         LEWIS v. UNITED STATES, 445 U.S. 55 (1980)

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a defendant's extant prior 
conviction, flawed because he was without counsel, as required by Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), may constitute the predicate for a 
subsequent conviction under 1202 (a) (1), as amended, of Title VII of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. App. 
1202 (a) (1). [1]

                              I

In 1961, petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr., upon his plea of guilty, 
was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony [445 U.S. 55, 57] for 
breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. See Fla. 
Stat. 810.05 (1961). He served a term of imprisonment. That conviction 
has never been overturned, nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying 
pardon or permission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a 
firearm. See 18 U.S.C. App. 1203 (2) and 18 U.S.C. 925 (c).

In January 1977, Lewis, on probable cause, was arrested in Virginia, and 
later was charged by indictment with having knowingly received and 
possessed at that time a specified firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
App. 1202 (a) (1). [2] He waived a jury and was given a bench trial. It 
was stipulated that the weapon in question had been shipped in 
interstate commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an 
exemplified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida felony 
proceeding. App. 10. 

Shortly before the trial, petitioner's counsel informed the court that 
he had been advised that Lewis was not represented by counsel in the 
1961 Florida proceeding.[3] He claimed that under Gideon v. Wainwright, 
supra, a violation of 1202 [445 U.S. 55, 58] (a) (1) could not be 
predicated on a prior conviction obtained in violation of petitioner's 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court rejected that claim, 
ruling that the constitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction 
was immaterial with respect to petitioner's status under 1202 (a) (1) as 
a previously convicted felon at the time of his arrest. Petitioner, 
accordingly, offered no evidence as to whether in fact he had been 
convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We therefore assume, for 
present purposes, that he was without counsel at that time.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, by 
a divided vote, affirmed. 591 F.2d 978 (1979). It held that a defendant, 
purely as a defense to a prosecution under 1202 (a) (1), could not 
attack collaterally an outstanding prior felony conviction, and that the 
statutory prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior 
conviction was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals also 
rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the effect that the use of 
the prior conviction as a predicate for his prosecution under 1202 (a) 
(1) violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

Because of conflict among the Courts of Appeals,[4] we granted 
certiorari. 442 U.S. 939 (1979). [445 U.S. 55, 59] 

                             II

Four cases decided by this Court provide the focus for petitioner's 
attack upon his conviction. The first, and pivotal one, is Gideon v. 
Wainwright, supra, where the Court held that a state felony conviction 
without counsel, and without a valid waiver of counsel, was 
unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling 
is fully retroactive. Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971). [445 U.S. 
55, 60]  

The second case is Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). There the 
Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon could not be used for 
enhancement of punishment under a State's recidivist statute. The third 
is United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), where it was held that 
such a conviction could not be considered by a court in sentencing a 
defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is Loper v. 
Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972), where the Court disallowed the use of the 
conviction to impeach the general credibility of the defendant. The 
prior conviction, the plurality opinion said, "lacked reliability." Id., 
at 484, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 , and n. 20 
(1965).

We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the present case. 
Petitioner's position, however, is that the four cases require a 
reversal of his conviction under 1202 (a) (1) on both statutory and 
constitutional grounds. 

                             III

The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case concerning the 
interpretation of a statute the "starting point" must be the language of 
the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). 
See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). An 
examination of 1202 (a) (1) reveals that its proscription is directed 
unambiguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court of the 
United States or of a State . . . of a felony." No modifier is present, 
and nothing suggests any restriction on the scope of the term 
"convicted." "Nothing on the face of the statute suggests a 
congressional intent to limit its coverage to persons [whose convictions 
are not subject to collateral attack]." United States v. Culbert, 435 
U.S. 371, 373 (1978); see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 
(1979). The statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is 
that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until 
the conviction is vacated or the felon is [445 U.S. 55, 61] relieved of 
his disability by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying pardon 
or a consent from the Secretary of the Treasury.[5] The obvious breadth 
of the language may well reflect the expansive legislative approach 
revealed by Congress' express findings and declarations, in 18 U.S.C. 
App. 1201,[6] concerning the problem of firearm abuse by felons and 
certain specifically described persons.

Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce its broad 
sweep. Section 1203 enumerates exceptions to [445 U.S. 55, 62] 1202 (a) 
(1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has expressly been 
entrusted with a firearm by prison authority; a person who has been 
pardoned and who has expressly been authorized to receive, possess, or 
transport a firearm). In addition, 1202 (c) (2) defines "felony" to 
exclude certain state crimes punishable by no more than two years' 
imprisonment. No exception, however, is made for a person whose 
outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid 
for any reason. On its face, therefore, 1202 (a) (1) contains nothing by 
way of restrictive language. It thus stands in contrast with other 
federal statutes that explicitly permit a defendant to challenge, by way 
of defense, the validity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. 
See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 3575 (e) (dangerous special offender) and 21 
U.S.C. 851 (c) (2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970).

When we turn to the legislative history of 1202 (a) (1), we find nothing 
to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a defendant to question 
the validity of his prior conviction as a defense to a charge under 1202 
(a) (1). The section was enacted as part of Title VII of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 82 Stat. 236. It was added 
by way of a floor amendment to the Act and thus was not a subject of 
discussion in the legislative reports. See United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114, 120 (1979); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 
569-570 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 , and n. 11 
(1971). What little legislative history there is that is relevant 
reflects an intent to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on 
the fact of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and directed the 
passage of Title VII, repeatedly stressed conviction, not a "valid" 
conviction, and not a conviction not subject to constitutional 
challenge, as the criterion. For example, the Senator observed:

     "So, under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun [445 U.S. 55,
     63] until the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction,
     however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and
     burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the future except where
     he has been pardoned by the President or a State Governor and
     had been expressedly authorized by his pardon to possess a
     firearm." 114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968).

See also id., at 13868, 14774. Inasmuch as Senator Long was the sponsor 
and floor manager of the bill, his statements are entitled to weight. 
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978).

It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII, as well as 
Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in response to the precipitous 
rise in political assassinations, riots, and other violent crimes 
involving firearms, that occurred in this country in the 1960's. See e. 
g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 76-78 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 
1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 22-23 (1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed:

     "The legislative history [of Title VII] in its entirety, while brief,
     further supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadly --
     to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated
     that `they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without
     becoming a threat to society.'" Scarborough v. United States, 431
     U.S., at 572 .

The legislative history, therefore, affords no basis for a loophole, by 
way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to the broad statutory 
scheme enacted by Congress. Section 1202 (a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, 
in simple terms, against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of 
any intent to require the Government to prove the validity of the 
predicate conviction.

The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title IV, enacted [445 U.S. 55, 
64] simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion. Each 
Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous persons from 
transporting or receiving firearms. See 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) and (h). 
Actually, with regard to the statutory question at issue here, we detect 
little significant difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks 
to keep a firearm away from "any person . . . who has been convicted" of 
a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs somewhat in the 
respective statutes. But to limit the scope of 922 (g) (1) and (h) (1) 
to a validly convicted felon would be at odds with the statutory scheme 
as a whole. Those sections impose a disability not only on a convicted 
felon but also on a person under a felony indictment, even if that 
person subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Since the fact of 
mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori the much more 
significant fact of conviction must deprive the person of a right to a 
firearm.

Finally, it is important to note that a convicted felon is not without 
relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus Act, in 1203 (2) and 925 
(c), states that the disability may be removed by a qualifying pardon or 
the Secretary's consent. Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, 
could have challenged his prior conviction in an appropriate proceeding 
in the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const., Art. 5, 5 (3); L'Hommedieu 
v. State, 362 So.2d 72 (Fla. App. 1978); Weir v. State, 319 So.2d 80 
(Fla. App. 1975). See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 
(1954).[7]  

It seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these remedies, two 
of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus Act itself, suggests 
that Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear his status 
before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose 
"broadly to keep firearms away [445 U.S. 55, 65] from the persons 
Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous." Barrett 
v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976).

With the face of the statute and the legislative history so clear, 
petitioner's argument that the statute nevertheless should be construed 
so as to avoid a constitutional issue is inapposite. That course is 
appropriate only when the statute provides a fair alternative 
construction. This statute could not be more plain. Swain v. Pressley, 
430 U.S. 372, 378 , and n. 11 (1977); United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U.S., at 122 -123. Similarly, any principle of lenity, see Rewis v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971), has no application. The 
touchstone of that principle is statutory ambiguity. Huddleston v. 
United States, 415 U.S. 814, 832 (1974); United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S., at 121 -122. There is no ambiguity here.

We therefore hold that 1202 (a) (1) prohibits a felon from possessing a 
firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject to 
collateral attack on constitutional grounds.

                             IV

The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant with the 
concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment if there is "some `rational basis' for the statutory 
distinctions made . . . or . . . they `have some relevance to the 
purpose for which the classification is made.'" Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. 417, 422 (1974), quoting from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 
U.S. 263, 270 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). 
See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).[8]   [445 U.S. 55, 66] 

Section 1202 (a) (1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as its expressed 
purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U.S.C. App. 1201, was 
concerned that the receipt and possession of a firearm by a felon 
constitutes a threat, among other things, to the continued and effective 
operation of the Government of the United States. The legislative 
history of the gun control laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy 
availability of firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat 
to community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus between violent 
crime and the possession of a firearm by any person with a criminal 
record. 114 Cong. Rec. 13220 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings); id., at 
16298 (remarks of Rep. Pollock). Congress could rationally conclude that 
any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient 
basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See, e. g., 
United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 891-892 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 944 (1976). This Court has recognized repeatedly that a 
legislature constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from 
engaging in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a 
firearm. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) 
(disenfranchisement); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) 
(proscription against holding office in a waterfront labor 
organization); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (prohibition 
against the practice of medicine).

We recognize, of course, that under the Sixth Amendment an uncounseled 
felony conviction cannot be used for certain purposes. See Burgett, 
Tucker, and Loper, all supra. The Court, however, has never suggested 
that an uncounseled conviction [445 U.S. 55, 67] is invalid for all 
purposes. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Loper v. Beto, 405 
U.S., at 482 . n. 11 (plurality opinion).

Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a 
civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal sanction, is not 
inconsistent with Burgett, Tucker, and Loper. In each of those cases, 
this Court found that the subsequent conviction of sentence violated the 
Sixth Amendment because it depended upon the reliability of a past 
uncounseled conviction. The federal gun laws, however, focus not on 
reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in 
order to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons. 
Congress' judgment that a convicted felon. even one whose conviction was 
allegedly uncounseled, is among the class of persons who should be 
disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms because of potential 
dangerousness is rational.[9] Enforcement of that essentially civil 
disability through a criminal sanction does not "support guilt or 
enhance punishment." see Burgett, 389 U.S., at 115 , on the basis of a 
conviction that is unreliable when one considers Congress' broad 
purpose. Moreover, unlike the situation in Burgett, the sanction imposed 
by 1202 (a) (1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's first 
conviction.

Again, it is important to note that a convicted felon may challenge the 
validity of a prior conviction. or otherwise remove his disability, 
before obtaining a firearm. We simply hold today that the firearms 
prosecution does not open the predicate conviction to a new form of 
collateral attack. See Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act 
of 1968. [445 U.S. 55, 68] 76 Colum. L. Rev. 326, 338-339 (1976). Cf. 
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

     It is so ordered.

Footnotes

[Footnote 1] Section 1202 (a) reads in full: 

"Any person who -- 
     "(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or
     any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or 
     "(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
     conditions, or 
     "(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or
     any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or 
     "(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his
     citizenship, or 
     "(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, "and who
     receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce,
     after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not
     more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both." 

[Footnote 2] The indictment also charged petitioner with a violation of 18
U.S.C. 922 (h) (1). That statute reads in pertinent part:

"It shall be unlawful for any person -- 
     "(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court
     of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 
     . . . . . 
     "to receive any firearm . . . which has been shipped or transported in
     interstate . . . commerce." 

Petitioner was acquitted on the 922 (h) (1) charge and it is not before 
us here.

[Footnote 3] Petitioner's counsel stated that a Florida attorney had 
advised him that the court records in that State showed affirmatively 
that Lewis had no lawyer. He noted also that Lewis had been charged with 
the same offense as had the defendant in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963), and that petitioner had been tried in the same State about 
six months before Gideon was tried. App. 2-3.

[Footnote 4] Compare United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (CA7 1972) 
(use of an underlying felony conviction unconstitutionally obtained to 
support a conviction under 1202 (a) (1) is reversible error), with the 
Fourth Circuit's ruling in the present case, and with United States v. 
Maggard, 573 F.2d 926 (CA6 1978); and United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 
65 (CA3 1977) (en banc) (claim of constitutional error in the underlying 
conviction may not be raised). The Ninth Circuit has distinguished 
between a claim of constitutional invalidity in the underlying 
conviction, which it has held may be raised, and a claim that the 
underlying conviction has been, or should be, reversed on other grounds. 
Compare United States v. O'Neal, 545 F.2d 85 (1976), and United States 
v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (1976), with United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d 
18 (1970). See also United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (CA9 1978), 
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964   [445 U.S. 55, 59] (1979) (underlying 
conviction in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 922 (h) (1) may not be 
challenged on nonconstitutional grounds).

The identical issue that is presented in this case has also arisen in 
the context of challenges to convictions under 18 U.S.C. 922 (g) (1) 
(proscribing shipping or transport of a firearm in interstate or foreign 
commerce by a person under indictment for, or convicted of, a felony) 
and 922 (h) (1) (proscribing receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate 
or foreign commerce by such a person). Compare United States v. Scales, 
599 F.2d 78 (CA5 1979); Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724 (CA5 
1974); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F.2d 1367 (CA9 1972); and United 
States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (CA2 1970) (underlying conviction may be 
attacked as unconstitutional), with Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 
1219, 1226 (CA10 1978) (underlying conviction may not be so challenged 
in prosecution under 922 (h) (1)).

The Courts of Appeals have treated the issue somewhat differently in 
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. 922 (a) (6) (prohibiting the falsification 
of one's status as a convicted felon in purchasing a firearm). 
Nonuniformity has prevailed nonetheless on the question whether a 
defendant charged with violating that statute may challenge the 
constitutionality of the underlying felony conviction. Compare United 
States v. O'Neal, supra, and United States v. Pricepaul, supra 
(permitting the challenge), with United States v. Allen, 556 F.2d 720 
(CA4 1977); United States v. Graves, supra; and Cassity v. United 
States, 521 F.2d 1320 (CA6 1975) (holding that the challenge may not be 
made). The Eighth Circuit has stated that it will not permit a challenge 
to the constitutionality of the underlying conviction where the 
defendant is charged under 922 (a) (6), while reserving the question 
under 1202 (a) (1) and 922 (g) (1) and (h) (1). United States v. 
Edwards, 568 F.2d 68, 70-72, and n.3 (1977). See also United States v. 
Graves, 554 F.2d, at 83-88 (Garth, J., and Seitz, C. J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (the Government need not prove the validity 
of the underlying conviction in a prosecution brought under 922 (a) (6), 
but it must do so in a prosecution under 1202 (a) (1)).

[Footnote 5] One might argue, of course, that the language is so 
sweeping that it includes in its proscription even a person whose 
predicate conviction in the interim had been finally reversed on appeal 
and thus no longer was outstanding. The Government, however, does not go 
so far, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, 37-40, and though we have no need to 
pursue that extreme argument in this case, we reject it. We are not 
persuaded that the mere possibility of making that argument renders the 
statute, as petitioner suggests, unconstitutionally vague. And unlike 
the dissent, post, at 69, we view the language Congress chose as 
consistent with the common-sense notion that a disability based upon 
one's status as a convicted felon should cease only when the conviction 
upon which that status depends has been vacated.

We note, nonetheless, that the disability effected by 1202 (a) (1) would 
apply while a felony conviction was pending on appeal. See Note, Prior 
Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 326, 334, 
and n. 42 (1976).

[Footnote 6] "The Congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt, 
possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are 
discharged under dishonorable conditions, mental incompetents, aliens 
who are illegally in the country, and former citizens who have renounced 
their citizenship, constitutes --

     "(1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of
     commerce,

     "(2) a threat to the safety of the President of the United States and
     Vice President of the United States,

     "(3) an impediment or a threat to the exercise of free speech and
     the free exercise of a religion guaranteed by the first amendment to
     the Constitution of the United States, and

     "(4) a threat to the continued and effective operation of the
     Government of the United States and of the government of each
     State guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution."

[Footnote 7] This being so, 1202 (a) (1) does not attach "what may 
amount to lifelong sanctions to a mere finding of probable cause," as 
has been argued by one commentator. See Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1790, 
1795 (1979).

[Footnote 8] These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are 
neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench 
upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no 
right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have "some reasonable 
relationship to [445 U.S. 55, 66]  the preservation or efficiency of a 
well regulated militia"); United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 
Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290, n. 5 (CA7 1974); 
United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (CA4 1974); Cody v. United 
States, 460 F.2d 34 (CA8), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972) (the 
latter three cases holding, respectively, that 1202 (a) (1), 922 (g), 
and 922 (a) (6) do not violate the Second Amendment).

[Footnote 9] The dissent's assertion that Congress' judgment in this 
regard cannot rationally be supported, post, at 72, is one we do not 
share. Moreover, such an assertion seems plainly inconsistent with the 
deference that a reviewing court should give to a legislative 
determination that, in essence, predicts a potential for future criminal 
behavior.



