Caron v. United States
524 U.S. 308 (1998)



                  Thomas, J., dissenting

            Supreme Court of the United States



                       No. 97-6270



          GERALD R. CARON, PETITIONER v. UNITED
                        STATES

       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
        COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                     [June 22, 1998]

    Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Souter join,
dissenting.

    The only limitation that Massachusetts law imposed on petitioners 
possession of firearms was that he could not carry handguns outside his 
home or business. See ante, at 3. In my view, Massachusetts law did not 
"expressly provid[e]" that petitioner "may not ... possess ... 
firearms," 18 U.S.C.  921(a)(20), and thus petitioner cannot be 
sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C.  924(e). Because 
the Court holds to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.

    Petitioners prior Massachusetts convictions qualify as violent 
felonies for purposes of 924(e) only if the "restoration of [his] civil 
rights" by operation of Massachusetts law "expressly provide[d] that 
[petitioner] may not ... possess ... firearms." 18 U.S.C.  921(a)(20). 
In 1994, Massachusetts law did not expressly provide that petitioner 
could not possess firearms. To the contrary: Petitioner was permitted by 
Massachusetts law to possess shotguns, rifles, and handguns. See ante, 
at 3; Mass. Gen. Stat. 140:123, 140:129B, 140:129C. (1998). Indeed, 
Massachusetts provided petitioner with a firearm identification card 
that enabled him to possess such firearms.* The only restriction 
Massachusetts law placed on petitioners possession of firearms was that 
he could not carry handguns outside his home or business. See 
269:10(A). By prohibiting petitioner from possessing only certain 
firearms (handguns) in only certain places (outside his home or office), 
Massachusetts law did not expressly provide that petitioner could not 
possess firearms.

    The plain meaning of 921(a)(20) thus resolves this case. The Court, 
however, rejects this plain meaning on the basis of "a likely, and 
rational, congressional policy" of prohibiting firearms possession by 
all ex-felons whose ability to possess certain firearms is in any way 
restricted by state law. Ante, at 7. According to the Court, Congress 
could not have intended the "bizarre result" that a conviction would not 
count as a violent felony if a State only partially restricts the 
possession of firearms by the ex-felon. But this would not be a bizarre 
result at all. Under 921(a)(20), state law limitations on firearms 
possession are only relevant once it has been established that an 
ex-felons other civil rights, such as the right to vote, the right to 
seek and to hold public office, and the right to serve on a jury, have 
been restored. See 77 F.3d 1, 2 (CA1 1996). In restoring those rights, 
the State has presumably deemed such ex-felons worthy of participating 
in civic life. Once a State makes such a decision, it is entirely 
rational (and certainly not bizarre) for Congress to authorize the 
increased sentences in 924(e) only when the State additionally 
prohibits those ex-felons from possessing firearms altogether.

    Moreover, as the Court concedes, its own interpretation creates 
"incongruities." Ante, at 7. Under the statute, whether a prior state 
conviction qualifies as a violent felony conviction under 924(e) turns 
entirely on state law. Given the primacy of state law in the statutory 
scheme, it is bizarre to hold that the legal possession of firearms 
under state law subjects a person to a sentence enhancement under 
federal law. That, however, is precisely the conclusion the Court 
reaches in this case. It is simply not true, as the Court reasons, that 
federal law "must reach primary conduct not covered by state law." Ante, 
at 7. It is entirely plausible that Congress simply intended to create 
stiffer penalties for weapons possessions that are already illegal under 
state law. And such a purpose is consistent with the statutory direction 
that state law controls what constitutes a conviction for a violent 
felony.

    I believe that the plain meaning of the statute is that 
Massachusetts did not "expressly provid[e]" that petitioner "may not ... 
possess ... firearms." At the very least, this interpretation is a 
plausible one. Indeed, both the Government and the Court concede as 
much. See Brief for United States 16 ("grammatically possible" to read 
statute to say that its condition is not satisfied if the State does 
permit its felons to possess some firearms); ante, at 8 (this "reading 
is not plausible enough"). Accordingly, it is far from clear under the 
statute that a prior state conviction counts as a violent felony 
conviction for purposes of 924(e) just because the State imposes some 
restriction, no matter how slight, on firearms possession by ex-felons. 
The rule of lenity must therefore apply: "[T]he Court will not interpret 
a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places 
on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more 
than a guess as to what Congress intended." Ladner v. United States, 358 
U.S. 169, 178 (1958). Ex-felons cannot be expected to realize that a 
federal statute that explicitly relies on state law prohibits behavior 
that state law allows.

    The Court rejects the rule of lenity in this case because it thinks 
the purported statutory ambiguity rests on a "grammatical possibility" 
and "an implausible reading of the congressional purpose." Ante, at 8. 
But the alleged ambiguity does not result from a mere grammatical 
possibility; it exists because of an interpretation that, for the 
reasons I have described, both accords with a natural reading of the 
statutory language and is consistent with the statutory purpose.

    The plain meaning of 921(a)(20) is that Massachusetts law did not 
"expressly provid[e] that [petitioner] may not ... possess . . . 
firearms." This interpretation is, at the very least, a plausible one, 
and the rule of lenity must apply. I would therefore reverse the 
judgment below.



Notes

1. * Petitioner was "entitled to" a firearm identification card five 
years after his release from prison. See Mass. Gen. Stat. 140:129B; see 
also Commonwealth v. Landry, 6 Mass. App. 404, 406 376 N. E. 2d 1243, 
1245, (1978) (firearm identification card can be obtained as a "matter 
of right"). 


