SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1260
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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
ALFONSO LOPEZ, Jr.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fifth circuit
[April 26, 1995]

  Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O'Connor
joins, concurring.
  The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the
Commerce Clause during the transition from the
economic system the Founders knew to the single,
national market still emergent in our own era counsels
great restraint before the Court determines that the
Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of the
national power.  That history gives me some pause
about today's decision, but I join the Court's opinion
with these observations on what I conceive to be its
necessary though limited holding. 
  Chief Justice Marshall announced that the national
authority reaches -that commerce which concerns more
States than one- and that the commerce power -is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the constitution.-  Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
1, 194, 196 (1824).  His statements can be understood
now as an early and authoritative recognition that the
Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and
ample discretion to determine its appropriate exercise. 
The progression of our Commerce Clause cases from
Gibbons to the present was not marked, however, by a
coherent or consistent course of interpretation; for
neither the course of technological advance nor the
foundational principles for the jurisprudence itself were
self-evident to the courts that sought to resolve contem-
porary disputes by enduring principles.
  Furthermore, for almost a century after the adoption
of the Constitution, the Court's Commerce Clause
decisions did not concern the authority of Congress to
legislate.  Rather, the Court faced the related but quite
distinct question of the authority of the States to
regulate matters that would be within the commerce
power had Congress chosen to act.  The simple fact was
that in the early years of the Republic, Congress seldom
perceived the necessity to exercise its power in circum-
stances where its authority would be called into ques-
tion.  The Court's initial task, therefore, was to elabo-
rate the theories that would permit the States to act
where Congress had not done so.  Not the least part of
the problem was the unresolved question whether the
congressional power was exclusive, a question reserved
by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra,
at 209-210.
  At the midpoint of the 19th century, the Court em-
braced the principle that the States and the National
Government both have authority to regulate certain
matters absent the congressional determination to
displace local law or the necessity for the Court to
invalidate local law because of the dormant national
power.  Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadel-
phia, 12 How. 299, 318-321 (1852).  But the utility of
that solution was not at once apparent, see generally F.
Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall,
Taney and Waite (1937) (hereinafter Frankfurter), and
difficulties of application persisted, see Leisy v. Hardin,
135 U. S. 100, 122-125 (1890).
  One approach the Court used to inquire into the
lawfulness of state authority was to draw content-based
or subject-matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic
or formalistic categories those activities that were com-
merce and those that were not.  For instance, in
deciding that a State could prohibit the in-state manu-
facture of liquor intended for out-of-state shipment, it
distinguished between manufacture and commerce. -No
distinction is more popular to the common mind, or
more clearly expressed in economic and political litera-
ture, than that between manufactur[e] and commerce. 
Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw
materials into a change of form for use.  The functions
of commerce are different.-  Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S.
1, 20 (1888).  Though that approach likely would not
have survived even if confined to the question of a
State's authority to enact legislation, it was not at all
propitious when applied to the quite different question
of what subjects were within the reach of the national
power when Congress chose to exercise it.
  This became evident when the Court began to confront
federal economic regulation enacted in response to the
rapid industrial development in the late 19th century. 
Thus, it relied upon the manufacture-commerce dichot-
omy in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1
(1895), where a manufacturers' combination controlling
some 98% of the Nation's domestic sugar refining
capacity was held to be outside the reach of the Sher-
man Act.  Conspiracies to control manufacture, agricul-
ture, mining, production, wages, or prices, the Court
explained, had too -indirect- an effect on interstate
commerce.  Id., at 16.  And in Adair v. United States,
208 U. S. 161 (1908), the Court rejected the view that
the commerce power might extend to activities that,
although local in the sense of having originated within
a single state, nevertheless had a practical effect on
interstate commercial activity.  The Court concluded that
there was not a -legal or logical connection . . . between
an employ-'s membership in a labor organization and
the carrying on of interstate commerce,- id., at 178, and
struck down a federal statute forbidding the discharge
of an employee because of his membership in a labor
organization.  See also The Employers' Liability Cases,
207 U. S. 463, 497 (1908) (invalidating statute creating
negligence action against common carriers for personal
injuries of employees sustained in the course of employ-
ment, because the statute -regulates the persons because
they engage in interstate commerce and does not alone
regulate the business of interstate commerce-).
  Even before the Court committed itself to sustaining
federal legislation on broad principles of economic
practicality, it found it necessary to depart from these
decisions. The Court disavowed E. C. Knight's reliance
on the manufacturing-commerce distinction in Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1,
68-69 (1911), declaring that approach -unsound.-  The
Court likewise rejected the rationale of Adair when it
decided, in Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Railway
Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 570-571 (1930), that Congress
had the power to regulate matters pertaining to the
organization of railroad workers. 
  In another line of cases, the Court addressed Congress'
efforts to impede local activities it considered undesir-
able by prohibiting the interstate movement of some
essential element.  In the Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321
(1903), the Court rejected the argument that Congress
lacked power to prohibit the interstate movement of
lottery tickets because it had power only to regulate, not
to prohibit.  See also Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U. S. 45 (1911); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S.
308 (1913).  In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251
(1918), however, the Court insisted that the power to
regulate commerce -is directly the contrary of the
assumed right to forbid commerce from moving,- id., at
269-270, and struck down a prohibition on the interstate
transportation of goods manufactured in violation of
child labor laws.
  Even while it was experiencing difficulties in finding
satisfactory principles in these cases, the Court was
pursuing a more sustainable and practical approach in
other lines of decisions, particularly those involving the
regulation of railroad rates.  In the Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913), the Court upheld a state
rate order, but observed that Congress might be empow-
ered to regulate in this area if -by reason of the
interblending of the interstate and intrastate operations
of interstate carriers- the regulation of interstate rates
could not be maintained without restrictions on -intra-
state rates which substantially affect the former.-  Id.,
at 432-433.  And in the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234
U. S. 342 (1914), the Court upheld an ICC order fixing
railroad rates with the explanation that congressional
authority, -extending to these interstate carriers as
instruments of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces
the right to control their operations in all matters
having such a close and substantial relation to interstate
traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to the
security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate
service, and to the maintenance of conditions under
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair
terms and without molestation or hindrance.-  Id., at
351.  
  Even the most confined interpretation of -commerce-
would embrace transportation between the States, so the
rate cases posed much less difficulty for the Court than
cases involving manufacture or production.  Neverthe-
less, the Court's recognition of the importance of a
practical conception of the commerce power was not
altogether confined to the rate cases.  In Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905), the Court upheld
the application of federal antitrust law to a combination
of meat dealers that occurred in one State but that
restrained trade in cattle -sent for sale from a place in
one State, with the expectation that they will end their
transit . . . in another.-  Id., at 398.  The Court ex-
plained that -commerce among the States is not a
technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn
from the course of business.-  Id., at 398.  Chief Justice
Taft followed the same approach in upholding federal
regulation of stockyards in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S.
495 (1922).  Speaking for the Court, he rejected a -nice
and technical inquiry,- id., at 519, when the local
transactions at issue could not -be separated from the
movement to which they contribute,- id., at 516.  
  Reluctance of the Court to adopt that approach in all
of its cases caused inconsistencies in doctrine to persist,
however.  In addressing New Deal legislation the Court
resuscitated the abandoned abstract distinction between
direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce.  See
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 309 (1936) (Act
regulating price of coal and wages and hours for miners
held to have only -secondary and indirect- effect on
interstate commerce); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 368 (1935) (compulsory retirement
and pension plan for railroad carrier employees too
-remote from any regulation of commerce as such-);
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U. S. 495, 548 (1935) (wage and hour law provision of
National Industrial Recovery Act had -no direct relation
to interstate commerce-).
  The case that seems to mark the Court's definitive
commitment to the practical conception of the commerce
power is NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1 (1937), where the Court sustained labor laws
that applied to manufacturing facilities, making no real
attempt to distinguish Carter, supra, and Schechter,
supra.  301 U. S., at 40-41.  The deference given to
Congress has since been confirmed.  United States v.
Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941), overruled Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart, supra.  And in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U. S. 111 (1942), the Court disapproved E. C.
Knight and the entire line of direct-indirect and manu-
facture-production cases, explaining that -broader
interpretations of the Commerce Clause [were] destined
to supersede the earlier ones,- id., at 122, and -whatever
terminology is used, the criterion is necessarily one of
degree and must be so defined.  This does not satisfy
those who seek mathematical or rigid formulas.  But
such formulas are not provided by the great concepts of
the Constitution,- id., at 123, n. 24.  Later examples of
the exercise of federal power where commercial transac-
tions were the subject of regulation include Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241
(1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 (1964),
and Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146 (1971).  These
and like authorities are within the fair ambit of the
Court's practical conception of commercial regulation and
are not called in question by our decision today.
  The history of our Commerce Clause decisions contains
at least two lessons of relevance to this case.  The first,
as stated at the outset, is the imprecision of content-
based boundaries used without more to define the limits
of the Commerce Clause.  The second, related to the
first but of even greater consequence, is that the Court
as an institution and the legal system as a whole have
an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.
Stare decisis operates with great force in counseling us
not to call in question the essential principles now in
place respecting the congressional power to regulate
transactions of a commercial nature.  That fundamental
restraint on our power forecloses us from reverting to an
understanding of commerce that would serve only an
18th-century economy, dependent then upon production
and trading practices that had changed but little over
the preceding centuries; it also mandates against
returning to the time when congressional authority to
regulate undoubted commercial activities was limited by
a judicial determination that those matters had an
insufficient connection to an interstate system.  Congress
can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assump-
tion that we have a single market and a unified purpose
to build a stable national economy.
  In referring to the whole subject of the federal and
state balance, we said this just three Terms ago:
    -This framework has been sufficiently flexible over
  the past two centuries to allow for enormous changes
  in the nature of government.  The Federal Govern-
  ment undertakes activities today that would have been
  unimaginable to the Framers in two senses: first,
  because the Framers would not have conceived that
  any government would conduct such activities; and
  second, because the Framers would not have believed
  that the Federal Government, rather than the States,
  would assume such responsibilities.  Yet the powers
  conferred upon the Federal Government by the
  Constitution were phrased in language broad enough
  to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government's
  role.- New York v. United States, 505 U. S. ___, ___
  (1992) (slip op., at 9-10) (emphasis omitted).  
It does not follow, however, that in every instance the
Court lacks the authority and responsibility to review
congressional attempts to alter the federal balance.  This
case requires us to consider our place in the design of
the Government and to appreciate the significance of
federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution.
  Of the various structural elements in the Constitution,
separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial
review, and federalism, only concerning the last does
there seem to be much uncertainty respecting the
existence, and the content, of standards that allow the
judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the
design contemplated by the Framers.  Although the
resolution of specific cases has proved difficult, we have
derived from the Constitution workable standards to
assist in preserving separation of powers and checks and
balances.  See, e.g., Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (1863);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); INS v. Chadha,
462 U. S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714
(1986); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, ___ U. S. ___ (1995). 
These standards are by now well accepted.  Judicial
review is also established beyond question, Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and though we may
differ when applying its principles, see, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U. S. ___ (1992), its legitimacy is undoubted.  Our role
in preserving the federal balance seems more tenuous.
  There is irony in this, because of the four structural
elements in the Constitution just mentioned, federalism
was the unique contribution of the Framers to political
science and political theory.  See Friendly, Federalism:
A Forward, 86 Yale L. J. 1019 (1977); G. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, pp.
524-532, 564 (1969).  Though on the surface the idea
may seem counterintuitive, it was the insight of the
Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation of
two governments, not one.  -In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments.  Hence a double security arises to
the rights of the people.  The different governments will
control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.-  The Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison).  See also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458-459 (1991) (-Just as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumu-
lation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front. . . .  In the tension between federal
and state power lies the promise of liberty-); New York
v. United States, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 34) (-[T]he
Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals.  State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself: `Rather, federal-
ism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power'-) (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
  The theory that two governments accord more liberty
than one requires for its realization two distinct and
discernable lines of political accountability: one between
the citizens and the Federal Government; the second
between the citizens and the States.  If, as Madison
expected, the federal and state governments are to
control each other, see The Federalist No. 51, and hold
each other in check by competing for the affections of
the people, see The Federalist No. 46, those citizens
must have some means of knowing which of the two
governments to hold accountable for the failure to
perform a given function.  -Federalism serves to assign
political responsibility, not to obscure it.-  FTC v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 504 U. S. 621, 636 (1992).  Were the
Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire
areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing
to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state
authority would blur and political responsibility would
become illusory.  See New York v. United States, supra,
at ___; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 787 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).  The resultant inability to hold
either branch of the government answerable to the
citizens is more dangerous even than devolving too much
authority to the remote central power.
  To be sure, one conclusion that could be drawn from
The Federalist Papers is that the balance between
national and state power is entrusted in its entirety to
the political process.  Madison's observation that -the
people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most
of their confidence where they may discover it to be
most due,- The Federalist No. 46, p. 295 (C. Rossiter ed.
1961), can be interpreted to say that the essence of
responsibility for a shift in power from the State to the
Federal Government rests upon a political judgment,
though he added assurance that -the State governments
could have little to apprehend, because it is only within
a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the
nature of things, be advantageously administered,- ibid. 
Whatever the judicial role, it is axiomatic that Congress
does have substantial discretion and control over the
federal balance.
  For these reasons, it would be mistaken and mischie-
vous for the political branches to forget that the sworn
obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in
maintaining the federal balance is their own in the first
and primary instance.  In the Webster-Hayne Debates,
see The Great Speeches and Orations of Daniel Webster
227-272 (E. Whipple ed. 1879), and the debates over the
Civil Rights Acts, see Hearings on S. 1732 before the
Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts. 1-3 (1963), some Congresses have accepted responsi-
bility to confront the great questions of the proper
federal balance in terms of lasting consequences for the
constitutional design.  The political branches of the
Government must fulfill this grave constitutional obliga-
tion if democratic liberty and the federalism that secures
it are to endure. 
  At the same time, the absence of structural mecha-
nisms to require those officials to undertake this
principled task, and the momentary political convenience
often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue
against a complete renunciation of the judicial role. 
Although it is the obligation of all officers of the
Government to respect the constitutional design, see
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440,
466 (1989); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64 (1981),
the federal balance is too essential a part of our consti-
tutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing
freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one
or the other level of Government has tipped the scales
too far.
  In the past this Court has participated in maintaining
the federal balance through judicial exposition of
doctrines such as abstention, see, e.g., Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37 (1971); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), the rules for determining the
primacy of state law, see, e.g., Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64 (1938), the doctrine of adequate and
independent state grounds, see, e.g., Murdock v. City of
Memphis, 87 U. S. 590 (1875); Michigan v. Long, 463
U. S. 1032 (1983), the whole jurisprudence of pre-
emption, see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U. S. 218 (1947); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U. S. ___ (1992), and many of the rules governing our
habeas jurisprudence, see, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson,
supra; McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991); Teague
v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S.
509 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977).
  Our ability to preserve this principle under the
Commerce Clause has presented a much greater chal-
lenge.  See supra, at 1-7.  -This clause has throughout
the Court's history been the chief source of its adjudica-
tions regarding federalism,- and -no other body of
opinions affords a fairer or more revealing test of
judicial qualities.-  Frankfurter 66-67.  But as the
branch whose distinctive duty it is to declare -what the
law is,- Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177, we are
often called upon to resolve questions of constitutional
law not susceptible to the mechanical application of
bright and clear lines.  The substantial element of
political judgment in Commerce Clause matters leaves
our institutional capacity to intervene more in doubt
than when we decide cases, for instance, under the Bill
of Rights even though clear and bright lines are often
absent in the latter class of disputes.  See County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 630 (1989) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(-We cannot avoid the obligation to draw lines, often
close and difficult lines- in adjudicating constitutional
rights).  But our cases do not teach that we have no
role at all in determining the meaning of the Commerce
Clause.
  Our position in enforcing the dormant Commerce
Clause is instructive.  The Court's doctrinal approach in
that area has likewise -taken some turns.-  Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. ___, ___
(1995) (slip op., at 4).  Yet in contrast to the prevailing
skepticism that surrounds our ability to give meaning to
the explicit text of the Commerce Clause, there is
widespread acceptance of our authority to enforce the
dormant Commerce Clause, which we have but inferred
from the constitutional structure as a limitation on the
power of the States.  One element of our dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been the principle
that the States may not impose regulations that place
an undue burden on interstate commerce, even where
those regulations do not discriminate between in-state
and out-of-state businesses.  See Brown-Forman Distill-
ers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S.
573, 579 (1986) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U. S. 137, 142 (1970)).  Distinguishing between regula-
tions that do place an undue burden on interstate
commerce and regulations that do not depends upon
delicate judgments.  True, if we invalidate a state law,
Congress can in effect overturn our judgment, whereas
in a case announcing that Congress has transgressed its
authority, the decision is more consequential, for its
stands unless Congress can revise its law to demonstrate
its commercial character.  This difference no doubt
informs the circumspection with which we invalidate an
Act of Congress, but it does not mitigate our duty to
recognize meaningful limits on the commerce power of
Congress.
  The statute before us upsets the federal balance to a
degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of
the commerce power, and our intervention is required. 
As the Chief Justice explains, unlike the earlier cases
to come before the Court here neither the actors nor
their conduct have a commercial character, and neither
the purposes nor the design of the statute have an
evident commercial nexus.  See ante, at 10-12.  The
statute makes the simple possession of a gun within
1,000 feet of the grounds of the school a criminal
offense.  In a sense any conduct in this interdependent
world of ours has an ultimate commercial origin or
consequence, but we have not yet said the commerce
power may reach so far.  If Congress attempts that
extension, then at the least we must inquire whether
the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an
area of traditional state concern.  
  An interference of these dimensions occurs here, for it
is well established that education is a traditional
concern of the States.  Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S.
717, 741-742 (1974); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97, 104 (1968).  The proximity to schools, including of
course schools owned and operated by the States or their
subdivisions, is the very premise for making the conduct
criminal.  In these circumstances, we have a particular
duty to insure that the federal-state balance is not
destroyed.  Cf. Rice, supra, at 230 (-[W]e start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States-
are not displaced by a federal statute -unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress-); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132,
146 (1963).
  While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any
reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to
allow students to carry guns on school premises, consid-
erable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish
that goal.  In this circumstance, the theory and utility
of our federalism are revealed, for the States may
perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to
devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear.  See San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 49-50 (1973); New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)). 
  If a State or municipality determines that harsh crimi-
nal sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students
from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved
powers of the States are sufficient to enact those
measures.  Indeed, over 40 States already have criminal
laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near
school grounds.  See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann.
11.61.195(a)(2)(A), 11.61.220(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1994); Cal.
Penal Code Ann. 626.9 (West Supp. 1994); Mass. Gen.
Laws 269:10(j) (1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39-5(e)
(West Supp. 1994); Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.1 (1988);
Wis. Stat. 948.605 (1991-1992).
  Other, more practicable means to rid the schools of
guns may be thought by the citizens of some States to
be preferable for the safety and welfare of the schools
those States are charged with maintaining.  See Brief
for National Conference of State Legislatures et al., as
Amici Curiae 26-30 (injection of federal officials into
local problems causes friction and diminishes political
accountability of state and local governments).  These
might include inducements to inform on violators where
the information leads to arrests or confiscation of the
guns, see C. Lima, Schools May Launch Weapons Hot
Line, L. A. Times, Jan. 13, 1995, part B, p. 1, col. 5;
Reward for Tips on Guns in Tucson Schools, The
Arizona Republic, Jan. 7, 1995, p. B2; programs to
encourage the voluntary surrender of guns with some
provision for amnesty, see A. Zaidan, Akron Rallies to
Save Youths, The Plain Dealer, Mar. 2, 1995, p. 1B; M.
Swift, Legislators Consider Plan to Get Guns Off
Streets, Hartford Courant, Apr. 29, 1992, p. A4; penal-
ties imposed on parents or guardians for failure to
supervise the child, see, e.g., Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, 858
(Supp. 1995) (fining parents who allow students to
possess firearm at school); Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-1312
(Supp. 1992) (misdemeanor for parents to allow student
to possess firearm at school); Straight Shooter: Gov.
Casey's Reasonable Plan to Control Assault Weapons,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Mar. 14, 1994, p. B2 (proposed
bill); E. Bailey, Anti-Crime Measures Top Legislators'
Agenda, L. A. Times, Mar. 7, 1994, part B, p. 1, col. 2
(same); G. Krupa, New Gun-Control Plans Could Tighten
Local Law, The Boston Globe, June 20, 1993, p. 29; laws
providing for suspension or expulsion of gun-toting
students, see, e.g., Ala. Code 16-1-24.1 (Supp. 1994);
Ind. Code 20-8.1-5-4(b)(1)(D) (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat.
Ann. 158.150(1)(a) (Michie 1992); Wash. Rev. Code
9.41.280 (1994), or programs for expulsion with assign-
ment to special facilities, see J. Martin, Legislators
Poised to Take Harsher Stand on Guns in Schools, The
Seattle Times, Feb. 1, 1995, p. B1 (automatic-year-long
expulsion for students with guns and intense semester-
long reentry program).
  The statute now before us forecloses the States from
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an
area to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity
beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual
sense of that term.  The tendency of this statute to
displace state regulation in areas of traditional state
concern is evident from its territorial operation.  There
are over 100,000 elementary and secondary schools in
the United States.  See U. S. Dept. of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of
Education Statistics 73, 104 (NCES 94-115, 1994)
(Tables 63, 94).  Each of these now has an invisible
federal zone extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often
irregular) boundaries of the school property.  In some
communities no doubt it would be difficult to navigate
without infringing on those zones.  Yet throughout these
areas, school officials would find their own programs for
the prohibition of guns in danger of displacement by the
federal authority unless the State chooses to enact a
parallel rule. 
  This is not a case where the etiquette of federalism
has been violated by a formal command from the
National Government directing the State to enact a
certain policy, cf. New York v. United States, 505 U. S.
___ (1992), or to organize its governmental functions in
a certain way, cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S., at 781
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part).  While the intrusion on state
sovereignty may not be as severe in this instance as in
some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases, the intru-
sion is nonetheless significant.  Absent a stronger
connection or identification with commercial concerns
that are central to the Commerce Clause, that interfer-
ence contradicts the federal balance the Framers
designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce. 
  For these reasons, I join in the opinion and judgment
of the Court.


