                    U.S. Supreme Court 

          BROWN v. SOCIALIST WORKERS '74 CAMPAIGN
                COMM., 459 U.S. 87 (1982)

      BROWN ET AL. v. SOCIALIST WORKERS '74 CAMPAIGN
                COMMITTEE (OHIO) ET AL. 
     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
            THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
                       No. 81-776. 

                   Argued October 4, 1982 
                  Decided December 8, 1982 

Held:

The disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law 
requiring every candidate for political office to report the names and 
addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements, 
cannot be constitutionally applied to appellee Socialist Workers Party 
(SWP), a minor political party that historically has been the object of 
harassment by Government officials and private parties. Pp. 91-102.

     (a) The First Amendment prohibits a State from compelling
     disclosures by a minor political party that will subject those
     persons identified to the reasonable probability of threats,
     harassment, or reprisals. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74.
     Moreover, minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility
     in the proof of injury. Ibid. These principles for safeguarding
     the First Amendment interests of minor parties and their
     members and supporters apply not only to the compelled
     disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the compelled
     disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements. Pp.
     91-98.

     (b) Here, the District Court, in upholding appellees' challenge
     to the constitutionality of the Ohio disclosure provisions,
     properly concluded that the evidence of private and
     Government hostility toward the SWP and its members
     establishes a reasonable probability that disclosing the names
     of contributors and recipients will subject them to threats,
     harassment, and reprisals. Pp. 98-101.

Affirmed.

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, III, and IV of 
which BLACKMUN, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 102. O'CONNOR, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST and 
STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 107.

Gary Elson Brown, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for 
appellants. With him on the briefs [459 U.S. 87, 88]  were William J. Brown, 
Attorney General, Thomas F. Staub, Assistant Attorney General, and James R. 
Rishel.

Thomas D. Buckley, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the 
brief were Gordon J. Beggs, Ben Sheerer, and Bruce Campbell.

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether certain disclosure requirements of 
the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3517.01 et seq. 
(1972 and Supp. 1981), can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist 
Workers Party, a minor political party which historically has been the 
object of harassment by government officials and private parties. The Ohio 
statute requires every political party to report the names and addresses of 
campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. In Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), this Court held that the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from compelling disclosures by a minor political 
party that can show a "reasonable probability" that the compelled 
disclosures will subject those identified to "threats, harassment, or 
reprisals." Id., at 74. Employing this test, a three-judge District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is 
unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. We affirm.

                            I

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is a small political party with 
approximately 60 members in the State of Ohio. The Party states in its 
constitution that its aim is "the abolition of capitalism and the 
establishment of a workers' government to achieve socialism." As the 
District Court found, the SWP does not advocate the use of violence. It 
seeks instead to achieve social change through the political process, and 
its members regularly run for public office. The SWP's candidates have had 
little success at the polls. In 1980, for example the Ohio SWP's candidate 
for the United States Senate received fewer than 77,000 votes, less than 
1.9% of the total [459 U.S. 87, 89]  vote. Campaign contributions and 
expenditures in Ohio have averaged about $15,000 annually since 1974.

In 1974 appellees instituted a class action[1] in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the 
disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law. The Ohio 
statute requires every candidate for political office to file a statement 
identifying each contributor and each recipient of a disbursement of 
campaign funds. 3517.10.[2] The "object or purpose"[3]  [459 U.S. 87, 90]  
of each disbursement must also be disclosed. The lists of names and 
addresses of contributors and recipients are open to public inspection for 
at least six years. Violations of the disclosure requirements are punishable 
by fines of up to $1,000 for each day of violation. 3517.99.

On November 6, 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
entered a temporary restraining order barring the enforcement of the 
disclosure requirements against the class pending a determination of the 
merits.[4] The case was then transferred to the District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio, which entered an identical temporary restraining 
order in February 1975.[5] Accordingly, since 1974 [459 U.S. 87, 91] 
appellees have not disclosed the names of contributors and recipients but 
have otherwise complied with the statute. A three-judge District Court was 
convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281. Following extensive discovery, the 
trial was held in February 1981. After reviewing the "substantial evidence 
of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP 
members and supporters," the three-judge court concluded that under Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Ohio disclosure requirements are 
unconstitutional as applied to appellees.[6] We noted probable jurisdiction. 
454 U.S. 1122 (1981).

                            II

The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political 
associations and beliefs. Such disclosures "can seriously infringe on 
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." 
Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 64, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 
372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). "Inviolability of privacy in group 
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of 
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident 
beliefs." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 462. The right to privacy in one's 
political associations and beliefs will yield [459 U.S. 87, 92] only to a 
"`subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,'" NAACP v. 
Alabama, supra, at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 
(1957) (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a 
"substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and 
compelling state interest." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, at 
546.

In Buckley v. Valeo this Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge 
the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on political parties by 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. 424 U.S., at 
60 -74. The Court found three government interests sufficient in general to 
justify requiring disclosure of information concerning campaign 
contributions and expenditures:[7] enhancement of voters' knowledge about a 
candidate's possible allegiances and interests, deterrence of corruption, 
and the enforcement of contribution limitations.[8] The Court stressed, 
however, that in certain circumstances the balance of interests requires 
exempting minor political parties from compelled disclosures. The 
government's interests in compelling disclosures are "diminished" in the 
case of minor parties. Id., at 70. Minor party candidates "usually represent 
definite and publicized viewpoints" well known to the public, and the 
improbability of their winning reduces the dangers of corruption and 
vote-buying. Ibid. At the same time, the potential for impairing First 
Amendment interests is substantially greater: [459 U.S. 87, 93] 

     "We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to
     the associational interests of the minor parties and their
     members and to supporters of independents could be
     significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound
     financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in
     contributions. In some instances fears of reprisal may deter
     contributions to the point where the movement cannot
     survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to
     pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free
     circulation of ideas both within and without the political
     arena." Id., at 71 (footnotes omitted).

We concluded that in some circumstances the diminished government interests 
furthered by compelling disclosures by minor parties does not justify the 
greater threat to First Amendment values.

Buckley v. Valeo set forth the following test for determining when the First 
Amendment requires exempting minor parties from compelled disclosures:

     "The evidence offered need show only a reasonable
     probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's
     contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment,
     or reprisals from either Government officials or private
     parties." Id., at 74.

The Court acknowledged that "unduly strict requirements of proof could 
impose a heavy burden" on minor parties. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court 
emphasized that "[m]inor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in 
the proof of injury." Ibid.

     "The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of
     past or present harassment of members due to their
     associational ties, or of harassment directed against the
     organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific
     manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New
     parties that have no history upon which to draw may be [459
     U.S. 87, 94]  able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats
     directed against individuals or organizations holding similar
     views." Ibid.

Appellants concede that the Buckley test for exempting minor parties governs 
the disclosure of the names of contributors, but they contend that the test 
has no application to the compelled disclosure of names of recipients of 
campaign disbursements.[9] Appellants assert that the State has a 
substantial interest in preventing the misuse of campaign funds.[10] They 
also argue that the disclosure of the names of [459 U.S. 87, 95] recipients 
of campaign funds will have no significant impact on First Amendment rights, 
because, unlike a contribution, the mere receipt of money for commercial 
services does not affirmatively express political support.

We reject appellants' unduly narrow view of the minor-party exemption 
recognized in Buckley. Appellants' attempt to limit the exemption to laws 
requiring disclosure of contributors is inconsistent with the rationale for 
the exemption stated in Buckley. The Court concluded that the government 
interests supporting disclosure are weaker in the case of minor parties, 
while the threat to First Amendment values is greater. Both of these 
considerations apply not only to the disclosure of campaign contributors but 
also to the disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.

Although appellants contend that requiring disclosure of recipients of 
disbursements is necessary to prevent corruption, this Court recognized in 
Buckley that this concededly legitimate government interest has less force 
in the context of minor parties. The federal law considered in Buckley, like 
the Ohio law at issue here, required campaign committees to identify both 
campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. 2 U.S.C. 
432(c) and (d), and 434(a) and (b). We stated that "by exposing large 
contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity," disclosure 
requirements "ten[d] to `prevent the corrupt use of money to affect 
elections.'" Id., at 67 (emphasis added), quoting Burroughs v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934). We concluded, however, that because minor 
party candidates are unlikely to win elections, the government's general 
interest in "deterring the `buying' of elections" is "reduced" in the case 
of minor parties. 424 U.S., at 70.[11]  [459 U.S. 87, 96] 

Moreover, appellants seriously understate the threat to First Amendment 
rights that would result from requiring minor parties to disclose the 
recipients of campaign disbursements. [459 U.S. 87, 97]  Expenditures by a 
political party often consist of reimbursements, advances, or wages paid to 
party members, campaign workers, and supporters, whose activities lie at the 
very core of the First Amendment.[12] Disbursements may also go to persons 
who choose to express their support for an unpopular cause by providing 
services rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion.[13] Should their 
involvement be publicized, these persons would be as vulnerable to threats, 
harassment, and reprisals as are contributors whose connection with the 
party is solely financial.[14] Even individuals [459 U.S. 87, 98]   who 
receive disbursements for "merely" commercial transactions may be deterred 
by the public enmity attending publicity, and those seeking to harass may 
disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information.[15] 
Because an individual who enters into a transaction with a minor party 
purely for commercial reasons lacks any ideological commitment to the party, 
such an individual may well be deterred from providing services by even a 
small risk of harassment.[16] Compelled disclosure of the names of such 
recipients of expenditures could therefore cripple a minor party's ability 
to operate effectively and thereby reduce "the free circulation of ideas 
both within and without the political arena." Buckley, 424 U.S., at 71 
(footnotes omitted). See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S., at 250-251 
(plurality opinion) ("Any interference with the freedom of a party is 
simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents").

We hold, therefore, that the test announced in Buckley for safeguarding the 
First Amendment interests of minor parties and their members and supporters 
applies not only to the compelled disclosure of campaign contributors but 
also to the compelled disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.

                           III

The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this 
case. The District Court found "substantial evidence [459 U.S. 87, 99]  of 
both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members 
and supporters." Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private 
and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four 
years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio 
and neighboring States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the 
burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members' property, police 
harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. 
There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP 
members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. 
Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not 
politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court's 
conclusion that "private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it 
difficult for them to maintain employment."

The District Court also found a past history of Government harassment of the 
SWP. FBI surveillance of the SWP was "massive" and continued until at least 
1976. The FBI also conducted a counterintelligence program against the SWP 
and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP's youth organization. One of 
the aims of the "SWP Disruption Program" was the dissemination of 
information designed to impair the ability of the SWP and YSA to function. 
This program included "disclosing to the press the criminal records of SWP 
candidates, and sending anonymous letters to SWP members, supporters, 
spouses, and employers."[17] Until at least 1976, the FBI employed various 
covert techniques to [459 U.S. 87, 100] obtain information about the SWP, 
including information concerning the sources of its funds and the nature of 
its expenditures. The District Court specifically found that the FBI had 
conducted surveillance of the Ohio SWP and had interfered with its 
activities within the State.[18] Government surveillance was not limited to 
the FBI. The United States Civil Service Commission also gathered 
information on the SWP, the YSA, and their supporters, and the FBI routinely 
distributed its reports to Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, the United 
States Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The District Court properly concluded that the evidence of private and 
Government hostility toward the SWP and its members establishes a reasonable 
probability that disclosing the names of contributors and recipients will 
subject them to threats, harassment, and reprisals.[19] There were numerous 
instances of recent harassment of the SWP both in Ohio and [459 U.S. 87, 
101]   in other States.20 There was also considerable evidence of past 
Government harassment. Appellants challenge the relevance of this evidence 
of Government harassment in light of recent efforts to curb official 
misconduct. Notwithstanding these efforts, the evidence suggests that 
hostility toward the SWP is ingrained and likely to continue. All this 
evidence was properly relied on by the District Court. Buckley, 424 U.S., at 
74.

                           IV

The First Amendment prohibits a State from compelling disclosures by a minor 
party that will subject those persons identified to the reasonable 
probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals. Such disclosures would 
infringe the [459 U.S. 87, 102]  First Amendment rights of the party and its 
members and supporters. In light of the substantial evidence of past and 
present hostility from private persons and Government officials against the 
SWP, Ohio's campaign disclosure requirements cannot be constitutionally 
applied to the Ohio SWP.

The judgment of the three-judge District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio is affirmed.

     It is so ordered.

Footnotes

[1] The plaintiff class as eventually certified includes all SWP candidates 
for political office in Ohio, their campaign committees and treasurers, and 
people who contribute to or receive disbursements from SWP campaign 
committees. The defendants are the Ohio Secretary of State and other state 
and local officials who administer the disclosure law.

[2] Section 3517.10 provides in relevant part:

"(A) Every campaign committee, political committee, and political party 
which made or received a contribution or made an expenditure in connection 
with the nomination or election of any candidate at any election held in 
this state shall file, on a form prescribed under this section, a full, 
true, and itemized statement, made under penalty of election falsification, 
setting forth in detail the contributions and expenditures ... "(B) Each 
statement required by division (A) of this section shall contain the 
following information: ... "(4) A statement of contributions made or 
received, which shall include: "(a) The month, day, and year of the 
contribution; "(b) The full name and address of each person, including any 
chairman or treasurer thereof if other than an individual, from whom 
contributions are received. The requirement of filing the full address does 
not apply to any statement filed by a state or local committee of a 
political party, to a finance committee of such committee, or to a committee 
recognized by a state or local committee as its fund-raising auxiliary. "(c) 
A description of the contribution received, if other than money; "(d) The 
value in dollars and cents of the contribution; "(e) All contributions and 
expenditures shall be itemized separately regardless of the amount except a 
receipt of a contribution from a person in the sum of twenty-five dollars or 
less at one social or fund-raising activity. An account of the total 
contributions from each such social or fund-raising activity shall be listed 
separately, together with the expenses incurred and [459 U.S. 87, 90]  paid 
in connection with such activity. No continuing association which makes a 
contribution from funds which are derived solely from regular dues paid by 
members of the association shall be required to list the name or address of 
any members who paid such dues. "(5) A statement of expenditures which shall 
include: "(a) The month, day, and year of expenditure; "(b) The full name 
and address of each person to whom the expenditure was made, including any 
chairman or treasurer thereof if a committee, association, or group of 
persons; "(c) The object or purpose for which the expenditure was made; "(d) 
The amount of each expenditure. "(C) ... "... All such statements shall be 
open to public inspection in the office where they are filed, and shall be 
carefully preserved for a period of at least six years." 

If the candidate is running for a statewide office, the statement shall be 
filed with the Ohio Secretary of State; otherwise, the statement shall be 
filed with the appropriate county board of elections. 3517.11 (A).

[3] 3517.10(B)(5)(c).

[4] The order restrained various state officials from "applying to or 
enforcing against plaintiffs ... the disclosure provisions of the Ohio 
Campaign Expense Reporting Law and the penalty provision of that law, the 
effect of which will be to postpone the beginning of any possible period of 
violation of that law by plaintiffs, ... until such time as the case is 
decided by the three judge panel, which is hereby convened." (Citations 
omitted.)

[5] Apparently none of the parties throughout the 6-year period questioned 
whether the extended duration of the temporary restraining order [459 U.S. 
87, 91]   conformed to the requirements of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.

[6] Because it invalidated the Ohio statute as applied to the Ohio SWP, the 
District Court did not decide appellees' claim that the statute was facially invalid. The Ohio statute requires disclosure 
of contributions and expenditures no matter how small the amount. Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. 3517.10(B)(4)(e) (Supp. 1981). Appellees contended that the 
absence of a monetary threshold rendered the statute facially invalid since 
the compelled disclosure of nominal contributions and expenditures lacks a 
substantial nexus with any claimed government interest. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S., at 82 -84.

The District Court's opinion is unreported.

[7] Title 2 U.S.C. 432, 434, and 438 (1976 ed., Supp. V) require each 
political committee to keep detailed records of both contributions and 
expenditures, including the names of campaign contributors and recipients of 
campaign disbursements, and to file reports with the Federal Election 
Commission which are made available to the public.

[8] The government interest in enforcing limitations is completely 
inapplicable in this case, since the Ohio law imposes no limitations on the 
amount of campaign contributions.

[9] We believe that the question whether the Buckley test applies to the 
compelled disclosure of recipients of expenditures is properly before us. 
Throughout this litigation Ohio has maintained that it can constitutionally 
require the SWP to disclose the names of both campaign contributors and 
recipients of campaign expenditures. In invalidating both aspects of the 
Ohio statute as applied to the SWP, the District Court necessarily held (1) 
that the Buckley standard, which permits flexible proof of the reasonable 
probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals, applies to both 
contributions and expenditures, and (2) that the evidence was sufficient to 
show a reasonable probability that disclosure would subject both 
contributors and recipients to public hostility and harassment. In their 
jurisdictional statement, appellants appealed from the entire judgment 
entered below and presented the following question for review:

     "Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in
     Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the provisions of
     Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code,
     which require that the campaign committee of a candidate for
     public office file a report disclosing the full names and
     addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving
     expenditures from such committee, are consistent with the
     right of privacy of association guaranteed by the First and
     Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
     States when applied to the committees of candidates of a
     minority party which can establish only isolated instances of
     harassment directed toward the organization or its members
     within Ohio during recent years." Juris. Statement i.

We think that the correctness of both holdings of the District Court is 
"fairly included" in the question presented in the jurisdictional statement. 
This Court's Rule 15.1(a). See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 559 , 
n. 6 (1978) ("[O]ur power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of 
the question presented").

[10] This is one of three government interests identified in Buckley. 
Appellants do not contend that the other two interests, enhancing voters' 
ability [459 U.S. 87, 95]  to evaluate candidates and enforcing contribution 
limitations, support the disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign 
disbursements.

[11] The partial dissent suggests that the government interest in the 
disclosure of recipients of expenditures is not significantly diminished in 
the case of minor political parties, since parties with little likelihood of 
electoral success might nevertheless finance improper campaign activities 
merely to [459 U.S. 87, 96]   gain recognition. Post, at 109-110. The 
partial dissent relies of JUSTICE WHITE's separate opinion in Buckley, in 
which he pointed out that "unlimited money tempts people to spend it on 
whatever money can buy to influence an election." 424 U.S., at 265 (emphasis 
in original).

An examination of the context in which JUSTICE WHITE made this observation 
indicates precisely why the state interest here is insubstantial. JUSTICE 
WHITE was addressing the constitutionality of ceilings on campaign 
expenditures applicable to all candidates. His point was that such ceilings 
"could play a substantial role in preventing unethical practices." Ibid. In 
the case of minor parties, however, their limited financial resources serve 
as a built-in expenditure ceiling which minimizes the likelihood that they 
will expend substantial amounts of money to finance improper campaign 
activities. See id., at 71. For example, far from having "unlimited money," 
the Ohio SWP has had an average of roughly $15,000 available each year to 
spend on its election efforts. Most of the limited resources of minor 
parties will typically be needed to pay for the ordinary fixed costs of 
conducting campaigns, such as filing fees, travel expenses, and the expenses 
incurred in publishing and distributing campaign literature and maintaining 
offices. Thus JUSTICE WHITE's observation that "financing illegal activities 
is low on the campaign organization's priority list," id., at 265, is 
particularly apposite in the case of minor parties. We cannot agree, 
therefore, that minor parties are as likely as major parties to make 
significant expenditures in funding dirty tricks or other improper campaign 
activities. See post, at 110. Moreover, the expenditure by minor parties of 
even a substantial portion of their limited funds on illegal activities 
would be unlikely to have a substantial impact.

Furthermore, the mere possibility that minor parties will resort to corrupt 
or unfair tactics cannot justify the substantial infringement on First 
Amendment interests that would result from compelling the disclosure of 
recipients of expenditures. In Buckley, we acknowledged the possibility that 
supporters of a major party candidate might channel money into minor parties 
to divert votes from other major party contenders, 424 U.S., at 70 , and 
that, as noted by the partial dissent, post, at 110, and n. 5, occasionally 
minor parties may affect the outcomes of elections. We thus recognized that 
the distorting influence of large contributors on elections may not be 
entirely absent in the context of minor parties. Nevertheless, because we 
concluded that the government interest in disclosing contributors is 
substantially reduced in the case of minor parties, we held that minor 
parties [459 U.S. 87, 97]  are entitled to an exemption from requirements 
that contributors be disclosed where they can show a reasonable probability 
of harassment. 424 U.S., at 70 . Because we similarly conclude that the 
government interest in requiring the disclosure of recipients of 
expenditures is substantially reduced in the case of minor parties, we hold 
that the minor-party exemption recognized in Buckley applies to compelled 
disclosure of expenditures as well.

[12] For example, the expenditure statements filed by the SWP contain a 
substantial percentage of entries designated as per diem, travel expenses, 
room rental, and so on. The Ohio statute makes it particularly easy to 
identify these individuals since it requires disclosure of the purpose of 
the disbursements as well as the identity of the recipients. Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. 3517.10(B)(5)(c) (Supp. 1981).

[13] "`[F]inancial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, 
associations, and beliefs.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 66 , quoting 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78 -79 (1974) (POWELL, J., 
concurring). The District Court found that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) at least until 1976 routinely investigated the financial 
transactions of the SWP and kept track of the payees of SWP checks.

[14] The fact that some or even many recipients of campaign expenditures may 
not be exposed to the risk of public hostility does not detract from the 
serious threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights of those who are so 
exposed. We cannot agree with the partial dissent's assertion that 
disclosures of disbursements paid to campaign workers and supporters will 
not increase the probability that they will be subjected to harassment and 
hostility. Post, at 111-112. Apart from the fact that individuals may work 
for a candidate in a variety of ways without publicizing their involvement, 
the application of a disclosure requirement results in a dramatic increase 
in public exposure. Under Ohio law a person's affiliation with the party 
will be recorded in a document that must be kept open to inspection [459 
U.S. 87, 98]  by any one who wishes to examine it for a period of at least 
six years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3517.10(C) (Supp. 1981). The preservation of 
unorthodox political affiliations in public records substantially increases 
the potential for harassment above and beyond the risk that an individual 
faces simply as a result of having worked for an unpopular party at one 
time.

[15] See, e. g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 458 F. Supp. 
895, 904 (SDNY 1978) (FBI interference with SWP travel arrangements and 
speaker hall rental), vacated on other grounds, 596 F.2d 58 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979).

[16] Moreover, it would be hard to think of many instances in which the 
state interest in preventing vote-buying and improper campaign activities 
[459 U.S. 87, 99]   would be furthered by the disclosure of payments for 
routine commercial services.

[17] The District Court was quoting from Part I of the Final Report of 
Special Master Judge Breitel in Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General 
of the United States, 73 Civ. 3160 (TPG) (SNDY, Feb. 4, 1980), detailing the 
United States Government's admissions concerning the existence and nature of 
the Government surveillance of the SWP.

[18] The District Court also found the following:

     "The Government possesses about 8,000,000 documents
     relating to the SWP, YSA ... and their members... . Since
     1960 the FBI has had about 300 informants who were
     members of the SWP and/or YSA and 1,000 nonmember
     informants. Both the Cleveland and Cincinnati FBI filed
     offices had one or more SWP or YSA member informants.
     Approximately 21 of the SWP member informants held local
     branch offices. Three informants even ran for elective office
     as SWP candidates. The 18 informants whose files were
     disclosed to Judge Breitel received total payments of
     $358,648.38 for their services and expenses." (Footnotes
     omitted.)

[19] After reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, the District Court 
concluded: "[T]he totality of the circumstances establishes that, in Ohio, 
public disclosure that a person is a member of or has made a contribution to 
the SWP would create a reasonable probability that he or she would be 
subjected to threats, harassment or reprisals." The District Court then 
enjoined the compelled disclosures of either contributors' or recipients' 
names. Although the District Court did not expressly refer in the quoted 
passage to disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign disbursements, 
it is evident from the opinion that the District Court was addressing both 
contributors and recipients.

[20] Some of the recent episodes of threats, harassment, and reprisals 
against the SWP and its members occurred outside of Ohio. Anti-SWP 
occurrences in places such as Chicago (SWP office vandalized) and Pittsburgh 
(shot fired at SWP building) are certainly relevant to the determination of 
the public's attitude toward the SWP in Ohio. In Buckley we stated that 
"[n]ew parties that have no history upon which to draw may ... offer 
evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or 
organizations holding similar views." 424 U.S., at 74. Surely the Ohio SWP 
may offer evidence of the experiences of other chapters espousing the same 
political philosophy. See 1980 Illinois Socialist Workers Campaign v. State 
of Illinois Board of Elections, 531 F. Supp. 915, 921 (ND Ill. 1981).

Appellants point to the lack of direct evidence linking the Ohio statute's 
disclosure requirements to the harassment of campaign contributors or 
recipients of disbursements. In Buckley, however, we rejected such "unduly 
strict requirements of proof" in favor of "flexibility in the proof of 
injury." 424 U.S., at 74 . We thus rejected requiring a minor party to "come 
forward with witnesses who are too fearful to contribute but not too fearful 
to testify about their fear" or prove that "chill and harassment [are] 
directly attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is 
sought." Ibd. We think that these considerations are equally applicable to 
the proof required to establish a reasonable probability that recipients 
will be subjected to threats and harassment if their names are disclosed. 
While the partial dissent appears to agree, post, at 112-113, n. 7, its 
"separately focused inquiry," post, at 112, and n. 7, in reality requires 
evidence of chill and harassment directly attributable to the 
expenditure-disclosure requirement.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion and agree with much of 
what is said in Part II. But I cannot agree, with the Court or with the 
partial dissent, that we should reach the issue whether a standard of proof 
different from that applied to disclosure of campaign contributions should 
be applied to disclosure of campaign disbursements. See ante, at 94, n. 9; 
post, at 112-113, n. 7.[1] Appellants did not suggest in the District Court 
that different standards might apply. Nor was the issue raised in 
appellants' jurisdictional statement or in their brief on the merits in this 
Court. Consequently, I would merely assume for purposes of our present 
decision - as appellants apparently have assumed throughout this litigation 
and as the District Court clearly assumed -- that the flexible proof rule of 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), applies equally to forced disclosure of 
contributions and to forced disclosure of expenditures. I would leave for 
another day, when the issue is squarely presented, considered by the courts 
below, and adequately briefed here, the significant question that now 
divides the Court.

This Court's Rule 15.1(a) states: "Only the questions set forth in the 
jurisdictional statement or fairly included therein [459 U.S. 87, 103]  will 
be considered by the Court." Appellants' jurisdictional statement presented 
a single question: 

     "Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in
     Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the provisions of
     Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code,
     which require that the campaign committee of a candidate for
     public office file a report disclosing the full names and
     addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving
     expenditures from such committee, are consistent with the
     right of privacy of association guaranteed by the First and
     Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
     States when applied to the committees of candidates of a
     minority party which can establish only isolated instances of
     harassment directed toward the organization or its members
     within Ohio during recent years." Juris. Statement i.

The question assumes the applicability of Buckley to the entire case, and 
asks this Court to decide only whether the evidence presented to and facts 
found by the District Court were sufficient to support that court's 
conclusion that the Buckley test was satisfied.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court does not decide issues beyond 
those it has agreed to review. Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 
U.S. 605, 623 (1974); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339, n. 4 (1971); 
General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 178-179 
(1938). According to the Court, however, the issue whether the flexible 
standard of proof established in Buckley applies to recipients of 
expenditures is "fairly included' in the question presented." Ante, at 94, 
n. 9. But appellants' failure to present the issue was not a mere oversight 
in phrasing that question. That appellants did not invoke this Court's 
jurisdiction to review specifically the proper standard for disclosure of 
campaign expenditures is also apparent from appellants' arguments in their 
jurisdictional statement and their brief on the merits. In their 
jurisdictional [459 U.S. 87, 104]   statement, under the heading "The 
Question is Substantial," appellants stated:

     "The standards governing the resolution of actions involving
     challenges to reporting requirements by minority parties were
     set forth by this Court in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424
     U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley the Court held that in order to
     receive relief from reporting requirements such as those at
     issue in this action a minority party must establish `... a
     reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a
     party's contributors' names will subject them to threats,
     harassment or reprisals from either Government officials or
     private parties.' 424 U.S. at 74." Juris. Statement 10.

Appellants went on to state that the flexible standard of proof of injury 
established in Buckley applied to "disclosure requirements." Juris. 
Statement 12-13. Similar assertions are found in appellants' brief on the 
merits. See Brief for Appellants 12 ("Summary of Argument"); id., at 18 
("While refusing to grant minority parties a blanket exemption from 
financial disclosure requirements, the Court in Buckley established a 
standard under which they may obtain relief ...").

Thus, appellants' exclusive theme in the initial presentation of their case 
here was that the District Court erred in finding that the Buckley standard 
was satisfied. They did not suggest that the standard was inapplicable, or 
applied differently, to campaign expenditure requirements. It was not until 
their reply brief, submitted eight years after this suit was instituted and 
at a time when appellees had no opportunity to respond in writing, that 
appellants sought to inject this new issue into the case. See Irvine v. 
California, 347 U.S. 128, 129 (1954) (plurality opinion of Jackson, J.). In 
my view, it simply cannot be said that it was "fairly included" in the 
jurisdictional statement.

Moreover, "[w]here issues are neither raised before nor considered [by the 
court below], this Court will not ordinarily [459 U.S. 87, 105]  consider 
them." Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970); Lawn v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362-363, n. 16 (1958). The District Court did 
not address the question whether some standard other than that developed in 
Buckley should apply to disclosure of campaign expenditures. The reason for 
this was that appellants conceded in the District Court, as they concede 
here, that the "flexibility in the proof of injury" applicable to disclosure 
of contributors governed the entire case. In their post-trial memorandum, 
for example, appellants did not even hint that a different standard should 
govern disclosure of the identities of recipients of expenditures. Instead, 
they quoted the Buckley test and granted that "evidence of past harassment 
may be presented by plaintiffs in cases such as the instant one." 
Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum 4-5.

This case presents no extraordinary circumstances justifying deviation from 
this Court's Rule 15.1(a) and its long-established practice respecting 
issues not presented below. We have deviated from the Rule when 
jurisdictional issues have been omitted by the parties and lower courts, 
see, e. g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197 
(1956), or when the Court has noticed "plain error" not assigned, see 
Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 (1947). Obviously, the issue 
that divides the Court from the partial dissent is not jurisdictional. Nor, 
as the Court's opinion persuasively demonstrates, is application of the 
Buckley test to disclosure of campaign disbursements "plain error." Indeed, 
I consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court would 
adopt the Buckley standard in this context for the reasons stated by the 
Court. I also consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the 
Court might wish to revise the Buckley standard as applied to campaign 
disbursements -- perhaps to take account of the different types of 
expenditures covered and their differing impacts on associational rights, or 
perhaps along the lines suggested in the partial dissent. But this 
significant constitutional [459 U.S. 87, 106]  decision should not be made 
until the question is properly presented so that the record includes data 
and arguments adequate to inform the Court's judgment.

The Court's apparent reliance on Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 560 , 
n. 6 (1978), does not provide a rationale for deciding this issue at this 
time. The petitioner there had included in his petition for certiorari all 
the questions we eventually decided. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court 
limited its grant of the petition to a single question, the parties fully 
briefed the questions on which review had been denied. Deciding those 
questions, therefore, was neither unwise nor unfair. In this case, in 
contrast, appellants affirmatively excluded the point at issue in their 
jurisdictional statement and in their brief on the merits. By failing to 
raise it until their reply brief, appellants prevented appellees from 
responding to the argument in writing. There can be no question that, as the 
Court observes, "`our power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of 
the question presented.'" Ante, at 94, n. 9 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 
434 U.S., at 560 , n. 6) (emphasis supplied). But Rule 15.1(a) is designed, 
as a prudential matter, to prevent the possibility that such tactics will 
result in ill-considered decisions. It is cases like this one that show the 
wisdom of the Rule.

Thus, for purposes of this case, I would assume, as appellants' 
jurisdictional statement and brief on the merits assume, that the Buckley 
standard applies to campaign expenditures just as it applies to 
contributions.[2] Appellees [459 U.S. 87, 107]  presented "specific evidence 
of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or 
of harassment directed against the organization itself," sufficient under 
the rule in Buckley to establish a "reasonable probability" that the Ohio 
law would trigger "threats, harassment, or reprisals" against contributors. 
424 U.S., at 74 . On this basis, I would affirm the judgment of the District 
Court in its entirety.

Footnotes

[1] Although the partial dissent agrees that this issue is not properly 
presented and therefore that the question should not be decided, post, at 
112, n. 7, its result and reasoning endorse a different standard of proof. 
See n. 2, infra.

[2] The partial dissent says it agrees that "this is not the appropriate 
case to determine whether a different test or standard of proof should be 
employed in determining the constitutional validity of required disclosure 
of expenditures." Post, at 112, n. 7. If that is so, however, appellees' 
proof, which the partial dissent agrees established a reasonable probability 
of threats, harassment, or reprisals against contributors, likewise allowed 
the District Court to find a reasonable probability of threats, harassment, 
or reprisals against recipients of expenditures. The Buckley standard 
permits proof that a particular disclosure creates the requisite likelihood 
of harassment to be based on a showing of harassment directed at members of 
[459 U.S. 87, 107]  the party or at the organization itself. 424 U.S., at 74 
. Thus, I do not understand how the partial dissent's "separately focused 
inquiry" can "plainly require a different result," post, at 113, n. 7, or 
how it possibly can lead to the conclusion that "appellees did not carry 
their burden of production and persuasion insofar as they challenge the 
expenditure disclosure provisions," post, at 115 -- unless, despite the 
partial dissent's uncertain disclaimer, post, at 113, n. 7, its "separate 
focus" alters Buckley's "reasonable probability" and "flexible proof" 
standards in the context of expenditures.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE STEVENS join, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the judgment that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has 
sufficiently demonstrated a reasonable probability that disclosure of 
contributors will subject those persons to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals, and thus under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the State of 
Ohio cannot constitutionally compel the disclosure. Further, I agree that 
the broad concerns of Buckley apply to the required disclosure of recipients 
of campaign expenditures. But, as I view the record presented here, the SWP 
has failed to carry its burden of showing that there is a reasonable 
probability that disclosure of recipients of expenditures will subject the 
recipients themselves or the SWP to threats, harassment, or reprisals. 
Moreover, the strong public interest in fair and honest elections outweighs 
any damage done to the associational rights of the party and its members by 
application of the State's expenditure disclosure law. [459 U.S. 87, 108] 

Buckley upheld the validity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 
which requires the disclosure of names of both contributors to a campaign 
and recipients of expenditures from the campaign. Buckley recognized three 
major governmental interests in disclosure requirements: deterrence of 
corruption; enhancement of voters' knowledge about a candidate's possible 
allegiances and interests; and provision of the data and means necessary to 
detect violations of any statutory limitations on contributions or 
expenditures. The precise challenge that the Buckley Court faced, however, 
was the overbreadth of the Act's requirements "insofar as they apply to 
contributions to minor parties and independent candidates." Id., at 68-69 
(emphasis added).1 Since the appellants in Buckley did not challenge the 
application to minor parties of requirements of disclosure of expenditures, 
the Court had no occasion to consider directly the First Amendment interests 
of a minor political party in preventing disclosure of expenditures, much 
less to weigh them against the governmental interests in disclosure. The 
test adopted by Buckley, quoted by the majority, ante, at 93, reflects this 
limitation, for it contemplates only assessing possible harassment of 
contributors, without a word about considering the harassment of recipients 
of expenditures if their names are disclosed or any effects this harassment 
may have on the party.

This is not to say that Buckley provides no guidance for resolving this 
claim. I agree with the majority that appellants [459 U.S. 87, 109]  have 
overstated their argument in declaring that Buckley has no application to 
the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. Certainly, Buckley enunciates 
the general governmental interest in regulating minor parties, who, although 
unlikely to win, can often affect the outcome of an election. 424 U.S., at 
70 . Buckley also emphasizes the sensitive associational rights of minor 
parties.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between disclosure of 
contributors and disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures - 
differences that the Buckley Court had no occasion to address, but that 
compel me to conclude that the balance should not necessarily be calibrated 
identically. First, unlike the government's interest in disclosure of 
contributions, its interest in disclosure of expenditures does not decrease 
significantly for small parties. The Court in Buckley recognized that 
knowing the identity of contributors would not significantly increase the 
voters' ability to determine the political ideology of the minor-party 
candidate, for the stance of the minor-party candidate is usually well 
known. Ibid.[2] Nor would identifying a minor party's contributors further 
the interest in preventing the "buying" of a candidate, because of the 
improbability of the minor-party candidate's winning the election. Ibid. 
Thus, these two major government interests in disclosure of contributions 
are significantly reduced for minor parties.[3]

In sharp contrast, however, the governmental interest in disclosure of 
expenditures remains significant for minor parties. The purpose of requiring 
parties to disclose expenditures is to deter improper influencing of voters. 
Corruption [459 U.S. 87, 110]  of the electoral process can take many forms: 
the actual buying of votes; the use of "slush funds;" dirty tricks; and 
bribes of poll watches and other election officials. Certainly, a 
"persuasive" campaign worker on election day can corral voters for his 
minor-party candidate with even a modest "slush fund."[4] Even though such 
improper practices are unlikely to be so successful as to attract enough 
votes to elect the minor-party candidate, a minor party, whose short-term 
goal is merely recognition, may be as tempted to resort to impressible 
methods as are major parties, and the resulting deflection of votes can 
determine the outcome of the election of other candidates.[5] The 
requirement of a full and verifiable report of expenditures is important in 
deterring such practices, for otherwise the party could hide the improper 
transactions through an accounting sleight of hand.[6]

On the other side of the balance, disclosure of recipients of expenditures 
will have a lesser impact on a minority party's First Amendment interests 
than will disclosure of contributors. [459 U.S. 87, 111]  As the majority 
states, ante, at 91, the First Amendment interest here is "[t]he right to 
privacy in one's political associations and beliefs." We have never drawn 
sharp distinctions between members and contributors, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 
66 . As we recognized in Buckley, the privacy rights of contributors are 
especially sensitive, since many seek to express their political views 
privately through their pocketbook rather than publicly through other means. 
Disclosure of contributors directly implicates the contributors' 
associational rights.

The impact on privacy interests arising from disclosure of expenditures is 
of a quite different -- and generally lesser -- dimension. Many expenditures 
of the minority party will be for quite mundane purposes to persons not 
intimately connected with the organization. Payments for such things as 
office supplies, telephone service, bank charges, printing and photography 
costs would generally fall in this category. The likelihood that such 
business transactions would dry up if disclosed is remote at best. Unlike 
silent contributors, whom disclosure would reveal to the public as 
supporters of the party's ideological positions, persons providing business 
services to a minor party are not generally perceived by the public as 
supporting the party's ideology, and thus are unlikely to be harassed if 
their names are disclosed. Consequently, the party's associational interests 
are unlikely to be affected by disclosure of recipients of such 
expenditures.

Other recipients of expenditures may have closer ideological ties to the 
party. The majority suggests that campaign workers receiving per diem, 
travel, or room expenses may fit in this category. Ante, at 97, n. 12. It is 
certainly conceivable that such persons may be harassed or threatened for 
their conduct. Laws requiring disclosure of recipients of expenditures, 
however, are not likely to contribute to this harassment. Once an individual 
has openly shown his close ties to the organization by campaigning for it, 
disclosure of receipt of expenditures is unlikely to increase the degree of 
[459 U.S. 87, 112]  harassment so significantly as to deter the individual 
from campaigning for the party. Further, in striking the balance, the 
governmental concerns are greatest precisely for the actions of campaign 
workers that might improperly influence voters. Thus, whatever marginal 
deterrence that may arise from disclosure of expenditures is outweighed by 
the heightened governmental interest.

In sum, the heightened governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures 
and the reduced marginal deterrent effect on associational interests demand 
a separately focused inquiry into whether there exists a reasonable 
probability that disclosure will subject recipients or the party itself to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals.[7]  [459 U.S. 87, 113] 

                            II

Turning to the evidence in this case, it is important to remember that, even 
though proof requirements must be flexible, Buckley, supra, at 74, the minor 
party carries the burden of production and persuasion to show that its First 
Amendment interests outweigh the governmental interests. Additionally, the 
application of the Buckley standard to the historical evidence is most 
properly characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, for which we 
normally assess the record independently to determine if it supports the 
conclusion of unconstitutionality as applied.[8]

Here, there is no direct evidence of harassment of either contributors or 
recipients of expenditures. Rather, as the majority accurately represents 
it, the evidence concerns harassment and reprisals of visible party members, 
including violence at party headquarters and loss of jobs. I concur in the 
majority's conclusion that this evidence, viewed in its entirety, supports 
the conclusion that there will be a reasonable probability of harassment of 
contributors if their names are disclosed. This evidence is sufficiently 
linked to disclosure of contributors in large part because any person 
publicly known to support the SWP's unpopular ideological position may 
suffer the reprisals that this record shows active party members suffer, and 
the disclosure of contributors may lead the public to presume these people 
support the party's ideology. [459 U.S. 87, 114]  

In contrast, the record, read in its entirety, does not suggest that 
disclosure of recipients of expenditures would lead to harassment of 
recipients or reprisals to the party or its members. Appellees gave no 
breakdown of the types of expenditures they thought would lead to harassment 
if disclosed. The record does contain the expenditure statements of the SWP, 
which itemize each expenditure with its purpose while usually omitting the 
name and address of the recipient. The majority of expenditures, both in 
number and dollar amount, are for business transactions such as office 
supplies, food, printing, photographs, telephone service, and books. There 
is virtually no evidence that disclosure of the recipients of these 
expenditures will impair the SWP's ability to obtain needed services.[9] 
Even if we assume that a portion [459 U.S. 87, 115]  of expenditures went to 
temporary campaign workers or others whom the public might identify as 
supporting the party's ideology,[10] these persons have already publicly 
demonstrated their support by their campaign work. There is simply no basis 
for inferring that such persons would thereafter be harassed or threatened 
or otherwise deterred from working for the party by virtue of inclusion of 
their names in later expenditure reports, or that if any such remote danger 
existed, it would outweigh the concededly important governmental interests 
in disclosure of recipients of expenditures.

It is plain that appellees did not carry their burden of production and 
persuasion insofar as they challenge the expenditure disclosure provisions. 
I would therefore uphold the constitutionality of those portions of the Ohio 
statute that require the SWP to disclose the recipients of expenditures.[11]

Footnotes

[1] Of course, the plaintiffs in Buckley challenged many aspects of the 
federal Act, including expenditure limitations and the disclosure 
requirements for independent contributions and expenditures. The Court 
upheld all disclosure requirements, including disclosure of independent 
expenditures "for communications that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 424 U.S., at 80 . The plaintiffs 
in Buckley did not challenge, however, the federal requirement that all 
political parties, including minor political parties, disclose the 
recipients of their expenditures.

[2] Certainly, that is true in this instance. The general political stance 
of the SWP and its candidates is readily discernible from the most cursory 
glance at its constitution or literature.

[3] The majority is obviously correct in noting that the third governmental 
interest articulated in Buckley -- using disclosures to police limitations 
on contributions and expenditures -- has no application to either 
contributions or expenditures in Ohio, since the Ohio statute sets no 
limitations on them.

[4] As JUSTICE WHITE noted in partial dissent in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 
264-265, citing Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934):

     "[T]he corrupt use of money by candidates is as much to be
     feared as the corrosive influence of large contributions. There
     are many illegal ways of spending money to influence
     elections. One would be blind to history to deny that
     unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever
     money can buy to influence an election." (Emphasis in
     original.)

[5] Certainly the SWP could have this effect. For example, appellants noted 
at oral argument that the SWP candidate in the 1974 Ohio gubernatorial 
election received some 95,000 votes. The Republican candidate's margin of 
victory over the Democratic candidate was only some 13,500 votes. Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 18. The impact of minor parties on elections in the United States 
is well documented. See generally W. Hesseltine, Third-Party Movements in 
the United States (1962).

[6] I therefore disagree with the majority's suggestion, ante, at 98-99, n. 
16, that the government interest in deterring corruption is not furthered by 
disclosure of all expenditures, including those for commercial services. 
Even if improprieties are unlikely to occur in expenditures for commercial 
services, full and verifiable disclosure is needed to ensure that other, 
improper expenditures are not hidden in commercial accounts.

[7] According to the majority, "the question whether the Buckley test 
applies to the compelled disclosure of recipients of expenditures is 
properly before us." Ante, at 94, n. 9. The majority declares that, in 
answering this question, "the District Court necessarily held (1) that the 
Buckley standard, which permits flexible proof of the reasonable probability 
of threats, harassment, or reprisals, applies to both contributions and 
expenditures, and (2) that the evidence was sufficient to show a reasonable 
probability that disclosure would subject both contributors and recipients 
to public hostility and harassment." Ibid. (emphasis added).

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante, at 102, however, more accurately characterizes the 
District Court's action as assuming that the Buckley standard applies to 
disclosure of expenditures and holding the evidence sufficient to meet this 
standard. The District Court's assumption is understandable, since 
appellants did not question it below. Thus, this is not the appropriate case 
to determine whether a different test or standard of proof should be 
employed in determining the constitutional validity of required disclosure 
of expenditures.

Even assuming the general applicability of the Buckley standard, though, the 
question presented here requires us to inquire whether the evidence of 
harassment establishes a "reasonable probability" that the Ohio law would 
trigger "threats, harassment, or reprisals" against recipients of 
expenditures that in turn may harm the party's associational interests. This 
inquiry is necessarily distinct from the inquiry whether the evidence 
establishes a reasonable probability that disclosure would trigger threats, 
harassment, or reprisals against contributors. Although the proof 
requirements guiding this separate inquiry remain flexible, and direct proof 
[459 U.S. 87, 113]  of harm from disclosure is not required, ultimately the 
party must prove that the harm to it from disclosure of recipients outweighs 
the governmental interest in disclosure. This separately focused inquiry 
does not necessarily alter Buckley's "reasonable probability" test or 
"flexible proof" standard. It does, however, plainly require a different 
result.

[8] See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 , n. 19 (1982). The 
majority does not clearly articulate the standard of review it is applying. 
By determining that the District Court "properly concluded" that the 
evidence established a reasonable probability of harassment, ante, at 100, 
the majority seems to apply an independent-review standard.

[9] The District Court admitted Exhibit 129 into the record, which is a 
certified copy of findings of fact made by the Federal Election Commission 
pursuant to a 1977 court order in Socialist Workers 1974 National Campaign 
Committee v. Jennings, No. 74-1338 (DC, stipulated judgment entered Jan. 3, 
1979). The FEC in that case analyzed affidavits submitted by SWP members and 
other documentary evidence of public and private harassment of SWP members. 
In finding No. 126, the FEC accepted the SWP's proposed finding that in 1971 
a landlady in San Francisco rejected the application of two SWP members for 
an apartment, because the FBI had visited the landlady and warned her of the 
dangers of the SWP. In finding No. 127, the FEC accepted the SWP's proposed 
finding that in 1974 a landlady in Chicago evicted a SWP member from her 
apartment. The landlady explained, "they told me all about you," refusing to 
identify who "they" were. 

These two incidents are, of course, remote in time and place, and do not 
suggest that the party itself has had difficulty in finding office space. 
Nor do they suggest that the general public is likely to engage in similar 
activity. Moreover, the FBI's actions against the SWP have long been ended, 
see Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, Vol. 4-5, pp. 
3-4 (1976), and Congress has since instituted more rigorous oversight of FBI 
and other intelligence activities, see 50 U.S.C. 413 (1976 ed., Supp. IV). 
An inference from these two incidents that disclosure of recipients of 
expenditures would increase any difficulty the party might have in obtaining 
office space would be tenuous, and is plainly outweighed by the "substantial 
public interest in disclosure," Buckley, 424 U.S., at 72.

[10] As the majority notes, ante, at 97, n. 12, some entries in the 
expenditure forms are designated as per diem, travel expenses, and room 
rental. At least until 1978, the expenditure statements gave the names of 
persons receiving per diem funds from the SWP. Apparently, party treasurers 
and party candidates received per diem payments. There is no evidence that 
filing these statements with the Ohio Secretary of State caused any 
harassment of the named persons, and indeed it is highly unlikely that this 
disclosure would increase the exposure of persons already so publicly 
identified with the party.

[11] In holding a state statute unconstitutional as applied, a court must 
sever and apply constitutional portions unless the legislature would not 
have intended to have applied "`those provisions which are within its power, 
independently of that which is not ...,'" Buckley, supra, at 108 (severing 
constitutional portions of Federal Election Campaign Act after holding other 
portions unconstitutional on their face), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. 
Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932). Clearly, the 
expenditure disclosure requirements of the Ohio statute should be severed 
and applied even though the contribution disclosure requirements cannot be 
applied in this instance, for the two requirements are analytically and 
practically distinct. [459 U.S. 87, 116] 


