                   U.S. Supreme Court 

       McINTYRE v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMM'N, 514 U.S.
                       334 (1995)

     JOSEPH McINTYRE, EXECUTOR OF ESTATE OF MARGARET
                  McINTYRE, DECEASED, 
       PETITIONER v. OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION 
       CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
                       No. 93-986. 

                  Argued October 12, 1994 
                   Decided April 19, 1995 

After petitioner's decedent distributed leaflets purporting to express the 
views of "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS" opposing a proposed school tax 
levy, she was fined by respondent for violating 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code, 
which prohibits the distribution of campaign literature that does not 
contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the 
literature. The Court of Common Pleas reversed, but the Ohio Court of 
Appeals reinstated the fine. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held that 
the burdens 3599.09(A) imposed on voters' First Amendment rights were 
"reasonable and "nondiscriminatory" and therefore valid. Declaring that 
3599.09(A) is intended to identify persons who distribute campaign materials 
containing fraud, libel, or false advertising and to provide voters with a 
mechanism for evaluating such materials, the court distinguished Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, in which this Court invalidated an ordinance 
prohibiting all anonymous leafletting.

Held:

Section 3599.09(A)'s prohibition of the distribution of anonymous campaign 
literature abridges the freedom of speech in violation of the First 
Amendment. Pp. 7-24.

     (a) The freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the
     First Amendment, and, as Talley indicates, extends beyond
     the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes. Pp. 7-9.

     (b) This Court's precedents make abundantly clear that the
     Ohio Supreme Court's reasonableness standard is
     significantly more lenient than is appropriate in a case of this
     kind. Although Talley concerned a different limitation than
     3599.09(A) and thus does not necessarily control here, the
     First Amendment's protection of anonymity nevertheless
     applies. Section 3599.09(A) is not simply an Page II election
     code provision subject to the "ordinary litigation" test set forth
     in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, and similar cases.
     Rather, it is a regulation of core political speech. Moreover,
     the category of documents it covers is defined by their
     content -- only those publications containing speech designed
     to influence the voters in an election need bear the required
     information. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
     435 U.S. 765, 776-777. When a law burdens such speech,
     the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction
     only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
     interest. See, e.g., id., at 786. Pp. 9-14.

     (c) Section 3599.09(A)'s anonymous speech ban is not
     justified by Ohio's asserted interests in preventing fraudulent
     and libelous statements and in providing the electorate with
     relevant information. The claimed informational interest is
     plainly insufficient to support the statute's disclosure
     requirement, since the speaker's identity is no different from
     other components of a document's contents that the author is
     free to include or exclude, and the author's name and address
     add little to the reader's ability to evaluate the document in
     the case of a handbill written by a private citizen unknown to
     the reader. Moreover, the state interest in preventing fraud
     and libel (which Ohio vindicates by means of other, more
     direct prohibitions) does not justify 3599.09(A)'s extremely
     broad prohibition of anonymous leaflets. The statute
     encompasses all documents, regardless of whether they are
     arguably false or misleading. Although a State might
     somehow demonstrate that its enforcement interests justify a
     more limited identification requirement, Ohio has not met that
     burden here. Pp. 14-20.

     (d) This Court's opinions in Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 792, n. 32
     -- which commented in dicta on the prophylactic effect of
     requiring identification of the source of corporate campaign
     advertising - and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75-76 --
     which approved mandatory disclosure of campaign-related
     expenditures -- do not establish the constitutionality of
     3599.09(A), since neither case involved a prohibition of
     anonymous campaign literature. Pp. 20-23.

67 Ohio St. 3d 391, 618 N. E. 2d 152, reversed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, 
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring 
opinion. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SCALIA, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined. [514 U.S. 
334, 334] 

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether an Ohio statute that prohibits the 
distribution of anonymous campaign literature is a "law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment.[1]  [514 U.S. 
334, 335] 

                            I

On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons 
attending a public meeting at the Blendon Middle School in Westerville, 
Ohio. At this meeting, the superintendent of schools planned to discuss an 
imminent referendum on a proposed school tax levy. The leaflets expressed 
Mrs. McIntyre's opposition to the levy.[2] There is no suggestion that the 
text of her message was false, misleading, or libelous. She [ 514 U.S. 334, 
336]  had composed and printed it on her home computer and had paid a 
professional printer to make additional copies. Some of the handbills 
identified her as the author; others merely purported to express the views 
of "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS." Except for the help provided by her 
son and a friend, who placed some of the leaflets on car windshields in the 
school parking lot, Mrs. McIntyre acted independently.

While Mrs. McIntyre distributed her handbills, an official of the school 
district, who supported the tax proposal, advised her that the unsigned 
leaflets did not conform to the Ohio election laws. Undeterred, Mrs. 
McIntyre appeared at another meeting on the next evening and handed out more 
of the handbills.

The proposed school levy was defeated at the next two elections, but it 
finally passed on its third try in November 1988. Five months later, the 
same school official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission 
charging that Mrs. McIntyre's distribution of unsigned leaflets violated 
3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code.[3]  [ 514 U.S. 334, 337]  The Commission agreed 
and imposed a fine of $100.

The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversed. Finding that Mrs. 
McIntyre did not "mislead the public nor act in a surreptitious manner," the 
court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to her 
conduct. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-34 to A-35. The Ohio Court of Appeals, by 
a divided vote, reinstated the fine. Notwithstanding doubts about the 
continuing validity of a 1922 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court upholding 
the statutory predecessor of 3599.09(A), the majority considered itself 
bound by that precedent. Id., at A-20 to A-21, citing State v. Babst, 104 
Ohio St. [ 514 U.S. 334, 338]  167, 135 N. E. 525 (1922). The dissenting 
judge thought that our intervening decision in Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60 (1960), in which we invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting all 
anonymous leafletting, compelled the Ohio court to adopt a narrowing 
construction of the statute to save its constitutionality. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A-30 to A-31.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed by a divided vote. The majority 
distinguished Mrs. McIntyre's case from Talley on the ground that 3599.09(A) 
"has as its purpose the identification of persons who distribute materials 
containing false statements." 67 Ohio St. 3d 391, 394, 618 N. E. 2d 152, 154 
(1993). The Ohio court believed that such a law should be upheld if the 
burdens imposed on the First Amendment rights of voters are "reasonable" and 
"nondiscriminatory." Id., at 396, 618 N. E. 2d, at 155, quoting Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). Under that standard, the majority 
concluded that the statute was plainly valid:

     "The minor requirement imposed by R.C. 3599.09 that those
     persons producing campaign literature identify themselves as
     the source thereof neither impacts the content of their
     message nor significantly burdens their ability to have it
     disseminated. This burden is more than counterbalanced by
     the state interest in providing the voters to whom the message
     is directed with a mechanism by which they may better
     evaluate its validity. Moreover, the law serves to identify
     those who engage in fraud, libel or false advertising. Not only
     are such interests sufficient to overcome the minor burden
     placed upon such persons, these interests were specifically
     acknowledged in [First National Bank of Boston v.] Bellotti[,
     435 U.S. 765 (1978),] to be regulations of the sort which
     would survive constitutional scrutiny." 67 Ohio St. 3d, at
     396, 618 N. E. 2d, at [ 514 U.S. 334, 339]  155-156. 

In dissent, Justice Wright argued that the statute should be tested under a 
more severe standard because of its significant effect "on the ability of 
individual citizens to freely express their views in writing on political 
issues." Id., at 398, 618 N. E. 2d, at 156-157. He concluded that 3599.09(A) 
"is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional as applied to McIntyre." Id., at 401, 618 N. E. 
2d, at 159.

Mrs. McIntyre passed away during the pendency of this litigation. Even 
though the amount in controversy is only $100, petitioner, as the executor 
of her estate, has pursued her claim in this Court. Our grant of certiorari, 
510 U.S. ___ (1994), reflects our agreement with his appraisal of the 
importance of the question presented.

                            II

Ohio maintains that the statute under review is a reasonable regulation of 
the electoral process. The State does not suggest that all anonymous 
publications are pernicious or that a statute totally excluding them from 
the marketplace of ideas would be valid. This is a wise (albeit implicit) 
concession, for the anonymity of an author is not ordinarily a sufficient 
reason to exclude her work product from the protections of the First 
Amendment. 

     "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books
     have played an important role in the progress of mankind."
     Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). Great works of
     literature have frequently been produced by authors writing
     under assumed names.[4] Despite [514 U.S. 334, 340]  readers'
     curiosity and the public's interest in identifying the creator of a
     work of art, an author generally is free to decide whether or
     not to disclose her true identity. The decision in favor of
     anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official
     retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
     desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.
     Whatever the motivation may be, at least in the field of
     literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works
     enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any
     public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of
     entry.[5] Accordingly, an author's decision to remain
     anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or
     additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
     freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. [514
     U.S. 334, 341] 

The freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the literary realm. In 
Talley, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the distribution of 
unsigned handbills urging readers to boycott certain Los Angeles merchants 
who were allegedly engaging in discriminatory employment practices. 362 U.S. 
60 . Writing for the Court, Justice Black noted that "[p]ersecuted groups 
and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize 
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." Id., at 64. 
Justice Black recalled England's abusive press licensing laws and seditious 
libel prosecutions, and he reminded us that even the arguments favoring the 
ratification of the Constitution advanced in the Federalist Papers were 
published under fictitious names. Id., at 64-65. On occasion, quite apart 
from any threat of persecution, an advocate may believe her ideas will be 
more persuasive if her readers are unaware of her identity. Anonymity 
thereby provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to 
ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not 
like its proponent. Thus, even in the field of political rhetoric, where 
"the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to 
persuade," City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 
13), the most effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity. The 
specific holding in Talley related to advocacy of an economic boycott, but 
the Court's reasoning embraced a respected tradition of anonymity in the 
advocacy of political causes.[6] This tradition is perhaps best exemplified 
[514 U.S. 334, 342]  by the secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote one's 
conscience without fear of retaliation.

                           III

California had defended the Los Angeles ordinance at issue in Talley as a 
law "aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false 
advertising and libel." 362 U.S., at 64 . We rejected that argument because 
nothing in the text or legislative history of the ordinance limited its 
application to those evils.[7] Ibid. We then made clear that we did "not 
pass on the validity of an ordinance limited to prevent these or [ 514 U.S. 
334, 343]  any other supposed evils." Ibid. The Ohio statute likewise 
contains no language limiting its application to fraudulent, false, or 
libelous statements; to the extent, therefore, that Ohio seeks to justify 
3599.09(A) as a means to prevent the dissemination of untruths, its defense 
must fail for the same reason given in Talley. As the facts of this case 
demonstrate, the ordinance plainly applies even when there is no hint of 
falsity or libel.

Ohio's statute does, however, contain a different limitation: It applies 
only to unsigned documents designed to influence voters in an election. In 
contrast, the Los Angeles ordinance prohibited all anonymous handbilling "in 
any place under any circumstances." Id., at 60-61. For that reason, Ohio 
correctly argues that Talley does not necessarily control the disposition of 
this case. We must, therefore, decide whether and to what extent the First 
Amendment's protection of anonymity encompasses documents intended to 
influence the electoral process.

Ohio places its principal reliance on cases such as Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
460 U.S. 780 (1983); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); and Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), in which we reviewed election code provisions 
governing the voting process itself. See Anderson, supra (filing deadlines); 
Storer, supra (ballot access); Burdick, supra (write-in voting); see also 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) 
(eligibility of independent voters to vote in party primaries). In those 
cases we refused to adopt "any `litmus-paper test' that will separate valid 
from invalid restrictions." Anderson, 460 U.S., at 789, quoting Storer, 415 
U.S., at 730 . Instead, we pursued an analytical process comparable to that 
used by courts "in ordinary litigation": we considered the relative 
interests of the State and the injured voters, and we evaluated the extent 
to which the State's interests necessitated the contested restrictions. 
Anderson, [514 U.S. 334, 344]  460 U.S., at 789 . Applying similar reasoning 
in this case, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld 3599.09(A) as a "reasonable" and 
"nondiscriminatory" burden on the rights of voters. 67 Ohio St. 3d 391, 396, 
618 N. E. 2d 152, 155 (1993), quoting Anderson, 460 U.S., at 788 .

The "ordinary litigation" test does not apply here. Unlike the statutory 
provisions challenged in Storer and Anderson, 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Code 
does not control the mechanics of the electoral process. It is a regulation 
of pure speech. Moreover, even though this provision applies evenhandedly to 
advocates of differing viewpoints,[8] it is a direct regulation of the 
content of speech. Every written document covered by the statute must 
contain "the name and residence or business address of the chairman, 
treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person 
who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
3599.09(A) (1988). Furthermore, the category of covered documents is defined 
by their content -- only those publications containing speech designed to 
influence the voters in an election need bear the required markings.[9] 
Ibid. Consequently, we are not faced with an ordinary election restriction; 
this case "involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting 
scrutiny." Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988).10  [ 514 U.S. 334, 345] 

Indeed, as we have explained on many prior occasions, the category of speech 
regulated by the Ohio statute occupies the core of the protection afforded 
by the First Amendment:

     "Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications
     of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
     government established by our Constitution. The First
     Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political
     expression in order `to assure [the] unfettered interchange of
     ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
     desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
     484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not
     confined to `the exposition of ideas,' Winters v. New York,
     333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948), `there is practically universal
     agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
     protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, ... of
     course includ[ing] discussions of candidates . . . .' Mills v.
     Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). This no more than
     reflects our `profound national commitment to the principle
     that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
     and wide-open,' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
     254, 270 (1964). In a republic where the people are
     sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
     choices among candidates for office is essential, for the
     identities of those who [514 U.S. 334, 346]  are elected will
     inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation. As the
     Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
     265, 272 (1971), `it can hardly be doubted that the
     constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent
     application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
     office.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).

Of course, core political speech need not center on a candidate for office. 
The principles enunciated in Buckley extend equally to issue-based elections 
such as the school-tax referendum that Mrs. McIntyre sought to influence 
through her handbills. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 776-777 (1978) (speech on income-tax referendum "is at the heart of the 
First Amendment's protection"). Indeed, the speech in which Mrs. McIntyre 
engaged -- handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically 
controversial viewpoint -- is the essence of First Amendment expression. See 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. ___ (1992); 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). That this advocacy occurred in the 
heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the protection 
afforded to Ms. McIntyre's expression: urgent, important, and effective 
speech can be no less protected than impotent speech, lest the right to 
speak be relegated to those instances when it is least needed. See 
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). No form of speech is entitled 
to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre's.

When a law burdens core political speech, we apply "exacting scrutiny," and 
we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an 
overriding state interest. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 786 . Our 
precedents thus make abundantly clear that the Ohio Supreme Court applied a 
significantly more lenient [514 U.S. 334, 347]  standard than is appropriate 
in a case of this kind.

                           IV

Nevertheless, the State argues that even under the strictest standard of 
review, the disclosure requirement in 3599.09(A) is justified by two 
important and legitimate state interests. Ohio judges its interest in 
preventing fraudulent and libelous statements and its interest in providing 
the electorate with relevant information to be sufficiently compelling to 
justify the anonymous speech ban. These two interests necessarily overlap to 
some extent, but it is useful to discuss them separately.

Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means nothing more than 
the provision of additional information that may either buttress or 
undermine the argument in a document, we think the identity of the speaker 
is no different from other components of the document's content that the 
author is free to include or exclude.11 We have already held that the State 
may not compel a newspaper that prints editorials critical of a particular 
candidate to provide space for a reply by the candidate. Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The simple interest in 
providing voters with additional relevant information does not [514 U.S. 
334, 348]  justify a state requirement that a writer make statements or 
disclosures she would otherwise omit. Moreover, in the case of a handbill 
written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and 
address of the author adds little, if anything, to the reader's ability to 
evaluate the document's message. Thus, Ohio's informational interest is 
plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure 
requirement. 

The state interest in preventing fraud and libel stands on a d