Caron v. United States 
524 U.S. 308 (1998)



                        Syllabus

          Supreme Court of the United States

                CARON v. UNITED STATES

       CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    No. 97-6270. Argued April 21, 1998 -- Decided June 22, 1998 



Federal law forbids a person convicted of a serious offense to possess 
any firearm, 18 U.S. C. 922(g)(1), and requires that a three-time 
violent felon who violates 922(g) receive an enhanced sentence, 
924(e). However, a previous conviction is not a predicate for the 
substantive offense or the enhanced sentence if the offenders civil 
rights have been restored, "unless such ... restoration ... expressly 
provides that the person may not ... possess ... firearms." 921(a)(20). 
Petitioner, who has an extensive criminal record, was convicted of 
possessing, inter alia, six rifles and shotguns in violation of 922(g). 
The District Court enhanced his sentence based on one California 
conviction and three Massachusetts convictions, but the First Circuit 
vacated the sentence, concluding that his civil rights had been restored 
by operation of a Massachusetts law that permitted him to possess rifles 
but restricted his right to carry handguns. On remand, the District 
Court disregarded the Massachusetts convictions, finding that, because 
Massachusetts law allowed petitioner to possess rifles, 921(a)(20)s 
"unless clause" was not activated, and that the handgun restriction was 
irrelevant because the case involved rifles and shotguns. The First 
Circuit reversed, counting the convictions because petitioner remained 
subject to significant firearms restrictions.

Held:  The handgun restriction activates the unless clause, making the 
Massachusetts convictions count under federal law. The phrase "may not 
... possess ... firearms" must be interpreted under either of two 
"all-or-nothing" approaches: either it applies when the State forbids 
one or more types of firearms, as the Government contends; or it does 
not apply if the State permits one or more types of firearms, regardless 
of the one possessed in the particular case. This Court agrees with the 
Governments approach, under which a state weapons limitation activates 
the uniform federal ban on possessing any firearms at all. Even if a 
State permitted an offender to have the guns he possessed, federal law 
uses the States determination that the offender is more dangerous than 
law-abiding citizens to impose its own broader stricture. Under 
petitioners approach, if he had possessed a handgun in violation of 
state law, the unless clause would not apply because he could have 
possessed a rifle. This approach contradicts a likely, and rational, 
congressional intent. Congress, believing that existing state laws 
provided less than positive assurance that a repeat violent offender no 
longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, intended to keep 
guns away from all offenders who might cause harm, even if they were not 
deemed dangerous by the States. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 
460 U.S. 103, 119, 120. To provide the missing assurance, federal law 
must reach primary conduct not covered by state law. The fact that state 
law determines the restoration of civil rights does not mean that state 
law also controls the unless clause: As to weapons possession, the 
Federal Government has an interest in a single, national, protective 
policy, broader than required by state law. The rule of lenity does not 
apply here, since petitioner relies on an implausible reading of the 
congressional purpose. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17. 
Pp. 4-8.

Affirmed.

    Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, 
C. J., and Stevens, OConnor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Souter, JJ., joined.


