen [387 U.S. 523, 531] has a very tangible interest in limiting the 
circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official 
authority, for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official 
sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And even 
accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are 
here considering do in fact jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the 
property owner. Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes 
are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation 
by the inspector leads to a criminal complaint. [7] Even in cities where 
discovery of a violation produces only an administrative compliance order, 
[8] refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is 
verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant. [9] Finally, as 
this case demonstrates, refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime, 
punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.

The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts, two other 
justifications for permitting administrative health and safety inspections 
without a warrant. First, it is argued that these inspections are "designed 
to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant." 359 U.S., at 
367 . The ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with safeguards, and 
at any rate the inspector's particular decision to enter must comply with 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness even if he may enter without a 
warrant. [10] In addition, the argument [387 U.S. 523, 532] proceeds, the 
warrant process could not function effectively in this field. The decision 
to inspect an entire municipal area is based upon legislative or 
administrative assessment of broad factors such as the area's age and 
condition. Unless the magistrate is to review such policy matters, he must 
issue a "rubber stamp" warrant which provides no protection at all to the 
property owner.

In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes behind the 
warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. Under the present 
system, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing 
whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of 
his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power 
to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting 
under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a 
neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to 
canvass an area. Yet, only by refusing entry and risking a criminal 
conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspector's decision to 
search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to take this 
risk, as appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason 
for the inspection than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to 
gain entry. The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant 
subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely 
the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently 
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need 
to [387 U.S. 523, 533] search. See cases cited, p. 529, supra. We simply 
cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not 
needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for 
individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be 
invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.

The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative searches is 
that the public interest demands such a rule: it is vigorously argued that 
the health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon 
enforcement of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that the 
only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized 
inspection of all physical structures. Of course, in applying any 
reasonableness standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an 
argument that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive 
careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark. The 
question is not, at this stage at least, whether these inspections may be 
made, but whether they may be made without a warrant. For example, to say 
that gambling raids may not be made at the discretion of the police without 
a warrant is not necessarily to say that gambling raids may never be made. 
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not 
whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but 
whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in 
turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is 
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. See 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 -771. It has nowhere been urged 
that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve 
their goals within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement. 
Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive. [387 U.S. 523, 
534] 

In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at issue here 
are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a 
warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment 
guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. 
Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are 
insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's 
protections. Because of the nature of the municipal programs under 
consideration, however, these conclusions must be the beginning, not the 
end, of our inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique 
character of these inspection programs by refusing to require search 
warrants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the question 
whether some other accommodation between public need and individual rights 
is essential.

                           II. 

The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause." Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment cases, 
appellant argues not only that code enforcement inspection programs must be 
circumscribed by a warrant procedure, but also that warrants should issue 
only when the inspector possesses probable cause to believe that a 
particular dwelling contains violations of the minimum standards prescribed 
by the code being enforced. We disagree.

In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be 
obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to 
search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To 
apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the 
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the 
constitutionally protected [387 U.S. 523, 535] interests of the private 
citizen. For example, in a criminal investigation, the police may undertake 
to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest 
would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the 
hope that these goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these 
goods, even with a warrant, is "reasonable" only when there is "probable 
cause" to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.

Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the inspection 
programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with 
minimum physical standards for private property. The primary governmental 
interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional development of 
conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. Because fires 
and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly conditions 
adversely affect the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous 
courts have upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce 
such minimum standards even upon existing structures. [11] In determining 
whether a particular inspection is reasonable  and thus in determining 
whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection  the 
need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals 
of code enforcement.

There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this field that 
the only effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum 
standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic [387 U.S. 
523, 536] inspections of all structures. [12] It is here that the probable 
cause debate is focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area 
inspection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area 
as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular building. 
Appellee contends that, if the probable cause standard urged by appellant is 
adopted, the area inspection will be eliminated as a means of seeking 
compliance with code standards and the reasonable goals of code enforcement 
will be dealt a crushing blow.

In meeting this contention, appellant argues first, that his probable cause 
standard would not jeopardize area inspection programs because only a minute 
portion of the population will refuse to consent to such inspections, and second, that individual privacy in any event should be 
given preference to the public interest in conducting such inspections. The 
first argument, even if true, is irrelevant to the question whether the area 
inspection is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The 
second argument is in effect an assertion that the area inspection is an 
unreasonable search. Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for 
determining reasonableness [387 U.S. 523, 537] other than by balancing the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But we think 
that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of 
area code-enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history 
of judicial and public acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S., at 367 -
371. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be 
prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique 
would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions  faulty wiring is an 
obvious example  are not observable from outside the building and indeed 
may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the 
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of 
evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban 
citizen's privacy. Both the majority and the dissent in Frank emphatically 
supported this conclusion:

     "Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to
     inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic
     area-by-area search or, as here. to treat a specific problem, is
     of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community
     health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket
     requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of
     evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is
     great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the
     power of inspection to its health officials; and these inspections
     are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few.
     Certainly, the nature of our society has not vitiated the need for
     inspections first thought necessary 158 years ago, nor has
     experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in
     meeting this need by means that history and dominant public
     opinion have sanctioned." 359 U.S., at 372 . [387 U.S. 523, 538] 

     "... This is not to suggest that a health official need show the
     same kind of proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one
     must who would search for the fruits or instrumentalities of
     crime. Where considerations of health and safety are involved,
     the facts that would justify an inference of `probable cause' to
     make an inspection are clearly different from those that would
     justify such an inference where a criminal investigation has
     been undertaken. Experience may show the need for periodic
     inspections of certain facilities without a further showing of
     cause to believe that substandard conditions dangerous to the
     public are being maintained. The passage of a certain period
     without inspection might of itself be sufficient in a given
     situation to justify the issuance of a warrant. The test of
     `probable cause' required by the Fourth Amendment can take
     into account the nature of the search that is being sought." 359
     U.S., at 383 (MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting). 

Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search of 
private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious 
that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable 
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection 
are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which 
will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the 
passage of time, the nature of the building (e. g., a multi-family apartment 
house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily 
depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. 
It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the 
standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a "synthetic search 
warrant" and thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359 Page 539 U.S., at 373 . But we do not 
agree. The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to 
search private property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. 
But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public 
interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause 
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. 
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 . Such an approach neither endangers time-honored 
doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the 
probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to 
the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, 
best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be 
free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy. See Eaton v. Price, 
364 U.S., at 273 -274 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

                           III. 

Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, 
nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even 
without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency 
situations. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 
306 (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 
(compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 
186 U.S. 380 (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N. 
E. 498 (summary destruction of tubercular cattle). On the other hand, in the 
case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to 
inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens 
allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical 
matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant 
specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should 
normally be sought only after entry is refused unless [387 U.S. 523, 540] 
there has been a citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for 
securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure 
does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, 
in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to 
inspect.

                           IV. 

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to 
permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There 
was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made 
three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to 
search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify 
either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, 
the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent 
of the landlord, through the building's manager, but appellee does not 
contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of 
appellant's premises. Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 ; Chapman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 610 ; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 . 
Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore conclude 
that appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors 
obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not constitutionally be 
convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these circumstances a 
writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California law.

The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

     It is so ordered. 

[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, see post, p. 546.]



Footnotes 

[1] The inspection was conducted pursuant to 86 (3) of the San Francisco 
Municipal Code, which provides that apartment house operators shall pay an 
annual license fee in part to defray the cost of periodic inspections of 
their buildings. The inspections are to be made by the Bureau of Housing 
Inspection "at least once a year and as often thereafter as may be deemed 
necessary." The permit of occupancy, which prescribes the apartment units 
which a building may contain, is not issued until the license is obtained.

[2] "Sec. 507 PENALTY FOR VIOLATION. Any person, the owner or his authorized 
agent who violates, disobeys, omits, neglects, or refuses to comply with, or 
who resists or opposes the execution of any of the provisions of this Code, 
or any order of the Superintendent, the Director of Public Works, or the 
Director of Public Health made pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not 
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment, not exceeding 
six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment, unless otherwise 
provided in this Code, and shall be deemed guilty of a separate offense for 
every day such violation, disobedience, omission, neglect or refusal shall 
continue."

[3] Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A. 2d 764 (1956); City of St. Louis v. 
Evans, 337 S. W. 2d 948 (Mo. 1960); State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio 
St. 123, 151 N. E. 2d 523 (1958), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 364 
U.S. 263 (1960). See also State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 139 N. W. 2d 406 
(1966); Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222 N. E. 2d 681 (1966), 
appeal docketed Jan. 5, 1967, No. 1179, Misc., O. T. 1966; People v. 
Laverne, 14 N. Y. 2d 304, 200 N. E. 2d 441 (1964).

[4] In Frank, the Baltimore ordinance required that the health inspector 
"have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or 
enclosure" before he could demand entry without a warrant, a requirement 
obviously met in Frank because the inspector observed extreme structural 
decay and a pile of rodent feces on the appellant's premises. Section 503 of 
the San Francisco Housing Code has no such "cause" requirement, but neither 
did the Ohio ordinance at issue in Eaton v. Price, a case which four 
Justices thought was controlled by Frank. 364 U.S., at 264 , 265, n. 2 
(opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

[5] See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 . Compare Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 766 -772.

[6] See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 254 -256 (MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, 
dissenting); District of Columbia v. Little, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 
13, aff'd, 339 U.S. 1 .

[7] See New York, N. Y., Administrative Code D26-8.0 (1964).

[8] See Washington, D.C., Housing Regulations 2104.

[9] This is the more prevalent enforcement procedure. See Note, Enforcement 
of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 813-816.

[10] The San Francisco Code requires that the inspector display proper
credentials, that he inspect "at reasonable times," and that [387 U.S. 523, 532]
he not obtain entry by force, at least when there is no emergency. The
Baltimore ordinance in Frank required that the inspector "have cause to
suspect that a nuisance exists." Some cities notify residents in advance, by
mail or posted notice, of impending area inspections. State courts upholding
these inspections without warrants have imposed a general reasonableness
requirement. See cases cited, n. 3, supra.

[11] See Abbate Bros. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. 2d 337, 142 N. E. 2d 691; 
City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S. W. 2d 869 (Ky.); Adamec v. Post, 273 
N. Y. 250, 7 N. E. 2d 120; Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 
155 N. E. 2d 775; Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S. C. 538, 88 S. E. 2d 
683; Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N. W. 2d 156.

[12] See Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and Conservation, 25 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 705, 718 and n. 43; Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative 
Law, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 401, 423 and n. 93; Comment, Rent Withholding and 
the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 304, 316-317; 
Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801, 807, 
851; Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1115, 1124-1125. 
Section 311 (a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 
478, 42 U.S.C. 1468 (1964 ed., Supp. I), authorizes grants of federal funds 
"to cities, other municipalities, and counties for the purpose of assisting 
such localities in carrying out programs of concentrated code enforcement in 
deteriorated or deteriorating areas in which such enforcement, together with 
those public improvements to be provided by the locality, may be expected to 
arrest the decline of the area." [387 U.S. 523, 541] 




