     Brown v. Socialist Workers', 458 U.S. 87 (1982)

                 Commentary by Jon Roland

This case represents a significant further erosion of the bad precedent set 
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which left open a defense against 
disclosure -- evidence that the party required to disclosure confronts a 
significant risk of harassment of itself or its supporters. The holding in 
this case was that the Socialist Workers' Party had a history of being 
harassed, and that, being a minor party, its First Amendment rights of 
nondisclosure outweighed the interests of the people in obtaining disclosure 
that might inhibit corruption.

This case has several significant implications. First, it would relieve any 
minor party of disclosure requirements, because any of them could be subject 
to harassment. However, second, by treating minor parties differently than 
major parties, the statute would be in conflict with the constitutional 
requirement of equal protection of the law. Furthermore, it can be shown by 
evidence that in situations where one of the major parties has an advantage 
in holding key positions in government or private enterprise, it is likely 
that supporters of the opposing major party, if they can be identified as 
such, as disclosure of their support would do, would be subject to 
discrimination in hiring, promotion, or contracting. Therefore, third, the 
disclosure requirements are unconstitutional for major parties and persons 
or committees affiliated with them as well, and therefore are 
unconstitutional for anyone.

In none of these cases has there been evidence offered in support of the 
theory that disclosure inhibits corruption or facilitates the detection of 
it. The theory has been accepted by legislatures and the courts as 
plausible, but the only evidence that anyone can offer as to how such 
disclosures are actually used by anyone are for harvesting lists of 
potential donors to solicit and for harassment of supporters of opposing 
candidates or policies. The hope that ordinary voters would be informed by 
such disclosures in the way they cast their votes has not been realized. 
Voters don't read disclosure reports. Only political insiders do, and they 
tend to use the information less to fight corruption than to find 
opportunities for it.

Political reformers who supported campaign disclosure statutes should have 
been more suspicious when they got support from elected officials for the 
adoption of disclosure legislation. As usual, the reform that seems most 
simple and direct turns out to have the opposite effect from that which was 
intended. 

The precedent in Buckley was further eroded in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).




