Caron v. United States
524 U.S. 308 (1998)



                  Opinion of the Court

           Supreme Court of the United States



                       No. 97-6270



         GERALD R. CARON, PETITIONER v. UNITED
                        STATES

      ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
        COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                      [June 22, 1998]

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

    Under federal law, a person convicted of a crime punishable by more 
than one year in prison may not possess any firearm. 18 U.S.C.  
922(g)(1). If he has three violent felony convictions and violates the 
statute, he must receive an enhanced sentence. 924(e). A previous 
conviction is a predicate for neither the substantive offense nor the 
sentence enhancement if the offender has had his civil rights restored, 
"unless such ... restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the 
person may not ... possess ... firearms." 921(a)(20). This is the 
so-called "unless clause" we now must interpret. As the ellipses 
suggest, the statute is more complex, but the phrase as quoted presents 
the issue for our decision.

    The parties, reflecting a similar division among various Courts of 
Appeals, disagree over the interpretation of the unless clause in the 
following circumstance. What if the State restoring the offenders 
rights forbids possession of some firearms, say pistols, but not others, 
say rifles? In one sense, he "may not ... possess ... firearms" under 
the unless clause because the ban on specified weapons is a ban on 
"firearms." In another sense, he can possess firearms under the unless 
clause because the state ban is not absolute. Compare, e.g., United 
States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 8 (CA1) (adopting former reading), cert. 
denied, 521 U.S. ___ (1997) and United States v. Driscoll, 970 F.2d 
1472, 1480-1481 (CA6 1992) (same), cert. denied, 506 U S. 1083 (1993), 
with United States v. Qualls, ___ F.3d ___, No. 95-50378, 1998 WL 
149393, *2 (CA9, Apr. 2, 1998) (en banc) (intermediate position), and 
United States v. Shoemaker, 2 F.3d 53, 55-56 (CA4 1993) (same), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1047 (1994).

    The Government contends the class of criminals who "may not ... 
possess ... firearms" includes those forbidden to have some guns but not 
others. On this reading, the restoration of rights is of no effect here, 
the previous offenses are chargeable, and petitioners sentence must be 
enhanced. On appeal, the Governments position prevailed in the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, and we now affirm its judgment. 

                           I

    Petitioner Gerald Caron has an extensive criminal record, including 
felonies. In Massachusetts state court, he was convicted in 1958 of 
attempted breaking and entering at night and, in 1959 and 1963, of 
breaking and entering at night. In California state court, he was 
convicted in 1970 of assault with intent to commit murder and attempted 
murder.

    In July 1993, petitioner walked into the home of Walter Miller, 
carrying a semiautomatic rifle. He threatened Miller, brandished the 
rifle in his face, and pointed it at his wife, his daughters, and his 
3-year-old grandson. Police officers disarmed and arrested petitioner.

    In September 1993, a federal agent called on petitioner at home to 
determine if he had other unlawful firearms. Petitioner said he had only 
flintlock or other antique weapons (not forbidden by law) and owned no 
conventional firearms. Federal law, the agent told him, forbade his 
possession of firearms and was not superseded by state law. In December 
1993, agents executed a search warrant at petitioners house, seizing 
six rifles and shotguns and 6,823 rounds of ammunition.

    A federal jury convicted petitioner of four counts of possessing a 
firearm or ammunition after having been convicted of a serious offense. 
See 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1). The District Court enhanced his sentence 
because he was at least a three-time violent felon, based on his one 
California and three Massachusetts convictions. See 924(e). Petitioner 
claimed the Court should not have counted his Massachusetts convictions 
because his civil rights had been restored by operation of Massachusetts 
law. Massachusetts law allowed petitioner to possess rifles or shotguns, 
as he had the necessary firearm permit and his felony convictions were 
more than five years old. Mass. Gen. Laws 140:123, 140:129B, 140:129C 
(1996). The law forbade him to possess handguns outside his home or 
business. See 140:121, 140:131, 269:10.

    At first, the District Court rejected the claim that Massachusetts 
had restored petitioners civil rights. It held civil rights had to be 
restored by an offender-specific action rather than by operation of law. 
The First Circuit disagreed, vacating the sentence and remanding the 
case. United States v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1, 2, 6 (1996) (en banc). We 
denied certiorari. 518 U.S. 1027 (1996). On remand, the District Court, 
interpreting the unless clause of the federal statute, disregarded the 
Massachusetts convictions. It ruled Massachusetts law did not forbid 
petitioners possession of firearms because he could possess rifles. 941 
F. Supp. 238, 251-254 (Mass. 1996). Though Massachusetts restricted 
petitioners right to carry a handgun, the District Court considered the 
restriction irrelevant because his case involved rifles and shotguns. 
See ibid. The First Circuit reversed, counting the convictions because 
petitioner remained subject to significant firearms restrictions. We 
granted certiorari. 522 U.S. ___ (1998).

                           II

    A federal statute forbids possession of firearms by those convicted of
serious offenses. An abbreviated version of the statute is as follows:

    "It shall be unlawful for any person --

    "(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

                          . . . . .

"to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in 
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any 
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C.  922(g).

    Three-time violent felons who violate 922(g) face enhanced 
sentences of at least 15 years imprisonment. 924(e)(1). "Violent 
felony" is defined to include burglary and other crimes creating a 
serious risk of physical injury. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). This term includes 
petitioners previous offenses discussed above.

    Not all violent felony convictions, however, count for purposes of 
922(g) or 924(e). Until 1986, federal law alone determined whether a 
state conviction counted, regardless of whether the State had expunged 
the conviction. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 
119-122 (1983). Congress modified this aspect of Dickerson by adopting 
the following language:

"What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings 
were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for 
which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall 
not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such 
pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides 
that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." 
921(a)(20).

The first sentence and the first clause of the second sentence define 
convictions, pardons, expungements, and restorations of civil rights by 
reference to the law of the convicting jurisdiction. See Beecham v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994).

    Aside from the unless clause, the parties agree Massachusetts law 
has restored petitioners civil rights. As for the unless clause, state 
law permits him to possess rifles and shotguns but forbids him to 
possess handguns outside his home or business. The question presented is 
whether the handgun restriction activates the unless clause, making the 
convictions count under federal law.

    We note these preliminary points. First, Massachusetts restored 
petitioners civil rights by operation of law rather than by pardon or 
the like. This fact makes no difference. Nothing in the text of 
921(a)(20) requires a case-by-case decision to restore civil rights to 
this particular offender. While the term "pardon" connotes a 
case-by-case determination, "restoration of civil rights" does not. 
Massachusetts has chosen a broad rule to govern this situation, and 
federal law gives effect to its rule. All Courts of Appeals to address 
the point agree. See Caron, 77 F.3d, at 2; McGrath v. United States, 60 
F.3d 1005, 1008 (CA2 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996); United 
States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1066, 1068-1069 (CA10 1994); United States v. 
Glaser, 14 F.3d 1213, 1218 (CA7 1994); United States v. Thomas, 991 F.2d 
206, 212-213 (CA5), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014 (1993); United States v. 
Dahms, 938 F.2d 131, 133-134 (CA9 1991); United States v. Essick, 935 
F.2d 28, 30-31 (CA4 1991); United States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 550, 
and n. 14 (CA6 1990).

    Second, the District Court ruled, and petitioner urges here, that 
the unless clause allows an offender to possess what state law permits 
him to possess, and nothing more. Here, petitioners shotguns and rifles 
were permitted by state law, so, under their theory, the weapons would 
not be covered by the unless clause. While we do not dispute the common 
sense of this approach, the words of the statute do not permit it. The 
unless clause is activated if a restoration of civil rights "expressly 
provides that the person may not ... possess ... firearms." 18 U.S.C.  
921(a)(20). Either the restorations forbade possession of "firearms" and 
the convictions count for all purposes, or they did not and the 
convictions count not at all. The unless clause looks to the terms of 
the past restorations alone and does not refer to the weapons at issue 
in the present case. So if the Massachusetts convictions count for some 
purposes, they count for all and bar possession of all guns.

                           III

    The phrase "may not ... possess ... firearms," then, must be 
interpreted under either of what the parties call the two 
"all-or-nothing" approaches. Either it applies when the State forbids 
one or more types of firearms, as the Government contends; or it does 
not apply if state law permits one or more types of firearms, regardless 
of the one possessed in the particular case.

    Under the Governments approach, a state weapons limitation on an 
offender activates the uniform federal ban on possessing any firearms at 
all. This is so even if the guns the offender possessed were ones the 
State permitted him to have. The State has singled out the offender as 
more dangerous than law-abiding citizens, and federal law uses this 
determination to impose its own broader stricture.

    Although either reading creates incongruities, petitioners approach 
yields results contrary to a likely, and rational, congressional policy. 
If permission to possess one firearm entailed permission to possess all, 
then state permission to have a pistol would allow possession of an 
assault weapon as well. Under this view, if petitioner, in violation of 
state law, had possessed a handgun, the unless clause would still not 
apply because he could have possessed a rifle. Not only would this 
strange result be inconsistent with any conceivable federal policy, but 
it also would arise often enough to impair the working of the federal 
statute. Massachusetts, in this case, and some 15 other States choose to 
restore civil rights while restricting firearm rights in part. The 
permissive reading would make these partial restrictions a nullity under 
federal law, indeed in the egregious cases with the most dangerous 
weapons. Congress cannot have intended this bizarre result. 

    Under petitioners all-or-nothing argument, federal law would forbid 
only a subset of activities already criminal under state law. This 
limitation would contradict the intent of Congress. In Congress view, 
existing state laws "provide less than positive assurance that the 
person in question no longer poses an unacceptable risk of 
dangerousness." Dickerson, 460 U.S., at 120. Congress meant to keep guns 
away from all offenders who, the Federal Government feared, might cause 
harm, even if those persons were not deemed dangerous by States. See 
id., at 119. If federal law is to provide the missing "positive 
assurance," it must reach primary conduct not covered by state law. The 
need for this caution is borne out by petitioners rifle attack on the 
Miller family, in which petitioner used a gun permitted by state law. 
Any other result would reduce federal law to a sentence enhancement for 
some state-law violations, a result inconsistent with the congressional 
intent we recognized in Dickerson. Permission to possess one gun cannot 
mean permission to possess all.

    Congress responded to our ruling in Dickerson by providing that the 
law of the State of conviction, not federal law, determines the 
restoration of civil rights as a rule. While state law is the source of 
law for restorations of other civil rights, however, it does not follow 
that state law also controls the unless clause. Under the Governments 
approach, with which we agree, the federal policy still governs the 
interpretation of the unless clause. We see nothing contradictory in 
this analysis. Restoration of the right to vote, the right to hold 
office, and the right to sit on a jury turns on so many complexities and 
nuances that state law is the most convenient source for definition. As 
to the possession of weapons, however, the Federal Government has an 
interest in a single, national, protective policy, broader than required 
by state law. Petitioners approach would undermine this protective 
purpose.

    As a final matter, petitioner says his reading is required by the 
rule of lenity, but his argument is unavailing. The rule of lenity is 
not invoked by a grammatical possibility. It does not apply if the 
ambiguous reading relied on is an implausible reading of the 
congressional purpose. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 
(1994) (requiring use of traditional tools of statutory construction to 
resolve ambiguities before resorting to the rule of lenity). For the 
reasons we have explained, petitioners reading is not plausible enough 
to satisfy this condition.

    In sum, Massachusetts treats petitioner as too dangerous to trust 
with handguns, though it accords this right to law-abiding citizens. 
Federal law uses this state finding of dangerousness in forbidding 
petitioner to have any guns. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is




