http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-5.ZS.html

          Supreme Court of the United States

           United States v. Morrison et al.

  CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                 FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


     No. 99-5. Argued January 11, 2000 - Decided May 15, 20001


Petitioner Brzonkala filed suit, alleging, inter alia, that she was 
raped by respondents while the three were students at the Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute, and that this attack violated 42 U.S.C.  13981 
which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of 
gender-motivated violence. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that the complaint failed to state a claim and that 13981s civil 
remedy is unconstitutional. Petitioner United States intervened to 
defend the sections constitutionality. In dismissing the complaint, the 
District Court held that it stated a claim against respondents, but that 
Congress lacked authority to enact 13981 under either 8 of the 
Commerce Clause or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had 
explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for 13981. 
The en banc Fourth Circuit affirmed. 

Held:  Section 13981 cannot be sustained under the Commerce Clause or 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 7-28.

    (a) The Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with authority to 
enact 13981s federal civil remedy. A congressional enactment will be 
invalidated only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its 
constitutional bounds. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568, 
577-578. Petitioners assert that 13981 can be sustained under Congress 
commerce power as a regulation of activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce. The proper framework for analyzing such a claim is 
provided by the principles the Court set out in Lopez. First, in Lopez, 
the noneconomic, criminal nature of possessing a firearm in a school 
zone was central to the Courts conclusion that Congress lacks authority 
to regulate such possession. Similarly, gender-motivated crimes of 
violence are not, in any sense, economic activity. Second, like the 
statute at issue in Lopez, 13981 contains no jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of 
Congress regulation of interstate commerce. Although Lopez makes clear 
that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument 
that 13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce to come within 
Congress authority, Congress elected to cast 13981s remedy over a 
wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime. Third, 
although 13981, unlike the Lopez statute, is supported by numerous 
findings regarding the serious impact of gender-motivated violence on 
victims and their families, these findings are substantially weakened by 
the fact that they rely on reasoning that this Court has rejected, 
namely a but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent 
crime to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If accepted, 
this reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime whose 
nationwide, aggregated impact has substantial effects on employment, 
production, transit, or consumption. Moreover, such reasoning will not 
limit Congress to regulating violence, but may be applied equally as 
well to family law and other areas of state regulation since the 
aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national 
economy is undoubtedly significant. The Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, and 
there is no better example of the police power, which the Founders 
undeniably left reposed in the States and denied the central government, 
than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims. 
Congress therefore may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on the conducts aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce. Pp. 7-19.

    (b)  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which permits Congress 
to enforce by appropriate legislation the constitutional guarantee that 
no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process or deny any person equal protection of the laws, City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517, also does not give Congress the 
authority to enact 13981. Petitioners assertion that there is 
pervasive bias in various state justice systems against victims of 
gender-motivated violence is supported by a voluminous congressional 
record. However, the Fourteenth Amendment places limitations on the 
manner in which Congress may attack discriminatory conduct. Foremost 
among them is the principle that the Amendment prohibits only state 
action, not private conduct. This was the conclusion reached in United 
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 
which were both decided shortly after the Amendments adoption. The 
force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not 
only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from 
the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that time, who 
all had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding 
the Amendments adoption. Neither United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 
nor District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, casts any doubt on the 
enduring vitality of the Civil Rights Cases and Harris. Assuming that 
there has been gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities in 
this case, it would not be enough to save 13981s civil remedy, which 
is directed not at a State or state actor but at individuals who have 
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. Section 13981 visits 
no consequence on any Virginia public official involved in investigating 
or prosecuting Brzonkalas assault, and it is thus unlike any of the 5 
remedies this Court has previously upheld. See e.g., South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301. Section 13981 is also different from 
previously upheld remedies in that it applies uniformly throughout the 
Nation, even though Congress findings indicate that the problem 
addressed does not exist in all, or even most, States. In contrast, the 
5 remedy in Katzenbach was directed only to those States in which 
Congress found that there had been discrimination. Pp. 19-27.

169 F.3d 820, affirmed. 

    Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a 
concurring opinion. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in which Souter 
and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to Part I-A.



Notes

1.  Together with No. 99-29, Brzonkala v. Morrison et al., also on
certiorari to the same court. 


